fix(online-agent): persist external runtime completion checkpoint phase

active-runtime/app/agent_event_bus.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from hashlib import sha256
 from pathlib import Path
 import json
 from typing import Any
+from message_handoff import stable_event_id
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -55,13 +56,19 @@ class AgentEventBus:
         payload: dict[str, Any],
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        event_id = "evt_" + sha256(
-            json.dumps(
-                {"kind": kind, "source": source, "summary": summary, "payload": payload},
-                sort_keys=True,
-                ensure_ascii=False,
-            ).encode("utf-8")
-        ).hexdigest()[:16]
+        event_id = stable_event_id(
+            source=source, target=target, message_type=kind, payload=payload,
+            tenant_id=(payload.get('tenant_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            user_id=(payload.get('user_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            project_id=(payload.get('project_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            conversation_id=(payload.get('conversation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            task_id=(payload.get('task_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            run_id=(payload.get('run_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            correlation_id=(payload.get('correlation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            causation_id=(payload.get('causation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            sequence=(payload.get('sequence') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            idempotency_key=(payload.get('idempotency_key') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+        )
         event = AgentEvent(event_id, kind, source, target, summary, payload, correlation_id=correlation_id)
         self._write("pending", event.to_dict())
         self._audit("created", event.to_dict())

active-runtime/app/agent_event_observability_bridge.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
     def __init__(self, hooks: AgentObservabilityHooks | None = None):
         self.hooks = hooks or AgentObservabilityHooks()
 
-    def consume(self, event: dict):
+    def consume(self, event: dict, *, actor=None, trace=None):
         kind = event.get("kind")
         payload = event.get("payload", {})
         if kind == "agent_started":
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
                 visible_scope=payload.get("scope", "self"),
                 entry_agent=payload.get("agent", "unknown"),
                 execution_id=event.get("id"),
+                actor=actor,
+                trace=trace,
             )
         if kind == "agent_delegated":
             return self.hooks.delegate(event["execution_id"], payload.get("agent", "unknown"))

active-runtime/app/agent_observability.py

@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ class AgentExecutionRecord:
     status: str = "completed"
     started_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
     ended_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    trace_id: str | None = None
+    span_id: str | None = None
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
 
     def to_dict(self):
         return asdict(self)

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py

@@ -9,25 +9,49 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
+from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
 from .agent_observability_dashboard import AgentObservabilityDashboard
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext, authorize_scope
 
 store = AgentObservabilityStore()
 dashboard = AgentObservabilityDashboard(store.load())
 
 
-def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any]):
-    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**payload)
+def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None):
+    scoped = any(payload.get(name) is not None for name in (
+        "trace_id", "span_id", "tenant_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id"
+    ))
+    values = dict(payload)
+    if scoped:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+        trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(trusted, trace.scope)
+        bound = {
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": trace.parent_span_id, "correlation_id": trace.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": trace.causation_id, "tenant_id": trace.scope.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": trace.scope.user_id, "project_id": trace.scope.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": trace.scope.conversation_id, "task_id": trace.task_id,
+            "claim_id": trace.claim_id, "run_id": trace.scope.run_id, "message_id": trace.message_id,
+        }
+        for name, authoritative in bound.items():
+            if values.get(name) not in (None, authoritative):
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:" + name)
+            values[name] = authoritative
+    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**values)
     return {"status": "ok", "record": store.append(record)}
 
 
-def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user"):
-    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role)
+def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None):
+    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role, actor=actor)
+    visible = AgentObservability()
+    visible.records = [AgentExecutionRecord(**record) for record in records]
     return {
         "status": "ok",
         "records": records,
-        "summary": store.load().summary(user_id if role != "owner" else None),
+        "summary": visible.summary(None),
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_hooks.py

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    TraceContext,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -36,6 +41,7 @@ class AgentRunContext:
     input_tokens: int = 0
     output_tokens: int = 0
     status: str = "running"
+    trace: TraceContext | None = None
 
     def delegate(self, agent_name: str) -> None:
         if agent_name not in self.path:
@@ -59,7 +65,19 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
         visible_scope: str,
         entry_agent: str,
         execution_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if execution_id is not None and execution_id in self.active:
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
+        if trace is not None:
+            if actor is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            authorize_scope(trusted_actor, trace.scope)
+            if trace.scope.user_id is not None and trace.scope.user_id != user_id:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:user_id")
         run = AgentRunContext(
             execution_id=execution_id or f"exec_{uuid4().hex[:12]}",
             user_id=user_id,
@@ -67,6 +85,7 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             entry_agent=entry_agent,
             path=[entry_agent],
             used_hermes=entry_agent.lower() == "hermes",
+            trace=trace,
         )
         self.active[run.execution_id] = run
         return {"status": "started", "execution_id": run.execution_id, "run": run.__dict__}
@@ -106,6 +125,18 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             status=status,
             started_at=run.started_at,
             ended_at=ended_at,
+            trace_id=run.trace.trace_id if run.trace else None,
+            span_id=run.trace.span_id if run.trace else None,
+            parent_span_id=run.trace.parent_span_id if run.trace else None,
+            correlation_id=run.trace.correlation_id if run.trace else None,
+            causation_id=run.trace.causation_id if run.trace else None,
+            tenant_id=run.trace.scope.tenant_id if run.trace else None,
+            project_id=run.trace.scope.project_id if run.trace else None,
+            conversation_id=run.trace.scope.conversation_id if run.trace else None,
+            task_id=run.trace.task_id if run.trace else None,
+            claim_id=run.trace.claim_id if run.trace else None,
+            run_id=run.trace.scope.run_id if run.trace else None,
+            message_id=run.trace.message_id if run.trace else None,
         )
         return {"status": "stored", "record": self.store.append(record)}
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 class AgentObservabilityStore:
@@ -23,6 +29,11 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
     def append(self, record: AgentExecutionRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
         path = self.records_dir / f"{record.execution_id}.json"
         data = record.to_dict()
+        if path.exists():
+            existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if existing == data:
+                return existing
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
         path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
         return data
 
@@ -33,8 +44,36 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
             observability.records.append(AgentExecutionRecord(**raw))
         return observability
 
-    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user") -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         records = [record.to_dict() for record in self.load().records]
+        scoped = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is not None]
+        legacy = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is None]
+        if actor is not None:
+            trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            visible: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            for record in scoped:
+                try:
+                    authorize_scope(
+                        trusted,
+                        GovernanceScope(
+                            "tenant",
+                            tenant_id=record.get("tenant_id"),
+                            user_id=record.get("user_id"),
+                            project_id=record.get("project_id"),
+                            conversation_id=record.get("conversation_id"),
+                            run_id=record.get("run_id"),
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except GovernanceError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(record)
+            if trusted.privileged:
+                visible.extend(legacy)
+            else:
+                visible.extend(record for record in legacy if record.get("user_id") == trusted.scope.user_id)
+            return visible
+        # Caller-supplied role remains a legacy compatibility path only.
+        records = legacy
         if role == "owner":
             return records
         if role == "group_admin" and group_id:

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py

@@ -0,0 +1,722 @@
+"""Owner-controlled CAS-bound execution-envelope rebind for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+This service exists for a narrow recovery case: a Task was projected/claimed with a read-only
+source_capture envelope before its already-registered deterministic plan became authoritative.
+
+It never creates Tasks/Jobs/branches and never accepts arbitrary metadata patches. It only replaces
+metadata.execution + the derived execution_projection for the same governed binding, after an
+official NEEDS_REWORK transition has returned the Task to QUEUED with no active lease.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZATION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(
+    value: object,
+    code: str,
+    pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZATION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionRebindRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    expected_old_execution_digest: str
+    expected_new_execution_digest: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+    reason: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ExecutionRebindRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status",
+            "expected_revision",
+            "expected_attempt",
+            "previous_verification_sha256",
+            "expected_old_execution_digest",
+            "expected_new_execution_digest",
+            "authorization_id",
+            "idempotency_key",
+            "reason",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "QUEUED":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+
+        revision = value["expected_revision"]
+        attempt = value["expected_attempt"]
+        if (
+            not isinstance(revision, int)
+            or isinstance(revision, bool)
+            or revision < 0
+            or not isinstance(attempt, int)
+            or isinstance(attempt, bool)
+            or attempt < 1
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+
+        verification = _require_string(
+            value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID"
+        )
+        old_digest = _require_string(
+            value["expected_old_execution_digest"], "OLD_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"
+        )
+        new_digest = _require_string(
+            value["expected_new_execution_digest"], "NEW_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"
+        )
+        for digest, code in (
+            (verification, "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID"),
+            (old_digest, "OLD_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+            (new_digest, "NEW_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID"),
+        ):
+            if SHA_RE.fullmatch(digest) is None:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 400)
+        if old_digest == new_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DIGEST_UNCHANGED", 400)
+
+        authorization = _require_string(
+            value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE
+        )
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        reason = _require_string(value["reason"], "EXECUTION_REBIND_REASON_INVALID")
+        if len(reason) > 512:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_REASON_INVALID", 400)
+
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            revision,
+            attempt,
+            verification,
+            old_digest,
+            new_digest,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+            reason,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "expected_old_execution_digest": self.expected_old_execution_digest,
+            "expected_new_execution_digest": self.expected_new_execution_digest,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+        }
+
+
+class CanonicalBridgeExecutionResolver:
+    """Resolve the already-registered plan from the canonical governed Bridge."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, control_token: str) -> None:
+        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token = control_token
+
+    def __call__(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        required_capabilities: Sequence[str],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "required_capabilities": list(required_capabilities),
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.base_url + "/v2/execution-envelope",
+            method="POST",
+            data=body,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self.control_token,
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read()
+            status = exc.code
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESPONSE_INVALID", 502)
+        if status != 200:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(
+                str(value.get("error") or "CANONICAL_EXECUTION_RESOLUTION_FAILED"),
+                502 if status >= 500 else 409,
+            )
+        return dict(value)
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindStore:
+    """Official owner-controlled mutation with CAS, plan resolution and durable audit."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        db_path: Path,
+        resolver: Callable[[str, Sequence[str]], Mapping[str, Any]],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+        self.resolver = resolver
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        table: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {
+            str(row["name"]): row
+            for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _json_value(raw: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
+            return dict(raw)
+        if not isinstance(raw, str):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409)
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(raw)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409) from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError(code, 409)
+        return dict(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _metadata_column(columns: Mapping[str, sqlite3.Row]) -> str:
+        for name in ("metadata_json", "metadata"):
+            if name in columns:
+                return name
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_METADATA_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _required_capabilities(
+        task: sqlite3.Row,
+        columns: Mapping[str, sqlite3.Row],
+        old_execution: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> list[str]:
+        for field in ("required_capabilities_json", "required_capabilities"):
+            if field not in columns:
+                continue
+            raw = task[field]
+            if raw in (None, ""):
+                continue
+            if isinstance(raw, str):
+                try:
+                    value = json.loads(raw)
+                except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                    value = [item for item in raw.split(",") if item.strip()]
+            else:
+                value = raw
+            if isinstance(value, list) and all(isinstance(item, str) for item in value):
+                return [item.strip() for item in value if item.strip()]
+        value = old_execution.get("capability_scope")
+        if isinstance(value, list) and all(isinstance(item, str) for item in value):
+            return [item for item in value if item]
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_CAPABILITIES_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+    ) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute(
+                "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'"
+            )
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = ExecutionRebindStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = ExecutionRebindStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        quoted = ",".join('"' + name + '"' for name in names)
+        placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in names)
+        connection.execute(
+            f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({quoted}) VALUES ({placeholders})',
+            tuple(values[name] for name in names),
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_rebind_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_execution_rebinds (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              old_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              new_execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              reason TEXT NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id,idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    def _load_and_validate(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ) -> tuple[sqlite3.Row, dict[str, sqlite3.Row], str, dict[str, Any], dict[str, Any]]:
+        columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+        required = {
+            "task_id",
+            "status",
+            "attempt",
+            "revision",
+            "claimed_by",
+            "lease_token_hash",
+            "lease_expires_at",
+            "verification_json",
+        }
+        if not required.issubset(columns):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_SCHEMA_EXECUTION_REBIND_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        metadata_column = self._metadata_column(columns)
+        task = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?",
+            (task_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if task is None:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+
+        if (
+            str(task["status"]) != request.expected_status
+            or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+            or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+        if task["lease_token_hash"] not in (None, "") or task["lease_expires_at"] not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+        verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+        if verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+
+        metadata = self._json_value(
+            task[metadata_column],
+            "TASK_METADATA_INVALID",
+        )
+        execution = metadata.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("TASK_EXECUTION_METADATA_MISSING", 409)
+        old_execution = validate_execution_envelope(dict(execution))
+        if old_execution["execution_digest"] != request.expected_old_execution_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_OLD_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+        if old_execution.get("action") != "source_capture":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_SOURCE_CAPTURE_REQUIRED", 409)
+
+        projection = metadata.get("execution_projection")
+        if isinstance(projection, Mapping):
+            projected_digest = str(projection.get("execution_digest") or "")
+            if projected_digest and projected_digest != request.expected_old_execution_digest:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_PROJECTION_DRIFT", 409)
+        return task, columns, metadata_column, metadata, old_execution
+
+    def rebind(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        request: ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+
+        request_sha = _sha(request.public())
+
+        # Idempotent replay must win before CAS validation because a successful
+        # rebind necessarily increments the Task revision and changes the persisted envelope.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            self._ensure_rebind_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_execution_rebinds WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": int(replay["attempt"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "old_execution_digest": replay["old_execution_digest"],
+                    "new_execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+        # Read/CAS snapshot first. Canonical Bridge resolution happens outside the DB write lock.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            task, columns, _, _, old_execution = self._load_and_validate(
+                connection, task_id, request
+            )
+            capabilities = self._required_capabilities(task, columns, old_execution)
+
+        binding = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(old_execution)
+        resolved = dict(self.resolver(task_id, capabilities))
+        new_execution = validate_execution_envelope(resolved, binding=binding)
+        if new_execution.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN_REQUIRED", 409)
+        if new_execution["execution_digest"] != request.expected_new_execution_digest:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_NEW_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+        if new_execution["execution_digest"] == old_execution["execution_digest"]:
+            raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_DIGEST_UNCHANGED", 409)
+
+        # Re-read under BEGIN IMMEDIATE and apply only if the exact snapshot is unchanged.
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_rebind_table(connection)
+
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_execution_rebinds WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": int(replay["attempt"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "old_execution_digest": replay["old_execution_digest"],
+                    "new_execution_digest": replay["new_execution_digest"],
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+
+            task, columns, metadata_column, metadata, current_old = self._load_and_validate(
+                connection, task_id, request
+            )
+            if current_old["execution_digest"] != old_execution["execution_digest"]:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_OLD_DIGEST_DRIFT", 409)
+
+            new_metadata = dict(metadata)
+            new_metadata["execution"] = new_execution
+            new_metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+                "schema": "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+                "task_id": binding.task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+            }
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                f"""
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET "{metadata_column}"=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ? AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    json.dumps(new_metadata, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-execution-rebind.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "reason": request.reason,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "old_execution_digest": old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "new_execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "old_action": old_execution.get("action"),
+                "new_action": new_execution.get("action"),
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_execution_rebinds(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,
+                  previous_verification_sha256,old_execution_digest,new_execution_digest,
+                  expected_revision,applied_revision,attempt,reason,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                    new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.reason,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "old_execution_digest": old_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "new_execution_digest": new_execution["execution_digest"],
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotent": False,
+            }
+
+
+class ExecutionRebindHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: ExecutionRebindStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(
+            dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+        ).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json(
+                {"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-execution-rebind"},
+                200,
+            )
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/execution-rebind", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise ExecutionRebindError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.rebind(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except ExecutionRebindError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(
+                Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+                / "agent_task_control_token"
+            ),
+        )
+    )
+    token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    bridge = os.environ.get(
+        "AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL",
+        "http://127.0.0.1:18892",
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_PORT", "18942"))
+    ExecutionRebindHandler.store = ExecutionRebindStore(
+        db,
+        CanonicalBridgeExecutionResolver(bridge, token),
+    )
+    ExecutionRebindHandler.control_token = token
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), ExecutionRebindHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+"""Owner-controlled, CAS-bound retry extension for exhausted Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class RetryExtensionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(value: object, code: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RetryExtensionRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    expected_max_attempts: int
+    next_max_attempts: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RetryExtensionRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status", "expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts",
+            "next_max_attempts", "previous_verification_sha256", "authorization_id", "idempotency_key",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "FAILED":
+            raise RetryExtensionError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+        ints: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for field in ("expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts", "next_max_attempts"):
+            item = value[field]
+            if not isinstance(item, int) or isinstance(item, bool) or item < 0:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+            ints[field] = item
+        if ints["expected_attempt"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"]:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_NOT_EXHAUSTED", 409)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"] + 1:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP", 400)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] > 50:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_LIMIT_EXCEEDED", 400)
+        verification = _require_string(value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID")
+        if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", verification) is None:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID", 400)
+        authorization = _require_string(value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            ints["expected_revision"],
+            ints["expected_attempt"],
+            ints["expected_max_attempts"],
+            ints["next_max_attempts"],
+            verification,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "expected_max_attempts": self.expected_max_attempts,
+            "next_max_attempts": self.next_max_attempts,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+        }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionStore:
+    """Owns the official mutation. Direct/manual DB edits remain forbidden."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {str(row["name"]): row for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = RetryExtensionStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_extension_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_retry_extensions (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              next_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id, idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = RetryExtensionStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        sql = f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(f"""\"{name}\"""" for name in names)}) VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})'
+        connection.execute(sql, tuple(values[name] for name in names))
+
+    def extend(self, task_id: str, request: RetryExtensionRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization_id = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization_id:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        request_payload = request.public()
+        request_sha = _sha(request_payload)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_extension_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_retry_extensions WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                    "max_attempts": int(replay["next_max_attempts"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "previous_verification_sha256": replay["previous_verification_sha256"],
+                }
+
+            columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+            required = {
+                "task_id", "status", "attempt", "max_attempts", "revision", "claimed_by",
+                "lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at", "verification_json",
+            }
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_SCHEMA_RETRY_EXTENSION_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+            task = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if task is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            actual_verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+            if actual_verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+            if (
+                task["status"] != request.expected_status
+                or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+                or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+                or int(task["max_attempts"]) != request.expected_max_attempts
+            ):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+            for lease_field in ("lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at"):
+                if lease_field in columns and task[lease_field] not in (None, ""):
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET status='QUEUED', max_attempts=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=? AND max_attempts=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ?
+                   AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-retry-extension.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "previous_max_attempts": request.expected_max_attempts,
+                "next_max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_terminal_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_retry_extensions(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,previous_verification_sha256,
+                  previous_max_attempts,next_max_attempts,expected_revision,applied_revision,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "idempotent": False,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+            }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: RetryExtensionStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json({"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-retry-extension"}, 200)
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/retry-extension", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.extend(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except RetryExtensionError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials")) / "agent_task_control_token"),
+        )
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT", "18941"))
+    RetryExtensionHandler.store = RetryExtensionStore(db)
+    RetryExtensionHandler.control_token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), RetryExtensionHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_authority_git_executor.py

@@ -94,6 +94,91 @@ class AuthorityGitExecutor:
         self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(path), base_oid])
         return path
 
+    def recover_failed_detached_worktree_exact(
+        self,
+        *,
+        path: Path,
+        expected_oid: str,
+        stale_oid: str,
+        target_ref: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        """Recreate one exact clean, detached, single-attempt worktree at its durable head."""
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(stale_oid, "stale_oid")
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(target_ref):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        if self.read_ref(target_ref) is not None:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        if (
+            not path.is_absolute()
+            or path.parent != self.worktree_root
+            or path.name in {"", ".", ".."}
+            or path.is_symlink()
+            or not path.is_dir()
+        ):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        head = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if head.returncode != 0 or head.stdout.strip() != stale_oid or stale_oid == expected_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_HEAD_INVALID")
+        symbolic = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if symbolic.returncode != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_NOT_DETACHED")
+        status = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "status", "--porcelain=v1", "--untracked-files=all"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if status.returncode != 0 or status.stdout:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_NOT_CLEAN")
+        parents = self._git(["rev-list", "--parents", "-n", "1", stale_oid]).split()
+        if parents != [stale_oid, expected_oid]:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        registered = [
+            line.removeprefix("worktree ")
+            for line in self._git(["worktree", "list", "--porcelain"]).splitlines()
+            if line.startswith("worktree ")
+        ]
+        if registered.count(str(path)) != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_REGISTRATION_INVALID")
+        self._git(["worktree", "remove", "--force", str(path)])
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_REMOVE_FAILED")
+        recreated = self.create_detached_worktree(expected_oid, path.name, path.parent)
+        readback = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(recreated), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        detached = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(recreated), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if readback.returncode != 0 or readback.stdout.strip() != expected_oid or detached.returncode != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return stale_oid
+
+    def create_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_base_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(expected_base_oid, "expected_base_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if current is not None:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_base_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        self._git(["update-ref", branch, new_oid, "0" * 40])
+        readback = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
     def advance_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
         if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
             raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")

active-runtime/app/aios_capability_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+"""Canonical fail-closed capability semantics for task eligibility."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Iterable
+
+
+_TASK_ALIASES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "repository_read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "git.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repo.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "test_execution": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "git.test": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test.execute": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "governed_git_write": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch", "governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.git.write": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch", "governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "shell": frozenset({"runtime.shell"}),
+    "git": frozenset({"runtime.git"}),
+    "python": frozenset({"runtime.python"}),
+    "code.read": frozenset({"legacy.code.read"}),
+    "code.review": frozenset({"legacy.code.review"}),
+    "code.write": frozenset({"legacy.code.write"}),
+    "code.write.patch": frozenset({"legacy.code.write.patch"}),
+    "test.python": frozenset({"legacy.test.python"}),
+    "test.shell.allowlisted": frozenset({"legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"}),
+    "git.commit": frozenset({"legacy.git.commit"}),
+    "git.diff.read": frozenset({"legacy.git.diff.read"}),
+    "git.force_push": frozenset({"legacy.git.force_push"}),
+    "deploy.production": frozenset({"legacy.deploy.production"}),
+    "secret.transform": frozenset({"legacy.secret.transform"}),
+    "secure_file_transformer": frozenset({"legacy.secure_file_transformer"}),
+    "runtime.shadow": frozenset({"legacy.runtime.shadow"}),
+    "review.security": frozenset({"legacy.review.security"}),
+    "review.api-contract": frozenset({"legacy.review.api-contract"}),
+    "gpu.train": frozenset({"legacy.gpu.train"}),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": frozenset({"agent.runtime.hermes"}),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": frozenset({"agent.runtime.openclaw"}),
+}
+
+_WORKER_ALIASES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "git.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repo.read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "repository_read": frozenset({"repo.read"}),
+    "git.test": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test.execute": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "test_execution": frozenset({"test.execute"}),
+    "governed.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.git.write.branch": frozenset({"governed.git.write.branch"}),
+    "governed.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "governed.git.write.file": frozenset({"governed.git.write.file"}),
+    "shell": frozenset({"runtime.shell"}),
+    "git": frozenset({"runtime.git"}),
+    "python": frozenset({"runtime.python"}),
+    "code.read": frozenset({"legacy.code.read"}),
+    "code.review": frozenset({"legacy.code.review"}),
+    "code.write": frozenset({"legacy.code.write"}),
+    "code.write.patch": frozenset({"legacy.code.write.patch"}),
+    "test.python": frozenset({"legacy.test.python"}),
+    "test.shell.allowlisted": frozenset({"legacy.test.shell.allowlisted"}),
+    "git.commit": frozenset({"legacy.git.commit"}),
+    "git.diff.read": frozenset({"legacy.git.diff.read"}),
+    "git.force_push": frozenset({"legacy.git.force_push"}),
+    "deploy.production": frozenset({"legacy.deploy.production"}),
+    "secret.transform": frozenset({"legacy.secret.transform"}),
+    "secure_file_transformer": frozenset({"legacy.secure_file_transformer"}),
+    "runtime.shadow": frozenset({"legacy.runtime.shadow"}),
+    "review.security": frozenset({"legacy.review.security"}),
+    "review.api-contract": frozenset({"legacy.review.api-contract"}),
+    "gpu.train": frozenset({"legacy.gpu.train"}),
+    "agent.runtime.hermes": frozenset({"agent.runtime.hermes"}),
+    "agent.runtime.openclaw": frozenset({"agent.runtime.openclaw"}),
+}
+
+_UNKNOWN_PREFIX = "exact:"
+
+
+def _clean(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ValueError("capability must be a string")
+    text = value.strip().lower()
+    if not text:
+        raise ValueError("capability must not be empty")
+    return text
+
+
+def normalize_required_capabilities(values: Iterable[object]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Map task-facing names to one semantic vocabulary.
+
+    Unknown names remain explicit exact requirements. They are never treated
+    as wildcards or granted by a failed normalization.
+    """
+
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for value in values:
+        text = _clean(value)
+        if "*" in text:
+            result.add(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX + text)
+        else:
+            result.update(_TASK_ALIASES.get(text, frozenset({_UNKNOWN_PREFIX + text})))
+    return frozenset(result)
+
+
+def normalize_worker_capabilities(values: Iterable[object]) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Map registered worker names to effective semantic capabilities."""
+
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for value in values:
+        text = _clean(value)
+        if "*" in text:
+            continue
+        mapped = _WORKER_ALIASES.get(text)
+        if mapped is not None:
+            result.update(mapped)
+    if {
+        "governed.git.write.branch",
+        "governed.git.write.file",
+    }.issubset(result):
+        result.add("governed.git.write")
+    return frozenset(result)
+
+
+def has_capabilities(
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+) -> bool:
+    """Return the single eligibility decision used by poll and claim."""
+
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_capabilities)
+    effective = normalize_worker_capabilities(worker_capabilities)
+    if any(value.startswith(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX) for value in required):
+        return False
+    return required.issubset(effective)
+
+
+def required_capabilities_subset(
+    granted_requirements: Iterable[object],
+    required_requirements: Iterable[object],
+) -> bool:
+    """Check semantic capability containment for delegation constraints."""
+    granted = normalize_required_capabilities(granted_requirements)
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_requirements)
+    if any(value.startswith(_UNKNOWN_PREFIX) for value in granted | required):
+        return False
+    return required.issubset(granted)
+
+
+def normalized_capability_matrix(
+    worker_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+    required_capabilities: Iterable[object],
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Expose non-secret decision evidence for tests and diagnostics."""
+
+    worker_values = tuple(worker_capabilities)
+    required_values = tuple(required_capabilities)
+    worker = normalize_worker_capabilities(worker_values)
+    required = normalize_required_capabilities(required_values)
+    return {
+        "worker_effective": sorted(worker),
+        "task_required": sorted(required),
+        "eligible": has_capabilities(worker_values, required_values),
+    }

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

@@ -3,12 +3,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, uuid
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
-from version_registry import (
-    configured_authoritative_git_dir,
-    configured_repository_identity,
-    list_registry_versions,
-    list_registry_versions_report,
-)
 from typing import Any
 
 try:
@@ -78,8 +72,8 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
-AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = configured_authoritative_git_dir()
-REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = configured_repository_identity()
+AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
+REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
 SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
     'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
     '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
@@ -472,14 +466,6 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 ))
                 return self.sendj(data)
             if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                registry_report = list_registry_versions_report(
-                    WS,
-                    baseline_file=Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_AUTHORITY', '/var/lib/aios-gitops-runtime-anchor/baseline/current.json')),
-                    # Do not invent an authoritative repository when authority
-                    # discovery is disabled/omitted. Preserve the unavailable
-                    # authority path (503) instead of turning it into a 404.
-                    repo_git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                )
                 snapshot = repository_snapshot(
                     git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
                     repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
@@ -488,8 +474,7 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     return self.sendj({
                         'repository_available': False,
                         'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
-                        'registry_versions': registry_report['registry_versions'],
-                        **{key: registry_report[key] for key in ('effective_registry_versions', 'runtime_registry_versions', 'attested_projection_versions', 'attested_projection_version', 'source_registry_converged', 'runtime_registry_converged', 'runtime_bundle_contains_current_version', 'runtime_bundle_contains_version', 'registry_consistency_status')},
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
                         'local_authoritative_tags': [],
                     }, 503)
                 try:
@@ -498,11 +483,10 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     return self.sendj({
                         'repository_available': False,
                         'query_error': str(exc),
-                        'registry_versions': registry_report['registry_versions'],
-                        **{key: registry_report[key] for key in ('effective_registry_versions', 'runtime_registry_versions', 'attested_projection_versions', 'attested_projection_version', 'source_registry_converged', 'runtime_registry_converged', 'runtime_bundle_contains_current_version', 'runtime_bundle_contains_version', 'registry_consistency_status')},
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
                         'local_authoritative_tags': [],
                     }, 503)
-                registry = registry_report['registry_versions']
+                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
                 return self.sendj({
                     'registry_versions': registry,
                     'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
@@ -512,7 +496,6 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     'versions_dir': registry,
                     'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
                     'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
-                    **{key: registry_report[key] for key in ('effective_registry_versions', 'runtime_registry_versions', 'attested_projection_versions', 'attested_projection_version', 'source_registry_converged', 'runtime_registry_converged', 'runtime_bundle_contains_current_version', 'runtime_bundle_contains_version', 'registry_consistency_status')},
                 })
             if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
                 frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
@@ -967,3 +950,4 @@ def main():
     print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
     ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
 if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2.py

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@ BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
     "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
     "createGovernedTask",
     "acquireWriterLease",
+    "bootstrapWriterLease",
+    "renewWriterLease",
     "commitFileGoverned",
     "commitFilesGoverned",
-    "publishExistingBranchGoverned",
     "getGitOpsJob",
     "resumeGitOpsJob",
     "reconcileGitOpsJob",
@@ -32,9 +33,10 @@ BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
 OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
     "createGovernedTask": ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key"),
     "acquireWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
+    "bootstrapWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
+    "renewWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
     "commitFileGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "path", "content_base64", "message"),
     "commitFilesGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "files", "message"),
-    "publishExistingBranchGoverned": ("repository", "branch", "expected_branch_oid", "owner_approval_reference", "idempotency_key"),
     "getGitOpsJob": ("job_id",),
     "resumeGitOpsJob": ("job_id", "expected_revision"),
     "reconcileGitOpsJob": ("job_id", "expected_revision"),
@@ -48,6 +50,49 @@ OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
     "getControlPlaneSnapshot": (),
 }
 
+BRIDGE_OPERATION_CONTRACTS = {
+    "acquireWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["acquireWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required",
+        ),
+    },
+    "bootstrapWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["bootstrapWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required",
+            "recovered", "bootstrapped", "runtime_rehydrated",
+            "durable_branch_lease_present", "idempotent",
+        ),
+    },
+    "renewWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease/renew",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["renewWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "recovered", "bootstrapped", "runtime_rehydrated",
+            "durable_branch_lease_present", "idempotent",
+        ),
+    },
+    "commitFileGoverned": {
+        "method": "POST", "path": "/v2/commit-file",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFileGoverned"],
+        "response_fields": ("job_id", "commit_oid", "commit_visible", "branch_mode", "target_branch", "generation"),
+    },
+    "commitFilesGoverned": {
+        "method": "POST", "path": "/v2/commit-files",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFilesGoverned"],
+        "response_fields": ("job_id", "commit_oid", "commit_visible", "branch_mode", "target_branch", "generation"),
+    },
+}
+
 
 class RuntimeDriftError(RuntimeError):
     pass
@@ -124,6 +169,14 @@ class BridgeV2Adapter:
             "legacy_writes_enabled": False,
             "governed_writes_enabled": True,
             "operations": list(BRIDGE_OPERATIONS),
+            "operation_contracts": {
+                operation: {
+                    **contract,
+                    "required_fields": list(contract["required_fields"]),
+                    "response_fields": list(contract["response_fields"]),
+                }
+                for operation, contract in BRIDGE_OPERATION_CONTRACTS.items()
+            },
             "force_push": False,
             "main_write": False,
             "tag_write": False,
@@ -153,9 +206,10 @@ class BridgeV2Adapter:
 
     def createGovernedTask(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createGovernedTask", request)
     def acquireWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("acquireWriterLease", request)
+    def bootstrapWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("bootstrapWriterLease", request)
+    def renewWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("renewWriterLease", request)
     def commitFileGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFileGoverned", request)
     def commitFilesGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFilesGoverned", request)
-    def publishExistingBranchGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("publishExistingBranchGoverned", request)
     def getGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getGitOpsJob", request)
     def resumeGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("resumeGitOpsJob", request)
     def reconcileGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("reconcileGitOpsJob", request)

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_executor.py

@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ class AuthorityPort(Protocol):
     def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
     def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
     def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+    def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, expected_base: str, new: str) -> str: ...
     def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
 
 
 class RemotePort(Protocol):
     def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
+    def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None: ...
     def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None: ...
     def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
     def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
@@ -103,6 +105,9 @@ class AuthorityGitAdapter:
     def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
         return self.executor.ancestry_check(older, newer)
 
+    def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, expected_base: str, new: str) -> str:
+        return self.executor.create_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected_base, new)
+
     def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str:
         return self.executor.advance_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected, new)
 
@@ -258,7 +263,16 @@ class GiteaContinuationRemote:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_GIT_READBACK_INVALID")
         return oid
 
-    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str | None, new: str) -> None:
+    def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        self.repository_identity()
+        if self.read_git_ref(branch) is not None:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        _run(["git", "push", self.remote_name, f"{new}:refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+        if self.read_git_ref(branch) != new:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+
+    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None:
         self._require_projected()
         self.repository_identity()
         if self.read_git_ref(branch) != expected:
@@ -329,6 +343,7 @@ class ContinuationPermissions:
 @dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
 class ContinuationRuntimeBinding:
     request: WriterLeaseRequestV2
+    job_id: str
     workspace_path: Path
     lease_not_before: datetime
     lease_expires_at: datetime
@@ -389,13 +404,20 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
     def observe_generation(self, branch: str, generation: int) -> None:
         self._observed_generations[branch] = max(generation, self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0))
 
-    def _max_generation(self, branch: str) -> int:
+    def _max_generation(self, branch: str, *, exclude_job_id: str | None = None) -> int:
         observed = self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0)
         with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
+            if exclude_job_id is None:
                 row = connection.execute(
                     "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
                     (branch,),
                 ).fetchone()
+            else:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases "
+                    "WHERE branch=? AND job_id!=?",
+                    (branch, exclude_job_id),
+                ).fetchone()
         durable = int(row["generation"] or 0)
         return max(observed, durable)
 
@@ -404,6 +426,7 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
         return {
             "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
             "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "job_id": request.job_id,
             "repository": request.repository,
             "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
             "base_oid": request.base_oid,
@@ -413,10 +436,21 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "lease_seconds": request.lease_seconds,
         }
 
-    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding) -> None:
+    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, *, job_id: str | None = None) -> None:
         request = binding.request
-        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(self._request_mapping(request), self.authority)
-        if normalized != {**self._request_mapping(request), "create_target_branch": False, "worktree_mode": "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}:
+        request_mapping = self._request_mapping(request)
+        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(request_mapping, self.authority)
+        expected_normalized = {
+            **request_mapping,
+            "create_target_branch": request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW",
+            "worktree_mode": (
+                "detached_at_base_oid"
+                if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW"
+                else "detached_at_expected_head"
+            ),
+            "cas_ref_update_required": True,
+        }
+        if normalized != expected_normalized:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("CONTINUATION_NORMALIZATION_INVALID")
         if not binding.original_receipt_valid or not binding.original_grant_consumed:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("ORIGINAL_GRANT_LINEAGE_INVALID")
@@ -426,7 +460,7 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
         if now >= binding.lease_expires_at:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_EXPIRED")
-        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch):
+        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch, exclude_job_id=job_id):
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
         if not self.workspace.is_detached():
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
@@ -452,57 +486,102 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "generation": request.generation,
         }
 
-    def execute(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit) -> dict[str, object]:
-        payload = commit.payload()
-        submitted = self.controller.submit(self._job_request(binding, commit, payload), payload=payload)
-        current = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding,
+        commit: ContinuationCommit,
+        *,
+        before_complete: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        commit.payload()
+        if not binding.job_id or binding.request.job_id != binding.job_id:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("RUNTIME_LINEAGE_MISSING_JOB_ID")
+        current = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+        current_state = JobState(current["state"])
+        if current_state == JobState.COMPLETED:
             return self.controller.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        self._validate_preflight(binding)
+        if current_state == JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED:
+            receipt = json.loads(str(current["receipt_json"] or "{}"))
+            commit_oid = str(receipt.get("authority_oid") or "")
+            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(commit_oid):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GOVERNED_COMMIT_OID_INVALID")
+            if before_complete is not None:
+                before_complete(commit_oid)
+            return self.controller.advance(
+                binding.job_id,
+                JobState.COMPLETED,
+                side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+                receipt=receipt,
+            ).as_dict()
+        self._validate_preflight(binding, job_id=binding.job_id)
         request = binding.request
         projected = False
         try:
             self.credential.project()
             projected = True
-            row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REQUESTED:
+            row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+            state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.REQUESTED:
                 self.controller.advance(
-                    submitted.job_id,
+                    binding.job_id,
                     JobState.AUTHORIZED,
                     side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
                     receipt={"task_id": request.task_id, "original_grant_consumed": True},
+                    expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
                 )
-                row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
                 self.controller.lease_job(
-                    submitted.job_id,
-                    lease_id=f"lease-{submitted.job_id}",
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    lease_id=f"lease-{binding.job_id}",
                     lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
                     current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
                     generation=request.generation,
                     lease_expires_at=binding.lease_expires_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
                     expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
                 )
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY")
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.LEASED:
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY,
+                                        side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.WORKTREE_READY:
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING,
+                                        side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+            elif state != JobState.EXECUTING:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("JOB_EXECUTION_STATE_INVALID")
             new_oid = self.workspace.commit_files(commit.files, commit.message)
             if not OID_RE.fullmatch(new_oid) or not self.authority.is_ancestor(request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
                 raise ContinuationExecutionError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
+            if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+                authority_oid = self.authority.create_task_branch_cas(request.target_branch, request.base_oid, new_oid)
+            else:
                 authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
             if authority_oid != new_oid:
                 raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
             self.controller.advance(
-                submitted.job_id,
+                binding.job_id,
                 JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
                 side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED",
                 receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "force_push": False},
             )
             try:
-                self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+                    self.remote.push_new_exact(request.target_branch, new_oid)
+                else:
                     self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
             except Exception:
-                return self._remote_pending(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
-            return self._finish_remote_verification(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+                return self._remote_pending(binding.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+            return self._finish_remote_verification(
+                binding.job_id,
+                authority_oid,
+                new_oid,
+                before_complete=before_complete,
+            )
         finally:
             if projected:
                 self.credential.revoke()
@@ -525,7 +604,14 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
         )
         return result.as_dict()
 
-    def _finish_remote_verification(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    def _finish_remote_verification(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        authority_oid: str,
+        new_oid: str,
+        *,
+        before_complete: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
         row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
         branch = row["branch"]
         request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
@@ -542,8 +628,20 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "reconciliation_decision": decision.action.value,
             "force_push": False,
         }
-        self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt)
-        return self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt).as_dict()
+        self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        )
+        if before_complete is not None:
+            before_complete(new_oid)
+        return self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.COMPLETED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        ).as_dict()
 
     def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
         row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_lease.py

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
     target_branch: str
     generation: int
     lease_seconds: int = 900
+    job_id: str = ""
 
     schema = "aios.task-writer-lease.v2"
     accepted_schemas = frozenset({"aios.task-writer-lease.v2", "aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2"})
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
     def validate(self, probe: BranchProbe) -> None:
         if not self.task_id or self.repository != "aios/aios":
             raise ContinuationError("request_identity_invalid")
+        if not self.job_id or not self.job_id.startswith("job-"):
+            raise ContinuationError("job_id_invalid")
         if self.branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
             raise ContinuationError("branch_mode_invalid")
         _oid(self.base_oid, "base_oid")

active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import secrets
+import re
 from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 
@@ -21,9 +22,14 @@ class CredentialLease:
     scopes: tuple[str, ...]
     provider: str
     state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    scope_type: str = "system"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
 
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
+        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state, "scope_type": self.scope_type, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id, "project_id": self.project_id, "run_id": self.run_id}
 
 
 class FileCredentialProvider:
@@ -43,11 +49,19 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
         self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
 
-    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
             raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if scope_type == "tenant":
+            if not tenant_id:
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        elif scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any((tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)):
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
         now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
+        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__, "ACTIVE", scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
         self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
         return lease.as_dict()
 
@@ -64,7 +78,39 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         lease = self._get(lease_id)
         if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
             raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
-        return self.provider.environment(lease)
+        environment = self.provider.environment(lease)
+        for key, value in environment.items():
+            upper = str(key).upper()
+            if not isinstance(value, str):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            sensitive = any(marker in upper for marker in ("CREDENTIAL", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "PRIVATE_KEY", "API_KEY"))
+            if re.search(r"(?i)bearer\s+\S+|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]", value):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            if sensitive and upper.endswith("_FILE"):
+                candidate = Path(value)
+                credential_root = Path("/run/credentials")
+                try:
+                    resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=False)
+                except OSError as exc:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY") from exc
+                if not candidate.is_absolute() or not (resolved == credential_root or credential_root in resolved.parents):
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive and upper.endswith("_REFERENCE"):
+                if re.fullmatch(r"(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}", value) is None:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive:
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        return environment
+
+    def authorize(self, lease_id: str, *, task_id: str, operation: str, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or lease.task_id != task_id or operation not in lease.scopes:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        requested = (scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
+        actual = (lease.scope_type, lease.tenant_id, lease.user_id, lease.project_id, lease.run_id)
+        if requested != actual:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        return self.environment(lease_id)
 
     def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()

active-runtime/app/aios_existing_branch_publisher.py

@@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed governed publication of an existing Authority branch at an exact OID."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from collections.abc import Mapping
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from enum import Enum
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import tempfile
-import time
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Protocol
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^(?!refs/)(?!tags/)[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
-IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}$")
-
-
-class ExistingBranchPublicationError(RuntimeError):
-    """Stable, non-secret error for the governed existing-branch publisher."""
-
-
-class ExistingBranchPublicationConflict(ExistingBranchPublicationError):
-    pass
-
-
-class ExistingBranchPublicationState(str, Enum):
-    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
-    PUBLISHING = "PUBLISHING"
-    REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING = "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING"
-    RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED = "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
-    MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED = "FAILED"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ExistingBranchPublicationRequest:
-    repository: str
-    branch: str
-    expected_branch_oid: str
-    owner_approval_reference: str
-    idempotency_key: str
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ExistingBranchPublicationRequest":
-        required = ("repository", "branch", "expected_branch_oid", "owner_approval_reference", "idempotency_key")
-        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("REQUEST_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-        if any(not isinstance(value.get(field), str) or not value[field].strip() for field in required):
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("REQUEST_FIELDS_MISSING")
-        repository = value["repository"].strip()
-        branch = value["branch"].strip()
-        expected = value["expected_branch_oid"].strip().lower()
-        approval = value["owner_approval_reference"].strip()
-        idempotency = value["idempotency_key"].strip()
-        if repository != "aios/aios":
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-        if not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch) or branch in {"main", "master"}:
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("BRANCH_NAMESPACE_REJECTED")
-        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(expected):
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
-        if len(approval) > 512:
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("OWNER_APPROVAL_REFERENCE_INVALID")
-        if not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(idempotency):
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
-        return cls(repository, branch, expected, approval, idempotency)
-
-    @property
-    def publication_job_id(self) -> str:
-        return "publication-" + hashlib.sha256(self.idempotency_key.encode()).hexdigest()[:32]
-
-    @property
-    def digest(self) -> str:
-        raw = json.dumps(asdict(self), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
-        return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-
-
-class ExistingBranchAuthority(Protocol):
-    def read_ref(self, ref: str) -> str | None: ...
-
-
-class ExistingBranchRemote(Protocol):
-    def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
-    def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
-    def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
-    def commit_visible(self, oid: str) -> bool: ...
-    def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str | None, new: str) -> None: ...
-
-
-class ExistingBranchPublicationStore:
-    def __init__(self, root: Path):
-        self.root = Path(root)
-        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-
-    def _path(self, request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest) -> Path:
-        return self.root / f"{request.publication_job_id}.json"
-
-    def load(self, request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(self._path(request).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            return {}
-        if not isinstance(value, dict):
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("PUBLICATION_STATE_INVALID")
-        return value
-
-    def record(self, request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest, state: ExistingBranchPublicationState, **evidence: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = {
-            "schema": "aios.existing-branch-publication.v1",
-            "publication_job_id": request.publication_job_id,
-            "repository": request.repository,
-            "branch": request.branch,
-            "expected_branch_oid": request.expected_branch_oid,
-            "owner_approval_reference": request.owner_approval_reference,
-            "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
-            "request_digest": request.digest,
-            "publication_state": state.value,
-            "updated_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
-            **evidence,
-        }
-        path = self._path(request)
-        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=path.parent)
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                json.dump(payload, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
-                handle.write("\n")
-                handle.flush()
-                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
-            os.replace(temporary, path)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                os.unlink(temporary)
-        return payload
-
-
-class ExistingBranchPublisher:
-    """Publish only the exact, already-authorized Authority branch tip."""
-
-    def __init__(self, authority: ExistingBranchAuthority, remote: ExistingBranchRemote, state_root: Path):
-        self.authority = authority
-        self.remote = remote
-        self.store = ExistingBranchPublicationStore(state_root)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _safe_error(exc: BaseException) -> str:
-        return type(exc).__name__
-
-    def _observe(self, request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "authority_branch_oid": self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{request.branch}"),
-            "gitea_git_branch_oid": self.remote.read_git_ref(request.branch),
-            "gitea_api_branch_oid": self.remote.read_api_branch(request.branch),
-            "commit_visible": bool(self.remote.commit_visible(request.expected_branch_oid)),
-        }
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _has_remote_conflict(request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest, observation: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
-        return any(
-            observation.get(field) not in (None, request.expected_branch_oid)
-            for field in ("gitea_git_branch_oid", "gitea_api_branch_oid")
-        )
-
-    def _manual(self, request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest, reason: str, observation: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self.store.record(
-            request,
-            ExistingBranchPublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
-            error_code=reason,
-            **dict(observation),
-        )
-
-    def _finish(self, request: ExistingBranchPublicationRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        try:
-            observation = self._observe(request)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            return self.store.record(
-                request,
-                ExistingBranchPublicationState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
-                error_code=self._safe_error(exc),
-            )
-        if observation.get("authority_branch_oid") != request.expected_branch_oid:
-            return self._manual(request, "AUTHORITY_BRANCH_OID_CHANGED", observation)
-        if self._has_remote_conflict(request, observation):
-            return self._manual(request, "REMOTE_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT", observation)
-        if (
-            observation.get("gitea_git_branch_oid") == request.expected_branch_oid
-            and observation.get("gitea_api_branch_oid") == request.expected_branch_oid
-            and observation.get("commit_visible") is True
-        ):
-            return self.store.record(request, ExistingBranchPublicationState.COMPLETED, **dict(observation))
-        return self.store.record(
-            request,
-            ExistingBranchPublicationState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
-            error_code="REMOTE_READBACK_INCOMPLETE",
-            **dict(observation),
-        )
-
-    def publish(self, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        request = ExistingBranchPublicationRequest.from_mapping(value)
-        previous = self.store.load(request)
-        if previous:
-            if previous.get("request_digest") != request.digest:
-                raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED")
-            if previous.get("publication_state") == ExistingBranchPublicationState.COMPLETED.value:
-                return {**previous, "idempotent": True}
-        authority_oid = self.authority.read_ref(f"refs/heads/{request.branch}")
-        if authority_oid is None:
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_MISSING")
-        if authority_oid != request.expected_branch_oid:
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("AUTHORITY_BRANCH_OID_MISMATCH")
-        if self.remote.repository_identity() != request.repository:
-            raise ExistingBranchPublicationConflict("REMOTE_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-        self.store.record(request, ExistingBranchPublicationState.QUEUED)
-        try:
-            observation = self._observe(request)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            return self.store.record(
-                request,
-                ExistingBranchPublicationState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
-                error_code=self._safe_error(exc),
-            )
-        if observation.get("authority_branch_oid") != request.expected_branch_oid:
-            return self._manual(request, "AUTHORITY_BRANCH_OID_CHANGED", observation)
-        if self._has_remote_conflict(request, observation):
-            return self._manual(request, "REMOTE_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT", observation)
-        if (
-            observation.get("gitea_git_branch_oid") == request.expected_branch_oid
-            and observation.get("gitea_api_branch_oid") == request.expected_branch_oid
-            and observation.get("commit_visible") is True
-        ):
-            return self.store.record(request, ExistingBranchPublicationState.COMPLETED, **dict(observation))
-        if observation.get("gitea_git_branch_oid") is not None or observation.get("gitea_api_branch_oid") is not None:
-            return self.store.record(
-                request,
-                ExistingBranchPublicationState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,
-                error_code="REMOTE_READBACK_INCOMPLETE",
-                **dict(observation),
-            )
-        self.store.record(request, ExistingBranchPublicationState.PUBLISHING, **dict(observation))
-        try:
-            self.remote.push_exact(request.branch, None, request.expected_branch_oid)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            return self.store.record(
-                request,
-                ExistingBranchPublicationState.REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING,
-                error_code=self._safe_error(exc),
-                desired_remote_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
-                **dict(observation),
-            )
-        return self._finish(request)

active-runtime/app/aios_external_agent_runtime.py

@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+"""Credential-isolated external Agent runtime executor for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+Task payloads never choose commands. A root-owned runtime profile chooses the executable and
+I/O mode. The Online Agent worker writes a hash-bound request into an exchange directory; this
+uncredentialed process executes Hermes/OpenClaw and returns a bounded, sanitized result.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+REQUEST_SCHEMA = "aios.external-agent-runtime.request.v1"
+RESULT_SCHEMA = "aios.external-agent-runtime.result.v1"
+PROFILE_SCHEMA = "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1"
+SUPPORTED_RUNTIMES = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,254}$")
+RUNTIME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{2,31}$")
+SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
+)
+SECRET_ENV_MARKERS = (
+    "TOKEN",
+    "SECRET",
+    "PASSWORD",
+    "CREDENTIAL",
+    "AUTHORIZATION",
+    "PRIVATE_KEY",
+    "API_KEY",
+)
+PROFILE_ENV_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63}$")
+PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{2,127}$")
+PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63}$")
+PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAMES = frozenset({"OPENAI_API_KEY"})
+PROFILE_FIXED_ENV_DENY = frozenset(
+    {
+        "PATH",
+        "HOME",
+        "NO_COLOR",
+        "LC_ALL",
+        "LANG",
+        "LD_PRELOAD",
+        "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
+        "PYTHONPATH",
+        "NODE_OPTIONS",
+        "BASH_ENV",
+        "SHELL",
+        "IFS",
+    }
+)
+MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 256 * 1024
+MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 128 * 1024
+MAX_PROFILE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+MAX_CREDENTIAL_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT = Path("/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d")
+DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor")
+ALLOWED_EXECUTABLE_ROOTS = (
+    Path("/usr/bin"),
+    Path("/usr/local/bin"),
+    Path("/opt/aios/bin"),
+    Path("/opt/hermes"),
+    Path("/opt/openclaw"),
+    Path("/opt/aios-hermes-agent"),
+    Path("/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering"),
+)
+
+
+class ExternalAgentRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(
+        value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def sanitize_text(value: str) -> str:
+    return SENSITIVE_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", str(value))
+
+
+def _bounded_text(value: str, limit: int = MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES) -> str:
+    data = sanitize_text(value).encode("utf-8", "replace")
+    if len(data) <= limit:
+        return data.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+    marker = b"\n...[TRUNCATED]...\n"
+    half = max(1, (limit - len(marker)) // 2)
+    return (data[:half] + marker + data[-half:]).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+
+
+def _safe_runtime(value: object) -> str:
+    runtime = str(value or "").strip().lower()
+    if RUNTIME_RE.fullmatch(runtime) is None or runtime not in SUPPORTED_RUNTIMES:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED")
+    return runtime
+
+
+def _assert_no_secret_env() -> None:
+    leaked = sorted(
+        key
+        for key, value in os.environ.items()
+        if value and any(marker in key.upper() for marker in SECRET_ENV_MARKERS)
+    )
+    # CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY itself is systemd metadata; the directory is expected to be hidden.
+    leaked = [key for key in leaked if key != "CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"]
+    if leaked:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+            "EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_ENV_EXPOSED:" + ",".join(leaked)
+        )
+
+
+def _safe_executable(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.startswith("/"):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTABLE_ABSOLUTE_REQUIRED")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    else:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    if not resolved.is_file() or not os.access(resolved, os.X_OK):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTABLE_INVALID")
+    if not any(resolved == root or root in resolved.parents for root in ALLOWED_EXECUTABLE_ROOTS):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTABLE_ROOT_DENY")
+    return str(resolved)
+
+
+def _safe_profile_script(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.startswith("/"):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SCRIPT_ABSOLUTE_REQUIRED")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if path.is_symlink():
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    else:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    if not resolved.is_file():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SCRIPT_INVALID")
+    if not any(resolved == root or root in resolved.parents for root in ALLOWED_EXECUTABLE_ROOTS):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SCRIPT_ROOT_DENY")
+    return str(resolved)
+
+
+def _profile_environment(value: object) -> tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_INVALID")
+    result: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for raw_name, raw_value in value.items():
+        if not isinstance(raw_name, str) or PROFILE_ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(raw_name) is None:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_NAME_INVALID")
+        if raw_name in PROFILE_FIXED_ENV_DENY:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_NAME_DENY")
+        if any(marker in raw_name.upper() for marker in SECRET_ENV_MARKERS):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_SECRET_ENV_DENY")
+        if not isinstance(raw_value, str) or "\x00" in raw_value or "\n" in raw_value or "\r" in raw_value:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_VALUE_INVALID")
+        if len(raw_value) > 4096:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ENVIRONMENT_VALUE_TOO_LARGE")
+        result.append((raw_name, raw_value))
+    return tuple(sorted(result))
+
+
+def _profile_credential_environment(
+    value: object,
+) -> tuple[tuple[str, str, str, str], ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_ENV_INVALID")
+    result: list[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = []
+    for raw_env_name, raw_spec in value.items():
+        if (
+            not isinstance(raw_env_name, str)
+            or raw_env_name not in PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAMES
+            or PROFILE_ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(raw_env_name) is None
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAME_DENY")
+        if not isinstance(raw_spec, Mapping):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_SPEC_INVALID")
+        credential = raw_spec.get("credential")
+        fmt = str(raw_spec.get("format") or "dotenv")
+        key = raw_spec.get("key")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(credential, str)
+            or PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_NAME_RE.fullmatch(credential) is None
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_NAME_INVALID")
+        if fmt not in {"dotenv", "raw"}:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_FORMAT_INVALID")
+        if fmt == "dotenv":
+            if not isinstance(key, str) or PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_INVALID")
+        elif key is not None:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_UNEXPECTED")
+        result.append((raw_env_name, credential, fmt, str(key or "")))
+    return tuple(sorted(result))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RuntimeProfile:
+    runtime: str
+    argv: tuple[str, ...]
+    input_mode: str
+    output_mode: str
+    timeout_seconds: int
+    max_output_bytes: int
+    environment: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]
+    credential_env: tuple[tuple[str, str, str, str], ...]
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load(
+        cls,
+        runtime: str,
+        profile_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT,
+    ) -> "RuntimeProfile":
+        runtime = _safe_runtime(runtime)
+        root = Path(profile_root)
+        if root.is_symlink():
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ROOT_SYMLINK_DENY")
+        path = root / f"{runtime}.json"
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size > MAX_PROFILE_BYTES:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_UNAVAILABLE")
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_INVALID") from exc
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != PROFILE_SCHEMA:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_INVALID")
+        if _safe_runtime(value.get("runtime")) != runtime:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_RUNTIME_MISMATCH")
+        argv = value.get("argv")
+        if (
+            not isinstance(argv, Sequence)
+            or isinstance(argv, (str, bytes))
+            or not argv
+            or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item and "\x00" not in item for item in argv)
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_ARGV_INVALID")
+        executable = _safe_executable(argv[0])
+        normalized = [executable, *list(argv[1:])]
+        if any(item in {"sh", "bash", "-c", "--command"} for item in normalized[1:]):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_SHELL_MODE_DENY")
+        joined_argv = " ".join(normalized)
+        if re.search(r"(?i)(token|secret|password|api[_-]?key|authorization)\s*[:=]", joined_argv):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROFILE_SECRET_ARG_DENY")
+        if Path(executable).name in {"node", "nodejs"}:
+            if len(normalized) < 2 or normalized[1].startswith("-"):
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_NODE_SCRIPT_REQUIRED")
+            normalized[1] = _safe_profile_script(normalized[1])
+            if any(item in {"-e", "--eval", "-p", "--print", "-r", "--require"} for item in normalized[1:]):
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_NODE_CODE_MODE_DENY")
+        input_mode = str(value.get("input_mode") or "stdin_text")
+        output_mode = str(value.get("output_mode") or "stdout_text")
+        if input_mode not in {"stdin_text", "stdin_json", "file_json"}:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_INPUT_MODE_INVALID")
+        if output_mode not in {"stdout_text", "stdout_json", "file_json"}:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_MODE_INVALID")
+        timeout = int(value.get("timeout_seconds") or 900)
+        max_output = int(value.get("max_output_bytes") or MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES)
+        if not 1 <= timeout <= 3600:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+        if not 1024 <= max_output <= MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        environment = _profile_environment(value.get("environment"))
+        credential_env = _profile_credential_environment(value.get("credential_env"))
+        return cls(
+            runtime,
+            tuple(normalized),
+            input_mode,
+            output_mode,
+            timeout,
+            max_output,
+            environment,
+            credential_env,
+        )
+
+
+def validate_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if value.get("schema") != REQUEST_SCHEMA:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    request_id = str(value.get("request_id") or "")
+    if REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id) is None:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+    runtime = _safe_runtime(value.get("runtime"))
+    task_id = str(value.get("task_id") or "")
+    execution_digest = str(value.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    if not task_id or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}", task_id):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", execution_digest) is None:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    payload = value.get("payload")
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
+    encoded = canonical(payload)
+    if len(encoded) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE")
+    goal = payload.get("goal")
+    instructions = payload.get("instructions")
+    if not isinstance(goal, str) or not goal.strip():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    if instructions is not None and not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    return {
+        "schema": REQUEST_SCHEMA,
+        "request_id": request_id,
+        "runtime": runtime,
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution_digest,
+        "payload": dict(payload),
+    }
+
+
+def render_prompt(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    goal = str(payload.get("goal") or "").strip()
+    instructions = str(payload.get("instructions") or "").strip()
+    criteria = payload.get("success_criteria") or []
+    constraints = payload.get("constraints") or {}
+    lines = [
+        "AIOS Online Agent Task",
+        "",
+        "Goal:",
+        goal,
+    ]
+    if instructions:
+        lines.extend(["", "Instructions:", instructions])
+    if criteria:
+        lines.extend(["", "Success criteria:", json.dumps(criteria, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)])
+    if constraints:
+        lines.extend(["", "Constraints:", json.dumps(constraints, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)])
+    lines.extend([
+        "",
+        "Return the final task result only. Do not claim repository, production, credential, or control-plane side effects unless they are explicitly represented in the task payload.",
+    ])
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def _argv_with_files(
+    profile: RuntimeProfile,
+    input_path: Path,
+    output_path: Path,
+    prompt: str,
+) -> list[str]:
+    replacements = {
+        "{input_json}": str(input_path),
+        "{output_json}": str(output_path),
+        "{prompt}": prompt,
+    }
+    result = []
+    for item in profile.argv:
+        for marker, replacement in replacements.items():
+            item = item.replace(marker, replacement)
+        result.append(item)
+    if profile.input_mode == "file_json" and not any("{input_json}" in item for item in profile.argv):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_INPUT_PLACEHOLDER_REQUIRED")
+    if profile.output_mode == "file_json" and not any("{output_json}" in item for item in profile.argv):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_PLACEHOLDER_REQUIRED")
+    return result
+
+
+def _credential_environment(profile: RuntimeProfile) -> dict[str, str]:
+    if not profile.credential_env:
+        return {}
+    raw_root = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
+    if not raw_root or not raw_root.startswith("/"):
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_DIRECTORY_MISSING")
+    root = Path(raw_root)
+    if root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_DIRECTORY_INVALID")
+    result: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for env_name, credential, fmt, key in profile.credential_env:
+        path = root / credential
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_FILE_INVALID")
+        try:
+            if path.stat().st_size > MAX_CREDENTIAL_BYTES:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOO_LARGE")
+            raw = path.read_bytes()
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_READ_FAILED") from exc
+        if b"\x00" in raw:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_CONTENT_INVALID")
+        try:
+            text = raw.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_CONTENT_INVALID") from exc
+        selected = ""
+        if fmt == "raw":
+            selected = text.strip()
+        else:
+            found = False
+            for line in text.splitlines():
+                candidate = line.strip()
+                if not candidate or candidate.startswith("#"):
+                    continue
+                if candidate.startswith("export "):
+                    candidate = candidate[7:].lstrip()
+                if "=" not in candidate:
+                    continue
+                candidate_key, candidate_value = candidate.split("=", 1)
+                if candidate_key.strip() != key:
+                    continue
+                if found:
+                    raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_DUPLICATE")
+                selected = candidate_value.strip()
+                if len(selected) >= 2 and selected[0] == selected[-1] and selected[0] in {"'", '"'}:
+                    selected = selected[1:-1]
+                found = True
+            if not found:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_KEY_MISSING")
+        if not selected or "\x00" in selected or "\n" in selected or "\r" in selected:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE_INVALID")
+        if len(selected) > MAX_CREDENTIAL_BYTES:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE_TOO_LARGE")
+        result[env_name] = selected
+    return result
+
+
+def _parse_output(
+    profile: RuntimeProfile,
+    stdout: str,
+    output_path: Path,
+) -> tuple[str, object]:
+    if profile.output_mode == "file_json":
+        if output_path.is_symlink() or not output_path.is_file():
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_FILE_MISSING")
+        raw = output_path.read_bytes()
+        if len(raw) > profile.max_output_bytes:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+        text = raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        try:
+            parsed = json.loads(text)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+        return _bounded_text(text, profile.max_output_bytes), parsed
+    if len(stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")) > profile.max_output_bytes:
+        stdout = _bounded_text(stdout, profile.max_output_bytes)
+    if profile.output_mode == "stdout_json":
+        try:
+            parsed = json.loads(stdout)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_OUTPUT_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+        return _bounded_text(stdout, profile.max_output_bytes), parsed
+    return _bounded_text(stdout, profile.max_output_bytes), None
+
+
+def execute_request(
+    request_path: Path,
+    result_path: Path,
+    *,
+    profile_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT,
+) -> None:
+    _assert_no_secret_env()
+    if request_path.is_symlink() or not request_path.is_file():
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_FILE_INVALID")
+    raw_request = request_path.read_bytes()
+    if len(raw_request) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
+    try:
+        request = validate_request(json.loads(raw_request.decode("utf-8")))
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_JSON_INVALID") from exc
+    profile = RuntimeProfile.load(request["runtime"], profile_root)
+
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix=f"aios-{request['runtime']}-") as temporary:
+        temp_root = Path(temporary)
+        (temp_root / "home").mkdir()
+        input_path = temp_root / "input.json"
+        output_path = temp_root / "output.json"
+        input_path.write_bytes(canonical(request["payload"]))
+        prompt = render_prompt(request["payload"])
+        argv = _argv_with_files(profile, input_path, output_path, prompt)
+
+        stdin_data = None
+        if profile.input_mode == "stdin_json":
+            stdin_data = canonical(request["payload"]).decode("utf-8")
+        elif profile.input_mode == "stdin_text":
+            stdin_data = prompt
+
+        child_env = {
+            "PATH": "/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/bin",
+            "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8",
+            "LANG": "C.UTF-8",
+            "HOME": str(temp_root / "home"),
+            "NO_COLOR": "1",
+        }
+        child_env.update(dict(profile.environment))
+        child_env.update(_credential_environment(profile))
+
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        try:
+            completed = subprocess.run(
+                argv,
+                input=stdin_data,
+                capture_output=True,
+                text=True,
+                check=False,
+                shell=False,
+                timeout=profile.timeout_seconds,
+                cwd=str(temp_root),
+                env=child_env,
+            )
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_TIMEOUT") from exc
+
+        if completed.returncode != 0:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+                f"EXTERNAL_AGENT_PROCESS_FAILED:{completed.returncode}:"
+                + _bounded_text(completed.stderr, 2048)
+            )
+
+        output_text, output_json = _parse_output(profile, completed.stdout, output_path)
+        result: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "schema": RESULT_SCHEMA,
+            "request_id": request["request_id"],
+            "request_sha256": sha256(canonical(request)),
+            "runtime": request["runtime"],
+            "task_id": request["task_id"],
+            "execution_digest": request["execution_digest"],
+            "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+            "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+            "output_text": output_text,
+            "output_sha256": sha256(output_text.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+            "stderr_sha256": sha256(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+            "credential_material_exposed": False,
+            "control_plane_access_granted": False,
+        }
+        if output_json is not None:
+            result["output_json"] = output_json
+        result["result_sha256"] = sha256(canonical(result))
+        result_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{result_path.name}.", dir=result_path.parent)
+        try:
+            os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                json.dump(result, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                handle.write("\n")
+                handle.flush()
+                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+            os.replace(name, result_path)
+        finally:
+            if os.path.exists(name):
+                os.unlink(name)
+
+
+class ExternalAgentExchange:
+    """Worker-side idempotent request/result exchange."""
+
+    def __init__(self, root: Path = DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        *,
+        request_id: str,
+        runtime: str,
+        task_id: str,
+        execution_digest: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+        timeout_seconds: int = 1800,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        request = validate_request(
+            {
+                "schema": REQUEST_SCHEMA,
+                "request_id": request_id,
+                "runtime": runtime,
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "execution_digest": execution_digest,
+                "payload": dict(payload),
+            }
+        )
+        requests = self.root / "requests"
+        results = self.root / "results"
+        failed = self.root / "failed"
+        for directory in (requests, results, failed):
+            directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        request_path = requests / f"{request_id}.json"
+        result_path = results / f"{request_id}.json"
+        failed_path = failed / f"{request_id}.json"
+        request_sha = sha256(canonical(request))
+
+        if result_path.is_file():
+            return self._validated_result(result_path, request, request_sha)
+        if failed_path.is_file():
+            value = json.loads(failed_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+                str(value.get("error") or "EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_FAILED")
+            )
+
+        if request_path.exists():
+            try:
+                existing = json.loads(request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXISTING_REQUEST_INVALID") from exc
+            if sha256(canonical(existing)) != request_sha:
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_REQUEST_ID_CONFLICT")
+        else:
+            fd, name = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{request_path.name}.", dir=requests)
+            try:
+                os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+                with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                    json.dump(request, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+                    handle.write("\n")
+                    handle.flush()
+                    os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+                os.replace(name, request_path)
+            finally:
+                if os.path.exists(name):
+                    os.unlink(name)
+
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            if result_path.is_file():
+                return self._validated_result(result_path, request, request_sha)
+            if failed_path.is_file():
+                try:
+                    value = json.loads(failed_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                    value = {"error": "EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_FAILED"}
+                raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError(
+                    str(value.get("error") or "EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_FAILED")
+                )
+            time.sleep(0.25)
+        raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _validated_result(
+        result_path: Path,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+        request_sha: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(result_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RESULT_INVALID") from exc
+        if (
+            not isinstance(value, Mapping)
+            or value.get("schema") != RESULT_SCHEMA
+            or value.get("request_id") != request["request_id"]
+            or value.get("request_sha256") != request_sha
+            or value.get("runtime") != request["runtime"]
+            or value.get("task_id") != request["task_id"]
+            or value.get("execution_digest") != request["execution_digest"]
+        ):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RESULT_BINDING_INVALID")
+        material = dict(value)
+        declared = str(material.pop("result_sha256", ""))
+        if declared != sha256(canonical(material)):
+            raise ExternalAgentRuntimeError("EXTERNAL_AGENT_RESULT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        return dict(value)
+
+
+def serve(
+    root: Path = DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT,
+    profile_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT,
+) -> None:
+    _assert_no_secret_env()
+    root = Path(root)
+    for directory in (root / "requests", root / "results", root / "failed"):
+        directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    while True:
+        for request_path in sorted((root / "requests").glob("*.json")):
+            if request_path.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            result_path = root / "results" / request_path.name
+            failed_path = root / "failed" / request_path.name
+            try:
+                execute_request(request_path, result_path, profile_root=profile_root)
+                request_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                failed_path.write_text(
+                    json.dumps(
+                        {"error": sanitize_text(str(exc) or type(exc).__name__)},
+                        ensure_ascii=False,
+                        sort_keys=True,
+                    )
+                    + "\n",
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                request_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        time.sleep(0.25)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    import argparse
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", default=str(DEFAULT_EXCHANGE_ROOT))
+    parser.add_argument("--profile-root", default=str(DEFAULT_PROFILE_ROOT))
+    parser.add_argument("--request")
+    parser.add_argument("--result")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.request and args.result:
+        execute_request(
+            Path(args.request),
+            Path(args.result),
+            profile_root=Path(args.profile_root),
+        )
+    else:
+        serve(Path(args.root), Path(args.profile_root))

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_controller.py

@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ class ServiceUnavailable(JobError):
     pass
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class LeaseRenewalResult:
+    """Durable outcome of one writer-lease recovery attempt."""
+
+    renewed: bool
+    idempotent: bool
+    durable: bool
+    lease_expires_at: str | None
+
+    def __bool__(self) -> bool:
+        return self.renewed or self.idempotent
+
+
 class BindingConflict(JobError):
     pass
 
@@ -66,6 +79,14 @@ def utc_now() -> str:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
 
 
+def parse_utc(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
 def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
     return (
         json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
@@ -404,13 +425,16 @@ class GitOpsJobController:
         self.store._mirror(result)
         return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
 
-    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE") -> None:
+    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE", lease_expires_at: str | None = None) -> None:
         if len(current_head_oid) != 40 or generation < 1:
             raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
         try:
             with self.store._connect() as connection:
                 connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                if lease_expires_at is None:
                     updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
+                else:
+                    updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,lease_expires_at=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, lease_expires_at, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
                 if updated.rowcount != 1:
                     raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
                 connection.commit()
@@ -419,6 +443,94 @@ class GitOpsJobController:
         except sqlite3.Error as exc:
             raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
 
+    def renew_lease(
+        self,
+        *,
+        branch: str,
+        lineage_anchor_oid: str,
+        current_head_oid: str,
+        generation: int,
+        lease_expires_at: str,
+    ) -> LeaseRenewalResult:
+        if (
+            not branch
+            or len(lineage_anchor_oid) != 40
+            or len(current_head_oid) != 40
+            or generation < 1
+            or not lease_expires_at.strip()
+        ):
+            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                rows = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT lease_id, revision, generation, state, lease_expires_at "
+                    "FROM branch_leases "
+                    "WHERE branch=? AND lineage_anchor_oid=? AND current_head_oid=? "
+                    "AND generation=? AND state='ACTIVE' ORDER BY revision DESC",
+                    (branch, lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid, generation),
+                ).fetchall()
+                if not rows:
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return LeaseRenewalResult(False, False, False, None)
+                if len(rows) != 1:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                row = rows[0]
+                try:
+                    current_expires_at = parse_utc(str(row["lease_expires_at"]))
+                    requested_expires_at = parse_utc(lease_expires_at)
+                except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID") from exc
+                now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+                if requested_expires_at <= now:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+                if current_expires_at > now:
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return LeaseRenewalResult(
+                        False,
+                        True,
+                        True,
+                        str(row["lease_expires_at"]),
+                    )
+                updated = connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE branch_leases SET lease_expires_at=?,revision=revision+1 "
+                    "WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=? AND generation=? "
+                    "AND state='ACTIVE' AND lease_expires_at=?",
+                    (
+                        lease_expires_at,
+                        row["lease_id"],
+                        int(row["revision"]),
+                        generation,
+                        row["lease_expires_at"],
+                    ),
+                )
+                if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                    current = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT lease_expires_at, generation, state FROM branch_leases "
+                        "WHERE lease_id=?",
+                        (row["lease_id"],),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                    if (
+                        current is not None
+                        and int(current["generation"]) == generation
+                        and current["state"] == "ACTIVE"
+                        and parse_utc(str(current["lease_expires_at"])) > now
+                    ):
+                        connection.commit()
+                        return LeaseRenewalResult(
+                            False,
+                            True,
+                            True,
+                            str(current["lease_expires_at"]),
+                        )
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                connection.commit()
+                return LeaseRenewalResult(True, False, True, lease_expires_at)
+        except JobError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
     def advance(self, job_id: str, state: JobState, *, side_effect_state: str, receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, expected_revision: int | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
         return self._advance(
             job_id,

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""Uncredentialed deterministic executor for governed Online Agent changes.
+
+This process never receives Agent/Owner/Bridge credentials and never writes Git refs.
+It operates only on an exchange bundle and returns hash-bound changed files + test evidence.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import errno
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import tarfile
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+ALLOWED_PROGRAMS = {"/usr/bin/python3", "/usr/bin/git", "/bin/true", "/usr/bin/true"}
+MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+SECRET_ENV_TOKENS = ("TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "CREDENTIAL", "AUTHORIZATION", "PRIVATE_KEY")
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,254}$")
+SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*bearer\s+\S+|authorization\s+bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
+)
+
+
+class IsolatedExecutorError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def safe_relative(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("/"):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if ".." in path.parts or "." in path.parts or any(part in {"", ".git"} for part in path.parts):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    return path.as_posix()
+
+
+def resolve_under(root: Path, relative: str) -> Path:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    path = (root / safe_relative(relative)).resolve(strict=False)
+    if path == root or root not in path.parents:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_ESCAPE")
+    return path
+
+
+def _credential_exposure(directory: Path) -> str | None:
+    """Return an exposure code; EACCES is the intended credential isolation proof."""
+    try:
+        if not directory.exists():
+            return None
+        if directory.is_symlink():
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_SYMLINK"
+        if os.access(directory, os.R_OK):
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_ACCESSIBLE"
+        if directory.is_dir():
+            for child in directory.iterdir():
+                if child.is_file() and os.access(child, os.R_OK):
+                    return "CREDENTIAL_FILE_ACCESSIBLE"
+    except PermissionError:
+        return None
+    return None
+
+
+def assert_uncredentialed() -> None:
+    credentials = Path("/run/credentials")
+    candidates = {credentials}
+    credentials_directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+    candidates.add(credentials_directory)
+    leaked = sorted(
+        key for key, value in os.environ.items()
+        if value
+        and (any(token in key.upper() for token in SECRET_ENV_TOKENS) or SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE.search(str(value)))
+    )
+    if leaked:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CREDENTIAL_ENV_EXPOSED:" + ",".join(leaked))
+    for directory in candidates:
+        exposure = _credential_exposure(directory)
+        if exposure is not None:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError(exposure)
+    # In the intended PrivateNetwork namespace host loopback services are unreachable.
+    try:
+        probe = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM, errno.EAFNOSUPPORT}:
+            return
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("NETWORK_ISOLATION_PROBE_FAILED") from exc
+    probe.settimeout(0.15)
+    try:
+        if probe.connect_ex(("127.0.0.1", 18892)) == 0:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("GOVERNED_BRIDGE_REACHABLE")
+    finally:
+        probe.close()
+
+
+def extract_source(archive: Path, root: Path) -> None:
+    if archive.is_symlink() or not archive.is_file() or archive.stat().st_size > MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_INVALID")
+    with tarfile.open(archive, "r:gz") as tf:
+        for member in tf.getmembers():
+            path = Path(member.name)
+            if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or ".git" in path.parts:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+            if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_LINK_DENY")
+        tf.extractall(root, filter="data")
+
+
+def run_command(item: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    argv = item.get("argv")
+    if not isinstance(argv, Sequence) or isinstance(argv, (str, bytes)) or not argv:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_INVALID")
+    argv = [str(part) for part in argv]
+    if argv[0] not in ALLOWED_PROGRAMS:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_PROGRAM_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/python3" and "-m" in argv:
+        index = argv.index("-m")
+        if index + 1 >= len(argv) or argv[index + 1] not in {"pytest", "py_compile"}:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("PYTHON_MODULE_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/git" and any(
+        token in {"push", "update-ref", "commit", "merge", "rebase", "reset", "clean", "branch"}
+        for token in argv[1:]
+    ):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("GIT_MUTATION_DENY")
+    timeout = int(item.get("timeout_seconds") or 300)
+    if not 1 <= timeout <= 1800:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+    cwd = root if item.get("cwd", ".") == "." else resolve_under(root, str(item.get("cwd")))
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
+    )
+    result = {
+        "label": str(item.get("label") or "command"),
+        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+        "stdout_sha256": sha256(completed.stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "stderr_sha256": sha256(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+    }
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError(
+            "COMMAND_FAILED:" + result["label"] + ":" + str(completed.returncode)
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def apply_changes(request: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> list[str]:
+    changes = request.get("change_set")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not changes:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    changed: list[str] = []
+    for change in changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_INVALID")
+        relative = safe_relative(change.get("path"))
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        current = path.read_bytes() if path.is_file() else None
+        expected = change.get("expected_sha256")
+        if expected is not None and (current is None or sha256(current) != expected):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_DRIFT:" + relative)
+        operation = change.get("operation")
+        if operation == "write_file":
+            content = change.get("content")
+            if not isinstance(content, str):
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("WRITE_CONTENT_INVALID")
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "replace_text":
+            if current is None:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_SOURCE_MISSING")
+            old = str(change.get("old"))
+            new = str(change.get("new"))
+            count = int(change.get("count", 1))
+            text = current.decode("utf-8")
+            if text.count(old) != count:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_COUNT_INVALID:" + relative)
+            path.write_text(text.replace(old, new), encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "delete_file":
+            if path.exists():
+                path.unlink()
+        else:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_OPERATION_INVALID")
+        changed.append(relative)
+    return sorted(set(changed))
+
+
+def changed_bundle(root: Path, changed: list[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    files = []
+    for relative in changed:
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        if path.exists():
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGED_FILE_TOO_LARGE:" + relative)
+            files.append({
+                "path": relative,
+                "deleted": False,
+                "sha256": sha256(data),
+                "content_b64": base64.b64encode(data).decode("ascii"),
+            })
+        else:
+            files.append({"path": relative, "deleted": True, "sha256": None, "content_b64": None})
+    return files
+
+
+def execute_request(request_path: Path, result_path: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    request = json.loads(request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if request.get("schema") != "aios.isolated-execution.request.v1":
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    request_id = request.get("request_id")
+    if not isinstance(request_id, str) or not REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+    source_archive = Path(str(request.get("source_archive") or ""))
+    if not source_archive.is_absolute():
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+    expected_archive_sha = str(request.get("source_archive_sha256") or "")
+    if sha256(source_archive.read_bytes()) != expected_archive_sha:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_SHA_MISMATCH")
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-isolated-executor-") as temporary:
+        root = Path(temporary) / "workspace"
+        root.mkdir()
+        extract_source(source_archive, root)
+        changed = apply_changes(request, root)
+        commands = [
+            run_command(item, root)
+            for item in request.get("verification", [])
+            if isinstance(item, Mapping)
+        ]
+        result = {
+            "schema": "aios.isolated-execution.result.v1",
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "request_sha256": sha256(canonical(request)),
+            "changed_files": changed_bundle(root, changed),
+            "verification": commands,
+            "credential_isolation": {
+                "credential_env_absent": True,
+                "credential_mount_inaccessible": True,
+                "governed_bridge_unreachable": True,
+            },
+        }
+        result["result_sha256"] = sha256(canonical(result))
+        temporary_result = result_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary_result.write_text(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")), encoding="utf-8")
+        os.replace(temporary_result, result_path)
+
+
+def serve(root: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    requests = root / "requests"
+    results = root / "results"
+    failed = root / "failed"
+    for path in (requests, results, failed):
+        path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    while True:
+        for request in sorted(requests.glob("*.json")):
+            if request.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            result = results / request.name
+            try:
+                execute_request(request, result)
+                request.unlink()
+            except Exception as exc:
+                (failed / request.name).write_text(
+                    json.dumps({"error": str(exc) or type(exc).__name__}, sort_keys=True),
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                request.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    import argparse
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", default="/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor")
+    parser.add_argument("--request")
+    parser.add_argument("--result")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.request and args.result:
+        execute_request(Path(args.request), Path(args.result))
+    else:
+        serve(Path(args.root))

active-runtime/app/aios_model_api_staging.py

@@ -3,12 +3,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import hashlib, hmac, json, os, re, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, uuid
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
-from version_registry import (
-    configured_authoritative_git_dir,
-    configured_repository_identity,
-    list_registry_versions,
-    list_registry_versions_report,
-)
 from baseline_authority import BaselineAuthority, BaselineAuthorityError
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -21,9 +15,6 @@ except ModuleNotFoundError:
 from gitea_tag_publication import (
     GiteaTagClient,
     GitTagBackend,
-    GiteaConfigurationError,
-    InvalidReleaseVersion,
-    PublicationError,
     PublicationConflict,
     PublicationPending,
     PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
@@ -82,13 +73,10 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
-AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = configured_authoritative_git_dir()
-REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = configured_repository_identity()
+AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
+REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
 BASELINE_AUTHORITY = BaselineAuthority()
-# Retain the generic Git directory only for legacy/staging compatibility
-# commands.  Source-registry convergence receives the separate authority
-# below and never falls back to this path.
-GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPO', '/data/aios-gitops/repo.git'))
+GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') or os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPO', '/data/aios-gitops/repo.git'))
 LEGACY_GIT_WRITE_COMMANDS = frozenset({'add','commit','checkout','branch','tag','push','fetch','reset','merge','rebase','update-ref','worktree'})
 SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
     'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
@@ -370,7 +358,12 @@ def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
     return TagPublisher(
         WS,
         GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
-        GiteaTagClient.from_authoritative_environment(),
+        GiteaTagClient(
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
+            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
+            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
+        ),
         os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
     )
 
@@ -502,11 +495,6 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 data['legacy_global_writes_enabled'] = False
                 return self.sendj(data)
             if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                registry_report = list_registry_versions_report(
-                    WS,
-                    baseline_file=BASELINE_AUTHORITY.path,
-                    repo_git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                )
                 try:
                     baseline = dict(BASELINE_AUTHORITY.read())
                 except BaselineAuthorityError as exc:
@@ -519,8 +507,7 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     return self.sendj({
                         'repository_available': False,
                         'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
-                        'registry_versions': registry_report['registry_versions'],
-                        **{key: registry_report[key] for key in ('effective_registry_versions', 'runtime_registry_versions', 'attested_projection_versions', 'attested_projection_version', 'source_registry_converged', 'runtime_registry_converged', 'runtime_bundle_contains_current_version', 'runtime_bundle_contains_version', 'registry_consistency_status')},
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
                         'local_authoritative_tags': [],
                         'baseline_version': baseline.get('current_baseline'),
                         'baseline_generation': baseline.get('generation'),
@@ -532,14 +519,13 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     return self.sendj({
                         'repository_available': False,
                         'query_error': str(exc),
-                        'registry_versions': registry_report['registry_versions'],
-                        **{key: registry_report[key] for key in ('effective_registry_versions', 'runtime_registry_versions', 'attested_projection_versions', 'attested_projection_version', 'source_registry_converged', 'runtime_registry_converged', 'runtime_bundle_contains_current_version', 'runtime_bundle_contains_version', 'registry_consistency_status')},
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
                         'local_authoritative_tags': [],
                         'baseline_version': baseline.get('current_baseline'),
                         'baseline_generation': baseline.get('generation'),
                         'baseline_sha256': baseline.get('authority_sha256'),
                     }, 503)
-                registry = registry_report['registry_versions']
+                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
                 return self.sendj({
                     'registry_versions': registry,
                     'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
@@ -553,7 +539,6 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                     'baseline_generation': baseline.get('generation'),
                     'baseline_sha256': baseline.get('authority_sha256'),
                     'baseline': baseline,
-                    **{key: registry_report[key] for key in ('effective_registry_versions', 'runtime_registry_versions', 'attested_projection_versions', 'attested_projection_version', 'source_registry_converged', 'runtime_registry_converged', 'runtime_bundle_contains_current_version', 'runtime_bundle_contains_version', 'registry_consistency_status')},
                 })
             if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
                 frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
@@ -649,22 +634,12 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 try:
                     version=validate_version(version)
                     status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
-                except InvalidReleaseVersion as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error': exc.code},400)
-                except GiteaConfigurationError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error': exc.code},503)
-                except PublicationError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error': getattr(exc, 'code', str(exc))},503)
+                except ValueError:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
                 return self.sendj(status)
             if path == '/api/release-consistency':
                 request=publication_request_from_query(q)
-                try:
-                    result=publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request)
-                except GiteaConfigurationError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error': exc.code},503)
-                except PublicationError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error': getattr(exc, 'code', str(exc))},503)
-                return self.sendj(result)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
             if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
                 request=publication_request_from_query(q)
                 return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
@@ -1044,3 +1019,4 @@ def main():
     print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
     ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST,PORT), H).serve_forever()
 if __name__ == '__main__': main()
+

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+"""Durable checkpoint journal for the generic Online Agent worker.
+
+The JSON task state remains a fast cache.  This SQLite journal is the durable,
+append-only evidence used for restart/resume/replay decisions.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+PHASE_ORDER = {
+    "claimed": 10,
+    "workspace_prepared": 20,
+    "verification_passed": 30,
+    "agent_runtime_done": 40,
+    "source_capture_done": 40,
+    "commit_done": 40,
+    "reconciliation_required": 45,
+    "result_pending": 50,
+    "result_submitted": 60,
+}
+
+
+class CheckpointError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CheckpointBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    attempt: int
+    execution_digest: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+
+    def material(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "attempt": self.attempt,
+            "execution_digest": self.execution_digest,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "base_oid": self.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": self.target_branch,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def binding_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.material())
+
+
+class CheckpointStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoints(
+                  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  repository TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  base_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  expected_branch_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  target_branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  PRIMARY KEY(task_id, attempt, sequence)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_task_latest
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt DESC, sequence DESC);
+                CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_exact_replay
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt, phase, payload_sha256);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _phase_order(phase: str) -> int:
+        try:
+            return PHASE_ORDER[phase]
+        except KeyError as exc:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def append(
+        self,
+        binding: CheckpointBinding,
+        phase: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        order = self._phase_order(phase)
+        payload_value = dict(payload)
+        payload_sha = sha256_json(payload_value)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND phase=? AND payload_sha256=?
+                """,
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, phase, payload_sha),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                connection.commit()
+                return dict(replay)
+
+            head = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoint_heads WHERE task_id=?",
+                (binding.task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if head is not None:
+                head_attempt = int(head["attempt"])
+                head_order = int(head["phase_order"])
+                if binding.attempt < head_attempt:
+                    raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_ATTEMPT_REGRESSION")
+                if binding.attempt == head_attempt:
+                    if head["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_EXECUTION_DIGEST_CONFLICT")
+                    if head["binding_sha256"] != binding.binding_sha256:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+                    if order < head_order and phase != "reconciliation_required":
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_REGRESSION")
+                    sequence = int(head["sequence"]) + 1
+                else:
+                    sequence = 1
+            else:
+                sequence = 1
+
+            created_at = now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoints(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,job_id,
+                  repository,base_oid,expected_branch_oid,target_branch,generation,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_json,payload_sha256,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    binding.repository,
+                    binding.base_oid,
+                    binding.expected_branch_oid,
+                    binding.target_branch,
+                    binding.generation,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    canonical(payload_value).decode("utf-8"),
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_sha256,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                  attempt=excluded.attempt,
+                  sequence=excluded.sequence,
+                  phase=excluded.phase,
+                  phase_order=excluded.phase_order,
+                  execution_digest=excluded.execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256=excluded.binding_sha256,
+                  payload_sha256=excluded.payload_sha256,
+                  updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoints WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND sequence=?",
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return dict(row)
+
+    def latest(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=?
+                 ORDER BY attempt DESC, sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def latest_for_attempt(self, task_id: str, attempt: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=?
+                 ORDER BY sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id, attempt),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def verify_latest_binding(self, binding: CheckpointBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        value = self.latest(binding.task_id)
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        if int(value["attempt"]) > binding.attempt:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_FUTURE_ATTEMPT")
+        # A previous attempt may be reused only when the immutable execution/scope binding matches.
+        if value["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+            return None
+        expected = CheckpointBinding(
+            task_id=value["task_id"],
+            attempt=int(value["attempt"]),
+            execution_digest=value["execution_digest"],
+            job_id=value["job_id"],
+            repository=value["repository"],
+            base_oid=value["base_oid"],
+            expected_branch_oid=value["expected_branch_oid"],
+            target_branch=value["target_branch"],
+            generation=int(value["generation"]),
+        )
+        current_scope = binding.material()
+        historical_scope = expected.material()
+        current_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        historical_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        if sha256_json(current_scope) != sha256_json(historical_scope):
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return value

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_compact_map.py

@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+"""Bounded read-only repository interface map for governed Online Agent analysis.
+
+The compact map intentionally returns symbols and short source excerpts rather than a
+source archive. It is designed for control-plane consumers that cannot safely ingest a
+multi-megabyte repository snapshot.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ast
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1"
+MAX_RESULT_BYTES = 120 * 1024
+TARGET_RESULT_BYTES = 108 * 1024
+MAX_MODULES = 40
+MAX_SYMBOLS = 80
+MAX_TESTS = 40
+MAX_EXCERPTS = 25
+MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS = 1200
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime/app",
+    "runtime/agent-os",
+    "tests",
+    "db/migrations",
+    "migrations",
+    "deploy/systemd",
+    "docs/task-plane",
+    "docs/superpowers/specs",
+)
+SUFFIXES = {".py", ".sql", ".service", ".md", ".json", ".yaml", ".yml"}
+
+DEFAULT_TERMS = {
+    "agent", "worker", "fleet", "scheduler", "scheduling", "task", "claim", "lease",
+    "heartbeat", "capacity", "concurrency", "priority", "fairness", "queue", "retry",
+    "backoff", "circuit", "health", "liveness", "scope", "tenant", "project", "trace",
+    "message", "checkpoint", "recovery", "idempotency", "dispatch", "assignment",
+}
+FLEET_CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION": ("agent", "register", "worker", "capability", "version"),
+    "FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING": ("capacity", "slot", "concurrency", "scheduler", "queue"),
+    "FLEET_FAIRNESS": ("fair", "priority", "queue", "tenant", "project", "starvation"),
+    "FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION": ("failure", "health", "liveness", "timeout", "circuit", "poison"),
+    "FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT": ("reassign", "assignment", "claim", "lease", "retry", "worker"),
+    "FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "conversation", "task", "run"),
+    "FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH": ("idempot", "dispatch", "claim", "lease", "result", "attempt"),
+    "FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY": ("checkpoint", "resume", "recover", "retry", "cleanup", "receipt"),
+}
+
+MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "MODEL_PROVIDER_REGISTRY": ("model", "provider", "registry", "endpoint", "capability"),
+    "MODEL_SELECTION_POLICY": ("model", "select", "route", "policy", "capability"),
+    "MODEL_VERSION_PINNING": ("model", "version", "pin", "revision", "snapshot"),
+    "MODEL_BUDGET_ACCOUNTING": ("budget", "token", "cost", "quota", "usage"),
+    "MODEL_FALLBACK_POLICY": ("fallback", "retry", "route", "provider", "model"),
+    "MODEL_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "policy", "model"),
+    "MODEL_CREDENTIAL_BOUNDARY": ("credential", "secret", "provider", "tool", "token"),
+    "MODEL_TRACE_AUDIT": ("trace", "audit", "model", "provider", "request"),
+    "MODEL_EVALUATION_GATE": ("eval", "evaluation", "approval", "quality", "gate"),
+    "MODEL_ROUTING_RESILIENCE": ("route", "retry", "fallback", "timeout", "health"),
+}
+
+PROFILE_CLASSIFICATION = {
+    "fleet": "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+    "model_governance": "MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED",
+}
+
+MODEL_PROFILE_MARKERS = {
+    "model", "provider", "llm", "inference", "routing", "router", "budget",
+    "token", "cost", "quota", "fallback", "evaluation", "eval", "approval",
+    "version", "pinning",
+}
+SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^'\"\s,;]+)"
+)
+SQL_TABLE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?is)\bcreate\s+table\s+(?:if\s+not\s+exists\s+)?[\"`[]?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*)"
+)
+
+
+class CompactInterfaceMapError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _sha(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _bounded_excerpt(text: str, start_line: int, end_line: int) -> str:
+    lines = text.splitlines()
+    start = max(0, start_line - 2)
+    end = min(len(lines), max(end_line + 1, start + 1))
+    excerpt = "\n".join(lines[start:end])
+    excerpt = SENSITIVE_RE.sub("<redacted-sensitive-source-pattern>", excerpt)
+    if len(excerpt) > MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS:
+        excerpt = excerpt[: MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS - 1] + "…"
+    return excerpt
+
+
+def _signal_terms(signals: Sequence[str]) -> set[str]:
+    terms = set(DEFAULT_TERMS)
+    for signal in signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        terms.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    return set(sorted(terms)[:96])
+
+
+def _profile(source_signals: Sequence[str]) -> str:
+    tokens: set[str] = set()
+    for signal in source_signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        tokens.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    model_score = len(tokens & MODEL_PROFILE_MARKERS)
+    return "model_governance" if model_score >= 2 else "fleet"
+
+
+def _contract_terms(profile: str) -> Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
+    if profile == "model_governance":
+        return MODEL_GOVERNANCE_CONTRACT_TERMS
+    if profile == "fleet":
+        return FLEET_CONTRACT_TERMS
+    raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PROFILE_INVALID")
+
+
+def _candidate_files(root: Path, terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for relative_root in ROOTS:
+        directory = (root / relative_root).resolve(strict=False)
+        if directory == root or root not in directory.parents:
+            raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not directory.is_dir() or directory.is_symlink():
+            continue
+        for path in sorted(directory.rglob("*")):
+            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.suffix.lower() not in SUFFIXES:
+                continue
+            resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+            if root not in resolved.parents:
+                raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PATH_ESCAPE")
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                continue
+            relative = path.relative_to(root).as_posix()
+            text = data.decode("utf-8", "ignore")
+            searchable = (relative + "\n" + text[:384000]).lower()
+            matched = sorted(term for term in terms if term in searchable)
+            if not matched:
+                continue
+            path_bonus = sum(3 for term in terms if term in relative.lower())
+            test_bonus = 3 if relative.startswith("tests/") else 0
+            score = min(250, len(matched) + path_bonus + test_bonus)
+            candidates.append(
+                {
+                    "path": relative,
+                    "sha256": _sha(data),
+                    "bytes": len(data),
+                    "score": score,
+                    "text": text,
+                    "suffix": path.suffix.lower(),
+                }
+            )
+    candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (-item["score"], item["path"]))
+    return candidates
+
+
+def _python_symbols(item: Mapping[str, Any], terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        tree = ast.parse(str(item["text"]), filename=str(item["path"]))
+    except SyntaxError:
+        return []
+    result: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    class Visitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.stack: list[str] = []
+
+        def _record(self, node: ast.AST, kind: str, name: str) -> None:
+            qualified = ".".join([*self.stack, name]) if self.stack else name
+            haystack = f"{item['path']} {qualified}".lower()
+            score = sum(3 if term in haystack else 0 for term in terms)
+            if name.startswith("test_"):
+                score += 12
+            result.append(
+                {
+                    "path": item["path"],
+                    "symbol": qualified,
+                    "kind": kind,
+                    "line": int(getattr(node, "lineno", 1)),
+                    "end_line": int(getattr(node, "end_lineno", getattr(node, "lineno", 1))),
+                    "score": score + int(item["score"]),
+                }
+            )
+
+        def visit_ClassDef(self, node: ast.ClassDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "class", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_AsyncFunctionDef(self, node: ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "async_function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+    Visitor().visit(tree)
+    return result
+
+
+def _surface_ref(symbol: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return f"{symbol['path']}::{symbol['symbol']}"
+
+
+def _contract_map(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    modules: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    contract_terms: Mapping[str, tuple[str, ...]],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    module_paths = [str(item["path"]) for item in modules]
+    for contract, terms in contract_terms.items():
+        scored: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+        for symbol in symbols:
+            haystack = _surface_ref(symbol).lower()
+            score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in haystack)
+            if score:
+                scored.append((score, _surface_ref(symbol)))
+        scored.sort(key=lambda item: (-item[0], item[1]))
+        surfaces = [value for _, value in scored[:6]]
+        if not surfaces:
+            for path in module_paths:
+                score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in path.lower())
+                if score:
+                    surfaces.append(path)
+                if len(surfaces) == 6:
+                    break
+        result[contract] = {
+            "status": "PARTIAL" if surfaces else "GAP",
+            "surfaces": surfaces,
+        }
+    return result
+
+
+def _gap_evidence(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    profile: str,
+) -> tuple[list[str], list[str], list[str]]:
+    haystack = "\n".join(_surface_ref(item).lower() for item in symbols)
+
+    if profile == "model_governance":
+        invariants = [
+            "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+            "Provider/model credentials remain outside uncredentialed planner/executor processes.",
+            "P0-A tenant/project scope and P0-C trace/audit lineage must constrain model routing.",
+            "P1 retry/checkpoint semantics remain authoritative for model-call execution recovery.",
+        ]
+        failure_windows: list[str] = []
+        if "provider" not in haystack and "model" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No first-class model/provider registry surface detected.")
+        if "budget" not in haystack and "cost" not in haystack and "quota" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit durable model budget/cost/quota accounting surface detected.")
+        if "fallback" not in haystack and "route" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit model fallback/routing policy surface detected.")
+        if "eval" not in haystack and "approval" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit evaluation/approval gate surface detected for model changes.")
+        if "version" not in haystack and "pin" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit model-version pinning surface detected.")
+        desired = (
+            ("trace", "P0-C trace/audit lineage"),
+            ("scope", "P0-A tenant/project scope isolation"),
+            ("credential", "P0-C credential governance"),
+            ("checkpoint", "P1 durable execution recovery"),
+            ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+            ("retry", "P1 retry/idempotency"),
+        )
+    else:
+        invariants = [
+            "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+            "Governed mutation remains separated from read-only analysis and requires WriterLease.",
+            "P1 attempt-aware result idempotency and durable checkpoint recovery are reusable fleet primitives.",
+            "Scope/trace/message lineage must remain attached when work is scheduled or reassigned.",
+        ]
+        failure_windows = []
+        if "scheduler" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No first-class durable fleet scheduler symbol detected; worker-local polling may still be the scheduling mechanism.")
+        if "capacity" not in haystack and "slot" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit durable worker-capacity/slot primitive detected.")
+        if "fair" not in haystack and "starvation" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit fairness/starvation policy symbol detected.")
+        if "circuit" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit circuit-breaker primitive detected for repeated worker/task failures.")
+        if "reassign" not in haystack:
+            failure_windows.append("No explicit worker-reassignment primitive detected beyond lease expiry/retry semantics.")
+        desired = (
+            ("checkpoint", "P1 durable checkpoint/resume"),
+            ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+            ("trace", "P0-C trace correlation"),
+            ("scope", "P0-A scope isolation"),
+            ("lease", "claim/WriterLease ownership"),
+            ("heartbeat", "worker liveness"),
+            ("idempot", "retry-safe dispatch/result"),
+        )
+
+    reuse_points: list[str] = []
+    for token, label in desired:
+        match = next((item for item in symbols if token in _surface_ref(item).lower()), None)
+        if match is not None:
+            reuse_points.append(f"{label}: {_surface_ref(match)}")
+    return invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points
+
+
+def _trim_to_budget(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def size() -> int:
+        return len(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and value["bounded_excerpts"]:
+        value["bounded_excerpts"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["functions"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["functions"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["classes"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["classes"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["tests"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["tests"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["modules"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["modules"].pop()
+    final_size = size()
+    if final_size > MAX_RESULT_BYTES:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_RESULT_TOO_LARGE")
+    value["result_bytes"] = final_size
+    return value
+
+
+def build_compact_interface_map(
+    worktree: Path,
+    source_signals: Sequence[str],
+    *,
+    source_commit: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    root = Path(worktree)
+    if not root.is_dir() or root.is_symlink():
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_WORKTREE_INVALID")
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", source_commit) is None:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SOURCE_COMMIT_INVALID")
+
+    profile = _profile(source_signals)
+    terms = _signal_terms(source_signals)
+    candidates = _candidate_files(root, terms)
+    if not candidates:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_EMPTY")
+
+    module_candidates = candidates[:MAX_MODULES]
+    modules = [
+        {
+            "path": item["path"],
+            "sha256": item["sha256"],
+            "bytes": item["bytes"],
+            "score": item["score"],
+        }
+        for item in module_candidates
+    ]
+
+    symbols: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    tables: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    systemd_units: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for item in candidates:
+        if item["suffix"] == ".py":
+            symbols.extend(_python_symbols(item, terms))
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".sql":
+            for table in SQL_TABLE_RE.findall(str(item["text"])):
+                tables.append({"path": item["path"], "table": table, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".service":
+            systemd_units.append({"path": item["path"], "unit": Path(str(item["path"])).name, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    all_symbols = list(symbols)
+    test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][: min(MAX_TESTS, 24)]
+    non_test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if item not in test_symbols
+    ][: max(0, MAX_SYMBOLS - len(test_symbols))]
+    symbols = [*test_symbols, *non_test_symbols]
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    classes = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] == "class"
+    ]
+    functions = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] in {"function", "async_function"} and not str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ]
+    tests = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][:MAX_TESTS]
+
+    excerpts: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    by_path = {str(item["path"]): item for item in candidates}
+    for symbol in symbols:
+        if len(excerpts) == MAX_EXCERPTS:
+            break
+        item = by_path.get(str(symbol["path"]))
+        if item is None:
+            continue
+        excerpt = _bounded_excerpt(str(item["text"]), int(symbol["line"]), int(symbol["end_line"]))
+        if not excerpt.strip():
+            continue
+        excerpts.append(
+            {
+                "path": symbol["path"],
+                "symbol": symbol["symbol"],
+                "sha256": item["sha256"],
+                "excerpt": excerpt,
+            }
+        )
+
+    invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points = _gap_evidence(all_symbols, profile)
+    result = {
+        "schema": SCHEMA,
+        "profile": profile,
+        "classification": PROFILE_CLASSIFICATION[profile],
+        "source_commit": source_commit,
+        "implementation_map": {
+            "modules": modules,
+            "classes": classes[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "functions": functions[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "tables": tables[:40],
+            "systemd_units": systemd_units[:20],
+            "tests": tests,
+            "current_invariants": invariants,
+            "failure_windows": failure_windows,
+            "reuse_points": reuse_points,
+        },
+        "bounded_excerpts": excerpts,
+        "contracts": _contract_map(all_symbols, modules, _contract_terms(profile)),
+    }
+    return _trim_to_budget(result)

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_execution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+"""Canonical governed execution projection for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+The durable governed binding is authoritative.  Natural-language task fields and
+worker configuration are never allowed to invent repository, ref, generation, or
+idempotency coordinates.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+EXECUTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.execution.v2"
+PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = ("main", "master", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "baseline/", "production/")
+MUTATION_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic"})
+READ_ONLY_ACTIONS = frozenset({"source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+SUPPORTED_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic", "source_capture", "agent_runtime"})
+AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "openclaw"})
+MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+
+class ExecutionProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """A canonical fail-closed projection or validation error."""
+
+
+class OnlineTaskProjectionClient:
+    """Official HTTP projection client using only a control credential reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, api_base: str, control_token_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.api_base = api_base.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token_path = Path(control_token_path)
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def create(
+        self,
+        projected_task: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding: "GovernedExecutionBinding",
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = dict(projected_task)
+        payload = _canonical(body).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.api_base + "/v1/tasks",
+            method="POST",
+            data=payload,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self._token(),
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+            try:
+                error = json.loads(raw).get("error")
+            except (AttributeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                error = "HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError(f"ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_FAILED:{exc.code}:{error}") from exc
+        except (OSError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if status not in {200, 201} or not isinstance(result, dict):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        if result.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or result.get("status") not in {"QUEUED", "VERIFYING", "SUCCEEDED"}:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        metadata = result.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        returned_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        submitted_metadata = _object(body.get("metadata"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        submitted_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(submitted_metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        if _canonical(returned_execution) != _canonical(submitted_execution):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> None:
+    raise ExecutionProjectionError(code)
+
+
+def _object(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        _error(code)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _task_id(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, code)
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _branch(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    if BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or value.startswith(PROTECTED_PREFIXES):
+        _error("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _generation(value: object) -> int:
+    if not isinstance(value, int) or isinstance(value, bool) or value < 1:
+        _error("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _source_signals(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Normalize untrusted natural-language hints before they enter a signed envelope."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        if not isinstance(item, str):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        text = " ".join(item.split()).strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        # Projection may accept long task prose, but execution envelopes stay bounded.
+        text = text[:512].rstrip()
+        if text not in result:
+            result.append(text)
+        if len(result) == 16:
+            break
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+def _agent_runtime_input(value: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_REQUIRED")
+    raw = dict(value)
+    allowed = {"goal", "instructions", "success_criteria", "constraints"}
+    if set(raw) - allowed:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_FIELDS_INVALID")
+    goal = _string(raw.get("goal"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_GOAL_REQUIRED")
+    instructions = raw.get("instructions", "")
+    if not isinstance(instructions, str):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INSTRUCTIONS_INVALID")
+    criteria = raw.get("success_criteria", [])
+    if not isinstance(criteria, list) or len(criteria) > 32:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+    normalized_criteria: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for item in criteria:
+        if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        criterion_id = _string(item.get("id"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID")
+        description = _string(
+            item.get("description"), "AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_INVALID"
+        )
+        normalized_criteria.append(
+            {"id": criterion_id[:120], "description": description[:1000]}
+        )
+    constraints = raw.get("constraints", {})
+    if not isinstance(constraints, Mapping):
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CONSTRAINTS_INVALID")
+    sensitive_markers = ("token", "secret", "password", "credential", "authorization", "api_key", "apikey")
+    for key in constraints:
+        lowered = str(key).lower()
+        if any(marker in lowered for marker in sensitive_markers):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SECRET_FIELD_DENY")
+    normalized = {
+        "goal": goal[:12000],
+        "instructions": instructions[:32000],
+        "success_criteria": normalized_criteria,
+        "constraints": dict(constraints),
+    }
+    if len(_canonical(normalized).encode("utf-8")) > MAX_AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_BYTES:
+        _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_TOO_LARGE")
+    return normalized
+
+
+def _capabilities(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    result = tuple(sorted({_string(item, "CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID") for item in value}))
+    if any(len(item) > 120 for item in result):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedExecutionBinding":
+        data = dict(value)
+        task_id = _task_id(data.get("task_id"))
+        job_id = _string(data.get("job_id"), "JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+        if TASK_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            _error("JOB_ID_INVALID")
+        repository = _string(data.get("repository"), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            _error("WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY")
+        base_oid = _oid(data.get("base_oid"), "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        expected = _oid(data.get("expected_branch_oid"), "EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        target = _branch(data.get("target_branch"))
+        mode = _string(data.get("branch_mode"), "BRANCH_MODE_MISSING")
+        if mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            _error("BRANCH_MODE_INVALID")
+        generation = _generation(data.get("generation"))
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW" and expected != base_oid:
+            _error("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+        key = _string(data.get("idempotency_key"), "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+            _error("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        return cls(task_id, job_id, repository, base_oid, expected, target, mode, generation, key)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def binding_from_bootstrap(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def validate_execution_envelope(
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding | None = None,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    envelope = dict(value)
+    if envelope.get("schema") != EXECUTION_SCHEMA:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_VALIDATION")
+    candidate = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(envelope)
+    if binding is not None and candidate != binding:
+        comparisons = (
+            (candidate.task_id, binding.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.job_id, binding.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.repository, binding.repository, "WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.base_oid, binding.base_oid, "WRONG_BASE_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.expected_branch_oid, binding.expected_branch_oid, "WRONG_EXPECTED_HEAD_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.target_branch, binding.target_branch, "WRONG_BRANCH_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.generation, binding.generation, "WRONG_GENERATION_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.branch_mode, binding.branch_mode, "BRANCH_MODE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.idempotency_key, binding.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        )
+        for actual, expected, code in comparisons:
+            if actual != expected:
+                _error(code)
+    action = _string(envelope.get("action"), "EXECUTION_ACTION_MISSING")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capability_scope = _capabilities(envelope.get("capability_scope"))
+    if worker_capabilities is not None and not set(capability_scope).issubset(set(worker_capabilities)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    workspace = _object(envelope.get("workspace"), "WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    if workspace.get("authority_git_dir") != "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git" or workspace.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
+        _error("WORKSPACE_POLICY_DENY")
+    governance = _object(envelope.get("governance"), "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    governed_coordinates = (
+        (governance.get("task_id"), candidate.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("job_id"), candidate.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("idempotency_key"), candidate.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    )
+    for actual_coordinate, expected_coordinate, code in governed_coordinates:
+        if actual_coordinate != expected_coordinate:
+            _error(code)
+    commit_key = _string(governance.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(commit_key) is None:
+        _error("COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if governance.get("writer_lease") is not (action in MUTATION_ACTIONS):
+        _error("WRITER_LEASE_POLICY_DENY")
+    for field in ("main_write", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "force_push", "protected_ref_bypass"):
+        if governance.get(field, False) is not False:
+            _error("POLICY_DENY")
+    changes = envelope.get("change_set")
+    verification = envelope.get("verification")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not isinstance(verification, list):
+        _error("EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_INVALID")
+    if action == "source_capture":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY")
+        signals = list(_source_signals(envelope.get("source_signals") or []))
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") != signals:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") not in (None, {}):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_RUNTIME_INPUT_DENY")
+    elif action == "agent_runtime":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_MUTATION_DENY")
+        adapter = str(envelope.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = _agent_runtime_input(envelope.get("runtime_input"))
+        if envelope.get("runtime_input") != runtime_input:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_INPUT_NOT_CANONICAL")
+        required_runtime_capability = f"agent.runtime.{adapter}"
+        if required_runtime_capability not in capability_scope:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_REQUIRED")
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") not in (None, []):
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_SOURCE_SIGNALS_DENY")
+    elif not changes:
+        _error("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    declared = str(envelope.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    material = {key: item for key, item in envelope.items() if key != "execution_digest"}
+    actual = _digest(material)
+    if declared != actual:
+        _error("EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    return {**material, "execution_digest": actual}
+
+
+def project_execution_envelope(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    required_capabilities: Sequence[str] = (),
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(execution_request or {})
+    action = str(request.get("action") or "source_capture")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capabilities = _capabilities(request.get("capability_scope", required_capabilities))
+    governance = {
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+        "commit_idempotency_key": str(request.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{binding.task_id}-commit-g{binding.generation}"),
+        "writer_lease": action in MUTATION_ACTIONS,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "force_push": False,
+        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+    }
+    supplied_governance = request.get("governance")
+    if supplied_governance is not None:
+        governance.update(_object(supplied_governance, "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED"))
+    material: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema": EXECUTION_SCHEMA,
+        **binding.public(),
+        "action": action,
+        "adapter": str(
+            request.get("adapter")
+            or ("deterministic" if action == "deterministic" else "source_capture")
+        ),
+        "capability_scope": list(capabilities),
+        "change_set": list(request.get("change_set") or []),
+        "verification": list(request.get("verification") or []),
+        "source_signals": list(_source_signals(request.get("source_signals") or [])) if action == "source_capture" else [],
+        "runtime_input": _agent_runtime_input(request.get("runtime_input")) if action == "agent_runtime" else {},
+        "governance": governance,
+        "workspace": {
+            "authority_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+            "read_only_repository": True,
+            "cleanup_policy": "always",
+        },
+    }
+    envelope = {**material, "execution_digest": _digest(material)}
+    return validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding)
+
+
+def project_online_task(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(task_request)
+    required = _capabilities(request.get("required_capabilities"))
+    execution_value = dict(execution_request or {})
+    if str(execution_value.get("action") or "source_capture") == "agent_runtime":
+        adapter = str(execution_value.get("adapter") or "")
+        if adapter not in AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTERS:
+            _error("AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER_INVALID")
+        runtime_input = execution_value.get("runtime_input")
+        if runtime_input is None:
+            runtime_input = {
+                "goal": request.get("goal"),
+                "instructions": request.get("instructions") or "",
+                "success_criteria": request.get("success_criteria") or [],
+                "constraints": request.get("constraints") or {},
+            }
+        execution_value["runtime_input"] = runtime_input
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        execution_value,
+        required_capabilities=required,
+    )
+    metadata = dict(request.get("metadata") or {})
+    if "execution" in metadata:
+        validate_execution_envelope(_object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"), binding=binding)
+        if metadata["execution"] != execution:
+            _error("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_CONFLICT")
+    metadata["execution"] = execution
+    metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+        "schema": PROJECTION_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+    }
+    return {
+        **request,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "metadata": metadata,
+        "required_capabilities": list(required),
+        "idempotency_key": str(request.get("idempotency_key") or f"online-task:{binding.idempotency_key}"),
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_task_execution(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and "execution" in metadata:
+        value = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+            worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        )
+        return value, "persisted"
+    projected = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {"action": "source_capture", "capability_scope": task.get("required_capabilities") or []},
+        required_capabilities=task.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+    )
+    validate_execution_envelope(projected, binding=binding, worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities)
+    return projected, "recovered_projection"

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_plan_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Durable, authority-bound deterministic execution plans for Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _task_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    readable = "".join(ch if ch.isalnum() or ch in "._-" else "-" for ch in task_id).strip("-")[:72] or "task"
+    return readable + "-" + hashlib.sha256(task_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionPlanRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    source_head_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    plan_digest: str
+    execution: dict[str, Any]
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1",
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": self.source_head_oid,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "plan_digest": self.plan_digest,
+            "execution": dict(self.execution),
+        }
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanStore:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def _path(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _lock(self, task_id: str):
+        path = self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        with path.open("a+b") as handle:
+            fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            try:
+                yield
+            finally:
+                fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _source_head(binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> str:
+        return binding.expected_branch_oid if binding.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING" else binding.base_oid
+
+    def _read(self, task_id: str) -> ExecutionPlanRecord | None:
+        path = self._path(task_id)
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            return None
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        execution = value.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        return ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=str(value.get("task_id") or ""),
+            job_id=str(value.get("job_id") or ""),
+            source_head_oid=str(value.get("source_head_oid") or ""),
+            generation=int(value.get("generation") or 0),
+            idempotency_key=str(value.get("idempotency_key") or ""),
+            plan_digest=str(value.get("plan_digest") or ""),
+            execution=dict(execution),
+        )
+
+    def register(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock(binding.task_id):
+            return self._register_locked(binding, request)
+
+    def _register_locked(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        if request.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or request.get("job_id") != binding.job_id:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if int(request.get("generation") or 0) != binding.generation:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_GENERATION_CONFLICT")
+        source_head = str(request.get("source_head_oid") or "")
+        if source_head != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_CONFLICT")
+        key = str(request.get("idempotency_key") or "")
+        if len(key) < 8:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+        execution_request = request.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution_request, Mapping) or execution_request.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_DETERMINISTIC_REQUIRED")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, execution_request)
+        material = {
+            "task_id": binding.task_id,
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": source_head,
+            "generation": binding.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": key,
+            "execution": dict(execution_request),
+        }
+        plan_digest = _digest(material)
+        existing = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        expected_previous = request.get("expected_previous_plan_digest")
+        if existing is not None:
+            if existing.idempotency_key == key:
+                if existing.plan_digest != plan_digest:
+                    raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                return {**existing.public(), "idempotent": True, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+            if expected_previous != existing.plan_digest:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            if existing.source_head_oid != source_head:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_STALE_REPLACEMENT_DENY")
+        elif expected_previous not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+
+        record = ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=binding.task_id,
+            job_id=binding.job_id,
+            source_head_oid=source_head,
+            generation=binding.generation,
+            idempotency_key=key,
+            plan_digest=plan_digest,
+            execution=dict(execution_request),
+        )
+        path = self._path(binding.task_id)
+        temporary = path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary.write_text(
+            json.dumps(record.public(), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        temporary.replace(path)
+        return {**record.public(), "idempotent": False, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+
+    def resolve(self, binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        record = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        if record is None:
+            return None
+        if (
+            record.task_id != binding.task_id
+            or record.job_id != binding.job_id
+            or record.generation != binding.generation
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if record.source_head_oid != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_DRIFT")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, record.execution)
+        return {
+            "execution": dict(record.execution),
+            "plan_digest": record.plan_digest,
+            "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"],
+        }

active-runtime/app/aios_signer_broker.py

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-"""Narrow, non-root client contract for the privileged signer broker."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-import hashlib
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import socket
-from typing import Any, Protocol
-
-DEFAULT_SIGNER_BROKER_SOCKET = Path("/run/aios/signer-broker.sock")
-MAX_SIGNING_PAYLOAD = 1024 * 1024
-CODE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z0-9_.:-]{3,96}$")
-
-
-class SignerBrokerError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str):
-        self.code = code
-        super().__init__(code)
-
-
-class SignerBroker(Protocol):
-    def self_test(self) -> None: ...
-    def sign(self, payload_kind: str, payload: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, str]: ...
-
-
-class UnixSignerBroker:
-    """AF_UNIX request client; it never accepts commands, paths, or shell text."""
-
-    def __init__(self, socket_path: Path = DEFAULT_SIGNER_BROKER_SOCKET, timeout: float = 15.0):
-        path = Path(socket_path)
-        if path != DEFAULT_SIGNER_BROKER_SOCKET or not path.is_absolute():
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_BROKER_SOCKET_INVALID")
-        self.socket_path = path
-        self.timeout = timeout
-
-    def _request(self, operation: str, **payload: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if operation not in {"self_test", "sign"}:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_OPERATION_REJECTED")
-        request = {
-            "schema": "aios.signer-broker.request.v1",
-            "operation": operation,
-            **payload,
-        }
-        try:
-            with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as channel:
-                channel.settimeout(self.timeout)
-                channel.connect(str(self.socket_path))
-                channel.sendall((json.dumps(request, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode())
-                raw = channel.makefile("rb").readline()
-        except (OSError, TimeoutError) as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_BROKER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        try:
-            response = json.loads(raw.decode())
-        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_BROKER_RESPONSE_INVALID") from exc
-        if not isinstance(response, dict) or response.get("schema") != "aios.signer-broker.response.v1":
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_BROKER_RESPONSE_INVALID")
-        if response.get("status") != "PASS":
-            code = str(response.get("error_code") or "SIGNER_BROKER_REJECTED")
-            raise SignerBrokerError(code if CODE_RE.fullmatch(code) else "SIGNER_BROKER_REJECTED")
-        return response
-
-    def self_test(self) -> None:
-        self._request("self_test")
-
-    def sign(self, payload_kind: str, payload: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
-        if payload_kind not in {"approval_plan", "grant_payload"}:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_KIND_REJECTED")
-        if not isinstance(payload, bytes) or not payload or len(payload) > MAX_SIGNING_PAYLOAD:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
-        response = self._request(
-            "sign",
-            payload_kind=payload_kind,
-            payload_sha256=hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest(),
-            payload_base64=base64.b64encode(payload).decode("ascii"),
-        )
-        try:
-            signature = base64.b64decode(str(response["signature_base64"]), validate=True)
-            key_id = str(response["key_id"]).strip()
-        except (KeyError, ValueError) as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_BROKER_RESPONSE_INVALID") from exc
-        if not signature or not key_id or len(key_id) > 256:
-            raise SignerBrokerError("SIGNER_BROKER_RESPONSE_INVALID")
-        return signature, key_id

active-runtime/app/aios_signer_broker_service.py

@@ -1,289 +0,0 @@
-"""Privileged, fixed-function signer broker service."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import base64
-import binascii
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import socket
-import socketserver
-import stat
-import struct
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import threading
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol, Sequence
-
-REQUEST_SCHEMA = "aios.signer-broker.request.v1"
-RESPONSE_SCHEMA = "aios.signer-broker.response.v1"
-AUDIT_SCHEMA = "aios.signer-broker.audit.v1"
-DEFAULT_SOCKET_PATH = Path("/run/aios/signer-broker.sock")
-DEFAULT_SIGNER_PATH = Path("/usr/local/libexec/aios-grant-signer-adapter")
-DEFAULT_AUDIT_PATH = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/audit/signer-broker.jsonl")
-DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/signer-broker")
-ALLOWED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"self_test", "sign"})
-ALLOWED_PAYLOAD_KINDS = frozenset({"approval_plan", "grant_payload"})
-MAX_SIGNING_PAYLOAD = 1024 * 1024
-MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 2 * MAX_SIGNING_PAYLOAD + 8192
-CODE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z0-9_.:-]{3,96}$")
-SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-
-
-class SignerBrokerServiceError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str):
-        self.code = code if CODE_RE.fullmatch(code) else "SIGNER_INTERNAL_ERROR"
-        super().__init__(self.code)
-
-
-class SignerRunner(Protocol):
-    def self_test(self) -> None: ...
-    def sign(self, payload_kind: str, payload: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, str]: ...
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class SignerBrokerPolicy:
-    socket_path: Path = DEFAULT_SOCKET_PATH
-    signer_path: Path = DEFAULT_SIGNER_PATH
-    audit_path: Path = DEFAULT_AUDIT_PATH
-    state_root: Path = DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT
-    allowed_uids: frozenset[int] = frozenset()
-    signer_timeout: float = 60.0
-    max_payload_bytes: int = MAX_SIGNING_PAYLOAD
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in ("socket_path", "signer_path", "audit_path", "state_root"):
-            if not Path(getattr(self, name)).is_absolute():
-                raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_POLICY_PATH_INVALID")
-        if not self.allowed_uids or any(not isinstance(uid, int) or uid < 0 for uid in self.allowed_uids):
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_POLICY_CALLER_INVALID")
-        if not 0 < self.signer_timeout <= 300:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_POLICY_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
-        if not 0 < self.max_payload_bytes <= MAX_SIGNING_PAYLOAD:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_POLICY_PAYLOAD_LIMIT_INVALID")
-
-
-class FixedSignerRunner:
-    """Use one configured signer executable and broker-owned temporary paths."""
-
-    def __init__(self, policy: SignerBrokerPolicy):
-        self.policy = policy
-
-    def _run(self, argv: Sequence[str]) -> None:
-        try:
-            result = subprocess.run(list(argv), capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, timeout=self.policy.signer_timeout)
-        except FileNotFoundError as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_TIMEOUT") from exc
-        except OSError as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_FAILED")
-
-    def self_test(self) -> None:
-        self._run((str(self.policy.signer_path), "self-test"))
-
-    def sign(self, payload_kind: str, payload: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
-        if payload_kind not in ALLOWED_PAYLOAD_KINDS:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_KIND_REJECTED")
-        try:
-            self.policy.state_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            os.chmod(self.policy.state_root, 0o700)
-            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="request-", dir=self.policy.state_root) as directory:
-                root = Path(directory)
-                input_path = root / "payload.canonical"
-                signature_path = root / "payload.sig"
-                key_id_path = root / "payload.key-id"
-                input_path.write_bytes(payload)
-                os.chmod(input_path, 0o600)
-                self._run((str(self.policy.signer_path), "sign", "--namespace", payload_kind, "--input", str(input_path), "--signature-out", str(signature_path), "--key-id-out", str(key_id_path)))
-                signature = signature_path.read_bytes()
-                key_id = key_id_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-        except SignerBrokerServiceError:
-            raise
-        except (OSError, UnicodeError) as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_OUTPUT_INVALID") from exc
-        if not signature or not key_id or len(key_id) > 256 or "\n" in key_id or "\r" in key_id:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_OUTPUT_INVALID")
-        return signature, key_id
-
-
-class SignerBrokerService:
-    def __init__(self, policy: SignerBrokerPolicy, runner: SignerRunner | None = None, *, now: Callable[[], datetime] | None = None) -> None:
-        self.policy = policy
-        self.runner = runner or FixedSignerRunner(policy)
-        self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
-        self._audit_lock = threading.Lock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _operation(value: Any) -> str:
-        return value if isinstance(value, str) and re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{1,64}", value) else "INVALID"
-
-    def _audit(self, *, peer_uid: int, operation: str, status: str, error_code: str | None = None, payload_sha256: str | None = None) -> None:
-        event: dict[str, Any] = {"schema": AUDIT_SCHEMA, "timestamp": self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(), "peer_uid": peer_uid, "operation": self._operation(operation), "status": status}
-        if isinstance(payload_sha256, str) and SHA256_RE.fullmatch(payload_sha256):
-            event["payload_sha256"] = payload_sha256
-        if error_code:
-            event["error_code"] = error_code if CODE_RE.fullmatch(error_code) else "SIGNER_INTERNAL_ERROR"
-        try:
-            with self._audit_lock:
-                self.policy.audit_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-                with self.policy.audit_path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                    handle.write(json.dumps(event, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n")
-                    handle.flush()
-                    os.fsync(handle.fileno())
-                os.chmod(self.policy.audit_path, 0o600)
-        except OSError as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_AUDIT_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _failure(code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"schema": RESPONSE_SCHEMA, "status": "FAIL", "error_code": code if CODE_RE.fullmatch(code) else "SIGNER_INTERNAL_ERROR"}
-
-    def _dispatch(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], peer_uid: int) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str, str | None]:
-        operation = self._operation(request.get("operation"))
-        if peer_uid not in self.policy.allowed_uids:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("CALLER_UNAUTHORIZED")
-        if request.get("schema") != REQUEST_SCHEMA:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-        if operation not in ALLOWED_OPERATIONS:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_OPERATION_REJECTED")
-        if operation == "self_test":
-            if set(request) != {"schema", "operation"}:
-                raise SignerBrokerServiceError("REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
-            self.runner.self_test()
-            return {"schema": RESPONSE_SCHEMA, "status": "PASS", "operation": operation}, operation, None
-        if set(request) != {"schema", "operation", "payload_kind", "payload_sha256", "payload_base64"}:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("REQUEST_FIELDS_REJECTED")
-        payload_kind = request.get("payload_kind")
-        encoded = request.get("payload_base64")
-        claimed_hash = request.get("payload_sha256")
-        if payload_kind not in ALLOWED_PAYLOAD_KINDS or not isinstance(encoded, str) or not isinstance(claimed_hash, str) or not SHA256_RE.fullmatch(claimed_hash):
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
-        if len(encoded) > self.policy.max_payload_bytes * 2 + 8:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
-        try:
-            payload = base64.b64decode(encoded.encode("ascii"), validate=True)
-        except (ValueError, UnicodeError, binascii.Error) as exc:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_INVALID") from exc
-        if not payload or len(payload) > self.policy.max_payload_bytes:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_INVALID")
-        actual_hash = hashlib.sha256(payload).hexdigest()
-        if actual_hash != claimed_hash:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_PAYLOAD_HASH_MISMATCH")
-        signature, key_id = self.runner.sign(payload_kind, payload)
-        if not isinstance(signature, bytes) or not signature or not isinstance(key_id, str) or not key_id.strip() or len(key_id) > 256:
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_OUTPUT_INVALID")
-        return {"schema": RESPONSE_SCHEMA, "status": "PASS", "operation": operation, "signature_base64": base64.b64encode(signature).decode("ascii"), "key_id": key_id.strip()}, operation, actual_hash
-
-    def handle_request(self, request: Mapping[str, Any], peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        operation = self._operation(request.get("operation")) if isinstance(request, Mapping) else "INVALID"
-        payload_hash = request.get("payload_sha256") if isinstance(request, Mapping) else None
-        status = "FAIL"
-        error_code: str | None = None
-        try:
-            if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
-                raise SignerBrokerServiceError("REQUEST_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-            response, operation, payload_hash = self._dispatch(request, peer_uid)
-            status = "PASS"
-        except SignerBrokerServiceError as exc:
-            error_code = exc.code
-            response = self._failure(exc.code)
-        except Exception:
-            error_code = "SIGNER_INTERNAL_ERROR"
-            response = self._failure(error_code)
-        try:
-            self._audit(peer_uid=peer_uid, operation=operation, status=status, error_code=error_code, payload_sha256=payload_hash if isinstance(payload_hash, str) else None)
-        except SignerBrokerServiceError as exc:
-            response = self._failure(exc.code)
-        return response
-
-    def handle_json_line(self, raw: bytes, peer_uid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if len(raw) > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES:
-            return self.handle_request({"operation": "invalid"}, peer_uid) | {"error_code": "REQUEST_TOO_LARGE", "status": "FAIL"}
-        try:
-            request = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-            return self.handle_request({"operation": "invalid"}, peer_uid) | {"error_code": "REQUEST_JSON_INVALID", "status": "FAIL"}
-        return self.handle_request(request, peer_uid)
-
-
-class _UnixRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
-    def handle(self) -> None:
-        service: SignerBrokerService = self.server.service  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
-        response = service.handle_json_line(self.rfile.readline(MAX_REQUEST_BYTES + 1), _peer_uid(self.request))
-        self.wfile.write((json.dumps(response, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode("utf-8"))
-        self.wfile.flush()
-
-
-class SignerBrokerUnixServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.UnixStreamServer):
-    daemon_threads = True
-    allow_reuse_address = True
-
-    def __init__(self, socket_path: Path, service: SignerBrokerService):
-        self.socket_path = Path(socket_path)
-        self.service = service
-        super().__init__(str(self.socket_path), _UnixRequestHandler)
-
-    def server_close(self) -> None:
-        super().server_close()
-        try:
-            if self.socket_path.exists() and stat.S_ISSOCK(self.socket_path.stat().st_mode):
-                self.socket_path.unlink()
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-
-
-def _peer_uid(channel: socket.socket) -> int:
-    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
-        return -1
-    try:
-        _pid, uid, _gid = struct.unpack("3i", channel.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, struct.calcsize("3i")))
-        return int(uid)
-    except (OSError, struct.error):
-        return -1
-
-
-def build_server(policy: SignerBrokerPolicy, runner: SignerRunner | None = None) -> SignerBrokerUnixServer:
-    socket_path = policy.socket_path
-    socket_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    if socket_path.exists():
-        if not stat.S_ISSOCK(socket_path.stat().st_mode):
-            raise SignerBrokerServiceError("SIGNER_BROKER_SOCKET_CONFLICT")
-        socket_path.unlink()
-    server = SignerBrokerUnixServer(socket_path, SignerBrokerService(policy, runner))
-    os.chmod(socket_path, 0o660)
-    return server
-
-
-def _parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AIOS fixed-function signer broker")
-    parser.add_argument("command", choices=("serve",))
-    parser.add_argument("--socket", default=str(DEFAULT_SOCKET_PATH))
-    parser.add_argument("--signer", default=str(DEFAULT_SIGNER_PATH))
-    parser.add_argument("--audit", default=str(DEFAULT_AUDIT_PATH))
-    parser.add_argument("--state-root", default=str(DEFAULT_STATE_ROOT))
-    parser.add_argument("--allowed-uid", action="append", type=int, required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=60.0)
-    return parser
-
-
-def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    args = _parser().parse_args(argv)
-    policy = SignerBrokerPolicy(socket_path=Path(args.socket), signer_path=Path(args.signer), audit_path=Path(args.audit), state_root=Path(args.state_root), allowed_uids=frozenset(args.allowed_uid), signer_timeout=args.timeout)
-    server = build_server(policy)
-    try:
-        server.serve_forever()
-    finally:
-        server.server_close()
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

active-runtime/app/approved_release_executor.py

@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ import time
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
 
-from version_registry import configured_authoritative_git_dir, verify_authoritative_repository
-
 OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
 SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
 PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
@@ -51,11 +49,6 @@ REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS = {
     "payload/ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json",
     "payload/ROLLBACK-METADATA.json",
 }
-REQUIRED_V2R2C1_MEMBERS = {
-    "payload/versions/V2R2C1.json",
-}
-V2R2C1_TAG_OID = "07fc2746b688f5f243f29b39de39f32edc3dd9d2"
-DEFAULT_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
 
 class ReleaseBlocked(RuntimeError):
     pass
@@ -79,13 +72,6 @@ class Binding:
     production_service: str
     production_port: int
     repository_identity: str = "aios/aios"
-    # Legacy V2R2C1 receipts intentionally omit tag_oid. Future release
-    # bindings must provide it explicitly and may use a versioned schema.
-    tag_oid: str | None = None
-    binding_schema: str | None = None
-    source_registry_main_oid: str | None = None
-    source_registry_path: str | None = None
-    source_registry_sha256: str | None = None
 
     def __post_init__(self) -> None:
         if not self.version or not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid):
@@ -104,32 +90,6 @@ class Binding:
             raise ValueError("invalid production port")
         if self.repository_identity != "aios/aios":
             raise ValueError("unexpected repository identity")
-        if self.tag_oid is not None and not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.tag_oid):
-            raise ValueError("invalid annotated tag object OID")
-        if self.binding_schema is not None and not self.binding_schema.startswith(
-            "aios.release-binding."
-        ):
-            raise ValueError("invalid release binding schema")
-        provenance = (
-            self.source_registry_main_oid,
-            self.source_registry_sha256,
-        )
-        if any(item is not None for item in provenance):
-            if not all(item is not None for item in provenance):
-                raise ValueError("source registry provenance must be complete")
-            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(self.source_registry_main_oid)):
-                raise ValueError("invalid source registry main OID")
-            if not SHA_RE.fullmatch(str(self.source_registry_sha256)):
-                raise ValueError("invalid source registry SHA-256")
-            path = self.source_registry_path or f"versions/{self.version}.json"
-            candidate = Path(path)
-            if (
-                candidate.is_absolute()
-                or ".." in candidate.parts
-                or "\\" in path
-                or not path.endswith(".json")
-            ):
-                raise ValueError("invalid source registry path")
 
     @property
     def tag(self) -> str:
@@ -148,22 +108,10 @@ class Binding:
             "production_port": self.production_port,
             "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
         }
-        if self.tag_oid is not None:
-            payload["tag_oid"] = self.tag_oid
-            payload["binding_schema"] = self.binding_schema or "aios.release-binding.v2"
-        if self.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-            payload.update(
-                {
-                    "source_registry_main_oid": self.source_registry_main_oid,
-                    "source_registry_path": self.source_registry_path
-                    or f"versions/{self.version}.json",
-                    "source_registry_sha256": self.source_registry_sha256,
-                }
-            )
         return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(payload)).hexdigest()
 
     def request(self, operation: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        request = {
+        return {
             "schema": "aios.production-executor-request.v1",
             "operation": operation,
             "binding_fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
@@ -179,19 +127,6 @@ class Binding:
             "production_port": self.production_port,
             "repository_identity": self.repository_identity,
         }
-        if self.tag_oid is not None:
-            request["tag_oid"] = self.tag_oid
-            request["binding_schema"] = self.binding_schema or "aios.release-binding.v2"
-        if self.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-            request.update(
-                {
-                    "source_registry_main_oid": self.source_registry_main_oid,
-                    "source_registry_path": self.source_registry_path
-                    or f"versions/{self.version}.json",
-                    "source_registry_sha256": self.source_registry_sha256,
-                }
-            )
-        return request
 
 
 def canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
@@ -233,23 +168,6 @@ def run_git(git_dir: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> subprocess.Complet
     )
 
 
-def run_git_bytes(
-    git_dir: Path,
-    *args: str,
-    check: bool = True,
-) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[bytes]:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={git_dir}", *args],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=30,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if check and completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(completed.stderr.decode("utf-8", "replace").strip())
-    return completed
-
-
 def verify_git_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
     authority_main = run_git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main").stdout.strip()
     if not OID_RE.fullmatch(authority_main):
@@ -291,45 +209,7 @@ def verify_git_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
     if not target_in_evidence:
         raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
 
-    source_main = None
-    if binding.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-        source_main = binding.source_registry_main_oid
-        source_type = run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", source_main).stdout.strip()
-        if source_type != "commit":
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("source_registry_main_oid is not a commit")
-        target_in_source_main = run_git(
-            git_dir,
-            "merge-base",
-            "--is-ancestor",
-            binding.target_oid,
-            source_main,
-            check=False,
-        ).returncode == 0
-        if not target_in_source_main:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-                "approved target is not an ancestor of source registry main"
-            )
-    expected_tag_oid = binding.tag_oid
-    if expected_tag_oid is None and binding.version == "V2R2C1":
-        expected_tag_oid = V2R2C1_TAG_OID
-    if expected_tag_oid is not None:
-        local_tag = run_git(
-            git_dir,
-            "rev-parse",
-            "--verify",
-            f"refs/tags/{binding.version}",
-        ).stdout.strip()
-        if local_tag != expected_tag_oid:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-                "future release binding tag object differs from local tag"
-            )
-        if run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", local_tag).stdout.strip() != "tag":
-            raise ReleaseBlocked("release tag is not annotated")
-        peeled = run_git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{local_tag}^{{commit}}").stdout.strip()
-        if peeled != binding.target_oid:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release tag peeled target mismatch")
-
-    result = {
+    return {
         "authority_main_oid": authority_main,
         "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
         "target_is_ancestor_of_main": True,
@@ -337,90 +217,17 @@ def verify_git_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
         "evidence_object_type": evidence_type,
         "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
     }
-    if source_main is not None:
-        result["source_registry_main_oid"] = source_main
-        result["target_is_ancestor_of_source_registry_main"] = True
-    return result
 
 
-def _source_registry_git_provenance(
-    git_dir: Path,
-    binding: Binding,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Read M:path and C:path independently of the artifact metadata."""
-    if binding.source_registry_main_oid is None:
-        return None
-    verify_authoritative_repository(git_dir)
-    source_main = binding.source_registry_main_oid
-    source_path = binding.source_registry_path or f"versions/{binding.version}.json"
-    authority_main = run_git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main").stdout.strip()
-    if run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", source_main).stdout.strip() != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("source_registry_main_oid is not a commit")
-    if run_git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", authority_main).stdout.strip() != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Authority main OID is not a commit")
-    if run_git(
-        git_dir,
-        "merge-base",
-        "--is-ancestor",
-        source_main,
-        authority_main,
-        check=False,
-    ).returncode != 0:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-            "source registry main is not an ancestor of current Authority main"
-        )
-    source_blob = run_git_bytes(git_dir, "show", f"{source_main}:{source_path}").stdout
-    current_blob = run_git_bytes(git_dir, "show", f"{authority_main}:{source_path}").stdout
-    if source_blob != current_blob:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-            "current Authority main source registry entry differs from pinned M"
-        )
-    try:
-        source = json.loads(source_blob.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Git source registry entry is invalid") from exc
-    expected_tag_oid = binding.tag_oid
-    if expected_tag_oid is None and binding.version == "V2R2C1":
-        expected_tag_oid = V2R2C1_TAG_OID
-    expected = {
-        "version": binding.version,
-        "repository": "aios/aios",
-        "tag_oid": expected_tag_oid,
-        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "peeled_target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-        "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
-    }
-    if not isinstance(source, dict) or source.get("schema") not in {
-        "aios.source-registry.v1",
-        "aios.production-registry.v2",
-    }:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Git source registry schema is invalid")
-    if expected_tag_oid is None or any(source.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items()):
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Git source registry identity mismatch")
-    if source.get("tag_object") != expected_tag_oid:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Git source registry tag object mismatch")
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(source_blob).hexdigest()
-    if digest != binding.source_registry_sha256:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("Git source registry SHA-256 mismatch")
-    return {
-        "source_registry_main_oid": source_main,
-        "current_main_oid": authority_main,
-        "source_registry_path": source_path,
-        "source_registry_bytes": source_blob,
-        "source_registry_sha256": digest,
-        "source_registry_identity_verified": True,
-        "source_registry_main_converged": True,
-    }
+def verify_artifact(binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    path = Path(binding.artifact_path)
+    if path.stat().st_size != binding.artifact_size:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact size mismatch")
+    actual = sha256_file(path)
+    if actual != binding.artifact_sha256:
+        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact SHA-256 mismatch")
 
-
-def _verify_artifact_members(
-    path: Path,
-    required: set[str],
-    binding: Binding | None = None,
-    git_provenance: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Verify archive safety and independently verify packaged release data."""
+    if binding.version == "V2R1C7":
         # Python tarfile may not have zstd support on the target host, so
         # decompress into a private temporary tar and inspect it there.
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-artifact-verify-") as temp_dir:
@@ -437,11 +244,9 @@ def _verify_artifact_members(
             if completed.returncode != 0:
                 raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact zstd decompression failed")
             import tarfile
-
             with tarfile.open(tar_path, "r:") as archive:
-            members = archive.getmembers()
                 names: set[str] = set()
-            for member in members:
+                for member in archive.getmembers():
                     candidate = Path(member.name)
                     if (
                         candidate.is_absolute()
@@ -451,150 +256,17 @@ def _verify_artifact_members(
                         or not (member.isfile() or member.isdir())
                     ):
                         raise ReleaseBlocked(f"unsafe artifact member: {member.name}")
-                if member.name in names:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked(f"duplicate artifact member: {member.name}")
                     names.add(member.name)
-            source_path = None
-            if binding is not None and binding.version != "V2R1C7":
-                source_path = binding.source_registry_path or f"versions/{binding.version}.json"
-            required_members = set(required)
-            if binding is not None and binding.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-                required_members.add("payload/BUILD-METADATA.json")
-            if source_path is not None and binding is not None:
-                required_members.add(f"payload/{source_path}")
-            missing = sorted(required_members - names)
+            missing = sorted(REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS - names)
             if missing:
                 raise ReleaseBlocked(
                     "artifact missing required members: " + ",".join(missing)
                 )
-            verification: dict[str, Any] = {}
-            if binding is not None and source_path is not None:
-                member_name = f"payload/{source_path}"
-                member = archive.getmember(member_name)
-                stream = archive.extractfile(member)
-                if stream is None:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked("source registry member is unreadable")
-                raw = stream.read()
-                try:
-                    source = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-                except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked("source registry member is invalid") from exc
-                canonical_source = (
-                    json.dumps(source, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n"
-                ).encode("utf-8")
-                if raw != canonical_source:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked("source registry member is not canonical JSON")
-                expected_tag_oid = binding.tag_oid
-                if expected_tag_oid is None and binding.version == "V2R2C1":
-                    expected_tag_oid = V2R2C1_TAG_OID
-                expected = {
-                    "version": binding.version,
-                    "repository": "aios/aios",
-                    "tag_oid": expected_tag_oid,
-                    "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                    "peeled_target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                    "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-                    "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
-                }
-                if expected_tag_oid is None:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked("future release binding tag object is required")
-                if not isinstance(source, dict) or any(
-                    source.get(key) != value for key, value in expected.items()
-                ):
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked("packaged source registry identity mismatch")
-                if source.get("tag_object") != expected_tag_oid:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked("packaged source registry tag object mismatch")
-                source_digest = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-                if git_provenance is not None:
-                    if raw != git_provenance["source_registry_bytes"]:
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                            "packaged source registry differs from Git M:path"
-                        )
-                    if source_digest != git_provenance["source_registry_sha256"]:
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                            "packaged source registry SHA-256 differs from Git M:path"
-                        )
-                verification.update(
-                    {
-                        "source_registry_path": source_path,
-                        "source_registry_sha256": source_digest,
-                        "source_registry_identity_verified": True,
-                    }
-                )
-                if binding.source_registry_sha256 is not None:
-                    if source_digest != binding.source_registry_sha256:
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked("packaged source registry SHA-256 mismatch")
-                    metadata_member = archive.getmember("payload/BUILD-METADATA.json")
-                    metadata_stream = archive.extractfile(metadata_member)
-                    if metadata_stream is None:
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked("BUILD-METADATA.json is unreadable")
-                    try:
-                        metadata = json.loads(metadata_stream.read().decode("utf-8"))
-                    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked("BUILD-METADATA.json is invalid") from exc
-                    metadata_expected = {
-                        "release_target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                        "source_registry_main_oid": binding.source_registry_main_oid,
-                        "source_registry_path": source_path,
-                        "source_registry_sha256": binding.source_registry_sha256,
-                    }
-                    if not isinstance(metadata, dict) or any(
-                        metadata.get(key) != value
-                        for key, value in metadata_expected.items()
-                    ):
-                        raise ReleaseBlocked("BUILD-METADATA source provenance mismatch")
-                    verification["build_metadata_provenance_verified"] = True
-                if git_provenance is not None:
-                    verification.update(
-                        {
-                            "git_source_registry_member_verified": True,
-                            "git_source_registry_main_converged": True,
-                            "git_source_registry_sha256": git_provenance[
-                                "source_registry_sha256"
-                            ],
-                        }
-                    )
-            return verification
-
-
-def verify_artifact(
-    binding: Binding,
-    *,
-    repository: Path | str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    path = Path(binding.artifact_path)
-    if path.stat().st_size != binding.artifact_size:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact size mismatch")
-    actual = sha256_file(path)
-    if actual != binding.artifact_sha256:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("artifact SHA-256 mismatch")
-
-    required = {
-        "V2R1C7": REQUIRED_V2R1C7_MEMBERS,
-        "V2R2C1": REQUIRED_V2R2C1_MEMBERS,
-    }.get(binding.version)
-    member_verification: dict[str, Any] = {}
-    git_provenance = None
-    if binding.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-        git_provenance = _source_registry_git_provenance(
-            Path(repository) if repository is not None else Path(
-                configured_authoritative_git_dir()
-            ),
-            binding,
-        )
-    if required or binding.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-        member_verification = _verify_artifact_members(
-            path,
-            required or set(),
-            binding,
-            git_provenance,
-        )
     return {
         "artifact_path": str(path),
         "artifact_sha256": actual,
         "artifact_size": binding.artifact_size,
         "verified": True,
-        **member_verification,
     }
 
 
@@ -610,18 +282,6 @@ def verify_authorization(receipt: Mapping[str, Any], binding: Binding) -> dict[s
         "artifact_sha256": binding.artifact_sha256,
         "approval_plan_id": binding.approval_plan_id,
     }
-    if binding.tag_oid is not None:
-        expected["tag_oid"] = binding.tag_oid
-        expected["binding_schema"] = binding.binding_schema or "aios.release-binding.v2"
-    if binding.source_registry_main_oid is not None:
-        expected.update(
-            {
-                "source_registry_main_oid": binding.source_registry_main_oid,
-                "source_registry_path": binding.source_registry_path
-                or f"versions/{binding.version}.json",
-                "source_registry_sha256": binding.source_registry_sha256,
-            }
-        )
     for key, value in expected.items():
         if receipt.get(key) != value:
             raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(f"Owner authorization mismatch: {key}")
@@ -773,29 +433,13 @@ def tag_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
     tag_oid = probe.get("tag_oid")
     if not isinstance(tag_oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(tag_oid):
         raise ReleaseBlocked("verified annotated tag object OID missing")
-    if binding.tag_oid is not None and tag_oid != binding.tag_oid:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired(
-            "same-name tag object differs from the future release binding"
-        )
     return dict(probe)
 
 
 def deploy_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    def require_runtime_registry(result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        if binding.source_registry_main_oid is None:
-            return
-        if (
-            result.get("runtime_bundle_contains_current_version") is not True
-            or result.get("runtime_registry_converged") is not True
-        ):
-            raise ReconciliationRequired(
-                "runtime bundle/runtime registry convergence was not independently verified"
-            )
-
     probe = run_adapter(command, binding.request("probe"))
     require_exact_response(probe, binding)
     if probe.get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
-        require_runtime_registry(probe)
         return dict(probe)
     if probe.get("status") == "CONFLICT":
         raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("production runtime has conflicting binding")
@@ -814,30 +458,9 @@ def deploy_step(command: Sequence[str], binding: Binding) -> dict[str, Any]:
         or probe.get("production_deployed") is not True
     ):
         raise ReconciliationRequired("production health contract is not ACTIVE")
-    require_runtime_registry(probe)
     return dict(probe)
 
 
-def verify_post_deploy_source_registry(
-    repository: Path,
-    binding: Binding,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Re-read authoritative Git after runtime deployment and before closure."""
-    if binding.source_registry_main_oid is None:
-        return {
-            "source_registry_converged": "not_required",
-            "source_registry_check": "not_required_for_legacy_binding",
-        }
-    provenance = _source_registry_git_provenance(repository, binding)
-    if provenance is None:
-        raise ReconciliationRequired("authoritative source registry was not checked")
-    return {
-        **provenance,
-        "source_registry_converged": True,
-        "source_registry_check": "post_deploy_authoritative_git_read",
-    }
-
-
 def finalize_step(
     command: Sequence[str],
     binding: Binding,
@@ -878,7 +501,7 @@ def execute(
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     authorization = verify_authorization(secure_json(authorization_path), binding)
     lineage = verify_git_lineage(repository, binding)
-    artifact = verify_artifact(binding, repository=repository)
+    artifact = verify_artifact(binding)
     state = DurableState(state_root, binding)
     with FileLock(state_root / "executor.lock"):
         state.record(
@@ -895,13 +518,6 @@ def execute(
             runtime = deploy_step(deploy_command, binding)
             state.record("RUNTIME_VERIFIED", "runtime", runtime)
 
-            # The runtime adapter proves only runtime facts.  Re-read M:path
-            # and C:path from authoritative Git immediately before Registry
-            # and Baseline closure so a post-preflight main change cannot be
-            # mistaken for source convergence.
-            source_registry = verify_post_deploy_source_registry(repository, binding)
-            state.record("SOURCE_REGISTRY_VERIFIED", "source_registry", source_registry)
-
             registry = finalize_step(
                 registry_command,
                 binding,
@@ -931,21 +547,10 @@ def execute(
                 require_exact_response(value, binding)
             if final_runtime.get("status") != "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
                 raise ReconciliationRequired("final runtime readback failed")
-            if binding.source_registry_main_oid is not None and not all(
-                final_runtime.get(name) is True
-                for name in (
-                    "runtime_bundle_contains_current_version",
-                    "runtime_registry_converged",
-                )
-            ):
-                raise ReconciliationRequired(
-                    "final runtime registry convergence readback failed"
-                )
             if final_registry.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
                 raise ReconciliationRequired("final Registry readback failed")
             if final_baseline.get("status") != "VERIFIED":
                 raise ReconciliationRequired("final Baseline readback failed")
-            final_source_registry = verify_post_deploy_source_registry(repository, binding)
             final = {
                 "status": "PRODUCTION_ACCEPTED",
                 "version": binding.version,
@@ -956,7 +561,6 @@ def execute(
                 "tag_oid": tag["tag_oid"],
                 "tag": final_tag,
                 "runtime": final_runtime,
-                "source_registry": final_source_registry,
                 "registry": final_registry,
                 "baseline": final_baseline,
                 "force_push_used": False,
@@ -996,11 +600,6 @@ def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     p.add_argument("--evidence-closure-oid", required=True)
     p.add_argument("--artifact-sha256", required=True)
     p.add_argument("--approval-plan-id", required=True)
-    p.add_argument("--tag-oid")
-    p.add_argument("--binding-schema")
-    p.add_argument("--source-registry-main-oid")
-    p.add_argument("--source-registry-path")
-    p.add_argument("--source-registry-sha256")
     p.add_argument("--production-service", required=True)
     p.add_argument("--production-port", required=True, type=int)
     p.add_argument("--repository-identity", default="aios/aios")
@@ -1024,11 +623,6 @@ def main() -> int:
         production_service=args.production_service,
         production_port=args.production_port,
         repository_identity=args.repository_identity,
-        tag_oid=args.tag_oid,
-        binding_schema=args.binding_schema,
-        source_registry_main_oid=args.source_registry_main_oid,
-        source_registry_path=args.source_registry_path,
-        source_registry_sha256=args.source_registry_sha256,
     )
     try:
         result = execute(

active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py

@@ -964,6 +964,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
     required = {
         "schema",
         "task_id",
+        "job_id",
         "repository",
         "branch_mode",
         "base_oid",
@@ -976,6 +977,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
         raise ProvisioningError("LEASE_REQUEST_V2_FIELDS_REJECTED", 409)
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
         task_id=str(raw["task_id"]),
+        job_id=str(raw["job_id"]),
         repository=str(raw["repository"]),
         branch_mode=str(raw["branch_mode"]),
         base_oid=str(raw["base_oid"]),
@@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
     return {
         "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
         "task_id": request.task_id,
+        "job_id": request.job_id,
         "repository": request.repository,
         "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
         "base_oid": request.base_oid,

active-runtime/app/gitea_tag_publication.py

@@ -64,40 +64,6 @@ class PublicationError(RuntimeError):
     pass
 
 
-class PublicationValueError(PublicationError, ValueError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str):
-        self.code = code
-        super().__init__(message)
-
-
-class InvalidReleaseVersion(PublicationValueError):
-    def __init__(self):
-        super().__init__("INVALID_RELEASE_VERSION", "invalid release version")
-
-
-class GiteaConfigurationError(PublicationValueError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str):
-        super().__init__(code, code)
-
-
-class GiteaUnavailableError(PublicationError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str = "GITEA_UNAVAILABLE"):
-        self.code = code
-        super().__init__(code)
-
-
-class GiteaTagNotFound(PublicationError):
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.code = "TAG_NOT_FOUND"
-        super().__init__(self.code)
-
-
-class TagTargetMismatch(PublicationError):
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.code = "TAG_TARGET_MISMATCH"
-        super().__init__(self.code)
-
-
 class PublicationConflict(PublicationError):
     pass
 
@@ -119,7 +85,7 @@ class PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired(
 def validate_version(version: str) -> str:
     value = str(version or "")
     if not VERSION_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise InvalidReleaseVersion()
+        raise ValueError("invalid release version")
     return value
 
 
@@ -436,40 +402,6 @@ class GitTagBackend:
         )
 
 
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GiteaClientConfig:
-    api_url: str
-    repository: str
-    token_file: Path
-    remote: str = "gitea"
-    token_line: int = 1
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_authoritative_environment(cls, environ: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> "GiteaClientConfig":
-        values = os.environ if environ is None else environ
-        api_url = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL", "")).strip()
-        repository = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY", "")).strip()
-        token_ref = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE", "")).strip()
-        if not api_url:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_API_URL_MISSING")
-        if not api_url.startswith(("https://", "http://")):
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_API_URL_INVALID")
-        if not repository:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_MISSING")
-        if repository.count("/") != 1 or repository.startswith("/"):
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_INVALID")
-        if not token_ref:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_MISSING")
-        token_file = Path(token_ref)
-        if not token_file.is_absolute():
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_INVALID")
-        remote = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE", "gitea")).strip() or "gitea"
-        token_line = int(str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE", "1")))
-        if token_line < 1:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_INVALID")
-        return cls(api_url, repository, token_file, remote, token_line)
-
-
 class GiteaTagClient:
     def __init__(
         self,
@@ -479,37 +411,23 @@ class GiteaTagClient:
         timeout: float = 15,
         token_line: int = 1,
     ):
-        self.api_url = str(api_url or "").rstrip("/")
-        self.repository = str(repository or "").strip("/")
-        self.token_file = Path(token_file)
+        self.api_url = api_url.rstrip("/")
+        self.repository = repository.strip("/")
+        self.token_file = token_file
         self.timeout = timeout
         self.token_line = token_line
-        if not self.api_url:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_API_URL_MISSING")
         if not self.api_url.startswith(("https://", "http://")):
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_API_URL_INVALID")
-        if not self.repository:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_MISSING")
+            raise ValueError("Gitea API URL must be HTTP(S)")
         if self.repository.count("/") != 1:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_REPOSITORY_INVALID")
-        if not str(token_file) or not self.token_file.is_absolute():
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_MISSING")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_authoritative_environment(cls, environ: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> "GiteaTagClient":
-        config = GiteaClientConfig.from_authoritative_environment(environ)
-        return cls(config.api_url, config.repository, config.token_file, token_line=config.token_line)
+            raise ValueError("Gitea repository must be owner/name")
 
     def _get(self, path: str) -> Any:
-        try:
         lines = self.token_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
-        except (OSError, UnicodeError) as exc:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
         if self.token_line < 1 or self.token_line > len(lines):
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+            raise RuntimeError("Gitea credential reference has no configured token line")
         token = lines[self.token_line - 1].strip()
         if not token:
-            raise GiteaConfigurationError("GITEA_TOKEN_REFERENCE_INVALID")
+            raise RuntimeError("Gitea token file is empty")
         request = urllib.request.Request(
             f"{self.api_url}{path}",
             headers={
@@ -521,12 +439,10 @@ class GiteaTagClient:
         try:
             with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
                 return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-            if exc.code == 404:
-                raise GiteaTagNotFound() from exc
-            raise GiteaUnavailableError() from exc
-        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
-            raise GiteaUnavailableError() from exc
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, urllib.error.HTTPError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            status = getattr(exc, "code", None)
+            detail = f" HTTP {status}" if status else ""
+            raise RuntimeError(f"Gitea API unavailable{detail}") from exc
 
     def repository_identity(self) -> str:
         repository = self._get(f"/repos/{self.repository}")
@@ -1034,12 +950,6 @@ class TagPublisher:
                 listing = state.get("gitea_listing_visible") is True
             expected_tag_oid = state.get("tag_oid")
             registry_tag_oid = registry.get("tag_oid") or registry.get("tag_object")
-            target_mismatch = any(
-                isinstance(value, tuple)
-                and len(value) > 1
-                and value[1] not in (None, request.target_oid)
-                for value in (remote, api)
-            )
             checks = {
                 "fingerprint": all(
                     baseline.get(field) == getattr(request, field)
@@ -1064,7 +974,7 @@ class TagPublisher:
                 and registry.get("enabled") is True,
             }
             status = "PASS" if all(checks.values()) else "FAIL"
-            result = {
+            return {
                 "version": request.version,
                 "status": status,
                 "checks": checks,
@@ -1076,19 +986,8 @@ class TagPublisher:
                 "gitea_listing_visible": listing,
                 "repository_identity": repository_identity,
             }
-            if target_mismatch:
-                result["fail_closed"] = True
-                result["error"] = TagTargetMismatch().code
-            return result
         except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired:
             raise
-        except PublicationError as exc:
-            return {
-                "version": request.version,
-                "status": "UNKNOWN",
-                "fail_closed": True,
-                "error": str(getattr(exc, "code", exc)),
-            }
         except Exception as exc:
             return {
                 "version": request.version,

active-runtime/app/governed_production_release.py

@@ -29,18 +29,9 @@ from gitea_tag_publication import (
     PublicationRequest,
     TagPublisher,
 )
-from version_registry import (
-    RegistryConvergenceError,
-    assert_source_registry_convergence,
-    resolve_source_registry_main_oid,
-    source_registry_snapshot,
-    verify_authoritative_repository,
-    verify_source_registry_git_identity,
-)
 
 
 VERSION = "V2R2C1"
-TAG_OID = "07fc2746b688f5f243f29b39de39f32edc3dd9d2"
 TARGET_OID = "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad"
 EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID = "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2"
 APPROVAL_PLAN_ID = "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e"
@@ -88,7 +79,6 @@ def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any], mode: int = 0o600) -> None
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class ReleaseBinding:
     version: str = VERSION
-    tag_oid: str = TAG_OID
     target_oid: str = TARGET_OID
     evidence_closure_oid: str = EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID
     approval_plan_id: str = APPROVAL_PLAN_ID
@@ -99,8 +89,6 @@ class ReleaseBinding:
     def validate(self) -> None:
         if self.version != VERSION or self.repository != REPOSITORY:
             raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release binding is outside V2R2C1 scope")
-        if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.tag_oid) or self.tag_oid != TAG_OID:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 tag_oid mismatch")
         if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.target_oid) or self.target_oid != TARGET_OID:
             raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("V2R2C1 target_oid mismatch")
         if not OID_RE.fullmatch(self.evidence_closure_oid) or self.evidence_closure_oid != EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID:
@@ -204,48 +192,19 @@ def _ancestor(git_dir: Path, ancestor: str, descendant: str) -> bool:
     ).returncode == 0
 
 
-def verify_lineage(
-    git_dir: Path,
-    binding: ReleaseBinding,
-    *,
-    authority_main_oid: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
+def verify_lineage(git_dir: Path, binding: ReleaseBinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
     binding.validate()
-    main_oid = authority_main_oid or _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main")
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(main_oid) or _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", main_oid) != "commit":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("authoritative main OID is not a commit")
     if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.target_oid) != "commit":
         raise ReleaseBlocked("approved target_oid is not a commit")
     if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", binding.evidence_closure_oid) != "commit":
         raise ReleaseBlocked("evidence closure is not a commit")
     if not _ancestor(git_dir, binding.target_oid, binding.evidence_closure_oid):
         raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("approved target is not an ancestor of evidence closure")
-    if not _ancestor(git_dir, binding.target_oid, main_oid):
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("approved target is not an ancestor of source registry main")
     return {
         "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
         "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
         "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
-        "main_oid": main_oid,
-        "target_is_ancestor_of_main": True,
-    }
-
-
-def verify_local_annotated_tag(git_dir: Path, binding: ReleaseBinding) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Verify the local authoritative tag object without creating or rewriting it."""
-    tag_oid = _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{binding.version}")
-    if tag_oid != binding.tag_oid:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("local annotated tag object mismatch")
-    if _git(git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", tag_oid) != "tag":
-        raise ReleaseBlocked("release tag is not annotated")
-    peeled = _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{tag_oid}^{{commit}}")
-    if peeled != binding.target_oid:
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("local annotated tag target mismatch")
-    return {
-        "tag_oid": tag_oid,
-        "tag_object_type": "tag",
-        "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
-        "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+        "main_oid": _git(git_dir, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"),
     }
 
 
@@ -289,41 +248,9 @@ def build_production_artifact(
     binding: ReleaseBinding,
     output_root: Path,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a deterministic artifact from composite immutable provenance.
-
-    Release payload files are read from target ``T``.  The source registry is
-    read once from the pinned main/convergence commit ``M`` and its exact blob
-    bytes are reused for packaging and all recorded digests.
-    """
+    """Build a deterministic executable V2R2C1 health artifact from target_oid."""
     binding.validate()
-    verify_authoritative_repository(git_dir)
-    source_registry_main_oid = resolve_source_registry_main_oid(
-        git_dir,
-        main_ref="refs/heads/main",
-    )
-    verify_lineage(git_dir, binding, authority_main_oid=source_registry_main_oid)
-    tag_lineage = verify_local_annotated_tag(git_dir, binding)
-    try:
-        source_snapshot = source_registry_snapshot(
-            git_dir,
-            VERSION,
-            source_registry_main_oid=source_registry_main_oid,
-            expected_tag_oid=binding.tag_oid,
-            expected_target_oid=binding.target_oid,
-            expected_evidence_closure_oid=binding.evidence_closure_oid,
-            expected_approval_plan_id=binding.approval_plan_id,
-        )
-        source_registry = source_snapshot["record"]
-        source_registry_bytes = source_snapshot["bytes"]
-        verify_source_registry_git_identity(git_dir, source_registry)
-    except RegistryConvergenceError as exc:
-        raise ReleaseBlocked(f"SOURCE_REGISTRY_NOT_CONVERGED:{exc}") from exc
-    if source_snapshot["source_registry_main_oid"] != source_registry_main_oid:
-        raise ReconciliationRequired("source registry main OID changed during build")
-    if not _ancestor(git_dir, binding.target_oid, source_registry_main_oid):
-        raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("release target is not an ancestor of source registry main")
-    source_registry_path = source_snapshot["source_registry_path"]
-    source_registry_sha256 = source_snapshot["source_registry_sha256"]
+    verify_lineage(git_dir, binding)
     epoch = _commit_epoch(git_dir, binding.target_oid)
     output_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     stem = f"aios-{VERSION}-{binding.target_oid[:12]}"
@@ -334,14 +261,10 @@ def build_production_artifact(
         source_paths = {
             "active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py": "active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
             "active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py": "active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
-            "versions/V2R2C1.json": "versions/V2R2C1.json",
         }
         for destination, source in source_paths.items():
             target = root / destination
             target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            if destination == source_registry_path:
-                target.write_bytes(source_registry_bytes)
-            else:
             target.write_bytes(_payload_file(git_dir, binding.target_oid, source))
         generated: dict[str, str] = {
             "VERSION": VERSION + "\n",
@@ -384,6 +307,16 @@ def build_production_artifact(
                 "with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as r: print(json.dumps(json.load(r), sort_keys=True))\n"
             ),
             "scripts/rollback_v2r2c1_release.sh": "#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\nprintf '%s\\n' 'rollback requires governed owner-approved executor'\nexit 2\n",
+            "release-manifests/V2R2C1.json": json.dumps({
+                "schema": "aios.release-source.v2",
+                "version": VERSION,
+                "repository": REPOSITORY,
+                "target_oid": binding.target_oid,
+                "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
+                "production_deployed": False,
+                "deployment_state": "STAGING",
+                "artifact_kind": "executable-production-health",
+            }, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n",
         }
         for rel, text in generated.items():
             target = root / rel
@@ -395,10 +328,6 @@ def build_production_artifact(
             "schema": "aios.release-artifact-build.v3",
             "version": VERSION,
             "repository": REPOSITORY,
-            "release_target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-            "source_registry_main_oid": source_registry_main_oid,
-            "source_registry_path": source_registry_path,
-            "source_registry_sha256": source_registry_sha256,
             "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
             "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
             "source_date_epoch": epoch,
@@ -408,31 +337,6 @@ def build_production_artifact(
             "tag_created": False,
             "baseline_changed": False,
             "secrets_included": False,
-            "source_registry": {
-                "path": source_registry_path,
-                "version": source_registry["version"],
-                "tag_oid": source_registry["tag_oid"],
-                "target_oid": source_registry["target_oid"],
-                "peeled_target_oid": source_registry["peeled_target_oid"],
-                "evidence_closure_oid": source_registry["evidence_closure_oid"],
-                "approval_plan_id": source_registry["approval_plan_id"],
-                "source_registry_main_oid": source_registry_main_oid,
-                "source_registry_sha256": source_registry_sha256,
-            },
-            "provenance": {
-                "release_payload_source": {
-                    "commit_oid": binding.target_oid,
-                    "role": "release_target",
-                },
-                "source_registry_source": {
-                    "commit_oid": source_registry_main_oid,
-                    "path": source_registry_path,
-                    "sha256": source_registry_sha256,
-                    "role": "source_registry_convergence",
-                },
-                "release_target_is_ancestor_of_source_registry_main": True,
-                "local_annotated_tag": tag_lineage,
-            },
         }
         (root / "BUILD-METADATA.json").write_bytes(canonical(metadata))
         (root / "ROLLBACK-METADATA.json").write_bytes(canonical(json.loads((root / "deploy/aios-v2/v2r2c1-rollback.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))))
@@ -440,10 +344,6 @@ def build_production_artifact(
         (root / "ARTIFACT-MANIFEST.json").write_bytes(canonical({
             "schema": "aios.release-artifact-manifest.v3",
             "version": VERSION,
-            "release_target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-            "source_registry_main_oid": source_registry_main_oid,
-            "source_registry_path": source_registry_path,
-            "source_registry_sha256": source_registry_sha256,
             "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
             "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
             "repository": REPOSITORY,
@@ -475,10 +375,6 @@ def build_production_artifact(
         "schema": "aios.release-artifact-receipt.v3",
         "version": VERSION,
         "repository": REPOSITORY,
-        "release_target_oid": binding.target_oid,
-        "source_registry_main_oid": source_registry_main_oid,
-        "source_registry_path": source_registry_path,
-        "source_registry_sha256": source_registry_sha256,
         "source_head_oid": binding.target_oid,
         "evidence_closure_oid": binding.evidence_closure_oid,
         "artifact": str(output),
@@ -489,14 +385,6 @@ def build_production_artifact(
         "production_deployed": False,
         "tag_created": False,
         "baseline_changed": False,
-        "source_registry_path": source_registry_path,
-        "source_registry_identity": source_registry,
-        "provenance": {
-            "release_payload_source": binding.target_oid,
-            "source_registry_source": source_registry_main_oid,
-            "release_target_is_ancestor_of_source_registry_main": True,
-            "local_annotated_tag": tag_lineage,
-        },
     }
     atomic_json(output.with_suffix(output.suffix + ".receipt.json"), receipt, mode=0o640)
     return receipt
@@ -570,12 +458,6 @@ class GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
                 self.state.fail("RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", str(exc))
                 raise ReconciliationRequired(str(exc)) from exc
             result = dict(verified)
-            if result.get("tag_oid") != self.binding.tag_oid:
-                self.state.fail(
-                    "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
-                    "same-name tag object differs from the approved V2R2C1 tag",
-                )
-                raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("approved tag object mismatch")
             self.state.record("TAG_VERIFIED", "tag", result)
             return {"status": "REMOTE_VERIFIED", **result}
 
@@ -596,8 +478,6 @@ class GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
         tag_state = self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("tag")
         if not isinstance(tag_state, Mapping) or tag_state.get("state") not in {"GITEA_API_CONFIRMED", "REMOTE_VERIFIED"}:
             raise ReleaseBlocked("REMOTE_TAG_PROOF_REQUIRED")
-        if tag_state.get("tag_oid") != self.binding.tag_oid:
-            raise ManualOwnerReviewRequired("approved tag object mismatch")
         artifact = self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("production_artifact")
         if not isinstance(artifact, Mapping):
             artifact = self.build_artifact(request)
@@ -608,13 +488,6 @@ class GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
             "artifact_size": int(artifact["artifact_size"]),
             "artifact_sha256": artifact["artifact_sha256"],
         }
-        for name in (
-            "source_registry_main_oid",
-            "source_registry_path",
-            "source_registry_sha256",
-        ):
-            if name in artifact:
-                value[name] = artifact[name]
         # The production adapter is privileged and is run through the root
         # approved-release service boundary by the caller.  This handler is
         # still useful for a root-owned staging invocation and remains
@@ -634,21 +507,6 @@ class GovernedProductionReleaseExecutor:
         result["production_health"] = _health(self.config.health_url, self.binding, self.state.value.get("completed", {}).get("production_artifact", {}))
         result["registry"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.registry_root) / f"{VERSION}.json")
         result["baseline"] = _read_json(Path(self.config.baseline_path))
-        try:
-            assert_source = Path(self.config.registry_root) / f"{VERSION}.json"
-            if not assert_source.is_file():
-                raise RegistryConvergenceError("runtime_registry_entry_missing")
-            assert_source_registry_convergence(
-                assert_source,
-                repo_git_dir=self.config.authoritative_git_dir,
-            )
-            source_check = {"status": "PASS", "path": str(assert_source)}
-        except RegistryConvergenceError as exc:
-            source_check = {"status": "FAIL", "error": str(exc)}
-        result["source_registry"] = source_check
-        result.setdefault("checks", {})["source_registry"] = source_check["status"] == "PASS"
-        if result.get("status") == "PASS" and source_check["status"] != "PASS":
-            result["status"] = "FAIL"
         return result
 
     def acceptance(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:

active-runtime/app/message_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import datetime as dt
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+UTC = dt.timezone.utc
+_ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY = frozenset({"public", "tenant", "project", "private", "run"})
+_PRIVILEGED = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "message.admin", "task.admin"})
+
+
+class HandoffError(RuntimeError):
+    code = "HANDOFF_ERROR"
+
+
+class MessageScopeMismatch(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"
+
+
+class ConfidentialityScopeDenied(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"
+
+
+class MessageExpired(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_EXPIRED"
+
+
+class SequenceGap(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT"
+
+
+class SequenceConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_CONFLICT"
+
+
+class IdempotencyConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"
+
+
+def _utcnow() -> dt.datetime:
+    return dt.datetime.now(UTC)
+
+
+def _iso(value: dt.datetime | str | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    parsed = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00")) if isinstance(value, str) else value
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=UTC)
+    return parsed.astimezone(UTC).isoformat()
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _tuple_scope(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({str(item).strip() for item in value if str(item).strip()}))
+
+
+_SECRET_KEY = re.compile(r"(?i)(?:token|secret|password|private[_-]?key|api[_-]?key)")
+_SECRET_VALUE = re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{8,}|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+")
+_SAFE_REFERENCE = re.compile(r"^(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+
+
+def assert_payload_secret_safe(value: Any, *, key: str = "") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for child_key, child in value.items():
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=str(child_key))
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        for child in value:
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=key)
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (bytes, bytearray)):
+        raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if _SECRET_VALUE.search(value):
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        if _SECRET_KEY.search(key) and value and _SAFE_REFERENCE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DeliveryContext:
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_actor(cls, actor: Any) -> "DeliveryContext":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            if isinstance(actor, Mapping):
+                return actor.get(name)
+            return getattr(actor, name, None)
+        return cls(
+            tenant_id=_clean(get("tenant_id")),
+            user_id=_clean(get("user_id")),
+            project_id=_clean(get("project_id")),
+            conversation_id=_clean(get("conversation_id")),
+            run_id=_clean(get("run_id")),
+            capabilities=_tuple_scope(get("capabilities") or get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & _PRIVILEGED)
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MessageEnvelope:
+    source: str
+    target: str
+    message_type: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    sequence: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    capability_scope: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    confidentiality_scope: str = "private"
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = dataclasses.field(default_factory=lambda: _iso(_utcnow()) or "")
+    envelope_id: str = ""
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        assert_payload_secret_safe(self.payload)
+        for field in ("source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key", "tenant_id", "user_id",
+                      "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field, _clean(getattr(self, field)) if field not in {
+                "source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key"
+            } else (_clean(getattr(self, field)) or ""))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capability_scope", _tuple_scope(self.capability_scope))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "confidentiality_scope", (_clean(self.confidentiality_scope) or "private").lower())
+        object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _iso(self.expires_at))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "created_at", _iso(self.created_at) or "")
+        if not self.source or not self.target or not self.message_type or not self.idempotency_key:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_IDENTITY_REQUIRED")
+        if not isinstance(self.sequence, int) or self.sequence < 1:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_MUST_BE_POSITIVE")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope not in _ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope != "public" and self.tenant_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TENANT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and self.project_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PROJECT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and self.user_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_USER_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope == "run" and self.run_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_RUN_REQUIRED")
+        expected = stable_event_id(
+            source=self.source, target=self.target, message_type=self.message_type, payload=self.payload,
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id, user_id=self.user_id, project_id=self.project_id,
+            conversation_id=self.conversation_id, task_id=self.task_id, run_id=self.run_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id, causation_id=self.causation_id,
+            sequence=self.sequence, idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
+        )
+        if self.envelope_id and self.envelope_id != expected:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_ID_MISMATCH")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "envelope_id", expected)
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return _sha(self.payload)
+
+    @property
+    def stream_key(self) -> str:
+        return _sha({
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "source": self.source, "target": self.target,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "run_id": self.run_id,
+        })
+
+    def is_expired(self, *, now: dt.datetime | None = None) -> bool:
+        if self.expires_at is None:
+            return False
+        return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at) <= (now or _utcnow()).astimezone(UTC)
+
+    def as_record(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "envelope_id": self.envelope_id, "stream_key": self.stream_key, "source": self.source,
+            "target": self.target, "message_type": self.message_type, "payload_json": _canonical(self.payload),
+            "payload_sha256": self.payload_sha256, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id, "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id, "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id, "sequence": self.sequence,
+            "capability_scope_json": _canonical(self.capability_scope),
+            "confidentiality_scope": self.confidentiality_scope, "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at, "created_at": self.created_at,
+        }
+
+
+def stable_event_id(*, source: Any, target: Any, message_type: Any, payload: Any,
+                    tenant_id: Any = None, user_id: Any = None, project_id: Any = None,
+                    conversation_id: Any = None, task_id: Any = None, run_id: Any = None,
+                    correlation_id: Any = None, causation_id: Any = None,
+                    sequence: Any = None, idempotency_key: Any = None) -> str:
+    assert_payload_secret_safe(payload)
+    material = {
+        "source": _clean(source), "target": _clean(target), "message_type": _clean(message_type),
+        "payload_sha256": _sha(payload), "tenant_id": _clean(tenant_id), "user_id": _clean(user_id),
+        "project_id": _clean(project_id), "conversation_id": _clean(conversation_id),
+        "task_id": _clean(task_id), "run_id": _clean(run_id), "causation_id": _clean(causation_id),
+        "sequence": sequence, "idempotency_key": _clean(idempotency_key),
+    }
+    # Preserve historical envelope IDs for legacy rows that predate correlation_id.
+    if _clean(correlation_id) is not None:
+        material["correlation_id"] = _clean(correlation_id)
+    return _sha(material)
+
+
+def bind_envelope_scope(envelope: MessageEnvelope, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return envelope
+    if ctx.tenant_id is None:
+        if envelope.tenant_id is not None:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(MessageScopeMismatch.code)
+        return envelope
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        trusted = getattr(ctx, field)
+        requested = getattr(envelope, field)
+        if requested is not None and requested != trusted:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:{field}")
+        if requested is None and trusted is not None:
+            updates[field] = trusted
+    if not updates:
+        return envelope
+    data = dataclasses.asdict(envelope)
+    data.update(updates)
+    data["envelope_id"] = ""
+    return MessageEnvelope(**data)
+
+
+def authorize_delivery(actor: Any, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> None:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return
+    if not set(envelope.capability_scope).issubset(set(ctx.capabilities)):
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:capability")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "public":
+        return
+    if ctx.tenant_id != envelope.tenant_id:
+        raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:tenant_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and ctx.project_id != envelope.project_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:project_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and ctx.user_id != envelope.user_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:user_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "run" and ctx.run_id != envelope.run_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:run_id")
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  correlation_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);
+"""
+
+
+class DurableHandoffStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            columns = {str(row[1]) for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(message_handoff)")}
+            if "correlation_id" not in columns:
+                conn.execute("ALTER TABLE message_handoff ADD COLUMN correlation_id TEXT")
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_lineage "
+                "ON message_handoff(correlation_id, causation_id)"
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return conn
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _from_row(row: sqlite3.Row) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        return MessageEnvelope(
+            source=row["source"], target=row["target"], message_type=row["message_type"],
+            payload=json.loads(row["payload_json"]), tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], user_id=row["user_id"],
+            project_id=row["project_id"], conversation_id=row["conversation_id"], task_id=row["task_id"],
+            run_id=row["run_id"], correlation_id=row["correlation_id"],
+            causation_id=row["causation_id"], sequence=int(row["sequence"]),
+            capability_scope=tuple(json.loads(row["capability_scope_json"])),
+            confidentiality_scope=row["confidentiality_scope"], idempotency_key=row["idempotency_key"],
+            expires_at=row["expires_at"], created_at=row["created_at"], envelope_id=row["envelope_id"],
+        )
+
+    def put(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        if envelope.is_expired():
+            raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+        record = envelope.as_record()
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(replay)
+                if existing.envelope_id != envelope.envelope_id or existing.payload_sha256 != envelope.payload_sha256:
+                    raise IdempotencyConflict(IdempotencyConflict.code)
+                conn.commit()
+                return "REPLAY", existing
+            seq = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND sequence=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if seq is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(seq)
+                if existing.envelope_id == envelope.envelope_id:
+                    conn.commit()
+                    return "REPLAY", existing
+                raise SequenceConflict(SequenceConflict.code)
+            maximum = int(conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(sequence),0) FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key,),
+            ).fetchone()[0])
+            expected = maximum + 1
+            if envelope.sequence != expected:
+                raise SequenceGap(f"{SequenceGap.code}:expected={expected}:actual={envelope.sequence}")
+            columns = tuple(record)
+            placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in columns)
+            conn.execute(
+                f"INSERT INTO message_handoff ({','.join(columns)}) VALUES ({placeholders})",
+                tuple(record[column] for column in columns),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            return "CREATED", envelope
+
+    def get(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise KeyError(envelope_id)
+            envelope = self._from_row(row)
+            if envelope.is_expired():
+                conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,))
+                conn.commit()
+                raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+            authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+            return envelope
+
+    def pending(self, *, target: str, actor: Any, limit: int = 100) -> list[MessageEnvelope]:
+        if not 1 <= limit <= 1000:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PENDING_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        visible: list[MessageEnvelope] = []
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE target=? AND status='PENDING' ORDER BY created_at, sequence LIMIT ?",
+                (target, limit),
+            ).fetchall()
+            for row in rows:
+                envelope = self._from_row(row)
+                if envelope.is_expired():
+                    conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope.envelope_id,))
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+                except HandoffError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(envelope)
+            conn.commit()
+        return visible
+
+    def mark_delivered(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='DELIVERED', delivered_at=? "
+                "WHERE envelope_id=? AND status='PENDING'",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+    def acknowledge(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='ACKED', acked_at=? WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+
+class HandoffFabric:
+    def __init__(self, store: DurableHandoffStore) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+
+    def publish(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope, *, actor: Any | None = None) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        return self.store.put(bind_envelope_scope(envelope, actor) if actor is not None else envelope)

active-runtime/app/message_handoff_adapters.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from message_handoff import MessageEnvelope
+
+
+def _get(value: Any, *names: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    for name in names:
+        if isinstance(value, Mapping) and name in value:
+            return value[name]
+        if hasattr(value, name):
+            return getattr(value, name)
+    return default
+
+
+def agent_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                            idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(event, "payload", "data", default={}) or {}
+    target = target or _get(event, "target", "recipient")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", "producer", "agent_id", default="agent-event")),
+        target=str(target),
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "event_type", "type", "message_type", default="agent.event")),
+        payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default="")) or f"agent-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=_get(event, "causation_id"),
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def taskplane_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str, sequence: int = 1,
+                                idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    data = _get(event, "data", "payload", default={}) or {}
+    event_id = str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default=""))
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", default="task-plane")),
+        target=target,
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "type", "event_type", default="task.event")),
+        payload=dict(data),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or event_id or f"task-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=event_id or None,
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def legacy_message_to_envelope(message: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                               idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(message, "payload", "data", "body", "content", default={})
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping):
+        payload = {"value": payload}
+    target = target or _get(message, "target", "recipient", "receiver")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    source = _get(message, "source", "sender", "agent_id", default="legacy-message-bus")
+    kind = _get(message, "message_type", "type", "kind", default="legacy.message")
+    identifier = _get(message, "id", "message_id", "event_id")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(source), target=str(target), message_type=str(kind), payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or (str(identifier) if identifier else f"legacy:{sequence}"),
+        causation_id=str(identifier) if identifier else None,
+        **scope,
+    )

active-runtime/app/release_metadata_adapter.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Registry and authoritative runtime-anchor Baseline only.
 Registry is finalized before Baseline. Baseline apply independently verifies:
 - exact Authority annotated tag and peeled target
 - exact ACTIVE production health
-- exact runtime Registry record and source-registry convergence
+- exact V2R1C7 Registry record
 - exact previous Baseline file SHA-256 (CAS)
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ import time
 import urllib.error
 import urllib.request
 from pathlib import Path
-from version_registry import assert_source_registry_convergence
 from typing import Any, Mapping
 
 OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
@@ -98,40 +97,11 @@ def load_request() -> dict[str, Any]:
         raise ValueError("approval_plan_id_invalid")
     if "tag_oid" in value and not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(value["tag_oid"])):
         raise ValueError("tag_oid_invalid")
-    if "source_registry_main_oid" in value and not OID_RE.fullmatch(
-        str(value["source_registry_main_oid"])
-    ):
-        raise ValueError("source_registry_main_oid_invalid")
-    if "source_registry_sha256" in value and not SHA_RE.fullmatch(
-        str(value["source_registry_sha256"])
-    ):
-        raise ValueError("source_registry_sha256_invalid")
-    if "source_registry_path" in value:
-        source_path = str(value["source_registry_path"])
-        if (
-            not source_path.startswith("versions/")
-            or ".." in Path(source_path).parts
-            or "\\" in source_path
-            or not source_path.endswith(".json")
-        ):
-            raise ValueError("source_registry_path_invalid")
-    provenance = tuple(
-        value.get(name)
-        for name in (
-            "source_registry_main_oid",
-            "source_registry_path",
-            "source_registry_sha256",
-        )
-    )
-    if any(item is not None for item in provenance) and not all(
-        item is not None for item in provenance
-    ):
-        raise ValueError("source_registry_provenance_incomplete")
     return value
 
 
 def exact_response(value: Mapping[str, Any], status: str, **extra: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    result = {
+    return {
         "status": status,
         "version": value["version"],
         "target_oid": value["target_oid"],
@@ -140,14 +110,6 @@ def exact_response(value: Mapping[str, Any], status: str, **extra: Any) -> dict[
         "approval_plan_id": value["approval_plan_id"],
         **extra,
     }
-    for name in (
-        "source_registry_main_oid",
-        "source_registry_path",
-        "source_registry_sha256",
-    ):
-        if name in value:
-            result[name] = value[name]
-    return result
 
 
 def git(repository: Path, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
@@ -192,7 +154,7 @@ def health(url: str, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
 
 
 def registry_record(value: Mapping[str, Any], tag_oid: str, production_health: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    result = {
+    return {
         "schema": "aios.production-registry.v2",
         "version": value["version"],
         "repository": "aios/aios",
@@ -213,18 +175,10 @@ def registry_record(value: Mapping[str, Any], tag_oid: str, production_health: M
         "deployment_state": production_health["deployment_state"],
         "updated_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
     }
-    for name in (
-        "source_registry_main_oid",
-        "source_registry_path",
-        "source_registry_sha256",
-    ):
-        if name in value:
-            result[name] = value[name]
-    return result
 
 
 def registry_matches(record: Mapping[str, Any], value: Mapping[str, Any], tag_oid: str) -> bool:
-    matches = all(
+    return all(
         record.get(key) == expected
         for key, expected in {
             "version": value["version"],
@@ -238,16 +192,11 @@ def registry_matches(record: Mapping[str, Any], value: Mapping[str, Any], tag_oi
             "production_deployed": True,
         }.items()
     ) and record.get("registered") is True and record.get("enabled") is True
-    return matches and all(
-        record.get(name) == value.get(name)
-        for name in ("source_registry_main_oid", "source_registry_path", "source_registry_sha256")
-        if name in value
-    )
 
 
 def baseline_matches(record: Mapping[str, Any], value: Mapping[str, Any], tag_oid: str) -> bool:
     current = record.get("current_baseline") or record.get("version")
-    matches = current == value["version"] and all(
+    return current == value["version"] and all(
         record.get(key) == expected
         for key, expected in {
             "target_oid": value["target_oid"],
@@ -260,11 +209,6 @@ def baseline_matches(record: Mapping[str, Any], value: Mapping[str, Any], tag_oi
             "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
         }.items()
     )
-    return matches and all(
-        record.get(name) == value.get(name)
-        for name in ("source_registry_main_oid", "source_registry_path", "source_registry_sha256")
-        if name in value
-    )
 
 
 def registry_probe(args: argparse.Namespace, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -361,11 +305,6 @@ def baseline_apply(args: argparse.Namespace, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[s
         int(previous.get("generation", 0) or 0),
         int(previous.get("authority_generation", 0) or 0),
     ) + 1
-    assert_source_registry_convergence(
-        registry_path,
-        repo_git_dir=args.repository,
-        source_registry_main_oid=value.get("source_registry_main_oid"),
-    )
     record = {
         "schema": "aios.production-baseline.v2",
         "source_identity": "aios-gitops-runtime-anchor-baseline-authority-v1",
@@ -397,13 +336,6 @@ def baseline_apply(args: argparse.Namespace, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[s
         "promoted_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
         "promoted_by": "aios-approved-production-release-executor",
     }
-    for name in (
-        "source_registry_main_oid",
-        "source_registry_path",
-        "source_registry_sha256",
-    ):
-        if name in value:
-            record[name] = value[name]
     atomic_json(args.baseline_path, record)
     return baseline_probe(args, value)
 

active-runtime/app/search_agent_adapter.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from typing import Any
 
 from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
         domain_profiles: list[str] | None = None,
         user_scope: str = "public",
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         payload = {
             "query": query,
@@ -59,7 +63,11 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
             "session_profile": context.session_profile,
             "correlation_id": correlation_id,
         }
+        if actor is None and trace is None:
+            # Preserve adapter compatibility; the governed orchestrator itself
+            # still fails closed when trusted context is absent.
             return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 class OpenClawSearchClient(SearchGatewayAgentAdapter):

active-runtime/app/search_gateway.py

@@ -13,10 +13,18 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
 from typing import Any, Protocol
 from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .search_profile_resolver import DomainQueryProfileRegistry, SearchProfile, SearchProfileResolver
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -156,13 +164,25 @@ class SearchPolicyGuard:
 
 
 class SearchGateway:
-    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None):
+    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.providers = providers or []
+        self.governance_store = governance_store
         self.profile_resolver = SearchProfileResolver()
         self.planner = QueryPlanner()
         self.guard = SearchPolicyGuard()
 
-    def search(self, request: SearchRequest) -> SearchResponse:
+    def search(self, request: SearchRequest, *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> SearchResponse:
+        trusted_actor: GovernanceActor | None = None
+        if self.governance_store is not None:
+            if actor is None or trace is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            if request.requester != trusted_actor.identity:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="requester")
+            if request.correlation_id is not None and request.correlation_id not in {
+                trace.trace_id, trace.correlation_id
+            }:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION", field="correlation_id")
         request_id = request.correlation_id or f"search_{uuid4().hex[:12]}"
         profile = self.profile_resolver.resolve(request.group_profile, request.user_profile, request.session_profile)
         expanded_queries = self.planner.expand(request, profile)
@@ -184,14 +204,60 @@ class SearchGateway:
         attempts: list[SearchProviderAttempt] = []
         providers = self._ordered_providers(profile)
         for provider in providers:
+            if request.authorized_sources and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_DENY"))
+                continue
+            if request.user_scope != "public" and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_REQUIRED"))
+                continue
             try:
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    assert trusted_actor is not None and trace is not None
+                    input_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {"query": request.query, "intent": request.intent, "provider": provider.name},
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    invocation_key = hashlib.sha256(
+                        f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}:{provider.name}:{input_digest}".encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    authorization = self.governance_store.authorize_tool(
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        tool_name=f"search.{provider.name}",
+                        trace=trace,
+                        requested_scope=trace.scope,
+                        input_digest=input_digest,
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                    )
+                    if authorization.get("idempotent"):
+                        raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_REPLAY")
                 provider_evidence, attempt = provider.search(request, expanded_queries)
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    result_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {
+                                "evidence": [item.to_dict() for item in provider_evidence],
+                                "attempt": attempt.to_dict(),
+                            },
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    self.governance_store.record_tool_receipt(
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                        result_digest=result_digest,
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        trace=trace,
+                    )
                 evidence.extend(provider_evidence)
                 attempts.append(attempt)
                 if provider_evidence:
                     break
-            except Exception as exc:
-                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason=str(exc)))
+            except GovernanceError:
+                raise
+            except Exception:
+                # Provider exceptions may contain URLs, tokens, or local paths.
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason="PROVIDER_FAILURE"))
 
         if evidence:
             return SearchResponse(

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_api.py

@@ -7,27 +7,29 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway import SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 from .search_gateway_dashboard import SearchGatewayDashboard
 
 
-gateway = SearchGateway()
+orchestrator = SearchGatewayOrchestrator()
 dashboard = SearchGatewayDashboard()
 
 
-def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = SearchRequest(**payload)
-    return gateway.search(request).to_dict()
+def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 def get_search_gateway_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
     return {
         "module": "search-gateway",
         "status": "ready",
-        "providers_configured": len(gateway.providers),
+        "providers_configured": len(orchestrator.gateway.providers),
         "policy_guard": "enabled",
         "profile_customization": "enabled",
         "fallback_required_when_provider_unavailable": True,
+        "governance": "required",
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_orchestrator.py

@@ -3,24 +3,49 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
+import os
 
 from .search_audit_store import SearchAuditStore
 from .search_event_bridge import SearchEventBridge
 from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
 from .search_provider_registry import SearchProviderRegistry
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    ToolDescriptor,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
-    def __init__(self):
+    def __init__(self, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.registry = SearchProviderRegistry()
         self.audit = SearchAuditStore()
         self.events = SearchEventBridge()
-        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered())
+        self.governance = governance_store or GovernanceStore(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_SEARCH_GOVERNANCE_DB", "runtime/search-governance.sqlite3")
+        )
+        registrar = GovernanceActor(
+            "search-runtime-bootstrap", GovernanceScope("system"), ("system.admin",)
+        )
+        for provider in self.registry.ordered():
+            self.governance.register_tool(
+                ToolDescriptor(
+                    f"search.{provider.name}", "tool", GovernanceScope("global"), ("tool.search",)
+                ),
+                registrar,
+            )
+        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered(), governance_store=self.governance)
 
-    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceError
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        self.governance.record_trace(trace, actor)
         request = SearchRequest(**payload)
         self.events.search_started(request.to_dict())
-        response = self.gateway.search(request)
+        response = self.gateway.search(request, actor=actor, trace=trace)
         result = response.to_dict()
         for attempt in result.get("attempts", []):
             self.events.provider_attempted(result["request_id"], attempt)
@@ -35,6 +60,7 @@ class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
             "registry": self.registry.status(),
             "audit": "enabled",
             "events": "enabled",
+            "governance": "required",
         }
 
 

active-runtime/app/signer_contract_compatibility.py

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ import subprocess
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
 
-from aios_signer_broker import SignerBroker, SignerBrokerError, UnixSignerBroker
-
 
 _SIGNER_FLAGS = (
     "--namespace",
@@ -157,36 +155,6 @@ def _sign(
         raise SignerContractError("signer_output_empty")
 
 
-def run_signer_self_test(broker: SignerBroker | None = None) -> dict[str, str]:
-    active = broker or UnixSignerBroker()
-    try:
-        active.self_test()
-    except SignerBrokerError as exc:
-        raise SignerContractError(exc.code) from exc
-    return {"status": "PASS", "contract": "aios.signer-broker.v1"}
-
-
-def _sign_with_broker(
-    broker: SignerBroker,
-    payload_kind: str,
-    input_path: Path,
-    signature_path: Path,
-    key_id_path: Path,
-) -> None:
-    if signature_path.exists() or key_id_path.exists():
-        raise SignerContractError("contract_output_exists")
-    try:
-        signature, key_id = broker.sign(payload_kind, input_path.read_bytes())
-    except SignerBrokerError as exc:
-        raise SignerContractError(exc.code) from exc
-    if not signature or not key_id.strip():
-        raise SignerContractError("signer_output_empty")
-    signature_path.write_bytes(signature)
-    key_id_path.write_text(key_id.strip() + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    os.chmod(signature_path, 0o600)
-    os.chmod(key_id_path, 0o600)
-
-
 def _manifest(grant_dir: Path, names: Sequence[str]) -> None:
     rows = []
     for name in names:
@@ -316,8 +284,6 @@ def run_compatible_signer(
     signer_command: Sequence[str],
     grant_dir: Path,
     result_path: Path,
-    *,
-    broker: SignerBroker | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, str]:
     try:
         if not _supports_deployed_signer(signer_command):
@@ -352,21 +318,22 @@ def run_compatible_signer(
                 "signing_key_identity": signer,
             }
         prepared = _prepare(grant_dir)
-        active_broker = broker or UnixSignerBroker()
-        try:
-            active_broker.self_test()
-        except SignerBrokerError as exc:
-            raise SignerContractError(exc.code) from exc
-        _sign_with_broker(
-            active_broker,
-            "approval_plan",
+        config_path = Path(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_GRANT_ROOT_CONFIG", "/etc/aios/grant-root/config.json")
+        )
+        config = _read(config_path)
+        grant_namespace = str(config["grant_namespace"])
+        approval_namespace = str(config["approval_namespace"])
+        _sign(
+            signer_command,
+            approval_namespace,
             grant_dir / "approval-plan.canonical.json",
             grant_dir / "approval-plan.sig",
             grant_dir / "approval-plan.key-id",
         )
-        _sign_with_broker(
-            active_broker,
-            "grant_payload",
+        _sign(
+            signer_command,
+            grant_namespace,
             grant_dir / "grant-payload.canonical.json",
             grant_dir / "signed-grant.sig",
             grant_dir / "signed-grant.key-id",

active-runtime/app/task_plane/api.py

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ from .models import (
 )
 from .policy import PolicyEngine
 from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+from .scope import bind_task_scope
 from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
 
 
@@ -68,28 +69,54 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
         self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
 
-    def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def _authorized_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str, action: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id, self.policy.actor_context(actor))
+        self.policy.assert_allowed(action, actor, task=task)
+        return task
+
+    def create_task(
+        self,
+        body: dict[str, Any],
+        idempotency_key: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if body.get("parent_task_id"):
             raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
         issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
-        actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        declared_actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        actor = actor_identity or declared_actor
         self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
         try:
             plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
         except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
             raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
+        if actor_identity is not None:
+            plan = bind_task_scope(
+                plan, self.policy.actor_context(actor_identity), public_create=True
+            )
         task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
         return task.to_dict()
 
     def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        context = None
         if actor is not None:
             self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
-        return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
+            context = self.policy.actor_context(actor)
+        return [
+            task.to_dict(include_task=False)
+            for task in self.store.list_tasks(context)
+        ]
 
     def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        context = None
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+            context = self.policy.actor_context(actor)
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id, context)
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=task)
+        return task.to_dict()
 
     def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if actor is not None:
@@ -163,9 +190,8 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not worker_id:
             raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
 
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "claim")
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
         lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
             body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
         )
@@ -184,10 +210,9 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not claim_id:
             raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "heartbeat")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
         lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
@@ -206,10 +231,9 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         message = body.get("message")
         if progress is None:
             raise ValidationError("progress required")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "progress")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
         if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
             if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
                 raise ValidationError(
@@ -234,7 +258,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not claim_id:
             raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "result")
 
         status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
         outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
@@ -247,7 +271,6 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
             raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
         if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
@@ -326,8 +349,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "fail")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
@@ -339,8 +361,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
         reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "cancel")
         updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
             task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
         )
@@ -349,8 +370,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
     def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
-        parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
+        parent = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "delegate")
         if "task" in body:
             try:
                 child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
@@ -364,24 +384,30 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
             except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
                 raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
         child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
+        child_plan = bind_task_scope(
+            child_plan, self.policy.actor_context(actor), public_create=False
+        )
         child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
         return child.to_dict()
 
     def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "audit")
+        else:
             self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.store.list_events(task_id)
 
     def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "audit")
+        else:
             self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.evidence.list(task_id)
 
     def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "read")
+        else:
             self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.store.list_children(task_id)
 
@@ -506,7 +532,11 @@ class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 ):
                     raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
                 body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
-                return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
+                return 201, self.service.create_task(
+                    body or {},
+                    headers.get("idempotency-key"),
+                    actor_identity=identity,
+                )
             if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
                 raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
             body["actor_identity"] = identity

active-runtime/app/task_plane/events.py

@@ -106,3 +106,8 @@ class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
             receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
             error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
         )
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(event, *, target, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import taskplane_event_to_envelope
+    return taskplane_event_to_envelope(event, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,911 @@
+"""Durable multi-agent fleet scheduling for TaskPlane.
+
+The fleet layer decides *which* eligible worker should receive *which* queued task.
+It never replaces TaskPlane claim/lease ownership: callers must still perform the
+authoritative TaskPlane claim CAS after a reservation is returned.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import math
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS = 30
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD = 3
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 15 * 60
+MAX_SLOTS = 128
+
+
+class FleetError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class FleetConflict(FleetError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _text(value: object, default: str = "") -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    return str(value).strip() or default
+
+
+def _int(value: object, default: int, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID")
+    try:
+        result = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID") from exc
+    if result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _float(value: object, default: float, minimum: float, maximum: float) -> float:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    try:
+        result = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_INVALID") from exc
+    if not math.isfinite(result) or result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _mapping(value: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value
+    if hasattr(value, "to_dict"):
+        data = value.to_dict()
+        if isinstance(data, Mapping):
+            return data
+    if hasattr(value, "__dict__"):
+        return vars(value)
+    return {}
+
+
+def _attr(value: object, name: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(value, name, default)
+
+
+def _task_plan(task: object) -> object:
+    return _attr(task, "task_plan", _attr(task, "plan", task))
+
+
+def _task_id(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "task_id", _attr(_task_plan(task), "task_id", "")))
+
+
+def _task_status(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "status", "")).upper()
+
+
+def _task_revision(task: object) -> int:
+    return _int(_attr(task, "revision", 0), 0, 0, 2**31 - 1)
+
+
+def _task_created_at(task: object) -> float:
+    value = _attr(task, "created_at", _attr(task, "updated_at", 0.0))
+    try:
+        return float(value or 0.0)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return 0.0
+
+
+def _task_required_capabilities(task: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "required_capabilities", ())
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+def _task_metadata(task: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "metadata", {})
+    return value if isinstance(value, Mapping) else {}
+
+
+def _task_scope_key(task: object) -> str:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    scope_type = _text(_attr(plan, "scope_type", "legacy"), "legacy")
+    tenant = _text(_attr(plan, "tenant_id", ""))
+    project = _text(_attr(plan, "project_id", ""))
+    user = _text(_attr(plan, "user_id", ""))
+    if scope_type == "tenant":
+        return "tenant:" + tenant + "|project:" + (project or "*")
+    if scope_type == "system":
+        return "system"
+    return "legacy:" + (user or "*")
+
+
+def _worker_id(worker: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(worker, "worker_id", ""))
+
+
+def _worker_capabilities(worker: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    value = _attr(worker, "capabilities", ())
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        value = value.keys()
+    if not isinstance(value, Iterable) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetWorkerPolicy:
+    worker_id: str
+    max_slots: int = 1
+    failure_domain: str = "default"
+    weight: float = 1.0
+    labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
+    revision: int = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetDispatchDecision:
+    reservation_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    task_revision: int
+    scope_key: str
+    failure_domain: str
+    reserved_until: float
+    score: tuple[float, float, float, str]
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "reservation_id": self.reservation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
+            "scope_key": self.scope_key,
+            "failure_domain": self.failure_domain,
+            "reserved_until": self.reserved_until,
+            "score": list(self.score),
+        }
+
+
+class FleetStateStore:
+    """Small durable fleet journal colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database."""
+
+    def __init__(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection, lock: threading.RLock | None = None) -> None:
+        self.conn = connection
+        self.lock = lock or threading.RLock()
+        self._savepoint_counter = 0
+        self._ensure_schema()
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _transaction(self):
+        with self.lock:
+            self._savepoint_counter += 1
+            name = f"fleet_{threading.get_ident()}_{self._savepoint_counter}"
+            self.conn.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}")
+            try:
+                yield
+            except Exception:
+                self.conn.execute(f"ROLLBACK TO {name}")
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+                raise
+            else:
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+
+    def _ensure_schema(self) -> None:
+        with self.lock:
+            self.conn.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_capacity (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    max_slots INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    weight REAL NOT NULL,
+                    labels_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_scope_state (
+                    scope_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    virtual_finish REAL NOT NULL,
+                    dispatch_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    last_dispatched_at REAL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_dispatches (
+                    reservation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    scope_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    reserved_until REAL NOT NULL,
+                    claim_id TEXT,
+                    created_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_fleet_dispatch_worker_state
+                    ON fleet_dispatches(worker_id, state, reserved_until);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_failures (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    circuit_open_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_task_worker_failures (
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    blocked_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(task_id, worker_id)
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def configure_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        max_slots: int = 1,
+        failure_domain: str = "default",
+        weight: float = 1.0,
+        labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_ID_REQUIRED")
+        max_slots = _int(max_slots, 1, 1, MAX_SLOTS)
+        weight = _float(weight, 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        failure_domain = _text(failure_domain, "default")
+        normalized_labels = {
+            _text(k): _text(v)
+            for k, v in dict(labels or {}).items()
+            if _text(k) and _text(v)
+        }
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT revision FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current = int(row[0]) if row else 0
+            if expected_revision is not None and current != int(expected_revision):
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_POLICY_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            revision = current + 1
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_capacity(
+                    worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    max_slots=excluded.max_slots,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    weight=excluded.weight,
+                    labels_json=excluded.labels_json,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    worker_id,
+                    max_slots,
+                    failure_domain,
+                    weight,
+                    json.dumps(normalized_labels, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    revision,
+                    now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id, max_slots, failure_domain, weight, normalized_labels, revision
+        )
+
+    def worker_policy(self, worker_id: str) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision
+                FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return FleetWorkerPolicy(worker_id=worker_id)
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id=str(row[0]),
+            max_slots=int(row[1]),
+            failure_domain=str(row[2]),
+            weight=float(row[3]),
+            labels=json.loads(row[4] or "{}"),
+            revision=int(row[5]),
+        )
+
+    def _cleanup_expired(self, now: float) -> None:
+        self.conn.execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+               SET state='EXPIRED', updated_at=?
+             WHERE state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until<=?
+            """,
+            (now, now),
+        )
+
+    def reserved_slots(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        with self.lock:
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    def scope_virtual_finish(self, scope_key: str) -> float:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+
+    def reserve(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task_revision: int,
+        scope_key: str,
+        failure_domain: str,
+        score: tuple[float, float, float, str],
+        reservation_seconds: int,
+        now: float,
+        scope_weight: float,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        reservation_id = "fleet-" + _sha(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "worker_id": worker_id,
+                "task_revision": task_revision,
+                "scope_key": scope_key,
+            }
+        )[:32]
+        reserved_until = now + reservation_seconds
+        with self._transaction():
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            existing = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT reservation_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                       reserved_until,state
+                  FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE task_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            # Capacity is rechecked inside the same durable reservation transaction.
+            # This closes the cross-thread/process race between eligibility scoring and reserve.
+            policy_row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT max_slots FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            max_slots = int(policy_row[0]) if policy_row else 1
+            if existing and str(existing[6]) in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"} and float(existing[5]) > now:
+                if str(existing[1]) != worker_id or int(existing[2]) != task_revision:
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_TASK_ALREADY_RESERVED")
+                return FleetDispatchDecision(
+                    str(existing[0]), task_id, worker_id, task_revision, str(existing[3]),
+                    str(existing[4]), float(existing[5]), score
+                )
+
+            claim_columns = {
+                str(row[1])
+                for row in self.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+            }
+            active_claims = 0
+            if {"worker_id", "status"}.issubset(claim_columns):
+                sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+                params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+                if "lease_expires_at" in claim_columns:
+                    sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+                    params.append(now)
+                row = self.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+                active_claims = int(row[0] if row else 0)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND task_id<>?
+                   AND state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, task_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+            active_reservations = int(row[0] if row else 0)
+            if active_claims + active_reservations >= max_slots:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_CAPACITY_EXHAUSTED")
+
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_dispatches(
+                    reservation_id,task_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                    state,reserved_until,claim_id,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,'RESERVED',?,NULL,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    reservation_id=excluded.reservation_id,
+                    worker_id=excluded.worker_id,
+                    task_revision=excluded.task_revision,
+                    scope_key=excluded.scope_key,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    state='RESERVED',
+                    reserved_until=excluded.reserved_until,
+                    claim_id=NULL,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+                    failure_domain, reserved_until, now, now,
+                ),
+            )
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish,dispatch_count,revision FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current_finish = float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+            dispatch_count = int(row[1]) if row else 0
+            revision = int(row[2]) if row else 0
+            next_finish = max(current_finish, 0.0) + 1.0 / max(scope_weight, 0.05)
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_scope_state(
+                    scope_key,virtual_finish,dispatch_count,last_dispatched_at,revision
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(scope_key) DO UPDATE SET
+                    virtual_finish=excluded.virtual_finish,
+                    dispatch_count=excluded.dispatch_count,
+                    last_dispatched_at=excluded.last_dispatched_at,
+                    revision=excluded.revision
+                """,
+                (scope_key, next_finish, dispatch_count + 1, now, revision + 1),
+            )
+        return FleetDispatchDecision(
+            reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+            failure_domain, reserved_until, score
+        )
+
+    def bind_claim(self, reservation_id: str, claim_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT state FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE reservation_id=?",
+                (reservation_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_FOUND")
+            if str(row[0]) not in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"}:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_ACTIVE")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+                   SET state='CLAIMED', claim_id=?, updated_at=?
+                 WHERE reservation_id=?
+                """,
+                (claim_id, now, reservation_id),
+            )
+
+    def release(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        *,
+        state: str = "RELEASED",
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if state not in {"RELEASED", "COMPLETED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED"}:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_STATE_INVALID")
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE fleet_dispatches SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (state, now, task_id),
+            )
+
+    def worker_circuit_open(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT circuit_open_until FROM fleet_worker_failures WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def task_worker_blocked(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT blocked_until FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def record_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        threshold: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD,
+        base_circuit_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        threshold = _int(threshold, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD, 1, 20)
+        base_circuit_seconds = _int(base_circuit_seconds, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT consecutive_failures,revision FROM fleet_worker_failures
+                 WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            failures = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            open_until = None
+            if failures >= threshold:
+                exponent = min(failures - threshold, 8)
+                open_until = now + min(
+                    MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, base_circuit_seconds * (2**exponent)
+                )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=excluded.consecutive_failures,
+                    circuit_open_until=excluded.circuit_open_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, failures, open_until, _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now),
+            )
+        return {
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "consecutive_failures": failures,
+            "circuit_open_until": open_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,0,NULL,NULL,1,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=0,
+                    circuit_open_until=NULL,
+                    last_failure_class=NULL,
+                    revision=revision+1,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            )
+
+    def record_task_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        quarantine_seconds: int = 60,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        quarantine_seconds = _int(quarantine_seconds, 60, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT failure_count,revision FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            count = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            blocked_until = now + quarantine_seconds
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_task_worker_failures(
+                    task_id,worker_id,failure_count,blocked_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id,worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    failure_count=excluded.failure_count,
+                    blocked_until=excluded.blocked_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id, worker_id, count, blocked_until,
+                    _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "failure_count": count,
+            "blocked_until": blocked_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+
+class FleetScheduler:
+    """Deterministic capacity/fairness scheduler over existing TaskPlane records."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: Any,
+        workers: Any,
+        *,
+        now_fn: Any = time.time,
+        reservation_seconds: int = DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.workers = workers
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self.reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        connection = getattr(store, "conn", None)
+        if not isinstance(connection, sqlite3.Connection):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASKPLANE_SQLITE_CONNECTION_REQUIRED")
+        lock = getattr(store, "_lock", None)
+        self.state = FleetStateStore(connection, lock)
+
+    def configure_worker(self, worker_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        return self.state.configure_worker(worker_id, **kwargs)
+
+    def _online(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        method = getattr(self.workers, "is_online", None)
+        if not callable(method):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_REGISTRY_ONLINE_CHECK_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            return bool(method(worker_id, now=now))
+        except TypeError:
+            return bool(method(worker_id))
+
+    def _worker_record(self, worker_id: str) -> object:
+        getter = getattr(self.store, "get_worker", None)
+        if not callable(getter):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_LOOKUP_REQUIRED")
+        return getter(worker_id)
+
+    def _active_claims(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        # The TaskPlane store owns one SQLite connection in the current runtime.
+        # Fleet reads must share its lock just like fleet writes do, otherwise two
+        # concurrent pullers can issue overlapping operations on the same handle.
+        with self.state.lock:
+            columns = {
+                str(row[1])
+                for row in self.store.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+            }
+            required = {"worker_id", "status"}
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIMS_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED")
+            sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+            params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+            if "lease_expires_at" in columns:
+                sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+                params.append(now)
+            row = self.store.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _labels_match(policy: FleetWorkerPolicy, task: object) -> bool:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        affinity = metadata.get("fleet_affinity_labels") or {}
+        if affinity and not isinstance(affinity, Mapping):
+            return False
+        labels = dict(policy.labels or {})
+        for key, value in dict(affinity).items():
+            if labels.get(_text(key)) != _text(value):
+                return False
+        avoid = metadata.get("fleet_avoid_failure_domains") or []
+        if isinstance(avoid, Sequence) and not isinstance(avoid, (str, bytes)):
+            if policy.failure_domain in {_text(item) for item in avoid}:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+    def _eligible_worker(self, worker_id: str, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[bool, int, FleetWorkerPolicy]:
+        if not self._online(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        worker = self._worker_record(worker_id)
+        policy = self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        if self.state.worker_circuit_open(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if self.state.task_worker_blocked(_task_id(task), worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if not self._labels_match(policy, task):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        required = _task_required_capabilities(task)
+        capabilities = _worker_capabilities(worker)
+        if required and not required.issubset(capabilities):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        active = self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+        reserved = self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+        load = active + reserved
+        if load >= policy.max_slots:
+            return False, load, policy
+        return True, load, policy
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_priority(task: object, now: float) -> float:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        base = _int(metadata.get("fleet_priority"), 0, -100, 100)
+        created = _task_created_at(task)
+        waited = max(0.0, now - created) if created > 0 else 0.0
+        aging = min(100.0, waited / 60.0)
+        return float(base) + aging
+
+    def _task_score(self, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[float, float, float, str]:
+        scope = _task_scope_key(task)
+        virtual_finish = self.state.scope_virtual_finish(scope)
+        priority = self._task_priority(task, now)
+        return (virtual_finish, -priority, _task_created_at(task), _task_id(task))
+
+    def _tasks(self, actor_context: Any = None) -> list[object]:
+        lister = getattr(self.store, "list_tasks", None)
+        if not callable(lister):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASK_LIST_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            tasks = lister(actor_context)
+        except TypeError:
+            tasks = lister()
+        return [
+            task for task in tasks
+            if _task_status(task) in {"CREATED", "QUEUED"}
+            and _task_id(task)
+        ]
+
+    def rank_for_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[object]:
+        """Return fleet-ranked tasks without reserving or claiming anything."""
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            return []
+        ranked: list[object] = []
+        for task in self._tasks(actor_context):
+            eligible, _, _ = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+            if eligible:
+                ranked.append(task)
+        return sorted(ranked, key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+
+    def reserve_for_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task: object,
+        *,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        """Reserve exactly one already-ranked task, rechecking eligibility and capacity."""
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        eligible, _, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+        if not eligible:
+            raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_NOT_ELIGIBLE")
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        return self.state.reserve(
+            task_id=_task_id(task),
+            worker_id=worker_id,
+            task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+            scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+            failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+            score=self._task_score(task, now),
+            reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+            now=now,
+            scope_weight=scope_weight,
+        )
+
+    def select(
+        self,
+        worker_ids: Sequence[str],
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        limit: int = 1,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[FleetDispatchDecision]:
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        limit = _int(limit, 1, 1, 100)
+        worker_ids = tuple(dict.fromkeys(_text(item) for item in worker_ids if _text(item)))
+        tasks = sorted(self._tasks(actor_context), key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+        decisions: list[FleetDispatchDecision] = []
+        local_load: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for task in tasks:
+            if len(decisions) >= limit:
+                break
+            candidates: list[tuple[int, float, str, FleetWorkerPolicy]] = []
+            for worker_id in worker_ids:
+                eligible, load, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+                if not eligible:
+                    continue
+                effective_load = local_load.get(worker_id, load)
+                if effective_load >= policy.max_slots:
+                    continue
+                candidates.append(
+                    (
+                        effective_load,
+                        -policy.weight,
+                        worker_id,
+                        policy,
+                    )
+                )
+            if not candidates:
+                continue
+            candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (item[0], item[1], item[2]))
+            _, _, worker_id, policy = candidates[0]
+            score = self._task_score(task, now)
+            metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+            scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+            try:
+                decision = self.state.reserve(
+                    task_id=_task_id(task),
+                    worker_id=worker_id,
+                    task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+                    scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+                    failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+                    score=score,
+                    reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+                    now=now,
+                    scope_weight=scope_weight,
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            local_load[worker_id] = local_load.get(
+                worker_id,
+                self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+                + self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+                - 1,
+            ) + 1
+            decisions.append(decision)
+        return decisions

active-runtime/app/task_plane/models.py

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
+from .scope import normalize_task_scope
+
 
 SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
     "secret",
@@ -66,6 +68,12 @@ TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
     "allowed_input_paths",
     "allowed_output_paths",
     "output_policy",
+    "scope_type",
+    "tenant_id",
+    "user_id",
+    "project_id",
+    "conversation_id",
+    "run_id",
 }
 
 
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ class TaskPlan:
     schema_version: int = 1
     task_id: str | None = None
     task_type: str = "code.change"
+    scope_type: str = "legacy"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
     issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
     intent: str | None = None
     required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
@@ -311,10 +325,17 @@ class TaskPlan:
                 raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
             if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
                 raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
+        scope = normalize_task_scope(data)
         return cls(
             schema_version=schema_version,
             task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
             task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
+            scope_type=scope.scope_type,
+            tenant_id=scope.tenant_id,
+            user_id=scope.user_id,
+            project_id=scope.project_id,
+            conversation_id=scope.conversation_id,
+            run_id=scope.run_id,
             issuer=issuer,
             intent=data.get("intent"),
             required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
@@ -348,6 +369,12 @@ class TaskPlan:
             "schema_version": self.schema_version,
             "task_id": self.task_id,
             "task_type": self.task_type,
+            "scope_type": self.scope_type,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id,
             "issuer": self.issuer,
             "intent": self.intent,
             "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),

active-runtime/app/task_plane/policy.py

@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Callable
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
 from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
+from .scope import TaskActorContext, actor_context as build_actor_context
 
 
 RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
@@ -93,6 +94,10 @@ class PolicyEngine:
         result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
         probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
         identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
+        identity_actor_contexts: Mapping[
+            str, TaskActorContext | Mapping[str, Any]
+        ]
+        | None = None,
         admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
         readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
         readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
@@ -109,12 +114,26 @@ class PolicyEngine:
             identity: set(capabilities)
             for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
         }
+        self.identity_actor_contexts = dict(identity_actor_contexts or {})
         self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
         self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
         self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
             profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
         }
 
+    def actor_context(self, identity: str) -> TaskActorContext:
+        configured = self.identity_actor_contexts.get(
+            identity, self.identity_actor_contexts.get("*")
+        )
+        capabilities = set(
+            self.identity_capabilities.get(
+                identity, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
+            )
+        )
+        if identity in self.admin_identities:
+            capabilities.add("task.admin")
+        return build_actor_context(identity, configured, capabilities)
+
     def _readonly_worker_allows(
         self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
     ) -> bool:

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scheduler.py

@@ -74,3 +74,203 @@ class TaskScheduler:
             operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
         )
         return claim
+
+# R4.2 P2 durable multi-agent fleet scheduling public surface.
+from .fleet import (
+    FleetConflict,
+    FleetDispatchDecision,
+    FleetError,
+    FleetScheduler,
+    FleetStateStore,
+    FleetWorkerPolicy,
+)
+# R4.2 P2-B fleet-aware pull scheduling.
+#
+# The original TaskScheduler remains the security oracle and claim-CAS implementation.
+# Fleet ordering only controls the order presented to that oracle.
+import inspect as _fleet_inspect
+import threading as _fleet_threading
+from collections.abc import Mapping as _FleetMapping
+
+from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry as _FleetWorkerRegistry
+from .errors import NotFoundError as _FleetNotFoundError
+
+_LegacyTaskScheduler = TaskScheduler
+_LegacyScheduleParameters = _fleet_inspect.signature(
+    _LegacyTaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker
+).parameters
+_LegacyNextParameters = _fleet_inspect.signature(
+    _LegacyTaskScheduler.next_queued_task
+).parameters
+
+
+class _FleetOrderedStoreProxy:
+    def __init__(self, delegate, tasks):
+        self._delegate = delegate
+        self._tasks = tuple(tasks)
+
+    def list_tasks(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        return list(self._tasks)
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name):
+        return getattr(self._delegate, name)
+
+
+def _fleet_claim_field(claim, name, default=None):
+    if isinstance(claim, _FleetMapping):
+        return claim.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(claim, name, default)
+
+
+class TaskScheduler(_LegacyTaskScheduler):
+    """Fleet-integrated pull scheduler preserving legacy security and claim semantics."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        store = getattr(self, "store", args[0] if args else None)
+        if store is None:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_SCHEDULER_STORE_REQUIRED")
+        registry = getattr(self, "workers", None)
+        if registry is None:
+            registry = _FleetWorkerRegistry(store)
+        self.fleet_scheduler = FleetScheduler(store, registry)
+        self._fleet_local = _fleet_threading.local()
+
+    def _fleet_legacy_next(self, worker_id, tasks, *args, **kwargs):
+        proxy = _FleetOrderedStoreProxy(self.store, tasks)
+        legacy = _LegacyTaskScheduler(proxy)
+        legacy_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyNextParameters:
+            legacy_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        return legacy.next_queued_task(worker_id, *args, **legacy_kwargs)
+
+    def next_queued_task(self, worker_id, *args, **kwargs):
+        actor_context = kwargs.get(
+            "actor_context", getattr(self._fleet_local, "actor_context", None)
+        )
+
+        # Preserve legacy fail-closed worker checks before fleet ordering.
+        probe_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyNextParameters:
+            probe_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        legacy_probe = _LegacyTaskScheduler(self.store).next_queued_task(
+            worker_id, *args, **probe_kwargs
+        )
+        if legacy_probe is None:
+            return None
+
+        ranked = self.fleet_scheduler.rank_for_worker(
+            worker_id, actor_context=actor_context
+        )
+        # Preserve FleetScheduler fairness order. The legacy scheduler is used
+        # only as a fail-closed security oracle: present one fleet-ranked task
+        # at a time so its internal sort cannot reorder across scopes.
+        # Keep the legacy priority dimension ahead of Fleet fairness for
+        # compatibility with existing TaskPlane scheduling contracts; the
+        # Fleet order remains authoritative among equal-priority tasks.
+        def _legacy_priority(task):
+            plan = getattr(task, "task_plan", task)
+            metadata = getattr(plan, "metadata", {}) or {}
+            if not isinstance(metadata, _FleetMapping):
+                return 0
+            try:
+                return int(metadata.get("priority", 0))
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                return 0
+
+        ranked = sorted(ranked, key=lambda task: -_legacy_priority(task))
+        for ranked_candidate in ranked:
+            try:
+                candidate = self._fleet_legacy_next(
+                    worker_id, [ranked_candidate], *args, **kwargs
+                )
+            except _FleetNotFoundError:
+                continue
+            if candidate is None:
+                continue
+
+            ranked_id = getattr(
+                ranked_candidate,
+                "task_id",
+                getattr(getattr(ranked_candidate, "task_plan", None), "task_id", None),
+            )
+            candidate_id = getattr(
+                candidate,
+                "task_id",
+                getattr(getattr(candidate, "task_plan", None), "task_id", None),
+            )
+            if candidate_id != ranked_id:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_LEGACY_ORACLE_ORDER_VIOLATION")
+
+            try:
+                decision = self.fleet_scheduler.reserve_for_worker(
+                    worker_id, candidate
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            self._fleet_local.pending = decision
+            return candidate
+        return None
+
+    def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id, *args, **kwargs):
+        actor_context = kwargs.get("actor_context")
+        legacy_kwargs = dict(kwargs)
+        if "actor_context" not in _LegacyScheduleParameters:
+            legacy_kwargs.pop("actor_context", None)
+        self._fleet_local.actor_context = actor_context
+        self._fleet_local.pending = None
+        try:
+            claim = _LegacyTaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker(
+                self, worker_id, *args, **legacy_kwargs
+            )
+            decision = getattr(self._fleet_local, "pending", None)
+            if claim is None:
+                if decision is not None:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                return None
+            if decision is not None:
+                claim_id = _fleet_claim_field(claim, "claim_id")
+                claim_task_id = _fleet_claim_field(claim, "task_id", decision.task_id)
+                if not claim_id:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                    raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIM_ID_REQUIRED")
+                if claim_task_id != decision.task_id:
+                    self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                        decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                    )
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_CLAIM_TASK_MISMATCH")
+                self.fleet_scheduler.state.bind_claim(
+                    decision.reservation_id, str(claim_id)
+                )
+            return claim
+        except Exception:
+            decision = getattr(self._fleet_local, "pending", None)
+            if decision is not None:
+                self.fleet_scheduler.state.release(
+                    decision.task_id, state="RELEASED"
+                )
+            raise
+        finally:
+            self._fleet_local.pending = None
+            self._fleet_local.actor_context = None
+
+    def record_worker_failure(self, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_worker_failure(
+            worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id, **kwargs):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_worker_success(
+            worker_id, **kwargs
+        )
+
+    def quarantine_task_worker(
+        self, task_id, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+    ):
+        return self.fleet_scheduler.state.record_task_worker_failure(
+            task_id, worker_id, failure_class, **kwargs
+        )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Trusted TaskPlane scope model and SQL authorization helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .errors import ForbiddenError, ValidationError
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
+    {"*", "admin", "system.admin", "task.admin", "task.read.all"}
+)
+
+
+def _value(value: Any, field: str) -> Any:
+    if hasattr(value, "task_plan"):
+        value = value.task_plan
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(field)
+    return getattr(value, field, None)
+
+
+def _text(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    result = str(value).strip()
+    return result or None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskScope:
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskActorContext:
+    identity: str
+    scope_type: str = "legacy"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
+
+
+def normalize_task_scope(value: Any) -> TaskScope:
+    fields = {field: _text(_value(value, field)) for field in SCOPE_FIELDS}
+    declared = _text(_value(value, "scope_type"))
+    if declared is None:
+        declared = "tenant" if fields["tenant_id"] else "legacy"
+    if declared == "tenant":
+        if fields["tenant_id"] is None:
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "tenant scope requires tenant_id", code="TASK_SCOPE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED"
+            )
+    elif declared == "legacy":
+        if any(fields.values()):
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "legacy scope cannot contain scoped ownership",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_LEGACY_WITH_SCOPED_FIELDS",
+            )
+    elif declared == "system":
+        if any(fields[field] for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id")):
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "system scope cannot contain tenant ownership",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_SYSTEM_WITH_TENANT_FIELDS",
+            )
+    else:
+        raise ValidationError("invalid task scope type", code="TASK_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+    return TaskScope(declared, **fields)
+
+
+def actor_is_privileged(actor: TaskActorContext) -> bool:
+    return bool(actor.capabilities & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def actor_context(
+    identity: str,
+    configured: TaskActorContext | Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    capabilities: set[str] | frozenset[str],
+) -> TaskActorContext:
+    if isinstance(configured, TaskActorContext):
+        context = configured
+    else:
+        data = dict(configured or {})
+        data.pop("identity", None)
+        data.pop("capabilities", None)
+        context = TaskActorContext(identity=str(identity), **data)
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(context)
+    return replace(
+        context,
+        identity=str(identity),
+        scope_type=scope.scope_type,
+        tenant_id=scope.tenant_id,
+        user_id=scope.user_id,
+        project_id=scope.project_id,
+        conversation_id=scope.conversation_id,
+        run_id=scope.run_id,
+        capabilities=frozenset(str(item) for item in capabilities),
+    )
+
+
+def bind_task_scope(plan: Any, actor: TaskActorContext, *, public_create: bool) -> Any:
+    requested = normalize_task_scope(plan)
+    if actor_is_privileged(actor):
+        trusted = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+        if requested.scope_type == "legacy" and trusted.scope_type != "legacy":
+            plan.scope_type = trusted.scope_type
+            for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+                setattr(plan, field, getattr(actor, field))
+        return plan
+    trusted = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+    if public_create and trusted.scope_type == "legacy":
+        raise ForbiddenError(
+            "authenticated identity has no tenant scope",
+            code="TASK_ACTOR_SCOPE_UNAVAILABLE",
+        )
+    if trusted.scope_type != "tenant":
+        if requested.scope_type == "legacy":
+            plan.scope_type = trusted.scope_type
+            for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+                setattr(plan, field, getattr(actor, field))
+            return plan
+        if requested.scope_type != trusted.scope_type:
+            raise ForbiddenError("task scope mismatch", code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return plan
+    if requested.scope_type not in {"legacy", "tenant"}:
+        raise ForbiddenError("task scope mismatch", code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {"scope_type": "tenant"}
+    for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        declared = getattr(requested, field)
+        authoritative = getattr(actor, field)
+        if declared is not None and declared != authoritative:
+            raise ForbiddenError(
+                "task scope mismatch",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY",
+                details={"field": field},
+            )
+        updates[field] = authoritative
+    for field, item in updates.items():
+        setattr(plan, field, item)
+    return plan
+
+
+def actor_scope_sql(actor: TaskActorContext | None) -> tuple[str, tuple[Any, ...]]:
+    if actor is None or actor_is_privileged(actor):
+        return "", ()
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+    if scope.scope_type == "legacy":
+        return "scope_type = 'legacy'", ()
+    if scope.scope_type == "system":
+        return "scope_type = 'system'", ()
+    clauses = ["scope_type = 'tenant'", "tenant_id = ?"]
+    params: list[Any] = [scope.tenant_id]
+    for field in ("user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        value = getattr(scope, field)
+        if value is None:
+            clauses.append(f"{field} IS NULL")
+        else:
+            clauses.append(f"({field} IS NULL OR {field} = ?)")
+            params.append(value)
+    return " AND ".join(clauses), tuple(params)
+
+
+def task_scope_values(value: Any) -> tuple[str | None, ...]:
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(value)
+    return (
+        scope.scope_type,
+        scope.tenant_id,
+        scope.user_id,
+        scope.project_id,
+        scope.conversation_id,
+        scope.run_id,
+    )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/store.py

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ from .models import (
     redact_value,
     validate_identifier,
 )
+from .scope import TaskActorContext, actor_scope_sql, task_scope_values
 
 
 EventEnvelope = tuple[str, str, str, str, str, float]
@@ -134,6 +135,12 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                     status TEXT NOT NULL,
                     task_json TEXT NOT NULL,
                     task_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'legacy',
+                    tenant_id TEXT,
+                    user_id TEXT,
+                    project_id TEXT,
+                    conversation_id TEXT,
+                    run_id TEXT,
                     root_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                     parent_task_id TEXT,
                     correlation_id TEXT,
@@ -272,6 +279,21 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                 )
                 """
             )
+            self._ensure_columns(
+                "tasks",
+                {
+                    "scope_type": "TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'legacy'",
+                    "tenant_id": "TEXT",
+                    "user_id": "TEXT",
+                    "project_id": "TEXT",
+                    "conversation_id": "TEXT",
+                    "run_id": "TEXT",
+                },
+            )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET scope_type='legacy' "
+                "WHERE scope_type IS NULL OR TRIM(scope_type)=''"
+            )
             self._ensure_columns(
                 "workers",
                 {
@@ -299,6 +321,14 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             )
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_status ON tasks(status)")
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_parent ON tasks(parent_task_id)")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_scope_tenant_project "
+                "ON tasks(scope_type, tenant_id, project_id)"
+            )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_scope_owner "
+                "ON tasks(scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id)"
+            )
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_workers_status ON workers(status)")
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_claims_task ON claims(task_id)")
             self.conn.execute(
@@ -347,6 +377,42 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             raise NotFoundError("task")
         task_json = json.loads(row["task_json"])
         task_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(task_json)
+        stored_scope = tuple(
+            row[field]
+            for field in (
+                "scope_type",
+                "tenant_id",
+                "user_id",
+                "project_id",
+                "conversation_id",
+                "run_id",
+            )
+        )
+        json_has_scope = any(
+            field in task_json
+            for field in (
+                "scope_type",
+                "tenant_id",
+                "user_id",
+                "project_id",
+                "conversation_id",
+                "run_id",
+            )
+        )
+        if json_has_scope and stored_scope != task_scope_values(task_plan):
+            raise ConflictError(
+                "task scope persistence mismatch",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_PERSISTENCE_MISMATCH",
+            )
+        if not json_has_scope:
+            (
+                task_plan.scope_type,
+                task_plan.tenant_id,
+                task_plan.user_id,
+                task_plan.project_id,
+                task_plan.conversation_id,
+                task_plan.run_id,
+            ) = stored_scope
         task_plan.parent_task_id = row["parent_task_id"]
         task_plan.correlation_id = row["correlation_id"]
         return TaskRecord(
@@ -389,6 +455,7 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
         task_id = task_plan.task_id or f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
         task_plan.task_id = task_id
         task_json = redact_value(task_plan.to_dict(redact=False))
+        scope_values = task_scope_values(task_plan)
         now = _now()
         with self._transaction():
             if idempotency_key:
@@ -397,7 +464,11 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                     (idempotency_key,),
                 ).fetchone()
                 if existing:
-                    if _canonical(json.loads(existing["task_json"])) != _canonical(task_json):
+                    existing_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+                        json.loads(existing["task_json"])
+                    )
+                    existing_json = redact_value(existing_plan.to_dict(redact=False))
+                    if _canonical(existing_json) != _canonical(task_json):
                         raise ConflictError("idempotency key payload mismatch")
                     return self.get_task(existing["task_id"])
             root_task_id = task_id
@@ -412,14 +483,18 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             self.conn.execute(
                 """
                 INSERT INTO tasks
-                (task_id, revision, status, task_json, task_type, root_task_id, parent_task_id, correlation_id, idempotency_key, created_at, updated_at, failure_reason)
-                VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NULL)
+                (task_id, revision, status, task_json, task_type,
+                 scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, conversation_id, run_id,
+                 root_task_id, parent_task_id, correlation_id, idempotency_key,
+                 created_at, updated_at, failure_reason)
+                VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NULL)
                 """,
                 (
                     task_id,
                     "CREATED",
                     json.dumps(task_json, ensure_ascii=False),
                     task_plan.task_type,
+                    *scope_values,
                     root_task_id,
                     task_plan.parent_task_id,
                     task_plan.correlation_id,
@@ -451,21 +526,30 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                 )
             return self.get_task(task.task_id)
 
-    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
+    def get_task(
+        self, task_id: str, actor_context: TaskActorContext | None = None
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
         task_id = _validated_id(task_id, "task_id")
+        predicate, scope_params = actor_scope_sql(actor_context)
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?"
+        if predicate:
+            sql += f" AND ({predicate})"
         with self._lock:
-            row = self.conn.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
+            row = self.conn.execute(sql, (task_id, *scope_params)).fetchone()
         if row is None:
             raise NotFoundError(f"task {task_id} not found")
         return self._row_to_task(row)
 
-    def list_tasks(self) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+    def list_tasks(
+        self, actor_context: TaskActorContext | None = None
+    ) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+        predicate, scope_params = actor_scope_sql(actor_context)
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks"
+        if predicate:
+            sql += f" WHERE ({predicate})"
+        sql += " ORDER BY created_at DESC"
         with self._lock:
-            rows = self.conn.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM tasks ORDER BY created_at DESC"
-            ).fetchall()
+            rows = self.conn.execute(sql, scope_params).fetchall()
         return [self._row_to_task(row) for row in rows]
 
     def get_task_budget(self, task_id: str) -> Budget:

active-runtime/app/trace_tool_credential_governance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+"""Scope-bound governance for traces, Tool/MCP calls, and credentials.
+
+This module deliberately stores references and audit metadata only.  Secret
+material remains in the configured credential provider boundary.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "governance.admin"})
+REFERENCE_RE = re.compile(r"^(systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,179}$")
+
+
+class GovernanceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, field: str | None = None) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code if field is None else f"{code}:{field}")
+        self.code = code
+        self.field = field
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _scope_tuple(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({_clean(item) for item in value if _clean(item)}))
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _identifier(value: Any, code: str) -> str:
+    text = _clean(value)
+    if text is None or IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text) is None:
+        raise GovernanceError(code)
+    return text
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceScope:
+    """Explicit resource scope; system/global resources never get fake tenants."""
+
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "scope_type", (_clean(self.scope_type) or "").lower())
+        for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _clean(getattr(self, name)))
+        if self.scope_type == "tenant":
+            if self.tenant_id is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED")
+        elif self.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_NON_TENANT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        elif self.scope_type == "legacy":
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        else:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceScope":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+        declared = _clean(get("scope_type"))
+        tenant_id = _clean(get("tenant_id"))
+        return cls(
+            scope_type=declared or ("tenant" if tenant_id else "legacy"),
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            user_id=get("user_id"),
+            project_id=get("project_id"),
+            conversation_id=get("conversation_id"),
+            run_id=get("run_id"),
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceActor:
+    identity: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "identity", _identifier(self.identity, "GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.capabilities))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceActor":
+        if isinstance(value, cls):
+            return value
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID")
+        return cls(
+            identity=value.get("identity") or value.get("actor_id") or value.get("user_id"),
+            scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(value),
+            capabilities=_scope_tuple(value.get("capabilities") or value.get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def authorize_scope(actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], resource: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    resource = resource if isinstance(resource, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(resource)
+    if actor.privileged:
+        return
+    if resource.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SYSTEM_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+    if resource.scope_type == "legacy":
+        if actor.scope.scope_type != "legacy":
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        return
+    if actor.scope.scope_type != "tenant":
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field="scope_type")
+    for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        expected = getattr(resource, name)
+        actual = getattr(actor.scope, name)
+        if expected is not None and expected != actual:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field=name)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TraceContext:
+    trace_id: str
+    span_id: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "trace_id", _identifier(self.trace_id, "TRACE_ID_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "span_id", _identifier(self.span_id, "TRACE_SPAN_ID_INVALID"))
+        for name in ("parent_span_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id"):
+            value = _clean(getattr(self, name))
+            if value is not None and IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_IDENTIFIER_INVALID", field=name)
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
+
+    def child(self, *, span_id: str, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], **lineage: Any) -> "TraceContext":
+        authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        for name in ("trace_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id", "correlation_id"):
+            supplied = _clean(lineage.get(name))
+            expected = getattr(self, name)
+            if supplied is not None and expected is not None and supplied != expected:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field=name)
+        requested_scope = lineage.pop("scope", self.scope)
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != self.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return TraceContext(
+            trace_id=self.trace_id,
+            span_id=span_id,
+            parent_span_id=self.span_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id,
+            causation_id=_clean(lineage.get("causation_id")) or self.span_id,
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            claim_id=self.claim_id,
+            message_id=self.message_id,
+            scope=self.scope,
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "span_id": self.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": self.parent_span_id,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "message_id": self.message_id,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+def bind_trace_lineage(
+    *,
+    actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+    task: Any,
+    message: Any,
+    trace_id: str,
+    span_id: str,
+    parent: TraceContext | None = None,
+) -> TraceContext:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    task_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(task)
+    message_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(message)
+    if task_scope != message_scope:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    authorize_scope(actor, task_scope)
+
+    def get(value: Any, name: str) -> Any:
+        return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+    task_id = _clean(get(task, "task_id"))
+    message_task = _clean(get(message, "task_id"))
+    if task_id and message_task and task_id != message_task:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    context = TraceContext(
+        trace_id=trace_id,
+        span_id=span_id,
+        parent_span_id=parent.span_id if parent else None,
+        correlation_id=_clean(get(task, "correlation_id")) or _clean(get(message, "correlation_id")),
+        causation_id=_clean(get(message, "causation_id")) or (parent.span_id if parent else None),
+        task_id=task_id or message_task,
+        claim_id=_clean(get(task, "claim_id")) or _clean(get(message, "claim_id")),
+        message_id=_clean(get(message, "envelope_id")) or _clean(get(message, "id")),
+        scope=task_scope,
+    )
+    if parent is not None:
+        if parent.trace_id != context.trace_id or parent.scope != context.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY")
+        if parent.task_id and context.task_id and parent.task_id != context.task_id:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    return context
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ToolDescriptor:
+    name: str
+    kind: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    credential_ref: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "name", _identifier(self.name, "TOOL_NAME_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "kind", (_clean(self.kind) or "").lower())
+        if self.kind not in {"tool", "mcp"}:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_KIND_INVALID")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "required_capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.required_capabilities))
+        if self.credential_ref is not None and REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref) is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CredentialGrant:
+    grant_id: str
+    credential_ref: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    operations: tuple[str, ...]
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    tool_name: str | None = None
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "grant_id", _identifier(self.grant_id, "CREDENTIAL_GRANT_ID_INVALID"))
+        if REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref or "") is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "operations", _scope_tuple(self.operations))
+        if not self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_OPERATIONS_REQUIRED")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None = None,
+        tool_name: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        try:
+            authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        except GovernanceError as exc:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field=exc.field) from exc
+        if operation not in self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="operation")
+        if self.task_id is not None and self.task_id != _clean(task_id):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="task_id")
+        if self.tool_name is not None and self.tool_name != _clean(tool_name):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="tool_name")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            expiry = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00")).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            if current >= expiry:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="expires_at")
+        return self.credential_ref
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "grant_id": self.grant_id,
+            "credential_ref": self.credential_ref,
+            "operations": list(self.operations),
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_schema_metadata (
+  singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK(singleton=1),
+  schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tools (
+  name TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+  scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  required_capabilities_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  credential_ref TEXT,
+  descriptor_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_trace_spans (
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  parent_span_id TEXT,
+  context_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  context_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY(trace_id, span_id)
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_credential_grants (
+  grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  grant_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tool_invocations (
+  invocation_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tool_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  claim_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL,
+  receipt_sha256 TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_audit_evidence (
+  sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  evidence_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  action TEXT NOT NULL,
+  actor_identity TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT,
+  span_id TEXT,
+  resource_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  outcome TEXT NOT NULL,
+  details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  previous_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  evidence_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+"""
+
+
+class GovernanceStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            has_metadata = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT 1 FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='governance_schema_metadata'"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if has_metadata:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is not None and int(row[0]) != 1:
+                    raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED")
+            connection.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO governance_schema_metadata(singleton,schema_version) VALUES(1,1)"
+                )
+            connection.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _connection(self):
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            yield connection
+            connection.commit()
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _audit(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor,
+        resource_id: str,
+        outcome: str,
+        trace: TraceContext | None,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        previous = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT evidence_sha256 FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence DESC LIMIT 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        previous_sha = str(previous[0]) if previous else ""
+        created_at = _now()
+        material = {
+            "action": action,
+            "actor_identity": actor.identity,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id if trace else None,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id if trace else None,
+            "resource_id": resource_id,
+            "outcome": outcome,
+            "details": dict(details),
+            "previous_sha256": previous_sha,
+            "created_at": created_at,
+        }
+        digest = _sha(material)
+        evidence_id = "gev-" + digest[:32]
+        connection.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO governance_audit_evidence
+               (evidence_id,action,actor_identity,trace_id,span_id,resource_id,outcome,
+                details_json,previous_sha256,evidence_sha256,created_at)
+               VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+            (
+                evidence_id, action, actor.identity, material["trace_id"], material["span_id"],
+                resource_id, outcome, _canonical(material["details"]), previous_sha, digest, created_at,
+            ),
+        )
+        return {"evidence_id": evidence_id, "evidence_sha256": digest, **material}
+
+    def record_trace(self, trace: TraceContext, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        context = trace.as_dict()
+        digest = _sha(context)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            if trace.parent_span_id:
+                parent = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT context_json FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                    (trace.trace_id, trace.parent_span_id),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if parent is None:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="parent_span_id")
+                parent_context = json.loads(parent[0])
+                if GovernanceScope.from_value(parent_context) != trace.scope:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_trace_spans VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, trace.parent_span_id, _canonical(context), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TRACE_RECORDED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}", outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"context_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def register_tool(self, descriptor: ToolDescriptor, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        public = {
+            "name": descriptor.name,
+            "kind": descriptor.kind,
+            "required_capabilities": list(descriptor.required_capabilities),
+            "credential_ref": descriptor.credential_ref,
+            **descriptor.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT descriptor_sha256 FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (descriptor.name,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_DESCRIPTOR_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_tools VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (descriptor.name, descriptor.kind, _canonical(descriptor.scope.as_dict()),
+                 _canonical(descriptor.required_capabilities), descriptor.credential_ref, digest),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_REGISTERED", actor=actor, resource_id=descriptor.name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=None, details={"descriptor_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_tool(
+        self,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        tool_name: str,
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        requested_scope: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any],
+        input_digest: str,
+        invocation_key: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", input_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INPUT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        if trace.task_id is None or trace.claim_id is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="active_claim")
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != trace.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION")
+        authorize_scope(actor, requested_scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            persisted_trace = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if persisted_trace is None or persisted_trace[0] != _sha(trace.as_dict()):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="trace")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (tool_name,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            descriptor_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(json.loads(row["scope_json"]))
+            if descriptor_scope.scope_type == "tenant" and descriptor_scope != requested_scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            required = set(json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"]))
+            if not required.issubset(set(actor.capabilities)):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            request_sha = _sha({
+                "tool_name": tool_name, "input_digest": input_digest,
+                "task_id": trace.task_id, "claim_id": trace.claim_id,
+                "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+                "scope": requested_scope.as_dict(),
+            })
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                if replay["status"] != "VERIFIED":
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+                return {
+                    "tool_name": tool_name, "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+                    "span_id": trace.span_id, "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+                    "status": "VERIFIED", "receipt_sha256": replay["receipt_sha256"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+            created_at = _now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """INSERT INTO governed_tool_invocations
+                   (invocation_key,request_sha256,tool_name,task_id,claim_id,trace_id,span_id,
+                    status,receipt_sha256,created_at,updated_at)
+                   VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                (invocation_key, request_sha, tool_name, trace.task_id, trace.claim_id,
+                 trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, "AUTHORIZED", None, created_at, created_at),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor, resource_id=tool_name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"input_sha256": input_digest, "scope_sha256": _sha(requested_scope.as_dict()),
+                         "invocation_key": invocation_key},
+            )
+        return {
+            "tool_name": tool_name,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+            "status": "AUTHORIZED",
+            "credential_required": row["credential_ref"] is not None,
+            "evidence": evidence,
+        }
+
+    def record_tool_receipt(
+        self,
+        *,
+        invocation_key: str,
+        result_digest: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", result_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None or row["trace_id"] != trace.trace_id or row["span_id"] != trace.span_id:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_BINDING_INVALID")
+            if row["status"] == "VERIFIED":
+                if row["receipt_sha256"] != result_digest:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_CONFLICT")
+                return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "idempotent": True}
+            if row["status"] != "AUTHORIZED":
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE governed_tool_invocations SET status='VERIFIED',receipt_sha256=?,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE invocation_key=? AND status='AUTHORIZED'",
+                (result_digest, _now(), invocation_key),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=row["tool_name"], outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"invocation_key": invocation_key, "result_sha256": result_digest},
+            )
+        return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def store_grant(self, grant: CredentialGrant, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        public = grant.public()
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_sha256 FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant.grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_GRANT_CONFLICT")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_credential_grants VALUES (?,?,?,?)",
+                (grant.grant_id, _canonical(public), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_GRANT_STORED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant.grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=None,
+                details={"grant_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"grant": public, "grant_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_credential(
+        self,
+        *,
+        grant_id: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None,
+        tool_name: str | None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_json FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+            raw = json.loads(row[0])
+            grant = CredentialGrant(
+                grant_id=raw["grant_id"], credential_ref=raw["credential_ref"],
+                scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(raw), operations=tuple(raw["operations"]),
+                task_id=raw.get("task_id"), tool_name=raw.get("tool_name"),
+                expires_at=raw.get("expires_at"),
+            )
+            if trace.scope != grant.scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="trace_scope")
+            reference = grant.authorize(
+                actor, operation=operation, task_id=task_id, tool_name=tool_name, now=now
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"operation": operation, "task_id": task_id, "tool_name": tool_name,
+                         "credential_ref_sha256": _sha(reference)},
+            )
+        return {"credential_ref": reference, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def verify_audit_chain(self, required_actions: Iterable[str] = ()) -> bool:
+        ordered_actions: list[str] = []
+        previous = ""
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            rows = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence").fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            details = json.loads(row["details_json"])
+            material = {
+                "action": row["action"], "actor_identity": row["actor_identity"],
+                "trace_id": row["trace_id"], "span_id": row["span_id"],
+                "resource_id": row["resource_id"], "outcome": row["outcome"],
+                "details": details, "previous_sha256": row["previous_sha256"],
+                "created_at": row["created_at"],
+            }
+            if row["previous_sha256"] != previous or row["evidence_sha256"] != _sha(material):
+                return False
+            previous = row["evidence_sha256"]
+            ordered_actions.append(row["action"])
+        position = 0
+        for required in required_actions:
+            try:
+                position = ordered_actions.index(required, position) + 1
+            except ValueError:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "CredentialGrant", "GovernanceActor", "GovernanceError", "GovernanceScope",
+    "GovernanceStore", "ToolDescriptor", "TraceContext", "authorize_scope",
+    "bind_trace_lineage",
+]

active-runtime/app/v2r2c1_production_adapter.py

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ previous V2R1C7 release available for an explicit, owner-approved rollback.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
-import hashlib
 import os
 import shutil
 import sys
@@ -30,7 +29,6 @@ ROLLBACK_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios/v2r2c1/rollback")
 
 REQUIRED_MEMBERS = {
     "payload/VERSION",
-    "payload/versions/V2R2C1.json",
     "payload/active-runtime/app/deployment_state.py",
     "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r1c6_privacy_tools.py",
     "payload/active-runtime/app/v2r2c1_health_service.py",
@@ -89,65 +87,12 @@ def execute_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         _backup(Path("/var/lib/aios/v2r1c7/deployment-state.json"), "v2r1c7-deployment-state.previous")
         return base.install_release(_args(), value)
     if value.get("operation") == "probe":
-        result = base.probe(_args(), value)
-        if result.get("status") == "ACTIVE_VERIFIED":
-            result.update(_runtime_registry_gate(value))
-        return result
+        return base.probe(_args(), value)
     if value.get("operation") == "rollback":
         return rollback(value)
     raise ValueError("unsupported_operation")
 
 
-def _runtime_registry_gate(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Prove the deployed immutable runtime contains the exact M:path blob."""
-    source_digest = value.get("source_registry_sha256")
-    source_main = value.get("source_registry_main_oid")
-    if not source_digest or not source_main:
-        return {}
-    source_path = str(value.get("source_registry_path") or f"versions/{VERSION}.json")
-    member = CURRENT_LINK / source_path
-    if member.is_symlink() or not member.is_file():
-        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_REGISTRY_MEMBER_MISSING")
-    raw = member.read_bytes()
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-    if digest != source_digest:
-        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_REGISTRY_DIGEST_MISMATCH")
-    try:
-        source = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID") from exc
-    expected = {
-        "version": VERSION,
-        "repository": "aios/aios",
-        "tag_oid": value.get("tag_oid"),
-        "target_oid": value.get("target_oid"),
-        "peeled_target_oid": value.get("target_oid"),
-        "evidence_closure_oid": value.get("evidence_closure_oid"),
-        "approval_plan_id": value.get("approval_plan_id"),
-    }
-    if not isinstance(source, dict) or any(source.get(key) != expected_value for key, expected_value in expected.items()):
-        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_REGISTRY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    if source.get("tag_object") != expected["tag_oid"]:
-        raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SOURCE_REGISTRY_TAG_OBJECT_MISMATCH")
-    version_name = f"{VERSION}.json"
-    return {
-        "runtime_registry_versions": [version_name],
-        "attested_projection_versions": [version_name],
-        "effective_registry_versions": [version_name],
-        # The adapter can only inspect the deployed immutable runtime.  It
-        # must not claim convergence with mutable authoritative Git; the
-        # executor performs that independent M/C read after deployment.
-        "source_registry_converged": "not_checked",
-        "source_registry_convergence_error": "executor_must_recheck_authoritative_git",
-        "runtime_registry_converged": True,
-        "runtime_bundle_contains_current_version": True,
-        "runtime_bundle_contains_version": True,
-        "registry_consistency_status": "RUNTIME_ONLY_VERIFIED",
-        "runtime_source_registry_main_oid": source_main,
-        "runtime_source_registry_sha256": digest,
-    }
-
-
 def rollback(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Explicit rollback only; this adapter never invokes it automatically."""
     import subprocess

active-runtime/app/version_registry.py

@@ -1,982 +0,0 @@
-"""Release registry visibility and source-convergence gates.
-
-Two invariants are enforced:
-
-1. listVersions may overlay exactly the current Production Baseline-attested
-   projection onto the immutable source bundle. Arbitrary projection files
-   are not surfaced.
-
-2. release_metadata_adapter.baseline_apply may not finalize a production
-   baseline unless the governed repository/main already contains a source
-   versions/<version>.json entry matching the release identity.
-
-The source convergence gate intentionally checks release identity, not
-post-deployment runtime fields. This allows the source entry to be committed
-before deployment while still preventing PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED from being
-written for an uncommitted release identity.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import stat
-import subprocess
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-_VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"^V[0-9]+R[0-9]+C[0-9]+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$")
-_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-_PLAN_RE = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-VERSION_RE = _VERSION_RE
-OID_RE = _OID_RE
-SOURCE_REGISTRY_SCHEMAS = frozenset(
-    {"aios.source-registry.v1", "aios.production-registry.v2"}
-)
-SOURCE_REGISTRY_FIELDS = (
-    "version",
-    "tag_oid",
-    "target_oid",
-    "peeled_target_oid",
-    "evidence_closure_oid",
-    "approval_plan_id",
-)
-REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = "aios/aios"
-
-DEFAULT_PROJECTION_ROOT = Path(
-    os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_GITOPS_REGISTRY_PROJECTION_ROOT",
-        "/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/registry-projection",
-    )
-)
-DEFAULT_BASELINE_FILE = Path(
-    os.getenv(
-        "AIOS_GITOPS_BASELINE_FILE",
-        "/var/lib/aios-gitops-runtime-anchor/baseline/current.json",
-    )
-)
-DEFAULT_MAIN_REF = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_MAIN_REF", "refs/heads/main")
-DEFAULT_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path("/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
-DEFAULT_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_ROOT = Path("/var/lib/aios-gitops/approval-authority")
-TEST_MODE_ENV = "AIOS_TEST_MODE"
-AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_ENV = "AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR"
-APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_ROOT_ENV = "AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_ROOT"
-REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_ENV = "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"
-
-
-class RegistryConvergenceError(RuntimeError):
-    """Release registry/source convergence is not proven."""
-
-
-def _load_object(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    obj = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if not isinstance(obj, dict):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"json_not_object:{path}")
-    return obj
-
-
-def _sha256(path: Path) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _git_text(repo_git_dir: Path | str, *args: str) -> str:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={Path(repo_git_dir)}", *args],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError(
-            completed.stderr.strip() or "authoritative_git_query_failed"
-        )
-    return completed.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def _git_bytes(repo_git_dir: Path | str, *args: str) -> bytes:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", f"--git-dir={Path(repo_git_dir)}", *args],
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError(
-            completed.stderr.decode("utf-8", "replace").strip()
-            or "authoritative_git_query_failed"
-        )
-    return completed.stdout
-
-
-def test_mode_enabled() -> bool:
-    """Return whether explicit dependency injection is allowed for tests."""
-    return os.environ.get(TEST_MODE_ENV) == "1"
-
-
-def _configured_override(env_name: str, default: str, label: str) -> Path:
-    if env_name in os.environ:
-        if not test_mode_enabled():
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"{label}_env_override_forbidden")
-        value = os.environ.get(env_name, "")
-        if not value:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"{label}_env_override_invalid")
-        return Path(value)
-    return Path(default)
-
-
-def configured_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
-    return _configured_override(
-        AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_ENV,
-        str(DEFAULT_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR),
-        "authoritative_repository",
-    )
-
-
-def configured_repository_identity() -> str:
-    if REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_ENV in os.environ:
-        if not test_mode_enabled():
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("repository_identity_env_override_forbidden")
-        value = os.environ.get(REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_ENV, "")
-        if not value:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("repository_identity_env_override_invalid")
-        return value
-    return REPOSITORY_IDENTITY
-
-
-def verify_authoritative_repository(
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    *,
-    repository_identity: str = REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-    expected_path: Path | str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Prove that a Git directory is the configured AIOS authority.
-
-    A repository that merely contains internally consistent objects is not
-    sufficient.  The resolved path must be the configured authority and the
-    bare repository must advertise the expected Gitea repository identity.
-    """
-    if repository_identity != REPOSITORY_IDENTITY:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("authoritative_repository_identity_invalid")
-    candidate = Path(repo_git_dir)
-    configured = Path(expected_path) if expected_path is not None else configured_authoritative_git_dir()
-    if test_mode_enabled() and expected_path is None and AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_ENV not in os.environ:
-        # Explicit test mode may inject a temporary bare repository directly.
-        # Production mode always compares against the fixed authority path.
-        configured = candidate
-    try:
-        candidate_real = candidate.resolve(strict=True)
-        configured_real = configured.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("authoritative_repository_path_unavailable") from exc
-    if candidate_real != configured_real:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("authoritative_repository_path_mismatch")
-    if not candidate_real.is_dir():
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("authoritative_repository_not_directory")
-    if _git_text(candidate_real, "rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository") != "true":
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("authoritative_repository_not_bare")
-    remotes = subprocess.run(
-        [
-            "git",
-            f"--git-dir={candidate_real}",
-            "config",
-            "--get-regexp",
-            r"^remote\..*\.url$",
-        ],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    urls = [line.split(None, 1)[1] for line in remotes.stdout.splitlines() if " " in line]
-    identity_suffix = repository_identity.removesuffix(".git")
-    identity_verified = any(
-        url.rstrip("/").removesuffix(".git").replace("\\", "/").split(":")[-1]
-        in {identity_suffix, "/" + identity_suffix}
-        or url.rstrip("/").removesuffix(".git").replace("\\", "/").split(":")[-1].endswith(
-            "/" + identity_suffix
-        )
-        for url in urls
-    )
-    if not test_mode_enabled() and not identity_verified:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("authoritative_repository_identity_unverified")
-    return {
-        "repository_identity": repository_identity,
-        "configured_path": str(configured_real),
-        "resolved_path": str(candidate_real),
-    }
-
-
-def resolve_source_registry_main_oid(
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    *,
-    main_ref: str = DEFAULT_MAIN_REF,
-) -> str:
-    """Resolve the authoritative main ref to one immutable commit OID."""
-    oid = _git_text(repo_git_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{main_ref}^{{commit}}")
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_oid_invalid")
-    if _git_text(repo_git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", oid) != "commit":
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_oid_not_commit")
-    return oid
-
-
-def source_registry_snapshot(
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    version: str,
-    *,
-    main_ref: str = DEFAULT_MAIN_REF,
-    source_registry_main_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_tag_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_target_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_evidence_closure_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_approval_plan_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Read one source entry and its exact bytes from one immutable commit.
-
-    Callers building an artifact should resolve ``source_registry_main_oid``
-    once and pass it back here.  The function then never consults the mutable
-    ref again, so validation and packaging use the same Git blob.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(version, str) or not _VERSION_RE.fullmatch(version):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_version_invalid")
-    main_oid = source_registry_main_oid or resolve_source_registry_main_oid(
-        repo_git_dir,
-        main_ref=main_ref,
-    )
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(main_oid):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_oid_invalid")
-    if _git_text(repo_git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", main_oid) != "commit":
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_oid_not_commit")
-    path = f"versions/{version}.json"
-    try:
-        raw = _git_bytes(repo_git_dir, "show", f"{main_oid}:{path}")
-    except RegistryConvergenceError as exc:
-        if "path" in str(exc).lower() or "does not exist" in str(exc).lower():
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(
-                f"source_registry_entry_missing:{main_oid}:{path}"
-            ) from exc
-        raise
-    try:
-        source = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_json_invalid") from exc
-    record = validate_source_registry_record(
-        source,
-        expected_version=version,
-        expected_tag_oid=expected_tag_oid,
-        expected_target_oid=expected_target_oid,
-        expected_evidence_closure_oid=expected_evidence_closure_oid,
-        expected_approval_plan_id=expected_approval_plan_id,
-    )
-    return {
-        "record": record,
-        "bytes": raw,
-        "source_registry_main_oid": main_oid,
-        "source_registry_path": path,
-        "source_registry_sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),
-    }
-
-
-def validate_source_registry_record(
-    value: Any,
-    *,
-    expected_version: str | None = None,
-    expected_tag_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_target_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_evidence_closure_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_approval_plan_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Validate the immutable identity carried by versions/<version>.json."""
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_not_object")
-    if value.get("schema") not in SOURCE_REGISTRY_SCHEMAS:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_schema_invalid")
-    version = value.get("version")
-    if not isinstance(version, str) or not _VERSION_RE.fullmatch(version):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_version_invalid")
-    if expected_version is not None and version != expected_version:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_mismatch:version")
-    if value.get("repository") != REPOSITORY_IDENTITY:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_repository_invalid")
-    for field in ("tag_oid", "target_oid", "peeled_target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"):
-        item = value.get(field)
-        if not isinstance(item, str) or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(item):
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"source_registry_{field}_invalid")
-    if value["peeled_target_oid"] != value["target_oid"]:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_peeled_target_mismatch")
-    approval = value.get("approval_plan_id")
-    if not isinstance(approval, str) or not _PLAN_RE.fullmatch(approval):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_approval_plan_invalid")
-    if value.get("tag_object", value["tag_oid"]) != value["tag_oid"]:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_tag_object_mismatch")
-    expected = {
-        "tag_oid": expected_tag_oid,
-        "target_oid": expected_target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": expected_evidence_closure_oid,
-        "approval_plan_id": expected_approval_plan_id,
-    }
-    for field, wanted in expected.items():
-        if wanted is not None and value.get(field) != wanted:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"source_registry_mismatch:{field}")
-    return dict(value)
-
-
-def build_source_registry_entry(
-    *,
-    version: str,
-    tag_oid: str,
-    target_oid: str,
-    peeled_target_oid: str,
-    evidence_closure_oid: str,
-    approval_plan_id: str,
-    repository: str = REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build the pre-promotion source entry; it performs no Git or runtime write."""
-    value = {
-        "schema": "aios.source-registry.v1",
-        "version": version,
-        "repository": repository,
-        "tag": version,
-        "tag_oid": tag_oid,
-        "tag_object": tag_oid,
-        "target_oid": target_oid,
-        "peeled_target_oid": peeled_target_oid,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": evidence_closure_oid,
-        "approval_plan_id": approval_plan_id,
-    }
-    return validate_source_registry_record(
-        value,
-        expected_version=version,
-        expected_tag_oid=tag_oid,
-        expected_target_oid=target_oid,
-        expected_evidence_closure_oid=evidence_closure_oid,
-        expected_approval_plan_id=approval_plan_id,
-    )
-
-
-def verify_source_registry_git_identity(
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    record: dict[str, Any],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Prove that every Git identity in a source entry exists and is related."""
-    record = validate_source_registry_record(record)
-    version = record["version"]
-    tag_oid = record["tag_oid"]
-    target_oid = record["target_oid"]
-    evidence_oid = record["evidence_closure_oid"]
-    if _git_text(repo_git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", tag_oid) != "tag":
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_tag_not_annotated")
-    named_tag = _git_text(
-        repo_git_dir,
-        "rev-parse",
-        "--verify",
-        f"refs/tags/{version}",
-    )
-    if named_tag != tag_oid:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_named_tag_mismatch")
-    if _git_text(repo_git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", target_oid) != "commit":
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_target_not_commit")
-    peeled = _git_text(
-        repo_git_dir,
-        "rev-parse",
-        "--verify",
-        f"{tag_oid}^{{commit}}",
-    )
-    if peeled != target_oid or record["peeled_target_oid"] != target_oid:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_tag_target_mismatch")
-    if _git_text(repo_git_dir, "cat-file", "-t", evidence_oid) != "commit":
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_evidence_not_commit")
-    ancestor = subprocess.run(
-        [
-            "git",
-            f"--git-dir={Path(repo_git_dir)}",
-            "merge-base",
-            "--is-ancestor",
-            target_oid,
-            evidence_oid,
-        ],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if ancestor.returncode != 0:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_evidence_lineage_invalid")
-    return {
-        "repository": REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-        "version": version,
-        "tag_oid": tag_oid,
-        "tag_object_type": "tag",
-        "target_oid": target_oid,
-        "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": evidence_oid,
-        "target_is_ancestor_of_evidence": True,
-    }
-
-
-def verify_source_registry_main_convergence(
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    version: str,
-    *,
-    main_ref: str = DEFAULT_MAIN_REF,
-    source_registry_main_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_tag_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_target_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_evidence_closure_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_approval_plan_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Prove that pinned M is still converged with current authoritative main C."""
-    current_main_oid = resolve_source_registry_main_oid(repo_git_dir, main_ref=main_ref)
-    source_main_oid = source_registry_main_oid or current_main_oid
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(source_main_oid):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_oid_invalid")
-    ancestor = subprocess.run(
-        [
-            "git",
-            f"--git-dir={Path(repo_git_dir)}",
-            "merge-base",
-            "--is-ancestor",
-            source_main_oid,
-            current_main_oid,
-        ],
-        check=False,
-        capture_output=True,
-        timeout=45,
-        env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-    )
-    if ancestor.returncode != 0:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_not_ancestor_of_current_main")
-    pinned = source_registry_snapshot(
-        repo_git_dir,
-        version,
-        source_registry_main_oid=source_main_oid,
-        expected_tag_oid=expected_tag_oid,
-        expected_target_oid=expected_target_oid,
-        expected_evidence_closure_oid=expected_evidence_closure_oid,
-        expected_approval_plan_id=expected_approval_plan_id,
-    )
-    current = source_registry_snapshot(
-        repo_git_dir,
-        version,
-        source_registry_main_oid=current_main_oid,
-        expected_tag_oid=expected_tag_oid,
-        expected_target_oid=expected_target_oid,
-        expected_evidence_closure_oid=expected_evidence_closure_oid,
-        expected_approval_plan_id=expected_approval_plan_id,
-    )
-    if pinned["bytes"] != current["bytes"]:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_main_entry_changed_after_pin")
-    return {
-        "source_registry_main_oid": source_main_oid,
-        "current_main_oid": current_main_oid,
-        "source_registry_path": pinned["source_registry_path"],
-        "source_registry_sha256": pinned["source_registry_sha256"],
-        "current_main_source_registry_sha256": current["source_registry_sha256"],
-        "source_registry_main_is_ancestor_of_current_main": True,
-        "source_registry_entry_matches_current_main": True,
-    }
-
-
-_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_STATES = frozenset(
-    {
-        "APPROVED",
-        "GITEA_API_CONFIRMED",
-        "REMOTE_VERIFIED",
-        "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
-    }
-)
-_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_SCHEMAS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "aios.v2r2c1.tag-approval-request.v1",
-        "aios.owner-release-approval.v1",
-        "aios.release-binding-approval.v2",
-    }
-)
-
-
-def configured_approval_authority_root() -> Path:
-    return _configured_override(
-        APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_ROOT_ENV,
-        str(DEFAULT_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_ROOT),
-        "approval_authority_root",
-    )
-
-
-def _secure_approval_authority_path(
-    authority_path: Path | str,
-    version: str,
-) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
-    root = configured_approval_authority_root()
-    path = Path(authority_path)
-    if path.is_dir():
-        path = path / f"{version}.json"
-    try:
-        root_real = root.resolve(strict=True)
-        path_real = path.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_trusted_root_missing") from exc
-    try:
-        path_real.relative_to(root_real)
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_untrusted_path") from exc
-    metadata = path.lstat()
-    if not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) or path.is_symlink():
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_not_regular")
-    if metadata.st_mode & 0o022:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_permissions_invalid")
-    if APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_ROOT_ENV not in os.environ and metadata.st_uid != 0:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_owner_invalid")
-    return path, root_real
-
-
-def _canonical_json(value: object) -> bytes:
-    return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode(
-        "utf-8"
-    )
-
-
-def _approval_is_revoked(root: Path, approval_plan_id: str, authority: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
-    if any(
-        authority.get(name) is True
-        for name in ("revoked", "invalidated", "revocation")
-    ):
-        return True
-    state = authority.get("state") or authority.get("status")
-    if state in {"REVOKED", "INVALIDATED", "EXPIRED", "CANCELLED"}:
-        return True
-    for marker in (
-        root / "revocations" / approval_plan_id,
-        root / "revocations" / approval_plan_id.replace(":", "_"),
-    ):
-        if marker.exists():
-            return True
-    expires_at = authority.get("expires_at")
-    if isinstance(expires_at, str) and expires_at:
-        try:
-            instant = datetime.fromisoformat(expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_expiry_invalid") from exc
-        if instant <= datetime.now(timezone.utc):
-            return True
-    return False
-
-
-def verify_approval_authority(
-    authority_path: Path | str,
-    record: dict[str, Any],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Verify the existing release approval/publication receipt association.
-
-    The authority document is intentionally supplied by the governed caller;
-    this helper never creates or rewrites an approval.  The path must be under
-    the configured canonical Owner-authority root and the document must use a
-    known release-approval schema.  A caller-supplied JSON file elsewhere is
-    never an authority, even when its fields are internally consistent.
-    """
-    path, trusted_root = _secure_approval_authority_path(authority_path, record["version"])
-    authority = _load_object(path)
-    schema = authority.get("schema")
-    if schema not in _APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_SCHEMAS:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_schema_invalid")
-    if _approval_is_revoked(trusted_root, record["approval_plan_id"], authority):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_plan_revoked_or_invalidated")
-    nested = authority.get("release_binding") or authority.get("release_request")
-    if not isinstance(nested, dict):
-        nested = authority.get("binding")
-    if not isinstance(nested, dict):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_authority_binding_missing")
-    expected = {
-        "version": record["version"],
-        "repository": REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-        "tag_oid": record["tag_oid"],
-        "target_oid": record["target_oid"],
-        "peeled_target_oid": record["peeled_target_oid"],
-        "evidence_closure_oid": record["evidence_closure_oid"],
-        "approval_plan_id": record["approval_plan_id"],
-    }
-    if authority.get("approval_plan_id") != expected["approval_plan_id"]:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_plan_not_found_or_mismatched")
-    state = authority.get("state") or authority.get("status")
-    if state not in _APPROVAL_AUTHORITY_STATES and authority.get("approved") is not True:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_plan_not_approved")
-    owner_approval = authority.get("owner_approval")
-    if schema == "aios.v2r2c1.tag-approval-request.v1":
-        if not isinstance(owner_approval, dict):
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("canonical_owner_approval_missing")
-        if (
-            owner_approval.get("approved") is not True
-            or owner_approval.get("status") != "APPROVED"
-            or owner_approval.get("approved_by") != "aiman"
-            or owner_approval.get("approval_source") != "explicit_owner_approval_in_chat"
-        ):
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("canonical_owner_approval_invalid")
-        expected_digest = hashlib.sha256(_canonical_json(owner_approval)).hexdigest()
-        if authority.get("owner_approval_digest_sha256") != expected_digest:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("canonical_owner_approval_digest_invalid")
-    for field, wanted in expected.items():
-        observed = nested.get(field)
-        if field == "repository" and observed is None:
-            observed = nested.get("repository_identity") or authority.get(
-                "repository_identity"
-            )
-        if field == "peeled_target_oid" and observed is None:
-            observed = (
-                nested.get("gitea_peeled_target_oid")
-                or authority.get("gitea_peeled_target_oid")
-                or nested.get("remote_peeled_target_oid")
-                or authority.get("remote_peeled_target_oid")
-            )
-        if observed != wanted:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"approval_plan_release_binding_mismatch:{field}")
-    if state == "GITEA_API_CONFIRMED":
-        gitea_tag = authority.get("gitea_tag_oid")
-        gitea_peeled = authority.get("gitea_peeled_target_oid")
-        if gitea_tag != expected["tag_oid"] or gitea_peeled != expected["target_oid"]:
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError("approval_plan_remote_tag_binding_mismatch")
-    return {
-        "path": str(path),
-        "schema": schema,
-        "state": state or "APPROVED",
-        "approval_plan_id": expected["approval_plan_id"],
-        "owner_approval_verified": schema == "aios.v2r2c1.tag-approval-request.v1",
-        "release_binding_verified": True,
-    }
-
-
-def source_registry_json(value: dict[str, Any]) -> bytes:
-    """Return the canonical bytes used by the governed file writer."""
-    return (json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n").encode(
-        "utf-8"
-    )
-
-
-def _validated_current_projection(
-    projection_root: Path,
-    baseline_file: Path,
-) -> Path | None:
-    """Return only the exact projection attested by the current Baseline."""
-    if not baseline_file.is_file():
-        return None
-    try:
-        baseline = _load_object(baseline_file)
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-    version = baseline.get("version")
-    if not isinstance(version, str) or not _VERSION_RE.fullmatch(version):
-        return None
-    if baseline.get("status") != "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED":
-        return None
-    if baseline.get("production_deployed") is not True:
-        return None
-
-    source = baseline.get("registry_source")
-    digest = baseline.get("registry_digest")
-    if not isinstance(source, str) or not isinstance(digest, str):
-        return None
-
-    candidate = projection_root / f"{version}.json"
-    try:
-        if candidate.resolve() != Path(source).resolve():
-            return None
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-    if not candidate.is_file() or _sha256(candidate) != digest:
-        return None
-
-    try:
-        record = _load_object(candidate)
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-    try:
-        validate_source_registry_record(
-            record,
-            expected_version=version,
-            expected_tag_oid=baseline.get("tag_oid"),
-            expected_target_oid=baseline.get("target_oid"),
-            expected_evidence_closure_oid=baseline.get("evidence_closure_oid"),
-            expected_approval_plan_id=baseline.get("approval_plan_id"),
-        )
-    except RegistryConvergenceError:
-        return None
-    if record.get("schema") != "aios.production-registry.v2":
-        return None
-    if record.get("status") != "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED":
-        return None
-    if record.get("version") != version:
-        return None
-    if record.get("repository") != REPOSITORY_IDENTITY:
-        return None
-    if record.get("production_deployed") is not True:
-        return None
-
-    tag_oid = record.get("tag_oid")
-    target_oid = record.get("target_oid")
-    if not isinstance(tag_oid, str) or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(tag_oid):
-        return None
-    if not isinstance(target_oid, str) or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(target_oid):
-        return None
-    if record.get("peeled_target_oid") != target_oid:
-        return None
-
-    return candidate
-
-
-def list_registry_versions(
-    workspace: Path | str,
-    *,
-    projection_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROJECTION_ROOT,
-    baseline_file: Path = DEFAULT_BASELINE_FILE,
-) -> list[str]:
-    """Return the legacy display list; use the report for provenance."""
-    return list_registry_versions_report(
-        workspace,
-        projection_root=projection_root,
-        baseline_file=baseline_file,
-    )["registry_versions"]
-
-
-def list_registry_versions_report(
-    workspace: Path | str,
-    *,
-    projection_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROJECTION_ROOT,
-    baseline_file: Path = DEFAULT_BASELINE_FILE,
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str | None = None,
-    main_ref: str = DEFAULT_MAIN_REF,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return version visibility with runtime/projection provenance.
-
-    The display list intentionally retains the historical projection overlay
-    for API compatibility.  The explicit booleans make that overlay
-    non-authoritative: a projection-only version has
-    ``runtime_bundle_contains_version == false`` and can never be reported as
-    converged.
-    """
-    ws = Path(workspace)
-    versions_root = ws / "versions"
-    runtime_names = {
-        path.name
-        for path in versions_root.iterdir()
-        if path.is_file()
-        and not path.is_symlink()
-        and path.suffix == ".json"
-        and _VERSION_RE.fullmatch(path.stem)
-    } if versions_root.is_dir() else set()
-    current = _validated_current_projection(projection_root, baseline_file)
-    attested_version = current.stem if current is not None else None
-    runtime_bundle_contains = bool(
-        attested_version is not None
-        and f"{attested_version}.json" in runtime_names
-    )
-    consistency_status = "NO_ATTESTED_PROJECTION"
-    source_converged: bool | str = "unknown"
-    source_error: str | None = None
-    runtime_converged = False
-    projection_record: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-    if current is not None:
-        try:
-            projection_record = _load_object(current)
-        except (OSError, RegistryConvergenceError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            source_error = f"projection_invalid:{type(exc).__name__}"
-        if repo_git_dir is None:
-            source_converged = "unknown"
-            source_error = "authoritative_repository_unavailable"
-        elif projection_record is not None:
-            try:
-                verify_authoritative_repository(repo_git_dir)
-                verify_source_registry_main_convergence(
-                    repo_git_dir,
-                    attested_version or "",
-                    main_ref=main_ref,
-                    expected_tag_oid=projection_record.get("tag_oid"),
-                    expected_target_oid=projection_record.get("target_oid"),
-                    expected_evidence_closure_oid=projection_record.get(
-                        "evidence_closure_oid"
-                    ),
-                    expected_approval_plan_id=projection_record.get("approval_plan_id"),
-                )
-                source_converged = True
-            except RegistryConvergenceError as exc:
-                detail = str(exc)
-                if detail.startswith("authoritative_repository_"):
-                    source_converged = "unknown"
-                    source_error = (
-                        "authoritative_repository_unavailable"
-                        if detail.endswith("path_unavailable")
-                        else detail
-                    )
-                else:
-                    source_converged = False
-                    source_error = detail
-    if current is not None and not runtime_bundle_contains:
-        consistency_status = "RUNTIME_ARTIFACT_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
-    elif current is not None and runtime_bundle_contains:
-        runtime_path = versions_root / current.name
-        try:
-            projection_record = projection_record or _load_object(current)
-            runtime_record = _load_object(runtime_path)
-            identity_fields = (
-                "version",
-                "repository",
-                "tag_oid",
-                "target_oid",
-                "peeled_target_oid",
-                "evidence_closure_oid",
-                "approval_plan_id",
-            )
-            runtime_converged = all(
-                runtime_record.get(field) == projection_record.get(field)
-                for field in identity_fields
-            )
-            if not runtime_converged:
-                consistency_status = "RUNTIME_IDENTITY_MISMATCH"
-        except (OSError, RegistryConvergenceError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-            consistency_status = "RUNTIME_ENTRY_INVALID"
-            runtime_converged = False
-    if current is not None and runtime_bundle_contains and runtime_converged:
-        if source_converged is True:
-            consistency_status = "FULLY_CONSISTENT"
-        elif source_converged == "unknown":
-            consistency_status = "SOURCE_GIT_NOT_CHECKED"
-        else:
-            consistency_status = "SOURCE_REGISTRY_NOT_CONVERGED"
-    elif current is not None and not runtime_bundle_contains:
-        if source_converged is False:
-            consistency_status = "SOURCE_REGISTRY_NOT_CONVERGED"
-        else:
-            consistency_status = "RUNTIME_ARTIFACT_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
-    names = set(runtime_names)
-    if current is not None:
-        names.add(current.name)
-    effective = sorted(names)
-    projection_versions = [attested_version + ".json"] if attested_version else []
-    return {
-        "registry_versions": effective,
-        "effective_registry_versions": effective,
-        "runtime_registry_versions": sorted(runtime_names),
-        "attested_projection_versions": projection_versions,
-        "attested_projection_version": attested_version,
-        "source_registry_converged": source_converged,
-        "source_registry_convergence_error": source_error,
-        "runtime_registry_converged": runtime_converged,
-        "runtime_bundle_contains_current_version": runtime_bundle_contains,
-        "runtime_bundle_contains_version": runtime_bundle_contains,
-        "registry_consistency_status": consistency_status,
-    }
-
-
-def assert_runtime_registry_convergence(
-    workspace: Path | str,
-    version: str,
-    *,
-    projection_root: Path = DEFAULT_PROJECTION_ROOT,
-    baseline_file: Path = DEFAULT_BASELINE_FILE,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Fail closed when a projection-only version is visible but unpackaged."""
-    report = list_registry_versions_report(
-        workspace,
-        projection_root=projection_root,
-        baseline_file=baseline_file,
-    )
-    expected_name = f"{version}.json"
-    if (
-        report.get("attested_projection_version") == version
-        and report.get("runtime_bundle_contains_version") is not True
-    ):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("runtime_bundle_missing_source_registry")
-    if expected_name not in report.get("runtime_registry_versions", []):
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("runtime_bundle_missing_source_registry")
-    if report.get("source_registry_converged") is not True:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError("source_registry_not_converged_or_not_checked")
-    if report.get("registry_consistency_status") not in {"FULLY_CONSISTENT", "PASS"}:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError(
-            f"runtime_registry_consistency:{report.get('registry_consistency_status')}"
-        )
-    return report
-
-
-def source_registry_from_main(
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    version: str,
-    *,
-    main_ref: str = DEFAULT_MAIN_REF,
-    source_registry_main_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_tag_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_target_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_evidence_closure_oid: str | None = None,
-    expected_approval_plan_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Read and validate the canonical source entry from the supplied main ref."""
-    try:
-        return source_registry_snapshot(
-            repo_git_dir,
-            version,
-            main_ref=main_ref,
-            source_registry_main_oid=source_registry_main_oid,
-            expected_tag_oid=expected_tag_oid,
-            expected_target_oid=expected_target_oid,
-            expected_evidence_closure_oid=expected_evidence_closure_oid,
-            expected_approval_plan_id=expected_approval_plan_id,
-        )["record"]
-    except RegistryConvergenceError as exc:
-        if str(exc).startswith("fatal:") or "path" in str(exc).lower():
-            raise RegistryConvergenceError(
-                f"source_registry_entry_missing:{source_registry_main_oid or main_ref}:versions/{version}.json"
-            ) from exc
-        raise
-
-
-def assert_source_registry_convergence(
-    registry_path: Path | str,
-    *,
-    repo_git_dir: Path | str,
-    main_ref: str = DEFAULT_MAIN_REF,
-    source_registry_main_oid: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Require governed main to contain a source entry for the release identity.
-
-    The source entry is intentionally required to match only fields that are
-    knowable and governable before production deployment. Post-deployment
-    fields such as production_service/port/status timestamps are not required.
-    """
-    registry_path = Path(registry_path)
-    repo_git_dir = Path(repo_git_dir)
-    verify_authoritative_repository(repo_git_dir)
-    record = _load_object(registry_path)
-
-    version = record.get("version")
-    tag_oid = record.get("tag_oid")
-    target_oid = record.get("target_oid")
-
-    try:
-        validate_source_registry_record(
-            record,
-            expected_version=version,
-            expected_tag_oid=tag_oid,
-            expected_target_oid=target_oid,
-            expected_evidence_closure_oid=record.get("evidence_closure_oid"),
-            expected_approval_plan_id=record.get("approval_plan_id"),
-        )
-    except RegistryConvergenceError as exc:
-        raise RegistryConvergenceError(f"registry_identity_invalid:{exc}") from exc
-    convergence = verify_source_registry_main_convergence(
-        repo_git_dir,
-        version,
-        main_ref=main_ref,
-        source_registry_main_oid=source_registry_main_oid,
-        expected_tag_oid=tag_oid,
-        expected_target_oid=target_oid,
-        expected_evidence_closure_oid=record["evidence_closure_oid"],
-        expected_approval_plan_id=record["approval_plan_id"],
-    )
-    return {
-        **convergence,
-    }

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+providers:
+  oneapi:
+    name: oneapi
+    base_url: http://172.18.0.2:3000/v1
+    key_env: OPENAI_API_KEY
+    default_model: deepseek-v4-flash
+model:
+  provider: oneapi
+  name: deepseek-v4-flash

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/local/bin/hermes",
+    "run",
+    "--non-interactive"
+  ],
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "hermes",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 900
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/opt/aios-hermes-agent/hermes-agent/.venv/bin/hermes",
+    "-z",
+    "{prompt}",
+    "--provider",
+    "oneapi",
+    "-m",
+    "deepseek-v4-flash",
+    "--no-restore-cwd"
+  ],
+  "credential_env": {
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY": {
+      "credential": "aios-external-agent-oneapi-env",
+      "format": "dotenv",
+      "key": "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "HERMES_HOME": "/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/hermes-home"
+  },
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "hermes",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 180
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw-config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+{
+  "tools": {
+    "profile": "minimal"
+  },
+  "memory": {
+    "search": {
+      "enabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "agents": {
+    "defaults": {
+      "workspace": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace",
+      "model": {
+        "primary": "openai/deepseek-v4-flash"
+      },
+      "thinkingDefault": "off"
+    },
+    "entries": {
+      "main": {
+        "default": true,
+        "workspace": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "models": {
+    "providers": {
+      "openai": {
+        "baseUrl": "http://172.18.0.2:3000/v1",
+        "api": "openai-completions",
+        "models": [
+          {
+            "id": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+            "name": "deepseek-v4-flash",
+            "contextWindow": 32768,
+            "maxTokens": 256
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/local/bin/openclaw",
+    "run",
+    "--non-interactive"
+  ],
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_text",
+  "runtime": "openclaw",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 900
+}

config/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw.profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "argv": [
+    "/usr/bin/node",
+    "/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering/v2026.7.2-beta.7/openclaw.mjs",
+    "agent",
+    "--local",
+    "--json",
+    "--agent",
+    "main",
+    "--thinking",
+    "off",
+    "--message",
+    "{prompt}",
+    "--model",
+    "openai/deepseek-v4-flash",
+    "--timeout",
+    "180"
+  ],
+  "credential_env": {
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY": {
+      "credential": "aios-external-agent-oneapi-env",
+      "format": "dotenv",
+      "key": "ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN"
+    }
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH": "/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/openclaw-config.json",
+    "OPENCLAW_HOME": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-home",
+    "OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR": "/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-state"
+  },
+  "input_mode": "stdin_text",
+  "max_output_bytes": 131072,
+  "output_mode": "stdout_json",
+  "runtime": "openclaw",
+  "schema": "aios.external-agent-runtime.profile.v1",
+  "timeout_seconds": 240
+}

db/migrations/20260817_message_handoff.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-- R4.2 P0-B durable Message/Handoff Fabric.
+-- Forward-only. The existing 20260707 message_outbox remains a compatibility source.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-execution-rebind.service

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task execution-rebind API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-execution-rebind.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_PORT=18942
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task retry-extension API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT=18941
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-external-agent-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS credential-isolated external Agent runtime executor
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_external_agent_runtime.py --root /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor --profile-root /etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+IPAddressDeny=127.0.0.0/8
+IPAddressDeny=::1/128
+IPAddressAllow=172.18.0.2/32
+LoadCredential=aios-external-agent-oneapi-env:/data/agent/secrets/oneapi-model-ready.env
+InaccessiblePaths=/etc/aios-gitops
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/aios-gitops
+InaccessiblePaths=/data/agent/secrets
+ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d
+ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios-hermes-agent
+ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios/openclaw-engineering
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-hermes-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS Hermes Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-hermes-worker-cn-network-mkt
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=external-agent-runtime-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-18.1-hermes-runtime
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.hermes
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=hermes
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-isolated-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS uncredentialed deterministic Planner/Executor
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py --root /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateNetwork=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=localhost
+InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS governed Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=trusted-online-engineering-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-17.2-durable
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=git.read,git.test,governed.write.branch,governed.write.file
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_ISOLATED_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-openclaw-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS OpenClaw Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service aios-external-agent-executor.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-worker
+Group=aios-engineering-worker
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
+Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-openclaw-worker-cn-network-mkt
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=external-agent-runtime-worker
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-18.1-openclaw-runtime
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_EXTERNAL_AGENT_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+TimeoutStopSec=20
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/sysusers.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+g aios-executor-exchange -
+u aios-engineering-executor - "AIOS isolated engineering executor" /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor /usr/sbin/nologin
+m aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange
+m aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-external-agent-runtime.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-workspace 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-state 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor/openclaw-home 0750 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-hermes/workspaces 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-openclaw/workspaces 0750 aios-engineering-worker aios-engineering-worker -
+d /etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d 0755 root root -

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/sources 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -

docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml

@@ -240,6 +240,114 @@ components:
       additionalProperties: false
       properties:
         candidate_id: {type: string}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds]
+      properties:
+        schema:
+          type: string
+          enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2, aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2]
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, job_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds, create_target_branch, worktree_mode, cas_ref_update_required]
+      properties:
+        schema: {type: string, enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2]}
+        task_id: {type: string}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+        create_target_branch: {type: boolean}
+        worktree_mode: {type: string, enum: [detached_at_base_oid, detached_at_expected_head]}
+        cas_ref_update_required: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        lease_expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, job_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds, lease_expires_at, create_target_branch, worktree_mode, cas_ref_update_required, recovered, bootstrapped, idempotent, runtime_rehydrated, durable_branch_lease_present]
+      properties:
+        schema: {type: string, enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2]}
+        task_id: {type: string}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+        lease_expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        create_target_branch: {type: boolean, const: false}
+        worktree_mode: {type: string, enum: [detached_at_base_oid, detached_at_expected_head]}
+        cas_ref_update_required: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        recovered: {type: boolean}
+        bootstrapped: {type: boolean}
+        idempotent: {type: boolean}
+        runtime_rehydrated: {type: boolean}
+        durable_branch_lease_present: {type: boolean}
+    BridgeCommitFileRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [task_id, repository, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, idempotency_key, path, content_base64, message]
+      properties:
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        idempotency_key: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        path: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 512}
+        content_base64: {type: string, format: byte}
+        message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}
+    BridgeCommitFilesRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [task_id, repository, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, idempotency_key, files, message]
+      properties:
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        idempotency_key: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        files: {type: object, additionalProperties: {type: string, format: byte}, minProperties: 1}
+        message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}
+    BridgeCommitResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: true
+      required: [job_id, commit_oid, commit_visible, branch_mode, target_branch, generation]
+      properties:
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        commit_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        commit_visible: {type: boolean}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+    BridgeGovernedCapabilities:
+      type: object
+      required: [bridge_schema_version, governed_writes_enabled, operations, operation_contracts]
+      properties:
+        bridge_schema_version: {type: string, const: aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2}
+        governed_writes_enabled: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        operations: {type: array, items: {type: string}}
+        operation_contracts: {type: object, additionalProperties: true}
 paths:
   /createReleaseIntent:
     post:
@@ -567,3 +675,118 @@ paths:
         '200': {description: Safe GitOps plan}
         '401': {description: Unauthorized}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/capabilities:
+    get:
+      operationId: getGovernedWriteCapabilities
+      summary: Read the governed Bridge v2 capability contract
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Governed operations and their request/response contracts
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeGovernedCapabilities'}
+  /v2/writer-lease:
+    post:
+      operationId: acquireWriterLease
+      summary: Acquire the exact governed writer lease for a task generation
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Exact detached worktree lease binding
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid lease binding}
+        '409': {description: Branch, base, or generation conflict}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/writer-lease/bootstrap:
+    post:
+      operationId: bootstrapWriterLease
+      summary: Bootstrap a governed writer runtime without creating a durable lease
+      description: >
+        Staging-only runtime recovery. It validates the exact task, repository,
+        base OID, expected branch OID, target branch, and generation. It must
+        not create a branch, insert a branch lease, or consume a generation.
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Runtime binding bootstrapped or returned idempotently
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid lease binding}
+        '409': {description: A matching durable lease already exists or binding conflicts}
+        '503': {description: Runtime or durable state unavailable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/writer-lease/renew:
+    post:
+      operationId: renewWriterLease
+      summary: Recover an expired governed writer lease without changing its binding
+      description: >
+        Renews only the current task generation and exact repository, base OID,
+        expected branch OID, and target branch. Durable renewal is revision-CAS
+        protected; runtime rehydration is reported separately.
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Lease recovered or idempotently observed as already active
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid schema, generation, or lease duration}
+        '409': {description: Task, base, repository, branch, generation, or durable lease conflict}
+        '503': {description: Durable job store or runtime unavailable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/commit-file:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFileGoverned
+      summary: Commit one file through the governed writer lease
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitFileRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Authority and remote visibility receipt
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitResponse'}
+        '409': {description: Lease, expected-head, idempotency, or repository conflict}
+        '503': {description: Reconciliation required}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/commit-files:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFilesGoverned
+      summary: Atomically commit a bounded set of files through the governed writer lease
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitFilesRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Authority and remote visibility receipt
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitResponse'}
+        '409': {description: Lease, expected-head, idempotency, or repository conflict}
+        '503': {description: Reconciliation required}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-16-r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# R4.2 P0-A TaskPlane Scope Isolation Design
+
+Status: approved candidate design. This document is not evidence of a protected-main merge or production deployment.
+
+## Boundary
+
+- Task: `r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-20260816`
+- Governed Job: `job-3fd743b51971c6007923699c1233f84c`
+- Repository: `aios/aios`
+- Base: `0eb6e1a864edfdaeef37b438991707a110e21558`
+- Target branch: `agent/r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-20260816`
+- Generation: `1`
+
+The implementation reuses this exact boundary. It does not create a replacement Task, Job, branch, generation, or idempotency key.
+
+## Model and invariants
+
+`TaskPlan` gains first-class `scope_type`, `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `project_id`, `conversation_id`, and `run_id` fields. The fields participate in accepted-key validation, parsing, serialization, persistence, and authorization.
+
+Historical rows without scope data normalize to `scope_type=legacy`; no tenant is inferred. Tenant-scoped tasks require a non-empty `tenant_id`. System/global resources use an explicit `scope_type=system` invariant and do not receive a fabricated tenant. A task may add user, project, conversation, and run ownership within its tenant.
+
+## Trusted ActorContext
+
+TaskPlane defines a small immutable `TaskActorContext` used only for authorization. The HTTP authenticator returns an identity. `PolicyEngine` resolves that identity through server-owned policy configuration into the effective context and capabilities. Request fields such as `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `group_id`, and `role` are declarations only and never expand authority.
+
+Public create, list, and get paths always use the resolved context. Internal compatibility calls may omit a context and retain explicit legacy behavior, but the HTTP adapter never uses that path.
+
+## Persistence
+
+SQLite remains the current runtime. `_create_schema()` performs an idempotent forward migration that adds the six scope columns and indexes, then backfills only missing `scope_type` values to `legacy`.
+
+New writes persist scope in both the canonical `task_json` representation and first-class columns. Reads accept historical JSON without scope, using legacy columns, but reject a new-row mismatch between JSON and columns. SQL list/get predicates are parameterized and applied before row hydration.
+
+PostgreSQL remains a separate migration target and is not claimed by this change.
+
+## Authorization flow
+
+1. HTTP bearer authentication yields an identity.
+2. `PolicyEngine` verifies capability and resolves the identity to `TaskActorContext`.
+3. Create binds the requested scope to the trusted context and rejects mismatches.
+4. List/get pass the trusted context to `TaskPlaneStore`.
+5. Store applies tenant and ownership predicates in SQL; privileged capabilities may explicitly cross scope.
+
+Tenant actors cannot read legacy tasks, another tenant, or mismatched owned resources. Legacy actors can only read legacy tasks. System actors require explicit privileged capability for cross-scope access.
+
+## Failure behavior
+
+Missing tenant scope, forged scope, unknown scope types, JSON/column divergence, and unauthorized list/get operations fail closed with canonical TaskPlane errors. Public get does not reveal whether an out-of-scope task exists.
+
+## Verification
+
+Tests exercise real model round trips, SQLite migration/restart, Service/Policy/Store wiring, tenant A versus tenant B list/get denial, ownership filtering, forged create payload rejection, legacy isolation, privileged access, and SQL parameterization. Existing TaskPlane API, RBAC, recovery/security, and security-contract suites remain mandatory.
+
+The candidate is complete only after real `TASK_CLAIMED`, `TASK_HEARTBEAT`, exact WriterLease, governed commit, OID convergence, result submission, and `TASK_VERIFIED`. Protected main and production remain unchanged.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p0c-trace-tool-credential-governance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# R4.2 P0-C Trace / Tool-MCP / Credential Governance
+
+## Status boundary
+
+This change is a candidate implementation on the governed P0-C branch. It does
+not promote protected `main`, deploy Production, or assert that all R4.2 target
+architecture is complete.
+
+## Scope model
+
+Governance resources use an explicit `scope_type`:
+
+- `tenant` requires `tenant_id` and may narrow to user, project,
+  conversation, and run;
+- `system` and `global` prohibit tenant ownership fields;
+- `legacy` preserves unscoped historical records without inventing ownership.
+
+System and global tools therefore never receive a synthetic tenant merely to
+satisfy a tenant-oriented schema.
+
+## Trace lineage
+
+`TaskPlan` and `MessageEnvelope` scope is bound to a `TraceContext`. The trace
+records `trace_id`, `span_id`, parent span, correlation, causation, task,
+message, and the canonical P0-A scope. Child spans must keep the parent's trace,
+task, and scope. Privileged visibility does not permit cross-scope trace
+splicing.
+
+`MessageEnvelope.correlation_id` is persisted and identity-bound. Existing
+handoff databases are upgraded in place with an idempotent column migration;
+legacy rows retain their prior event IDs because a null correlation field is
+not added to the historical identity material.
+
+Observability keeps its legacy presentation fields, but new governed records
+also carry immutable trace and scope fields. Scoped records require a trusted
+server actor for queries. A repeated execution ID is an idempotent replay only
+when the complete record matches; conflicting overwrites are denied.
+
+## Tool and MCP governance
+
+`ToolDescriptor` binds a tool or MCP server to:
+
+- an explicit resource scope;
+- required actor capabilities;
+- an optional credential reference.
+
+Invocation authorization requires exact propagation of the trace scope and a
+capability superset. Unknown tools, cross-tenant calls, scope substitution, and
+non-privileged access to system/global resources fail closed. Every successful
+registration and invocation appends hash-chained audit evidence.
+
+## Credential governance
+
+Credentials are represented only by references whose schemes are
+`systemd-credential`, `vault`, or `secret-manager`. Raw bearer tokens, passwords,
+and arbitrary values are rejected. Grants are bound to scope, operation, task,
+tool, and expiry. Public/audit records contain a reference hash where disclosure
+is unnecessary; secret material is never persisted by this module.
+
+The existing runtime credential broker remains backward compatible for system
+leases, adds explicit tenant/system/global invariants, and rejects providers
+that attempt to return raw token/secret/password environment values instead of
+file/reference indirection.
+
+## Durable evidence
+
+The SQLite governance store is restart-safe and idempotently initializes four
+tables: governed tools, trace spans, credential grants, and audit evidence.
+Audit entries form a SHA-256 chain. Acceptance requires the chain to verify and
+contain the required actions; missing evidence is not treated as success.
+
+## Acceptance tests
+
+The candidate must pass:
+
+- `TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY`;
+- `TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY`;
+- `AUDIT_EVIDENCE_COMPLETENESS`;
+- P0-A scope and P0-B handoff regression suites;
+- Python compilation, `git diff --check`, and a diff-scoped secret scan.
+
+The repository-wide baseline currently has seven unrelated failures in the
+isolated host environment (five stale continuation-contract fixtures and two
+host-permission fixtures). The same seven failures reproduce at the untouched
+`a642b045775b9154a00ae78543037fbef4fb447b` base; they are not suppressed or
+modified by P0-C.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p1-durable-execution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# R4.2 P1 — Durable Online Agent Execution
+
+Status: candidate implementation. This document does not imply protected-main promotion or Production deployment.
+
+## State model
+
+The generic worker uses two local durable layers:
+
+1. `tasks/<task_id>.json`: atomic fast-state cache for compatibility and quick restart.
+2. `checkpoints.sqlite3`: append-only attempt/phase journal with `synchronous=FULL`.
+
+Checkpoint identity is bound to:
+
+- task_id
+- attempt
+- execution_digest
+- job_id
+- repository
+- base_oid
+- expected_branch_oid
+- target_branch
+- generation
+
+A checkpoint from another repository/branch/generation is never reused.
+
+Phases are monotonic within an attempt:
+
+`claimed → workspace_prepared → verification_passed → source_capture_done|commit_done → result_pending → result_submitted`
+
+`reconciliation_required` is an explicit recovery phase.
+
+## Attempt-aware result idempotency
+
+Result submission idempotency keys include the official Task attempt and the execution digest. The same
+attempt reuses the same key after a timeout/restart; a later official attempt cannot collide with an
+earlier result.
+
+Before submitting a result the worker durably writes `result_pending`, including the result hash and
+idempotency key. After a successful or exact-idempotency-reconciled API response it writes
+`result_submitted`.
+
+A 409 is accepted only if the Task API already contains the exact same result body and the Task is
+VERIFYING/SUCCEEDED. A conflicting result remains a hard failure.
+
+## Resume rules
+
+- `source_capture_done` and `result_pending` may be reused across later official attempts only when the
+  execution/scope binding is identical. This avoids repeating read-only source capture.
+- A deterministic task that crashed before governed commit replays from a new clean detached worktree.
+  This is safe because there is no external side effect yet.
+- `commit_done` is never recommitted. Recovery requires exact Job receipt OID convergence plus exactly
+  one ACTIVE WriterLease whose `current_head_oid` equals the governed commit.
+- delayed Git visibility remains `RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`, preserving an explicit recovery entry.
+
+## Crash cleanup
+
+On worker startup, stale `task-*` workspaces under the configured workspace root are removed before
+polling begins. The path boundary is verified before deletion.
+
+## Contracts
+
+P1 gates include:
+
+- CHECKPOINT_DURABLE_WRITE
+- RESUME_FROM_CHECKPOINT
+- RETRY_IDEMPOTENT_NO_DUPLICATE_SIDE_EFFECT
+- CRASH_RECOVERY_CONVERGENCE
+- WORKER_RESTART_RESUME
+- CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_ISOLATION
+- RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE
+- WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_RECOVERY
+- LEASE_RENEWAL_RECOVERY
+
+WriterLease and governed Job authority remain in the existing Bridge/GitOps durable stores; the worker
+checkpoint DB is not a competing authority for Git state.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-agent-fleet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Agent Fleet / Multi-Agent Scheduling / Fault Isolation
+
+P2 adds a durable fleet decision layer inside TaskPlane without replacing TaskPlane claim/lease
+ownership. Worker registration/heartbeat remains authoritative for liveness. TaskPlane claim CAS
+remains authoritative for ownership. Probe-before-reassignment remains mandatory after an expired
+lease. P1 checkpoint/result replay remains authoritative after worker restart.
+
+`FleetScheduler` adds durable worker capacity slots, weighted scope fairness, starvation aging,
+affinity/anti-affinity labels, worker circuit breakers, per-task/worker quarantine and idempotent
+dispatch reservations. Fleet state is colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database and is
+created idempotently; no new daemon or database is introduced.
+
+A fleet reservation is only a scheduling decision. It does not claim a Task. Callers must perform
+the normal TaskPlane claim and may then bind the returned claim ID to the reservation. This preserves
+the existing ownership and recovery invariants.
+
+Failure recovery never bypasses probe evidence. When TaskPlane recovery places work back in a
+claimable state, P2 may quarantine the failed worker and prefer another worker/failure domain.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Compact Interface Map Runtime
+
+## Purpose
+
+The persistent Online Agent already supports the canonical read-only `source_capture` action, but
+its `SourceCaptureExecutor` always returns an `aios.engineering.source-snapshot.v2` tar.gz+base64
+payload. That is correct for implementation source transfer, but too large for control-plane
+consumers that only need a bounded implementation map.
+
+P2 adds a new **adapter**, not a new execution action:
+
+```text
+action=source_capture
+adapter=compact_interface_map
+```
+
+This preserves the existing execution-v2 schema and Bridge policy:
+
+- read-only repository;
+- no change set;
+- no verification commands;
+- `writer_lease=false`;
+- no branch or commit;
+- existing capability and execution-digest validation.
+
+## Compact map contract
+
+`aios_online_agent_compact_map.py` scans only approved repository roots and source suffixes. It
+returns:
+
+- at most 40 relevant modules;
+- at most 80 selected Python symbols in total;
+- at most 40 test symbols;
+- at most 25 excerpts;
+- at most 1200 characters per excerpt;
+- SQL table names;
+- systemd unit names;
+- current invariants, failure windows and reuse points;
+- P2 fleet contract-to-surface mappings.
+
+The result is hard-bounded to 120 KiB and contains no source archive or `payload_b64`.
+
+Source excerpts apply a conservative sensitive-pattern redaction before result construction.
+
+## P2 contracts
+
+The map supplies evidence surfaces for:
+
+- `FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION`
+- `FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING`
+- `FLEET_FAIRNESS`
+- `FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT`
+- `FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH`
+- `FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY`
+
+Missing first-class scheduling/fleet primitives are reported as gaps rather than invented.
+
+## Result
+
+When the adapter is selected, the worker returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED
+execution_mode=compact_interface_map
+writer_lease=NONE
+```
+
+The existing `source_capture_done` / P1 checkpoint/retry path is reused, so the compact analysis
+inherits attempt-aware result idempotency and restart-safe result submission.
+
+## Governance
+
+This capability is runtime infrastructure only. The implementation candidate may use a governed
+branch/WriterLease for its own code change, but any task executed through `compact_interface_map`
+is read-only and must not create a WriterLease, branch, commit, protected-ref write, or Production
+side effect.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2b-fleet-order-preservation-repair.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# R4.2 P2-B Fleet Order Preservation Repair
+
+P2-C live acceptance exposed a real integration defect in the verified P2-B candidate. The fleet
+scheduler correctly produced durable cross-scope fairness order, but the integration passed the
+entire ranked list to the legacy scheduler. The legacy scheduler then applied its own priority /
+created_at / task_id sort and silently discarded fleet ordering.
+
+The repair preserves the legacy scheduler as the fail-closed security oracle while changing how it
+is called: one fleet-ranked candidate is presented at a time. A candidate rejected by legacy
+security/policy advances to the next fleet candidate. A candidate returned by the oracle must have
+the same task ID as the candidate presented, otherwise execution fails closed.
+
+Task ownership remains unchanged: the original schedule_for_worker/claim_task CAS remains
+authoritative, and a fleet reservation is still only bound after the claim succeeds.
+
+This repair does not modify FleetScheduler state semantics, capacity, WriterLease, checkpoint,
+protected refs or Production behavior.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2b-fleet-runtime-integration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# R4.2 P2-B Fleet Runtime Integration
+
+P2-B connects the verified P2 fleet primitives to the existing TaskPlane pull scheduler without
+replacing its security or ownership logic.
+
+The integration uses two stages. `FleetScheduler.rank_for_worker()` performs only read-only
+capacity/fairness/fault-isolation ranking. The original `TaskScheduler.next_queued_task()` is then
+run over that ordered list and remains the fail-closed security oracle for worker liveness,
+capabilities, data classification, execution zone and other existing policy checks. Only a task
+accepted by the original scheduler receives a short durable fleet reservation.
+
+The original `TaskScheduler.schedule_for_worker()` remains the sole claim path and continues to call
+the existing TaskPlane `claim_task` CAS. After a successful claim, the claim ID is bound to the
+fleet reservation. A claim error releases the reservation. A fleet reservation is never treated as
+task ownership.
+
+P2-B also makes the reservation capacity check atomic inside the fleet SQLite transaction so two
+concurrent pullers cannot oversubscribe the same worker slot. Circuit and task/worker quarantine
+state are enforced on the real pull path. Explicit execution-failure signals can be recorded through
+the integrated scheduler's failure/success/quarantine methods; policy/claim failures are not
+automatically mislabeled as worker crashes.
+
+No new daemon, database or production write path is introduced.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-generic-compact-interface-map-profiles.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Generic Compact Interface-Map Profiles
+
+The compact interface-map runtime is a reusable read-only control-plane capability. It keeps the
+canonical `source_capture` action and `compact_interface_map` adapter, but selects a bounded semantic
+profile from the task's source signals.
+
+The existing `fleet` profile remains backward compatible and returns
+`P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED` with the `FLEET_*` contracts.
+
+The new `model_governance` profile is selected when model/provider/routing/budget/evaluation terms
+are present. It returns `MODEL_GOVERNANCE_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED` and model-specific contracts for
+provider registry, selection policy, version pinning, budget accounting, fallback, scope isolation,
+credential boundary, trace/audit, evaluation gates and routing resilience.
+
+Profile and classification are emitted by the compact-map module and revalidated by the worker
+before result submission. Unknown or mismatched profile/classification pairs fail closed.
+
+No new Bridge action, daemon, database, WriterLease, mutation path or credential surface is added.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-hermes-openclaw-online-agent-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Hermes / OpenClaw Online Agent Runtime
+
+## Goal
+
+Promote Hermes and OpenClaw from shadow-only adapter descriptions to real Online Agent workers
+without creating a second Task/claim protocol.
+
+Both workers reuse the existing P1/P2 Online Agent lifecycle:
+
+```text
+Online Task projected
+→ capability-filtered poll
+→ automatic claim
+→ heartbeat
+→ durable checkpoint
+→ external Agent execution
+→ attempt-aware result submission
+→ official verification
+```
+
+They do **not** change the existing TaskPlane `OpenClawAdapter/HermesAdapter` shadow contract. Those
+adapters remain side-effect-free compatibility surfaces.
+
+## Execution action
+
+The canonical execution envelope adds a read-only action:
+
+```text
+action=agent_runtime
+adapter=hermes | openclaw
+```
+
+The action requires capability `agent.runtime.<adapter>`, has an empty change set, no verification
+commands, and `writer_lease=false`.
+
+`project_online_task()` copies only bounded task fields into the signed execution envelope:
+
+- goal;
+- instructions;
+- success criteria;
+- non-secret constraints.
+
+The task may not choose a command, executable, URL, credential path, environment, or shell string.
+
+## Worker separation
+
+The generic engineering worker defaults to:
+
+```text
+AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=deterministic,source_capture,compact_interface_map,codex
+```
+
+so it skips Hermes/OpenClaw tasks before claim.
+
+Dedicated services advertise:
+
+```text
+Hermes:
+  AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.hermes
+  AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=hermes
+
+OpenClaw:
+  AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=agent.runtime.openclaw
+  AIOS_WORKER_ALLOWED_ADAPTERS=openclaw
+```
+
+This makes adapter selection a pre-claim capability/fleet decision instead of a post-claim failure.
+
+## Credential-isolated executor
+
+The Online Agent worker itself still owns only Task API/Bridge coordination credentials. It writes
+a hash-bound request to `/var/lib/aios-external-agent-executor`.
+
+`aios-external-agent-executor.service` runs as the existing uncredentialed engineering executor user.
+It has:
+
+- one provider-only `LoadCredential` projection for the model-ready OneAPI environment;
+- `/etc/aios-gitops`, `/data/aios-gitops`, and the original provider-secret directory inaccessible;
+- no repository path;
+- no shell execution;
+- loopback denied, preventing direct access to the AIOS Task/Bridge control plane;
+- only the staging OneAPI container address allowed for the installed Agent runtime/provider;
+- only the exchange directory writable.
+
+The root-owned runtime profile in `/etc/aios/external-agent-runtime.d/<runtime>.json` decides the
+absolute executable, fixed non-secret environment, provider-only credential mapping, and I/O mode.
+A task cannot override any of these values. The profile may select `OPENAI_API_KEY` only from the
+systemd credential named `aios-external-agent-oneapi-env`; it cannot name a credential, inject an
+environment variable, or carry an inline secret. The runtime executor parses only the selected
+`ONEAPI_REGULAR_TOKEN` entry and does not expose the source file or other provider tiers to the
+child.
+
+## Runtime profile
+
+A profile supports:
+
+- `argv`: fixed argv, absolute allowlisted executable;
+- `input_mode`: `stdin_text`, `stdin_json`, or `file_json`;
+- `output_mode`: `stdout_text`, `stdout_json`, or `file_json`;
+- timeout;
+- bounded output size.
+
+`{input_json}` and `{output_json}` placeholders are allowed only for file modes. `{prompt}` is a
+root-profile-only argv placeholder populated from the bounded, signed task projection.
+
+The repository includes the staging profile templates validated against the installed Hermes
+v0.20.0 and OpenClaw v2026.7.2-beta.7 CLIs. Before activation, the Agent must re-run the actual
+`--help`/version probes and install the profiles and static configs root-owned. If the installed
+CLI differs, update only the root-owned profile/config projection and record the observed command;
+do not modify the Task contract to compensate.
+
+The provider projection is staging-only and uses the existing model-ready OneAPI source. It is not
+an AIOS Task, Bridge, GitOps, SSH, or Writer credential. Live activation remains blocked if the
+model-ready source cannot be projected through systemd or if the selected provider credential is
+missing/quota-invalid. This worker never passes API keys through task metadata or arbitrary
+environment variables.
+
+## Retry/restart
+
+The external request ID is deterministic over Task/Job/execution digest/runtime. The exchange keeps
+the request/result across worker restart. A repeated attempt with the exact execution digest reuses
+the durable external result instead of invoking the Agent twice.
+
+The normal P1 result idempotency/checkpoint path remains authoritative for Task result submission.
+
+## Result
+
+Successful execution returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=EXTERNAL_AGENT_RUNTIME_SUCCEEDED
+execution_mode=agent_runtime
+agent_runtime=hermes | openclaw
+writer_lease=NONE
+changed_files=[]
+credential_material_exposed=false
+control_plane_access_granted_to_runtime=false
+```
+
+This first runtime version is intentionally read-only with respect to the repository. Engineering
+changes continue to use assistant-authored deterministic plans and governed WriterLease/commit.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-18-owner-controlled-execution-rebind.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Owner-Controlled Same-Binding Execution Rebind
+
+## Purpose
+
+`aios_agent_task_execution_rebind.py` closes a projection/plan race without replacing the Task,
+Governed Job, target branch, generation, or idempotency lineage.
+
+The only supported transition is:
+
+```text
+official NEEDS_REWORK
+→ Task QUEUED with no active lease
+→ persisted source_capture envelope
+→ canonical Bridge resolves an already-registered deterministic plan
+→ CAS-bound metadata.execution + execution_projection replacement
+→ audit event
+→ normal worker claim
+```
+
+The service rejects arbitrary metadata patches. It derives the new envelope from canonical Bridge
+`/v2/execution-envelope`, validates every governed binding coordinate against the persisted envelope,
+requires `source_capture → deterministic`, requires exact old/new execution digests supplied by the
+Owner recovery request, and increments the Task revision under `BEGIN IMMEDIATE`.
+
+It records `TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED` and an idempotent `task_execution_rebinds` receipt.
+No Task/Job/branch replacement is created and the worker still performs the real claim/heartbeat,
+WriterLease and governed commit.
+
+The endpoint is loopback-only:
+
+`POST /v1/tasks/{task_id}/execution-rebind`
+
+and requires the existing Owner control credential plus
+`AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID`.
+
+Direct/manual Task database edits remain forbidden; the service is the audited mutation boundary.

docs/task-plane/r42-p0a-scope-isolation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# R4.2 P0-A TaskPlane Scope Isolation
+
+Status: candidate implementation. This is not proof of protected-main promotion or production deployment.
+
+Task scope is now represented by `scope_type`, `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `project_id`, `conversation_id`, and `run_id` in the model and SQLite persistence. Historical rows become `legacy`; their tenant is never guessed. Tenant tasks require `tenant_id`. System resources use `scope_type=system` without a fabricated tenant.
+
+The HTTP adapter uses the authenticated identity. `PolicyEngine` resolves that identity through server-owned `identity_actor_contexts`; request payload fields do not grant scope. Public create binds the trusted scope, and public list/get apply parameterized scope predicates in `TaskPlaneStore`.
+
+SQLite is the current runtime database. PostgreSQL remains a separate migration and runtime-acceptance gate.

docs/task-plane/r42-p0b-message-handoff-fabric.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# R4.2 P0-B — Durable Message / Handoff Fabric
+
+Status: candidate implementation; not evidence of protected-main merge or Production deployment.
+
+`MessageEnvelope` is the single durable handoff identity and carries source/target/type, tenant/user/
+project/conversation/task/run scope, causation, sequence, capability scope, confidentiality scope,
+idempotency key, expiry and delivery state.
+
+Identity includes **target + scope + sequence + idempotency key + payload hash**, fixing the existing
+AgentEventBus target collision. Server ActorContext is authoritative; caller scope may narrow but may
+not widen/forge trusted tenant/user/project/conversation/run fields.
+
+`DurableHandoffStore` provides SQLite durability in the current runtime. Each logical stream has
+unique `(stream_key, idempotency_key)` and `(stream_key, sequence)`. Exact retry returns `REPLAY`;
+changed payload under the same key is rejected; sequence gaps are rejected; expired messages are not
+delivered.
+
+Confidentiality scopes:
+
+- public: no tenant requirement
+- tenant: same tenant
+- project: same tenant + project
+- private: same tenant + project + user
+- run: same tenant + project + user + run
+
+Required `capability_scope` must be present on the authenticated delivery actor unless the actor is
+explicitly administrative.
+
+Compatibility adapters convert AgentEventBus events, TaskPlane CloudEvents and legacy Agent OS
+MessageBus messages into the durable envelope. Existing message_outbox remains intact as a migration
+source; P0-B does not delete or silently rewrite it.
+
+Required gates:
+`MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`, `MESSAGE_TARGET_COLLISION_DENY`, `MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_REPLAY`,
+`MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT`, `MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE`,
+`HANDOFF_CROSS_TENANT_DENY`, plus existing P0-A TaskPlane scope/security regressions.
+
+SQLite remains current runtime persistence. PostgreSQL remains a separate migration gate.

reports/V2R2C1-source-registry-reconciliation-20260810.json

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "aios.source-registry-reconciliation.v1",
-  "version": "V2R2C1",
-  "root_cause": "PROMOTION_STATE_MACHINE_FINALIZED_BEFORE_SOURCE_REGISTRY_CONVERGENCE",
-  "main_before": "3244f0f17f8845592ac94d585f5ebd65693c9f29",
-  "tag_oid": "07fc2746b688f5f243f29b39de39f32edc3dd9d2",
-  "target_oid": "998d30304787e31e5ae607c0bd86b5edb2b0e5ad",
-  "projection_sha256": "924dfc0ec58afc4e31638f6538e551c5bc8858f804cdbee5af7dce6eba7c90fe",
-  "evidence_closure_oid": "a8b906d1bc24088c19647e98de6a679268f6d0a2",
-  "approval_plan_id": "sha256:c0df52008ae7f64cec5ee2d28947aa7b892066c670ab8295e4549140b1a7500e",
-  "remote_tag_verified": true,
-  "remote_target_verified": true,
-  "gitea_api_verified_by_owner_acceptance": true,
-  "source_entry_before": "missing",
-  "source_entry_added": "versions/V2R2C1.json",
-  "source_entry_is_exact_attested_projection": true,
-  "release_manifest_added": false,
-  "release_manifest_reason": "Historical release-manifest schema differs; no canonical V2R2C1 source-manifest generator was proven. Do not synthesize one by copying old release values.",
-  "runtime_backing": "immutable WS/versions bundle",
-  "runtime_mutated": false,
-  "tag_rewritten": false,
-  "baseline_modified": false,
-  "production_modified": false
-}

runtime/agent-os/message_bus.py

@@ -48,3 +48,8 @@ class MessageBus:
         messages = list(self.queue)
         self.queue.clear()
         return messages
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(message, *, target=None, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import legacy_message_to_envelope
+    return legacy_message_to_envelope(message, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

scripts/autonomous-release/build_artifact.py

@@ -32,36 +32,18 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     parser.add_argument("--tree-oid", required=True)
     parser.add_argument("--output-directory", required=True, type=Path)
     parser.add_argument("--name", default="aios-autonomous-release-candidate")
-    parser.add_argument("--release-version")
-    parser.add_argument("--release-binding-json", type=Path)
-    parser.add_argument("--artifact-mode", choices=("release", "general"))
     return parser
 
 
 def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
-    release_binding = (
-        json.loads(args.release_binding_json.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        if args.release_binding_json is not None
-        else None
-    )
-    if release_binding is not None and not isinstance(release_binding, dict):
-        raise ValueError("release binding JSON must be an object")
     output = args.output_directory
     output.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o750)
     if output.is_symlink():
         raise RuntimeError("artifact output directory symlink rejected")
     os.chmod(output, output.stat().st_mode & 0o750)
     builder = ArtifactBuilder()
-    built = builder.build_from_directory(
-        args.source_oid,
-        args.tree_oid,
-        args.source,
-        release_version=args.release_version,
-        release_binding=release_binding,
-        release_mode=args.release_version is not None,
-        artifact_mode=args.artifact_mode,
-    )
+    built = builder.build_from_directory(args.source_oid, args.tree_oid, args.source)
     builder.verify(built)
     artifact_path = output / f"{args.name}.tar"
     manifest_path = output / f"{args.name}.manifest.json"

scripts/generate_source_registry.py

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Generate one canonical source entry for a governed non-main change.
-
-This utility only creates the file in the caller's worktree. It never commits,
-pushes, changes main, rewrites a tag, or updates a production projection. The
-caller must submit the resulting file through the existing governed writer and
-approval flow.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-
-APP = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "active-runtime" / "app"
-sys.path.insert(0, str(APP))
-
-from version_registry import (  # noqa: E402
-    build_source_registry_entry,
-    configured_authoritative_git_dir,
-    configured_repository_identity,
-    source_registry_json,
-    validate_source_registry_record,
-    verify_approval_authority,
-    verify_authoritative_repository,
-    verify_source_registry_git_identity,
-)
-
-
-def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    value = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    value.add_argument("--output", required=True, type=Path)
-    value.add_argument("--version", required=True)
-    value.add_argument("--tag-oid", required=True)
-    value.add_argument("--target-oid", required=True)
-    value.add_argument("--peeled-target-oid", required=True)
-    value.add_argument("--evidence-closure-oid", required=True)
-    value.add_argument("--approval-plan-id", required=True)
-    value.add_argument(
-        "--repository",
-        type=Path,
-        default=configured_authoritative_git_dir(),
-        help="authoritative bare repository; required for release generation",
-    )
-    value.add_argument(
-        "--approval-authority",
-        type=Path,
-        default=(
-            Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY"])
-            if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVAL_AUTHORITY")
-            else None
-        ),
-        help="canonical approval/publication receipt for this release request",
-    )
-    value.add_argument(
-        "--repository-identity",
-        default=configured_repository_identity(),
-    )
-    return value
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    args = parser().parse_args()
-    if args.approval_authority is None:
-        raise ValueError("canonical approval authority is required")
-    verify_authoritative_repository(
-        args.repository,
-        repository_identity=args.repository_identity,
-    )
-    tag_oid = args.tag_oid.lower()
-    target_oid = args.target_oid.lower()
-    peeled_target_oid = args.peeled_target_oid.lower()
-    evidence_closure_oid = args.evidence_closure_oid.lower()
-    expected = build_source_registry_entry(
-        version=args.version,
-        tag_oid=tag_oid,
-        target_oid=target_oid,
-        peeled_target_oid=peeled_target_oid,
-        evidence_closure_oid=evidence_closure_oid,
-        approval_plan_id=args.approval_plan_id,
-        repository=args.repository_identity,
-    )
-    verify_source_registry_git_identity(args.repository, expected)
-    verify_approval_authority(args.approval_authority, expected)
-    destination = args.output.resolve()
-    if destination.name != f"{args.version}.json" or destination.parent.name != "versions":
-        raise ValueError("output must be versions/<version>.json")
-    payload = source_registry_json(expected)
-    destination.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    if destination.is_symlink():
-        raise ValueError("existing source registry path must not be a symlink")
-    if destination.exists() and not destination.is_file():
-        raise ValueError("existing source registry path must be a regular file")
-    if destination.exists():
-        current = json.loads(destination.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        validate_source_registry_record(
-            current,
-            expected_version=args.version,
-            expected_tag_oid=tag_oid,
-            expected_target_oid=target_oid,
-            expected_evidence_closure_oid=evidence_closure_oid,
-            expected_approval_plan_id=args.approval_plan_id,
-        )
-        print(json.dumps({"status": "EXISTING_IDENTITY_VERIFIED", "path": str(destination)}))
-        return 0
-    descriptor = os.open(
-        destination,
-        os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0),
-        0o640,
-    )
-    try:
-        os.write(descriptor, payload)
-        os.fsync(descriptor)
-    finally:
-        os.close(descriptor)
-    print(json.dumps({"status": "GENERATED", "path": str(destination)}))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-autonomous-release-candidate/aios_autonomous_release_candidate/artifact.py

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import io
 import json
 import os
 from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
-import re
 import stat
 import tarfile
 from typing import Mapping
@@ -76,30 +75,6 @@ class BuiltArtifact:
     manifest: ArtifactManifest
 
 
-@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
-class ReleaseIdentityBinding:
-    """Immutable release identity required for a release artifact build."""
-
-    version: str
-    repository: str
-    tag_oid: str
-    target_oid: str
-    evidence_closure_oid: str
-    approval_plan_id: str
-    peeled_target_oid: str | None = None
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return {
-            "version": self.version,
-            "repository": self.repository,
-            "tag_oid": self.tag_oid,
-            "target_oid": self.target_oid,
-            "peeled_target_oid": self.peeled_target_oid or self.target_oid,
-            "evidence_closure_oid": self.evidence_closure_oid,
-            "approval_plan_id": self.approval_plan_id,
-        }
-
-
 class ArtifactBuilder:
     MAX_FILE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
     MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
@@ -117,188 +92,14 @@ class ArtifactBuilder:
         if not is_git_oid(value):
             raise ValueError(f"{name} must be a full lowercase Git OID")
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _binding_dict(
-        binding: ReleaseIdentityBinding | Mapping[str, str],
-    ) -> dict[str, str]:
-        if isinstance(binding, ReleaseIdentityBinding):
-            return binding.as_dict()
-        values = {str(key): str(value) for key, value in binding.items()}
-        values.setdefault("peeled_target_oid", values.get("target_oid", ""))
-        return values
-
-    @classmethod
-    def _validate_source_registry(
-        cls,
-        root: Path,
-        release_version: str,
-        release_binding: ReleaseIdentityBinding | Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
-        *,
-        release_mode: bool = False,
-    ) -> dict[str, str]:
-        if not re.fullmatch(r"V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?", release_version):
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID", "release version is not canonical"
-            )
-        path = root / "versions" / f"{release_version}.json"
-        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_MISSING",
-                f"artifact source is missing versions/{release_version}.json",
-            )
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID",
-                f"artifact source registry cannot be read: {path}",
-            ) from exc
-        if not isinstance(value, dict):
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID", "source registry is not an object"
-            )
-        if value.get("version") != release_version or value.get("repository") != "aios/aios":
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH",
-                "source registry version or repository does not match the artifact",
-            )
-        if value.get("schema") not in {
-            "aios.source-registry.v1",
-            "aios.production-registry.v2",
-        }:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID", "source registry schema is invalid"
-            )
-        for field in ("tag_oid", "target_oid", "peeled_target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"):
-            item = value.get(field)
-            if not isinstance(item, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", item):
-                raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                    "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID",
-                    f"source registry field is invalid: {field}",
-                )
-        if value["peeled_target_oid"] != value["target_oid"]:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH",
-                "source registry peeled target differs from target",
-            )
-        if not isinstance(value.get("approval_plan_id"), str) or not re.fullmatch(
-            r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}", value["approval_plan_id"]
-        ):
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_INVALID", "source registry approval plan is invalid"
-            )
-        if release_mode and release_binding is None:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_REQUIRED",
-                "release artifact builds require an expected release identity",
-            )
-        if release_binding is not None:
-            expected = cls._binding_dict(release_binding)
-            required = (
-                "version",
-                "repository",
-                "tag_oid",
-                "target_oid",
-                "peeled_target_oid",
-                "evidence_closure_oid",
-                "approval_plan_id",
-            )
-            if any(not expected.get(name) for name in required):
-                raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                    "ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID",
-                    "expected release identity is incomplete",
-                )
-            for name in ("tag_oid", "target_oid", "peeled_target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid"):
-                if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", expected[name]):
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                        "ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID",
-                        f"expected release identity field is invalid: {name}",
-                    )
-            if not re.fullmatch(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}", expected["approval_plan_id"]):
-                raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                    "ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID",
-                    "expected release identity approval plan is invalid",
-                )
-            for name in required:
-                if value.get(name) != expected[name]:
-                    raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                        "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH",
-                        f"source registry does not match expected release identity: {name}",
-                    )
-        return {
-            "version": str(value["version"]),
-            "repository": str(value["repository"]),
-            "tag_oid": str(value["tag_oid"]),
-            "target_oid": str(value["target_oid"]),
-            "peeled_target_oid": str(value["peeled_target_oid"]),
-            "evidence_closure_oid": str(value["evidence_closure_oid"]),
-            "approval_plan_id": str(value["approval_plan_id"]),
-        }
-
     def build_from_directory(
-        self,
-        source_oid: str,
-        tree_oid: str,
-        source: str | Path,
-        release_version: str | None = None,
-        release_binding: ReleaseIdentityBinding | Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
-        release_mode: bool | None = None,
-        artifact_mode: str | None = None,
+        self, source_oid: str, tree_oid: str, source: str | Path
     ) -> BuiltArtifact:
         root = Path(source)
         if root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
             raise ReleaseBlocked(
                 "ARTIFACT_SOURCE_LINK_REJECTED", "artifact source must be a real directory"
             )
-        if artifact_mode not in {None, "release", "general"}:
-            raise ValueError("artifact_mode must be release, general, or omitted")
-        if artifact_mode == "release" and release_mode is False:
-            raise ValueError("artifact_mode=release conflicts with release_mode=False")
-        if artifact_mode == "general" and release_mode is True:
-            raise ValueError("artifact_mode=general conflicts with release_mode=True")
-
-        explicit_release_version = release_version is not None
-        detected_canonical_version = False
-        if release_version is None:
-            version_file = root / "VERSION"
-            if version_file.is_file() and not version_file.is_symlink():
-                release_version = version_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-                detected_canonical_version = bool(
-                    re.fullmatch(r"V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?", release_version)
-                )
-        elif re.fullmatch(r"V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?", release_version):
-            detected_canonical_version = True
-
-        binding_expected: dict[str, str] | None = None
-        if release_binding is not None:
-            binding_expected = self._binding_dict(release_binding)
-            if not binding_expected.get("version"):
-                raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                    "ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID",
-                    "release identity binding must include version",
-                )
-            release_version = release_version or binding_expected["version"]
-
-        release_requested = bool(
-            explicit_release_version
-            or detected_canonical_version
-            or release_binding is not None
-            or release_mode is True
-            or artifact_mode == "release"
-        )
-        if artifact_mode == "general" and release_requested:
-            raise ReleaseBlocked(
-                "ARTIFACT_GENERAL_MODE_RELEASE_VERSION",
-                "general artifacts cannot contain canonical release metadata",
-            )
-        if release_requested:
-            release_mode = True
-            self._validate_source_registry(
-                root,
-                release_version or "",
-                release_binding,
-                release_mode=True,
-            )
         files: list[ArtifactFile] = []
         for directory, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(root, followlinks=False):
             current = Path(directory)

services/aios-autonomous-release-candidate/aios_autonomous_release_candidate/cli.py

@@ -61,9 +61,6 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     artifact_build.add_argument("--source-oid", required=True)
     artifact_build.add_argument("--tree-oid", required=True)
     artifact_build.add_argument("--output-directory", required=True, type=Path)
-    artifact_build.add_argument("--release-version")
-    artifact_build.add_argument("--release-binding-json", type=Path)
-    artifact_build.add_argument("--artifact-mode", choices=("release", "general"))
     artifact_verify = artifact_sub.add_parser("verify")
     artifact_verify.add_argument("--artifact", required=True, type=Path)
     artifact_verify.add_argument("--manifest", required=True, type=Path)
@@ -148,20 +145,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     if args.command == "artifact":
         builder = ArtifactBuilder()
         if args.artifact_command == "build":
-            release_binding = (
-                load_json(args.release_binding_json)
-                if args.release_binding_json is not None
-                else None
-            )
-            built = builder.build_from_directory(
-                args.source_oid,
-                args.tree_oid,
-                args.source,
-                release_version=args.release_version,
-                release_binding=release_binding,
-                release_mode=args.release_version is not None,
-                artifact_mode=args.artifact_mode,
-            )
+            built = builder.build_from_directory(args.source_oid, args.tree_oid, args.source)
             builder.verify(built)
             artifact_path = args.output_directory / "candidate.tar"
             manifest_path = args.output_directory / "manifest.json"

tests/autonomous_release/test_artifact_closure.py

@@ -1,35 +1,11 @@
-import json
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import pytest
 
-from aios_autonomous_release_candidate.artifact import (
-    ArtifactBuilder,
-    ArtifactFile,
-    BuiltArtifact,
-    ReleaseIdentityBinding,
-)
+from aios_autonomous_release_candidate.artifact import ArtifactBuilder, ArtifactFile, BuiltArtifact
 from aios_autonomous_release_candidate.errors import EvidenceIncomplete, ReleaseBlocked
 
 
-def _source_registry(root: Path) -> None:
-    target = "2" * 40
-    value = {
-        "schema": "aios.source-registry.v1",
-        "version": "V2R2C1",
-        "repository": "aios/aios",
-        "tag_oid": "1" * 40,
-        "tag_object": "1" * 40,
-        "target_oid": target,
-        "peeled_target_oid": target,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": "3" * 40,
-        "approval_plan_id": "sha256:" + "4" * 64,
-    }
-    path = root / "versions" / "V2R2C1.json"
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
-    path.write_text(json.dumps(value) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
-
-
 def test_artifact_is_deterministic_and_reverified() -> None:
     builder = ArtifactBuilder()
     files = (
@@ -56,143 +32,6 @@ def test_source_tree_rejects_symlink_and_hardlink(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
         ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory("a" * 40, "b" * 40, root)
 
 
-def test_release_source_tree_requires_source_registry_entry(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY_MISSING"):
-        ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory("a" * 40, "b" * 40, root)
-
-
-def test_canonical_version_without_binding_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    _source_registry(root)
-    with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_REQUIRED"):
-        ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory("a" * 40, "b" * 40, root)
-
-
-def test_release_source_tree_requires_expected_release_identity(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    _source_registry(root)
-    binding = ReleaseIdentityBinding(
-        version="V2R2C1",
-        repository="aios/aios",
-        tag_oid="1" * 40,
-        target_oid="2" * 40,
-        evidence_closure_oid="3" * 40,
-        approval_plan_id="sha256:" + "4" * 64,
-    )
-    built = ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory(
-        "a" * 40,
-        "b" * 40,
-        root,
-        release_binding=binding,
-    )
-    ArtifactBuilder().verify(built)
-
-
-def test_canonical_version_with_malformed_binding_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    _source_registry(root)
-    with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_INVALID"):
-        ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory(
-            "a" * 40,
-            "b" * 40,
-            root,
-            release_binding={
-                "version": "V2R2C1",
-                "repository": "aios/aios",
-                "tag_oid": "not-an-oid",
-            },
-        )
-
-
-def test_explicit_general_artifact_without_release_version_passes(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "README.txt").write_text("general candidate\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    built = ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory(
-        "a" * 40,
-        "b" * 40,
-        root,
-        artifact_mode="general",
-    )
-    assert "README.txt" in built.manifest.files
-
-
-def test_explicit_general_mode_rejects_canonical_version(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    _source_registry(root)
-    with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_GENERAL_MODE_RELEASE_VERSION"):
-        ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory(
-            "a" * 40,
-            "b" * 40,
-            root,
-            artifact_mode="general",
-        )
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize(
-    "field,wrong",
-    [
-        ("repository", "other/repository"),
-        ("version", "V2R2C2"),
-        ("tag_oid", "9" * 40),
-        ("target_oid", "8" * 40),
-        ("peeled_target_oid", "7" * 40),
-        ("evidence_closure_oid", "6" * 40),
-        ("approval_plan_id", "sha256:" + "5" * 64),
-    ],
-)
-def test_release_source_tree_rejects_every_identity_mismatch(
-    tmp_path: Path, field: str, wrong: str
-) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    _source_registry(root)
-    binding = {
-        "version": "V2R2C1",
-        "repository": "aios/aios",
-        "tag_oid": "1" * 40,
-        "target_oid": "2" * 40,
-        "peeled_target_oid": "2" * 40,
-        "evidence_closure_oid": "3" * 40,
-        "approval_plan_id": "sha256:" + "4" * 64,
-    }
-    binding[field] = wrong
-    with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_SOURCE_REGISTRY"):
-        ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory(
-            "a" * 40,
-            "b" * 40,
-            root,
-            release_binding=binding,
-        )
-
-
-def test_release_mode_without_binding_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    root = tmp_path / "source"
-    root.mkdir()
-    (root / "VERSION").write_text("V2R2C1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    _source_registry(root)
-    with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_RELEASE_BINDING_REQUIRED"):
-        ArtifactBuilder().build_from_directory(
-            "a" * 40,
-            "b" * 40,
-            root,
-            release_version="V2R2C1",
-            release_mode=True,
-        )
-
-
 def test_artifact_rejects_secret_markers() -> None:
     with pytest.raises(ReleaseBlocked, match="ARTIFACT_SECRET_MARKER"):
         ArtifactBuilder().build(

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_shadow_client_rbac.py

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ class ShadowClientRBACPublicInterfaceTests(unittest.TestCase):
             identity_verifier=self.IdentityVerifier({"shadow-client"}),
             execution_enabled=False,
             identity_capabilities={"shadow-client": set(capabilities)},
+            identity_actor_contexts={
+                "shadow-client": {"scope_type": "system"}
+            },
         )
         service = self.TaskPlaneService(store, policy=policy)
 

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.task_plane.fleet import FleetConflict, FleetScheduler
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Plan:
+    task_id: str
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda:["code.read"])
+    metadata: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
+    scope_type: str = "tenant"
+    tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"
+    project_id: str | None = "project-a"
+    user_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Task:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int = 1
+    status: str = "QUEUED"
+    created_at: float = 1.0
+    task_plan: Plan | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self):
+        if self.task_plan is None:
+            self.task_plan=Plan(self.task_id)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Worker:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: list[str]=field(default_factory=lambda:["code.read"])
+
+
+class Store:
+    def __init__(self, path=":memory:"):
+        self.conn=sqlite3.connect(path,check_same_thread=False)
+        self._lock=threading.RLock()
+        self.conn.executescript("""
+        CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS claims(
+          claim_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,task_id TEXT,worker_id TEXT,status TEXT,lease_expires_at REAL
+        );
+        """)
+        self.tasks=[]
+        self.workers={}
+
+    def list_tasks(self,_ctx=None):
+        return list(self.tasks)
+
+    def get_worker(self,worker_id):
+        return self.workers[worker_id]
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.online=set()
+    def is_online(self,worker_id,now=None):
+        return worker_id in self.online
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fleet():
+    store=Store(); registry=Registry()
+    for wid in ("w-a","w-b","w-c"):
+        store.workers[wid]=Worker(wid)
+        registry.online.add(wid)
+    scheduler=FleetScheduler(store,registry,now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-a",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-a",weight=1)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-b",max_slots=2,failure_domain="zone-b",weight=1)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-c",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-c",weight=2)
+    return store,registry,scheduler
+
+
+def test_FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION_capacity_policy_is_durable(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    policy=scheduler.state.worker_policy("w-b")
+    assert policy.max_slots==2 and policy.failure_domain=="zone-b"
+    reloaded=type(scheduler)(store, scheduler.workers, now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    assert reloaded.state.worker_policy("w-b").max_slots==2
+
+
+def test_FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING_does_not_oversubscribe_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1"),Task("task-2"),Task("task-3")]
+    decisions=scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=3,now=1000.0)
+    assert [d.worker_id for d in decisions]==["w-a"]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING_accounts_for_active_claims(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.conn.execute(
+      "INSERT INTO claims VALUES ('claim-1','other','w-a','ACTIVE',2000)"
+    )
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    assert scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=1,now=1000.0)==[]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAIRNESS_scope_virtual_finish_prevents_hot_scope_monopoly(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[
+      Task("a1",created_at=1,task_plan=Plan("a1",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p-a")),
+      Task("a2",created_at=2,task_plan=Plan("a2",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p-a")),
+      Task("b1",created_at=3,task_plan=Plan("b1",tenant_id="tenant-b",project_id="p-b")),
+    ]
+    first=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    assert first.task_id=="a1"
+    scheduler.state.release("a1",state="COMPLETED",now=1000.1)
+    store.tasks=[task for task in store.tasks if task.task_id!="a1"]
+    second=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.2)[0]
+    assert second.task_id=="b1"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION_opens_worker_circuit_after_threshold(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    for _ in range(3):
+        scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",now=1000.0)
+    assert scheduler.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.0)
+    assert scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=1,now=1001.0)==[]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT_avoids_quarantined_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    scheduler.state.record_task_worker_failure(
+      "task-1","w-a","lease_expired",quarantine_seconds=60,now=1000.0
+    )
+    decision=scheduler.select(["w-a","w-b"],limit=1,now=1001.0)[0]
+    assert decision.worker_id=="w-b"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION_uses_tenant_project_fairness_keys(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[
+      Task("a",task_plan=Plan("a",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p")),
+      Task("b",task_plan=Plan("b",tenant_id="tenant-b",project_id="p")),
+    ]
+    decisions=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=2,now=1000.0)
+    assert {d.scope_key for d in decisions}=={
+      "tenant:tenant-a|project:p","tenant:tenant-b|project:p"
+    }
+
+
+def test_FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH_replay_same_task_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    one=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    # Reservation remains authoritative; a conflicting second worker cannot steal it.
+    with pytest.raises(FleetConflict):
+        scheduler.state.reserve(
+            task_id="task-1",worker_id="w-c",task_revision=1,
+            scope_key=one.scope_key,failure_domain="zone-c",score=one.score,
+            reservation_seconds=30,now=1001.0,scope_weight=1.0,
+        )
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY_worker_success_closes_circuit(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    for _ in range(3):
+        scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",now=1000.0)
+    scheduler.state.record_worker_success("w-a",now=1001.0)
+    assert not scheduler.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.1)
+
+
+def test_affinity_and_failure_domain_anti_affinity(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-b",max_slots=2,failure_domain="zone-b",labels={"gpu":"false"})
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-c",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-c",labels={"gpu":"true"})
+    task=Task("gpu-task")
+    task.task_plan.metadata={
+      "fleet_affinity_labels":{"gpu":"true"},
+      "fleet_avoid_failure_domains":["zone-b"],
+    }
+    store.tasks=[task]
+    decision=scheduler.select(["w-b","w-c"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    assert decision.worker_id=="w-c"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY_state_survives_sqlite_restart(tmp_path):
+    path=tmp_path/"task-plane.sqlite3"
+    first=Store(str(path)); registry=Registry()
+    first.workers["w-a"]=Worker("w-a"); registry.online.add("w-a")
+    scheduler=FleetScheduler(first,registry,now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-a",max_slots=3,failure_domain="zone-a")
+    scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",threshold=1,now=1000.0)
+    first.conn.close()
+
+    second=Store(str(path)); second.workers["w-a"]=Worker("w-a")
+    resumed=FleetScheduler(second,registry,now_fn=lambda:1001.0)
+    assert resumed.state.worker_policy("w-a").max_slots==3
+    assert resumed.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.0)

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet_order_preservation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+from app.task_plane.scheduler import TaskScheduler
+
+
+def _security_contract():
+    path = Path(__file__).with_name("test_task_plane_security_contract.py")
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("p2b_order_security_contract", path)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def _create_task(service, contract, task_id, tenant, project):
+    return service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "issuer": {"type": "agent", "id": contract.ADMIN_IDENTITY},
+            "required_capabilities": ["code.read"],
+            "scope_type": "tenant",
+            "tenant_id": tenant,
+            "project_id": project,
+            "metadata": {"fleet_priority": 0},
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def _task_id(claim):
+    return getattr(
+        claim,
+        "task_id",
+        claim.get("task_id") if isinstance(claim, dict) else None,
+    )
+
+
+def test_P2B_FLEET_ORDER_is_preserved_through_legacy_claim_oracle():
+    contract = _security_contract()
+    service = contract._service()
+    service.register_worker(contract._worker_payload(max_concurrency=3))
+    worker_id = contract.WORKER_ID
+
+    scheduler = TaskScheduler(service.store)
+    scheduler.fleet_scheduler.configure_worker(
+        worker_id, max_slots=3, failure_domain="zone-a"
+    )
+
+    _create_task(service, contract, "p2b-order-a1", "tenant-a", "project-a")
+    _create_task(service, contract, "p2b-order-a2", "tenant-a", "project-a")
+    _create_task(service, contract, "p2b-order-b1", "tenant-b", "project-b")
+
+    first = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+    second = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+
+    assert _task_id(first) == "p2b-order-a1"
+    assert _task_id(second) == "p2b-order-b1"
+
+    rows = service.store.conn.execute(
+        "SELECT scope_key,dispatch_count FROM fleet_scope_state ORDER BY scope_key"
+    ).fetchall()
+    assert len(rows) >= 2

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet_runtime_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+from app.task_plane.fleet import FleetConflict, FleetScheduler
+from app.task_plane.errors import NotFoundError
+from app.task_plane.scheduler import TaskScheduler
+
+
+def _security_contract():
+    path = Path(__file__).with_name("test_task_plane_security_contract.py")
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("p2b_security_contract", path)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_P2B_REAL_DISPATCH_claim_binds_fleet_reservation_and_circuit():
+    contract = _security_contract()
+    service = contract._service()
+    service.register_worker(contract._worker_payload(max_concurrency=2))
+    worker_id = contract.WORKER_ID
+
+    service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-p2b-real-1",
+            "issuer": {"type": "agent", "id": contract.ADMIN_IDENTITY},
+            "required_capabilities": ["code.read"],
+        }
+    )
+
+    scheduler = TaskScheduler(service.store)
+    scheduler.fleet_scheduler.configure_worker(
+        worker_id,
+        max_slots=2,
+        failure_domain="zone-real",
+        labels={"runtime": "task-plane"},
+    )
+    first = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+    assert first is not None
+    assert first.task_id == "task-p2b-real-1"
+
+    row = service.store.conn.execute(
+        "SELECT state,claim_id,worker_id FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE task_id=?",
+        ("task-p2b-real-1",),
+    ).fetchone()
+    assert tuple(row) == ("CLAIMED", first.claim_id, worker_id)
+
+    # A real circuit blocks the actual scheduler even though one capacity slot remains.
+    failure_now = time.time()
+    scheduler.record_worker_failure(
+        worker_id, "runtime_crash", threshold=1, now=failure_now
+    )
+    service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-p2b-real-2",
+            "issuer": {"type": "agent", "id": contract.ADMIN_IDENTITY},
+            "required_capabilities": ["code.read"],
+        }
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError, match="no queued tasks available"):
+        scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+
+    scheduler.record_worker_success(worker_id, now=failure_now + 1.0)
+    second = scheduler.schedule_for_worker(worker_id)
+    assert second is not None
+    assert second.task_id == "task-p2b-real-2"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Plan:
+    task_id: str
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: ["code.read"])
+    metadata: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
+    scope_type: str = "tenant"
+    tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"
+    project_id: str | None = "project-a"
+    user_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Task:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int = 1
+    status: str = "QUEUED"
+    created_at: float = 1.0
+    task_plan: Plan | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self):
+        if self.task_plan is None:
+            self.task_plan = Plan(self.task_id)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Worker:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: ["code.read"])
+
+
+class Store:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False)
+        self._lock = threading.RLock()
+        self.conn.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE claims("
+            "claim_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,task_id TEXT,worker_id TEXT,status TEXT,"
+            "lease_expires_at REAL)"
+        )
+        self.tasks = []
+        self.workers = {}
+
+    def list_tasks(self, _ctx=None):
+        return list(self.tasks)
+
+    def get_worker(self, worker_id):
+        return self.workers[worker_id]
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.online = set()
+
+    def is_online(self, worker_id, now=None):
+        return worker_id in self.online
+
+
+def _fleet():
+    store = Store()
+    registry = Registry()
+    store.workers["w-a"] = Worker("w-a")
+    registry.online.add("w-a")
+    fleet = FleetScheduler(store, registry, now_fn=lambda: 1000.0)
+    fleet.configure_worker("w-a", max_slots=1, failure_domain="zone-a")
+    return store, fleet
+
+
+def test_P2B_CAPACITY_RESERVATION_is_atomic_under_concurrent_pullers():
+    store, fleet = _fleet()
+    tasks = [Task("task-a"), Task("task-b")]
+    store.tasks = tasks
+    barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+    outcomes = []
+
+    def reserve(task):
+        barrier.wait()
+        try:
+            fleet.reserve_for_worker("w-a", task, now=1000.0)
+            outcomes.append("reserved")
+        except FleetConflict:
+            outcomes.append("conflict")
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=reserve, args=(task,)) for task in tasks]
+    for thread in threads:
+        thread.start()
+    for thread in threads:
+        thread.join()
+
+    assert sorted(outcomes) == ["conflict", "reserved"]
+    assert fleet.state.reserved_slots("w-a", 1000.0) == 1
+
+
+def test_P2B_RANK_is_read_only_until_legacy_security_accepts_candidate():
+    store, fleet = _fleet()
+    store.tasks = [Task("task-a"), Task("task-b")]
+    ranked = fleet.rank_for_worker("w-a", now=1000.0)
+    assert [task.task_id for task in ranked] == ["task-a", "task-b"]
+    assert fleet.state.reserved_slots("w-a", 1000.0) == 0

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_scope_isolation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import threading
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = os.getcwd()
+if os.path.join(ROOT, "active-runtime") not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.append(os.path.join(ROOT, "active-runtime"))
+
+from app.task_plane.api import TaskPlaneRequestHandler, TaskPlaneService
+from app.task_plane.errors import ForbiddenError, NotFoundError, ValidationError
+from app.task_plane.models import TaskPlan
+from app.task_plane.policy import PolicyEngine
+from app.task_plane.store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+def _policy() -> PolicyEngine:
+    return PolicyEngine(
+        identity_capabilities={
+            "actor-a": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+            "actor-b": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+            "reader-a": {"task.read"},
+            "reader-b": {"task.read"},
+            "owner": {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.read.all"},
+            "unbound": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+        },
+        identity_actor_contexts={
+            "actor-a": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+                "user_id": "user-a",
+                "project_id": "project-a",
+                "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+                "run_id": "run-a",
+            },
+            "reader-a": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+                "user_id": "user-a",
+                "project_id": "project-a",
+                "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+                "run_id": "run-a",
+            },
+            "actor-b": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-b",
+                "user_id": "user-b",
+                "project_id": "project-b",
+            },
+            "reader-b": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-b",
+                "user_id": "user-b",
+                "project_id": "project-b",
+            },
+            "owner": {"scope_type": "system"},
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def _service() -> TaskPlaneService:
+    return TaskPlaneService(TaskPlaneStore(":memory:"), policy=_policy())
+
+
+def test_taskplan_scope_fields_round_trip_as_first_class_values() -> None:
+    plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-scope-roundtrip",
+            "scope_type": "tenant",
+            "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+            "user_id": "user-a",
+            "project_id": "project-a",
+            "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+            "run_id": "run-a",
+        }
+    )
+    payload = plan.to_dict()
+    assert TaskPlan.from_dict(payload).to_dict() == payload
+
+
+def test_tenant_scope_requires_tenant_id_and_system_scope_does_not() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
+        TaskPlan.from_dict({"task_id": "task-missing-tenant", "scope_type": "tenant"})
+    assert exc.value.error_code == "TASK_SCOPE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED"
+    system = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+        {"task_id": "task-system", "scope_type": "system", "run_id": "system-run"}
+    )
+    assert system.tenant_id is None
+
+
+def test_ACTOR_BINDING_AUTHZ_MERGE_uses_server_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    created = service.create_task(
+        {"task_id": "task-a", "task_type": "code.change"},
+        actor_identity="actor-a",
+    )
+    assert created["plan"]["tenant_id"] == "tenant-a"
+    assert created["plan"]["user_id"] == "user-a"
+    assert created["plan"]["project_id"] == "project-a"
+    declared = service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-a-declared",
+            "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+            "user_id": "user-a",
+            "project_id": "project-a",
+            "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+            "run_id": "run-a",
+        },
+        actor_identity="actor-a",
+    )
+    assert declared["plan"]["scope_type"] == "tenant"
+
+
+def test_TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY_rejects_forged_client_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    with pytest.raises(ForbiddenError) as exc:
+        service.create_task(
+            {
+                "task_id": "task-forged",
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-b",
+                "user_id": "user-b",
+                "project_id": "project-b",
+            },
+            actor_identity="actor-a",
+        )
+    assert exc.value.error_code == "TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"
+
+
+def test_public_create_fails_closed_without_server_actor_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    with pytest.raises(ForbiddenError) as exc:
+        service.create_task(
+            {"task_id": "task-unbound"}, actor_identity="unbound"
+        )
+    assert exc.value.error_code == "TASK_ACTOR_SCOPE_UNAVAILABLE"
+
+
+def test_TASKPLANE_LIST_AUTHZ_DENY_and_TASK_OWNERSHIP_FILTER() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-b"}, actor_identity="actor-b")
+    assert [item["task_id"] for item in service.list_tasks("reader-a")] == ["task-a"]
+    assert [item["task_id"] for item in service.list_tasks("reader-b")] == ["task-b"]
+
+
+def test_TASKPLANE_GET_AUTHZ_DENY_does_not_disclose_cross_tenant_task() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError):
+        service.get_task("task-a", "reader-b")
+
+
+def test_http_authentication_drives_server_scope_and_cross_tenant_404() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+
+    class Handler(TaskPlaneRequestHandler):
+        pass
+
+    Handler.service = service
+    Handler.authenticator = lambda token: {
+        "token-a": "actor-a",
+        "token-b": "reader-b",
+    }.get(token)
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
+    try:
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + "/tasks",
+            data=json.dumps({"task_id": "task-http-a"}).encode(),
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer token-a",
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            },
+            method="POST",
+        )
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=3) as response:
+            created = json.loads(response.read())
+        assert created["plan"]["tenant_id"] == "tenant-a"
+
+        denied = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + "/tasks/task-http-a",
+            headers={"Authorization": "Bearer token-b"},
+        )
+        with pytest.raises(urllib.error.HTTPError) as exc:
+            urllib.request.urlopen(denied, timeout=3)
+        assert exc.value.code == 404
+    finally:
+        server.shutdown()
+        server.server_close()
+        thread.join(timeout=3)
+
+
+def test_mutating_endpoint_is_scoped_before_cancel() -> None:
+    policy = PolicyEngine(
+        execution_enabled=True,
+        identity_capabilities={
+            "actor-a": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+            "actor-b": {"task.cancel"},
+        },
+        identity_actor_contexts={
+            "actor-a": {"scope_type": "tenant", "tenant_id": "tenant-a"},
+            "actor-b": {"scope_type": "tenant", "tenant_id": "tenant-b"},
+        },
+    )
+    service = TaskPlaneService(TaskPlaneStore(":memory:"), policy=policy)
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError):
+        service.cancel("task-a", {"actor_identity": "actor-b"})
+
+
+def test_privileged_server_actor_can_cross_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-b"}, actor_identity="actor-b")
+    assert {item["task_id"] for item in service.list_tasks("owner")} == {
+        "task-a",
+        "task-b",
+    }
+
+
+def test_scope_sql_parameters_do_not_interpolate_tenant_values() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    policy = PolicyEngine(
+        identity_capabilities={"attacker": {"task.read"}},
+        identity_actor_contexts={
+            "attacker": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-a' OR 1=1 --",
+            }
+        },
+    )
+    attacker_service = TaskPlaneService(service.store, policy=policy)
+    assert attacker_service.list_tasks("attacker") == []
+
+
+def test_existing_sqlite_rows_migrate_to_legacy_without_tenant_guess(tmp_path) -> None:
+    path = tmp_path / "legacy.sqlite3"
+    connection = sqlite3.connect(path)
+    connection.execute(
+        """
+        CREATE TABLE tasks (
+            task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, revision INTEGER NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL,
+            task_json TEXT NOT NULL, task_type TEXT NOT NULL, root_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+            parent_task_id TEXT, correlation_id TEXT, idempotency_key TEXT UNIQUE,
+            created_at REAL NOT NULL, updated_at REAL NOT NULL, failure_reason TEXT
+        )
+        """
+    )
+    connection.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+        (
+            "task-legacy",
+            1,
+            "CREATED",
+            json.dumps({"task_id": "task-legacy"}),
+            "code.change",
+            "task-legacy",
+            None,
+            None,
+            "legacy-key",
+            1.0,
+            1.0,
+            None,
+        ),
+    )
+    connection.commit()
+    connection.close()
+
+    store = TaskPlaneStore(str(path))
+    task = store.get_task("task-legacy")
+    assert task.task_plan.scope_type == "legacy"
+    assert task.task_plan.tenant_id is None
+    replay = store.create_task(
+        TaskPlan.from_dict({"task_id": "task-legacy"}),
+        idempotency_key="legacy-key",
+    )
+    assert replay.task_id == "task-legacy"
+    assert tuple(
+        store.conn.execute(
+            "SELECT scope_type,tenant_id FROM tasks WHERE task_id='task-legacy'"
+        ).fetchone()
+    ) == ("legacy", None)
+    tenant_context = _policy().actor_context("reader-a")
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError):
+        store.get_task("task-legacy", tenant_context)
+    store.close()

tests/test_agent_event_bus.py

@@ -20,3 +20,12 @@ def test_unified_event_flow():
 
     dashboard = AgentEventDashboard(bus).overview()
     assert dashboard["audit"]["enabled"] is True
+
+
+def test_target_changes_event_identity(tmp_path):
+    bus = AgentEventBus(tmp_path)
+    first = bus.publish('test', 'same', 'user-a', 'same summary', {'value': 1})
+    second = bus.publish('test', 'same', 'user-b', 'same summary', {'value': 1})
+    first_id = first.get('id') if isinstance(first, dict) else getattr(first, 'id', first)
+    second_id = second.get('id') if isinstance(second, dict) else getattr(second, 'id', second)
+    assert first_id != second_id

tests/test_agent_runtime_capability_contract.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_capability_contract import (  # noqa: E402
+    has_capabilities,
+    normalize_required_capabilities,
+    normalize_worker_capabilities,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("runtime", ["hermes", "openclaw"])
+def test_runtime_capability_is_known_to_task_and_worker_vocabulary(runtime: str) -> None:
+    capability = f"agent.runtime.{runtime}"
+    assert normalize_required_capabilities([capability]) == frozenset({capability})
+    assert normalize_worker_capabilities([capability]) == frozenset({capability})
+    assert has_capabilities([capability], [capability]) is True
+
+
+def test_runtime_capabilities_are_isolated_between_workers() -> None:
+    assert has_capabilities(["agent.runtime.hermes"], ["agent.runtime.openclaw"]) is False
+    assert has_capabilities(["agent.runtime.openclaw"], ["agent.runtime.hermes"]) is False
+
+
+def test_unknown_runtime_capability_remains_fail_closed() -> None:
+    assert has_capabilities(["agent.runtime.hermes"], ["agent.runtime.unknown"]) is False

tests/test_agent_task_execution_rebind.py

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_agent_task_execution_rebind import (
+    ExecutionRebindError,
+    ExecutionRebindRequest,
+    ExecutionRebindStore,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+AUTHORIZATION="owner-execution-rebind-20260818"
+TASK_ID="task-rebind-a"
+JOB_ID="job-rebind-a"
+BASE="a"*40
+BRANCH="agent/task-rebind-a"
+IDEMPOTENCY="task-rebind-a-binding-v1"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _auth(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv(
+        "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZATION_ID",
+        AUTHORIZATION,
+    )
+
+
+def canon(value):
+    return hashlib.sha256(
+        json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(",",":")).encode()
+    ).hexdigest()
+
+
+def binding():
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+        "task_id":TASK_ID,
+        "job_id":JOB_ID,
+        "repository":"aios/aios",
+        "base_oid":BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid":BASE,
+        "target_branch":BRANCH,
+        "branch_mode":"CREATE_NEW",
+        "generation":1,
+        "idempotency_key":IDEMPOTENCY,
+    })
+
+
+def old_envelope():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"source_capture",
+            "adapter":"compact_interface_map",
+            "capability_scope":[
+                "git.read","git.test","governed.write.branch","governed.write.file"
+            ],
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def new_envelope():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action":"deterministic",
+            "adapter":"deterministic",
+            "capability_scope":[
+                "git.read","git.test","governed.write.branch","governed.write.file"
+            ],
+            "change_set":[
+                {
+                    "path":"active-runtime/app/example.py",
+                    "operation":"write_file",
+                    "content":"VALUE=1\\n",
+                }
+            ],
+            "verification":[
+                {
+                    "label":"unit",
+                    "argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","pytest","-q"],
+                    "cwd":".",
+                    "timeout_seconds":120,
+                }
+            ],
+            "governance":{
+                "commit_idempotency_key":"task-rebind-a-commit-v1",
+            },
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def make_db(tmp_path, *, status="QUEUED", revision=5, attempt=2, lease=False):
+    path=tmp_path/"state.sqlite3"
+    con=sqlite3.connect(path)
+    con.executescript("""
+    CREATE TABLE tasks(
+      task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+      status TEXT NOT NULL,
+      attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      claimed_by TEXT,
+      lease_token_hash TEXT,
+      lease_expires_at TEXT,
+      verification_json TEXT,
+      result_json TEXT,
+      metadata_json TEXT,
+      required_capabilities_json TEXT
+    );
+    CREATE TABLE task_events(
+      event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+      task_id TEXT,
+      event_type TEXT,
+      agent_id TEXT,
+      payload_json TEXT,
+      created_at TEXT
+    );
+    """)
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"WRONG_ENVELOPE_BEFORE_PLAN"}
+    old=old_envelope()
+    metadata={
+        "execution":old,
+        "execution_projection":{
+            "schema":"aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1",
+            "task_id":TASK_ID,
+            "job_id":JOB_ID,
+            "execution_digest":old["execution_digest"],
+        },
+        "preserved":{"value":"unchanged"},
+    }
+    con.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+        (
+            TASK_ID,status,attempt,3,revision,
+            "previous-worker" if not lease else "active-worker",
+            "lease-hash" if lease else None,
+            "2099-01-01T00:00:00Z" if lease else None,
+            json.dumps(verification),
+            json.dumps({"status":"SUCCEEDED"}),
+            json.dumps(metadata),
+            json.dumps([
+                "git.read","git.test","governed.write.branch","governed.write.file"
+            ]),
+        ),
+    )
+    con.commit();con.close()
+    return path,verification
+
+
+def request(verification, *, revision=5, old=None, new=None, key="rebind-task-a-v1"):
+    old=old or old_envelope()
+    new=new or new_envelope()
+    return ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping({
+        "expected_status":"QUEUED",
+        "expected_revision":revision,
+        "expected_attempt":2,
+        "previous_verification_sha256":canon(verification),
+        "expected_old_execution_digest":old["execution_digest"],
+        "expected_new_execution_digest":new["execution_digest"],
+        "authorization_id":AUTHORIZATION,
+        "idempotency_key":key,
+        "reason":"projection-before-plan race recovery",
+    })
+
+
+def resolver(_task_id,_caps):
+    return new_envelope()
+
+
+def test_rebind_cas_updates_only_execution_projection_and_audits(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    result=ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(
+        TASK_ID,request(verification)
+    )
+    assert result["status"]=="QUEUED"
+    assert result["revision"]==6
+    assert result["idempotent"] is False
+
+    con=sqlite3.connect(path)
+    row=con.execute(
+        "SELECT status,attempt,revision,claimed_by,metadata_json FROM tasks"
+    ).fetchone()
+    assert row[:4]==("QUEUED",2,6,None)
+    metadata=json.loads(row[4])
+    assert metadata["preserved"]=={"value":"unchanged"}
+    assert metadata["execution"]["action"]=="deterministic"
+    assert metadata["execution"]["execution_digest"]==new_envelope()["execution_digest"]
+    assert metadata["execution_projection"]["execution_digest"]==new_envelope()["execution_digest"]
+
+    event=con.execute(
+        "SELECT event_type,payload_json FROM task_events"
+    ).fetchone()
+    assert event[0]=="TASK_EXECUTION_REBIND_AUTHORIZED"
+    payload=json.loads(event[1])
+    assert payload["old_action"]=="source_capture"
+    assert payload["new_action"]=="deterministic"
+    assert payload["stale_claim_normalized"] is True
+    assert con.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_execution_rebinds").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_rebind_idempotent_replay(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    store=ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver)
+    req=request(verification)
+    first=store.rebind(TASK_ID,req)
+    second=store.rebind(TASK_ID,req)
+    assert first["idempotent"] is False
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    assert second["new_execution_digest"]==first["new_execution_digest"]
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_active_lease(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path,lease=True)
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_verification_drift(tmp_path):
+    path,_=make_db(tmp_path)
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_VERIFICATION_DRIFT"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(
+            TASK_ID,request({"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"other"})
+        )
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_nonqueued_task(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path,status="VERIFYING")
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_CAS_MISMATCH"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,resolver).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_non_deterministic_canonical_resolution(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    def wrong(_task,_caps):
+        return old_envelope()
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_DETERMINISTIC_PLAN_REQUIRED"):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,wrong).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_rejects_binding_drift(tmp_path):
+    path,verification=make_db(tmp_path)
+    different=project_execution_envelope(
+        GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+            "task_id":TASK_ID,
+            "job_id":"job-other",
+            "repository":"aios/aios",
+            "base_oid":BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid":BASE,
+            "target_branch":BRANCH,
+            "branch_mode":"CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation":1,
+            "idempotency_key":IDEMPOTENCY,
+        }),
+        {
+            "action":"deterministic",
+            "capability_scope":["git.read"],
+            "change_set":[{"path":"x.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x=1\\n"}],
+        },
+    )
+    def wrong(_task,_caps):
+        return different
+    with pytest.raises(Exception):
+        ExecutionRebindStore(path,wrong).rebind(TASK_ID,request(verification))
+
+
+def test_rebind_request_is_narrow_and_digest_bound():
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK"}
+    data=request(verification).public()
+    data["arbitrary_metadata"]={"x":1}
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionRebindError,match="EXECUTION_REBIND_FIELDS_INVALID"):
+        ExecutionRebindRequest.from_mapping(data)
+
+
+def test_execution_rebind_unit_is_unprivileged_and_owner_credential_bound():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-execution-rebind.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "Group=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:" in unit
+    assert "Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892" in unit
+    assert "RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET" in unit
+    assert "User=root" not in unit

tests/test_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib, json, sqlite3, sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+from aios_agent_task_retry_extension import RetryExtensionRequest, RetryExtensionStore, RetryExtensionError
+
+AUTHORIZATION_ID="owner-scheme-a-20260817"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _authorization_id(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID", AUTHORIZATION_ID)
+
+
+def canon(v):
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(v,sort_keys=True,separators=(",",":")).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def db(tmp_path):
+    p=tmp_path/"state.sqlite3"
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    c.executescript("""
+    CREATE TABLE tasks(
+      task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,status TEXT,attempt INTEGER,max_attempts INTEGER,revision INTEGER,
+      claimed_by TEXT,lease_token_hash TEXT,lease_expires_at TEXT,verification_json TEXT,result_json TEXT
+    );
+    CREATE TABLE task_events(
+      event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,task_id TEXT,event_type TEXT,agent_id TEXT,
+      payload_json TEXT,created_at TEXT
+    );
+    """)
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"BASE_OID_BINDING_INVALID"}
+    c.execute("INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+              ("task-a","FAILED",10,10,41,None,None,None,json.dumps(verification),json.dumps({"status":"FAILED"})))
+    c.commit(); c.close()
+    return p,verification
+
+
+def request(v):
+    return RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping({
+      "expected_status":"FAILED","expected_revision":41,"expected_attempt":10,"expected_max_attempts":10,
+      "next_max_attempts":11,"previous_verification_sha256":canon(v),
+      "authorization_id":AUTHORIZATION_ID,"idempotency_key":"retry-task-a-attempt11",
+    })
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_cas_and_audit(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    out=RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+    assert out["status"]=="QUEUED" and out["max_attempts"]==11 and out["revision"]==42
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute("select status,attempt,max_attempts,revision from tasks").fetchone()==("QUEUED",10,11,42)
+    event=c.execute("select event_type,payload_json from task_events").fetchone()
+    assert event[0]=="TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+    assert json.loads(event[1])["authorization_id"]=="owner-scheme-a-20260817"
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_idempotent_replay(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path); store=RetryExtensionStore(p); req=request(v)
+    first=store.extend("task-a",req); second=store.extend("task-a",req)
+    assert first["idempotent"] is False and second["idempotent"] is True
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute("select count(*) from task_retry_extensions").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_normalizes_stale_terminal_claim_without_active_lease(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    c.execute("update tasks set claimed_by='previous-worker'")
+    c.commit(); c.close()
+    out=RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+    assert out["status"]=="QUEUED"
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute(
+        "select claimed_by,lease_token_hash,lease_expires_at from tasks"
+    ).fetchone()==(None,None,None)
+    payload=json.loads(c.execute("select payload_json from task_events").fetchone()[0])
+    assert payload["previous_claimed_by"]=="previous-worker"
+    assert payload["stale_terminal_claim_normalized"] is True
+    assert c.execute("select count(*) from task_events").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_verification_drift_denied(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    bad=request({"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"other"})
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT"):
+        RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",bad)
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_authorization_id_mismatch_rejected(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID", "other-owner-id")
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH"):
+        RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_bounded_one_step():
+    v={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK"}
+    data={
+      "expected_status":"FAILED","expected_revision":41,"expected_attempt":10,"expected_max_attempts":10,
+      "next_max_attempts":12,"previous_verification_sha256":canon(v),
+      "authorization_id":"owner-scheme-a-20260817","idempotency_key":"retry-task-a-attempt11",
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP"):
+        RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(data)
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_unit_is_unprivileged_and_requires_owner_binding():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "Group=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:" in unit
+    assert "EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env" in unit
+    assert "User=root" not in unit

tests/test_approved_release_executor.py

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ def test_execute_orders_registry_before_baseline_and_baseline_last(
     )
     monkeypatch.setattr(
         "approved_release_executor.verify_artifact",
-        lambda binding, **kwargs: {"verified": True},
+        lambda binding: {"verified": True},
     )
 
     calls = []

tests/test_authoritative_git_context.py

@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ class AuthoritativeGitContextTests(unittest.TestCase):
             json.dumps({"branch": "patch/context"}), encoding="utf-8"
         )
         self.env = {
-            "AIOS_TEST_MODE": "1",
             "AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR": str(self.bare),
             "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY": "aios/aios",
         }

tests/test_bridge_v2_governed_http_bootstrap.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import base64
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
+from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2 import BridgeV2Adapter, OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS
 from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server import BridgeHandler, RuntimeConfig
 from aios_continuation_executor import GiteaContinuationRemote, ServerSideCredentialProjection
 from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ class Probe:
 
 def test_create_new_lease_is_exact_base_and_absent():
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
+        job_id="job-bridge-runtime-lineage-test",
         task_id="TASK-P0-BRIDGE-V21-DURABLE-RECONCILIATION-20260809",
         repository="aios/aios",
         branch_mode="CREATE_NEW",
@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ def test_create_new_lease_is_exact_base_and_absent():
 
 def test_create_new_lease_rejects_existing_target():
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
+        job_id="job-bridge-runtime-lineage-test",
         task_id="task",
         repository="aios/aios",
         branch_mode="CREATE_NEW",
@@ -75,8 +78,7 @@ def test_slash_branch_uses_paginated_collection():
 def test_http_route_contract_is_complete():
     expected = {
         "/v2/runtime", "/v2/capabilities", "/v2/governed-task",
-        "/v2/writer-lease", "/v2/commit-file", "/v2/commit-files",
-        "/v2/branch/publish",
+        "/v2/writer-lease", "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap", "/v2/writer-lease/renew", "/v2/commit-file", "/v2/commit-files",
         "/v2/job", "/v2/job/resume", "/v2/job/reconcile",
         "/v2/tag/approval-request",
         "/v2/tag/publish",
@@ -89,3 +91,121 @@ def test_http_route_contract_is_complete():
     from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server import ROUTES
 
     assert set(ROUTES) == expected
+
+
+def test_renew_writer_lease_is_exposed_in_action_and_capability_contracts():
+    adapter = BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status={})
+    capabilities = adapter.getGovernedWriteCapabilities()
+    contract = capabilities["operation_contracts"]["renewWriterLease"]
+
+    assert contract["method"] == "POST"
+    assert contract["path"] == "/v2/writer-lease/renew"
+    assert tuple(contract["required_fields"]) == OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["renewWriterLease"]
+    assert "runtime_rehydrated" in contract["response_fields"]
+
+    action_schema = Path("docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "/v2/writer-lease/renew:" in action_schema
+    assert "operationId: renewWriterLease" in action_schema
+    assert "BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest" in action_schema
+    assert "BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse" in action_schema
+    assert {
+        capabilities["operation_contracts"][operation]["path"]
+        for operation in (
+            "acquireWriterLease",
+            "renewWriterLease",
+            "commitFileGoverned",
+            "commitFilesGoverned",
+        )
+    } == {
+        "/v2/writer-lease",
+        "/v2/writer-lease/renew",
+        "/v2/commit-file",
+        "/v2/commit-files",
+    }
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_writer_lease_is_exposed_in_action_and_capability_contracts():
+    adapter = BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status={})
+    capabilities = adapter.getGovernedWriteCapabilities()
+    contract = capabilities["operation_contracts"]["bootstrapWriterLease"]
+
+    assert contract["method"] == "POST"
+    assert contract["path"] == "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap"
+    assert tuple(contract["required_fields"]) == OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["bootstrapWriterLease"]
+    assert "bootstrapped" in contract["response_fields"]
+    assert "durable_branch_lease_present" in contract["response_fields"]
+
+    action_schema = Path("docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap:" in action_schema
+    assert "operationId: bootstrapWriterLease" in action_schema
+    assert "bootstrapped: {type: boolean}" in action_schema
+    assert "durable_branch_lease_present: {type: boolean}" in action_schema
+
+
+
+def test_http_allows_explicit_job_id_on_lease_and_commit_requests():
+    handler = BridgeHandler.__new__(BridgeHandler)
+    lease_body = {
+        "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+        "task_id": "task",
+        "job_id": "job-explicit-runtime-lineage",
+        "repository": "aios/aios",
+        "branch_mode": "CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+        "base_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "target_branch": "agent/explicit-runtime-lineage",
+        "generation": 2,
+        "lease_seconds": 120,
+    }
+    handler._allowed("acquireWriterLease", lease_body)
+    handler._allowed(
+        "commitFilesGoverned",
+        {
+            "task_id": "task",
+            "job_id": "job-explicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+            "target_branch": "agent/explicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "generation": 2,
+            "idempotency_key": "commit-explicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "files": {"docs/x.txt": "eA=="},
+            "message": "test",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_http_allows_omitted_job_id_for_durable_server_resolution():
+    handler = BridgeHandler.__new__(BridgeHandler)
+    lease_body = {
+        "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+        "task_id": "task",
+        "repository": "aios/aios",
+        "branch_mode": "CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+        "base_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "target_branch": "agent/implicit-runtime-lineage",
+        "generation": 2,
+        "lease_seconds": 120,
+    }
+    handler._allowed("acquireWriterLease", lease_body)
+    handler._allowed(
+        "commitFilesGoverned",
+        {
+            "task_id": "task",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+            "target_branch": "agent/implicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "generation": 2,
+            "idempotency_key": "commit-implicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "files": {"docs/x.txt": "eA=="},
+            "message": "test",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_capability_contracts_return_exact_job_id_lineage():
+    contracts = BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status={}).getGovernedWriteCapabilities()["operation_contracts"]
+    for operation in ("acquireWriterLease", "bootstrapWriterLease", "renewWriterLease"):
+        assert "job_id" in contracts[operation]["response_fields"]
+    for operation in ("commitFileGoverned", "commitFilesGoverned"):
+        assert "job_id" in contracts[operation]["response_fields"]