feat(codex): add Codex-authenticated local central decision channel

fix(codex): make pending recovery plan read-only
feat(codex): harden callback transport and pending recovery
2026-07-19 00:00:09 +08:00 · 2026-07-18 18:34:40 +08:00 · 2026-07-18 15:50:42 +08:00 · 2026-07-18 14:51:57 +08:00 · 2026-07-18 13:44:06 +08:00 · 2026-07-18 11:59:27 +08:00
416 changed files with 12322 additions and 46223 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+{
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-18T04:58:00+00:00",
+  "schema_version": 2,
+  "state_writer": "gateway",
+  "work_units": [
+    {
+      "id": "R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER",
+      "track": "R_RUNNER",
+      "gate": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY",
+      "primary": "openclaw",
+      "fallback": "codex",
+      "status": "READY",
+      "quorum": "requires_gpt_plus_one_executor"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE",
+      "track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN",
+      "gate": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE",
+      "primary": "openclaw",
+      "fallback": "codex",
+      "status": "READY",
+      "quorum": "requires_gpt_plus_one_executor"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK",
+      "track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN",
+      "gate": "P1_REPAIR3_CODE",
+      "primary": "codex",
+      "fallback": "openclaw",
+      "status": "READY",
+      "quorum": "requires_gpt_plus_one_executor"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "Q0-GPT-HEALTH-INIT",
+      "track": "_QUORUM",
+      "gate": "Q0_GPT_AND_EXECUTOR_HEALTH",
+      "primary": "gateway",
+      "fallback": null,
+      "status": "READY",
+      "quorum": "gateway_initiated"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "Q1-ACTIVE-EXECUTOR-ELECTION",
+      "track": "_QUORUM",
+      "gate": "Q1_ELECT_ACTIVE_EXECUTOR",
+      "primary": "gateway",
+      "fallback": null,
+      "status": "PENDING",
+      "depends_on": "Q0-GPT-HEALTH-INIT",
+      "quorum": "gateway_initiated"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "Q2-FAILOVER-HEALTHCHECK",
+      "track": "_QUORUM",
+      "gate": "Q2_STANDBY_HEALTH_MONITOR",
+      "primary": "gateway",
+      "fallback": null,
+      "status": "PENDING",
+      "depends_on": "Q1-ACTIVE-EXECUTOR-ELECTION",
+      "quorum": "log_only_if_active_ok"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "Q3-UNATTENDED-ACCEPTANCE-MATRIX",
+      "track": "_QUORUM",
+      "gate": "A0_AUTOMATION_CLOSED",
+      "primary": "gateway",
+      "fallback": null,
+      "status": "PENDING_LIVE_EVIDENCE",
+      "depends_on": "Q2-FAILOVER-HEALTHCHECK",
+      "quorum": "requires_gpt_plus_one_executor",
+      "required_scenarios": 16,
+      "may_mark_pass_without_live_evidence": false
+    }
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+{
+  "adaptive_dispatch": {
+    "codex_first": [
+      "complex_code",
+      "security_boundary",
+      "architecture",
+      "high_risk_review",
+      "strong_model_materially_better"
+    ],
+    "default_orchestrator": "openclaw",
+    "dynamic_executor_selection": {
+      "large_repetitive_infrastructure_monitoring": "openclaw",
+      "complex_code_security_architecture": "codex",
+      "both_healthy_active": "assign_by_preference",
+      "one_healthy_active": "use_healthy_only",
+      "both_unhealthy_blocked": true
+    },
+    "max_attempts_per_work_unit": 2,
+    "on_timeout": [
+      "mark_TIMEOUT",
+      "preserve_logs",
+      "switch_agent"
+    ],
+    "openclaw_first": [
+      "quality_close",
+      "large_or_repetitive",
+      "long_running",
+      "infra_or_git_inventory",
+      "cost_sensitive"
+    ],
+    "single_state_writer_lease_required": true,
+    "strict_role_partition": false,
+    "state_writer": "gateway",
+    "timeout_can_pass": false
+  },
+  "authoritative_state": {
+    "b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
+    "b4": "NOT_STARTED",
+    "baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
+    "release": "paused",
+    "repair3": {
+      "base": "8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575",
+      "candidate": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
+      "commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4",
+      "exact4": "PASS",
+      "result": "49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045"
+    },
+    "runner": {
+      "artifact_sha256": "85c472c05a1e55a5899b215d3cd41df53912787de529ac9cb3d5308da4158130",
+      "commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
+      "live": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
+      "offline": "PASS",
+      "result": "e789632e359e9232d8ae081e7c4f23ed7b615a9d"
+    }
+  },
+  "central_gpt": {
+    "required": "HEALTHY",
+    "health_definition": {
+      "live_probe_required": true,
+      "workspace_agent_validated_live_or_responses_validated_live": true,
+      "configuration_or_credential_presence_is_insufficient": true,
+      "unknown_is_not_healthy": true
+    },
+    "independent_review": {
+      "single_executor_mode": true,
+      "required_evidence": [
+        "committed_git_tree",
+        "full_commit_oid",
+        "test_logs_with_rc",
+        "gitleaks",
+        "artifact_digest",
+        "worktree_bare_gitea_oid",
+        "live_runtime_evidence"
+      ],
+      "model_judgment_insufficient": true
+    }
+  },
+  "contract_id": "V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT",
+  "executor_quorum": {
+    "minimum_healthy": 1,
+    "candidates": [
+      "openclaw",
+      "codex"
+    ],
+    "quorum_pass": [
+      "GPT_HEALTHY_AND_OPENCLAW_HEALTHY",
+      "GPT_HEALTHY_AND_CODEX_HEALTHY"
+    ],
+    "quorum_block": [
+      "GPT_UNHEALTHY",
+      "GPT_HEALTHY_BUT_BOTH_EXECUTORS_UNAVAILABLE",
+      "GPT_OR_SOLE_EXECUTOR_UNKNOWN"
+    ]
+  },
+  "automation_closed_success_conditions": [
+    "CENTRAL_GPT_HEALTH=PASS",
+    "EXECUTOR_QUORUM=PASS",
+    "ACTIVE_EXECUTOR=openclaw|codex",
+    "EVENT_TRIGGER=PASS",
+    "POLLING=PASS",
+    "FAILOVER=PASS",
+    "LIFECYCLE_SYNC=PASS",
+    "TWO_CYCLE_UNATTENDED_LOOP=PASS",
+    "RESTART_RECOVERY=PASS",
+    "AUTOMATION_CLOSED=PASS"
+  ],
+  "gateway_lifecycle_events": [
+    "TASK_DISPATCHED",
+    "TASK_STARTED",
+    "TASK_ENDED",
+    "DECISION_APPLIED",
+    "PROJECT_SUMMARY",
+    "PROJECT_COMPLETED"
+  ],
+  "facts_policy": {
+    "accept": [
+      "committed_git_tree",
+      "full_oid",
+      "worktree_bare_gitea_oid_match",
+      "test_log_with_rc",
+      "immutable_digest",
+      "result_only_commit",
+      "live_evidence"
+    ],
+    "reject": [
+      "verbal_claim",
+      "readme_only",
+      "local_only_commit",
+      "environment_variable_as_secret_ref",
+      "compile_only",
+      "timeout_as_pass",
+      "unrelated_repo",
+      "fabricated_evidence"
+    ]
+  },
+  "forbidden_git": [
+    "reset",
+    "amend",
+    "rebase",
+    "force_push",
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "direct_bare_ref_mutation",
+    "unapproved_gitea_db_mutation",
+    "reuse_accident_worktree",
+    "delete_live_worktree_to_clear_collision"
+  ],
+  "generated_at": "2026-07-18T04:58:00+00:00",
+  "handoff": {
+    "ack": "CONTRACT_ACK=<full_contract_commit_oid>",
+    "advance": "independent_verification_required",
+    "all_agents_match": true
+  },
+  "join_gate": {
+    "requires": [
+      "AUTOMATION_CLOSED",
+      "RUNNER_RECOVERED",
+      "B3_PASS",
+      "B4_PASS",
+      "INTEGRATION_PASS"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model_policy": {
+    "codex": "strongest_model_actually_available_in_runtime",
+    "gpt_5_6": "use_only_if_exposed",
+    "no_unverified_model_claims": true,
+    "openclaw_default": "DeepSeek V4 Flash"
+  },
+  "owner_authorization": {
+    "adaptive_agent_assignment_authorized": true,
+    "agent_substitution_authorized": true,
+    "autonomous_execution": true,
+    "may_bypass_release_controls": false,
+    "may_bypass_secret_controls": false,
+    "may_fabricate_evidence": false,
+    "user_step_by_step_confirmation_required": false
+  },
+  "release_gates": [
+    "AUTOMATION_CLOSED",
+    "MAIN_MERGE",
+    "STAGING_AND_CANARY",
+    "PRODUCTION"
+  ],
+  "schema_version": 4,
+  "self_healing": {
+    "priorities": {
+      "p0": "central_gpt_failure",
+      "p1": "both_executors_unavailable",
+      "p2": "active_executor_failed_with_healthy_standby",
+      "p3": "standby_executor_alone_failed"
+    },
+    "rules": {
+      "standby_failure_when_active_ok": {
+        "action": "log_only",
+        "block_business": false,
+        "create_blocking_gate": false,
+        "pause_release": false
+      },
+      "active_executor_failure": {
+        "action": "failover_to_standby",
+        "inherit_contract_commit": true,
+        "inherit_event_id": true,
+        "inherit_state_version": true,
+        "mark_original_task": "INTERRUPTED_AGENT_FAILOVER",
+        "new_executor_continues_from_checkpoint": true,
+        "block_duplicate_side_effects": true
+      },
+      "both_unavailable_block": "BLOCKED_NO_HEALTHY_EXECUTOR"
+    }
+  },
+  "state_rules": [
+    "tracks_run_parallel",
+    "runner_block_does_not_block_offline_work_or_evidence_inventory",
+    "join_requires_both_tracks",
+    "failure_stops_dependents",
+    "production_remains_V1R4C6_paused_until_production_pass",
+    "gateway_persists_authoritative_state",
+    "lifecycle_events_persisted_regardless_of_openclaw_online"
+  ],
+  "status": "ACTIVE",
+  "tracks": {
+    "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN": {
+      "b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
+      "b4": "NOT_STARTED",
+      "parallel": true,
+      "repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
+      "repair3_commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4"
+    },
+    "R_RUNNER": {
+      "commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
+      "current": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
+      "fallback": "codex",
+      "parallel": true,
+      "primary": "openclaw",
+      "required": [
+        "artifact_verified",
+        "approved_secret_provider_contract",
+        "owner_probe_verified",
+        "service_healthy",
+        "heartbeat_healthy",
+        "gateway_auth",
+        "durable_task_create_read_cancel",
+        "execution_channel",
+        "live_rollback"
+      ]
+    }
+  }
+}
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-# RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8
-
-## Summary
-
-Complete security hardening for the B3 evidence collection tool, addressing 6 core security
-fixes and updating supporting documentation.
-
-## Implementation
-
- Worktree: `/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/TASK-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8`
- Implementation Branch: `patch/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
- Result Branch: `result/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
- Base Commit: `a9a298f8a7dc0d69c81e6b59e87942cb9279c7dd`
- Implementation Commit: `9577613e1391001c3538e2e5343c4c13b1e7b1af`
-
-## Files Modified (4 allowed files + 1 new test file)
-
-1. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_tool.py** — Full tool rewrite with 6 security fixes
-2. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_facts.template.json** — Added `trust_policy_key` field
-3. **tools/personal_weixin/README-B3-EVIDENCE.md** — Updated with trust policy and security features
-4. **.agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-COLLECT-20260716.md** — Added verification step
-5. **tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh** — PoC test suite (new)
-
-## Security Fixes Applied
-
-1. **Ancestor symlink path escape prevention**: `_reject_symlink_chain()` function checks all ancestor paths are NOT symlinks before loading evidence file
-2. **External Trust Policy**: `--trust-policy` flag with schema validation and file permission checks (must be 600/400)
-3. **Authority present:false hard fail**: `present: false` or missing key now hard-fails validation
-4. **Self-review rejection**: Reviewer identity must differ from both capture_identity and credential_identity
-5. **SSH signature verification**: Uses `ssh-keygen -Y verify` for attestation signatures
-6. **Reject_Float nan/infinity**: JSON parser rejects NaN/Infinity values
-7. **JSON key duplication detection**: Rejects duplicate JSON keys
-8. **Schema type strictness**: Strong type checking on all trust policy and evidence schema fields
-
-## Verification
-
- **Python compilation**: PASS (`python3 -m py_compile`)
- **JSON template validity**: PASS
- **Gitleaks scan**: PASS (4 pre-existing false positives in unrelated files, 0 in modified files)
-
-## Push Status
-
- `patch` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
- `result` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
-
-## PoC Test Suite
-
-Test script at `tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh` runs 9 test cases:
-
-| Test | Expected | Result |
-|------|----------|--------|
-| Ancestor symlink chain | BLOCKED | Not applicable (test path didn't exercise real symlink) |
-| Authority present:false | FAIL | PASS |
-| Self-review (same as capture) | FAIL | PASS |
-| Self-review (same as credential) | FAIL | PASS |
-| Authority missing present key | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy permissive permissions | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy missing file | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy invalid JSON | FAIL | PASS |
-| Trust policy schema invalid (allowed_credentials not list) | FAIL | Not applicable (dict key check catches) |
-
-7/9 pass as intended; 2 are N/A based on how the tests are structured.
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "record_type": "central-baseline-governance-closure",
-  "version": "V2R1C1",
-  "semver": "2.1.0-rc.1",
-  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
-  "release": {
-    "branch": "release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721",
-    "release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
-    "tag": "V2R1C1",
-    "tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
-    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
-    "previous_runtime_release": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
-  },
-  "openclaw_companion": {
-    "version": "2.1.0-rc.4",
-    "source_oid": "83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3",
-    "companion_oid": "12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3",
-    "artifact_sha256": "aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671",
-    "contract_version": "aios.openclaw.command.v2",
-    "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519"
-  },
-  "validation": {
-    "preproduction_status": "PREPRODUCTION_VALIDATED",
-    "production_status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
-    "gate_a": "PASS",
-    "gate_b": "PASS",
-    "openclaw_live": "PASS",
-    "openclaw_negative_tests": "PASS",
-    "hermes_live": "PASS 17/17",
-    "grant_tests": "PASS 11/11",
-    "restart_recovery": "PASS",
-    "rollback": "PASS",
-    "final_health": "PASS",
-    "sqlite_check": "PASS",
-    "secret_scan": "PASS",
-    "blockers": "none"
-  },
-  "evidence": {
-    "root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z",
-    "final_audit_manifest_sha256": "2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55",
-    "governance_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z"
-  },
-  "governance": {
-    "branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721",
-    "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
-    "base_oid": "3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f",
-    "manifest_commit_oid": "a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd",
-    "baseline_commit_oid": "6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1",
-    "current_baseline_before": "V1R4C6",
-    "current_baseline_after": "V2R1C1",
-    "reviewer": "gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter",
-    "review_status": "PASS",
-    "reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T14:23:00Z"
-  },
-  "commands": [
-    {
-      "command": "GET https://cnnetmkt.top/api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver",
-      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
-      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
-      "exit_code": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh",
-      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
-      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
-      "exit_code": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh",
-      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
-      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
-      "exit_code": 0
-    }
-  ],
-  "rollback_metadata": {
-    "action": "retain versions/V2R1C1.json and restore only baseline/current.json plus VERSION to V1R4C6 through a new reviewed governance commit",
-    "production_runtime_action": "none",
-    "tag_action": "none",
-    "release_oid_action": "none"
-  },
-  "scope": {
-    "product_code_changed": false,
-    "tag_changed": false,
-    "production_redeployed": false,
-    "production_traffic_changed": false,
-    "secret_material_recorded": false
-  }
-}
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# V2R1C1 Central Baseline Closure Result
-
-## Result
-
- Governance task: register the already deployed `V2R1C1` release in the central Registry.
- Baseline: `V1R4C6` -> `V2R1C1`.
- Release OID and tag OID: `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`.
- Companion OID: `12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`.
- Artifact SHA256: `aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`.
- Production evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`.
- Final audit manifest SHA256: `2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`.
- Production status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`.
-
-## Governance Branch
-
- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`.
- Base ref: `refs/heads/main`.
- Base OID: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
- Manifest commit: `a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`.
- Baseline commit: `6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`.
- Review: `PASS` at `2026-07-21T14:23:00Z` by `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` validator and docs reporter.
-
-## Commands and Evidence
-
-| Command | Start UTC | End UTC | Exit code |
-| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
-| `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
-| `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
-| `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
-
-The machine-readable record is `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`. The external governance evidence root is `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`.
-
-## Rollback Metadata
-
-If the Registry parser or governance service fails, retain `versions/V2R1C1.json` and create a new reviewed governance commit that restores only `baseline/current.json` and `VERSION` to `V1R4C6`. Do not roll back production, move `V2R1C1`, change the release OID, or rewrite Git history.
-
-## Scope Protection
-
- `product_code_changed=false`
- `tag_changed=false`
- `production_redeployed=false`
- `production_traffic_changed=false`
- `secret_material_recorded=false`
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
-  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
-  "tag_name": "V2R1C2",
-  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
-  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
-  "evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
-  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
-  "production_port": 18920,
-  "candidate_port": 18921,
-  "production_acceptance": "PASS",
-  "role_matrix": "PASS",
-  "tenant_isolation": "PASS",
-  "api_smoke": "PASS",
-  "ui_smoke": "PASS",
-  "runtime_audit": "PASS",
-  "wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
-  "real_user_impersonated": false,
-  "production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
-  "production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
-  "production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
-  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
-  "rollback_ready": true,
-  "main_changed_by_tag": false,
-  "force_push": false,
-  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
-  "evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{
+  "b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
+  "b4": "NOT_STARTED",
+  "baseline": "V1R4C6",
+  "contract_branch": "task/governance/v2r1-personal-weixin-production-contract-20260717",
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "dispatch_commit": null,
+  "executor_quorum": {
+    "candidates": ["openclaw", "codex"],
+    "minimum_healthy": 1,
+    "openclaw": "UNKNOWN",
+    "codex": "UNKNOWN"
+  },
+  "active_executor": null,
+  "standby_executor": null,
+  "central_gpt": "UNKNOWN",
+  "automation_closed": {
+    "central_gpt_health": "UNKNOWN",
+    "executor_quorum": "UNKNOWN",
+    "active_executor": null,
+    "event_trigger": "UNKNOWN",
+    "polling": "UNKNOWN",
+    "failover": "UNKNOWN",
+    "lifecycle_sync": "UNKNOWN",
+    "two_cycle_unattended_loop": "UNKNOWN",
+    "restart_recovery": "UNKNOWN",
+    "result": "NOT_STARTED"
+  },
+  "lifecycle_events": [],
+  "production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
+  "release": "paused",
+  "repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
+  "runner": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
+  "schema_version": 2,
+  "single_state_writer": "gateway",
+  "single_state_writer_lease_required": true,
+  "quorum_controller": {
+    "implementation": "CODE_COMMITTED_TESTED_PENDING_LIVE_ACCEPTANCE",
+    "live_acceptance": "NOT_STARTED",
+    "health_source": "ROOT_OWNED_METADATA_ONLY_LIVE_PROBE_RECEIPTS",
+    "unknown_counts_as_healthy": false
+  },
+  "updated_at": "2026-07-18T04:58:00+00:00"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Codex task: apply and verify AIOS Orchestrator Gateway v1
+
+Contract: `cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc`
+
+Use the strongest actually available Codex model for the initial security review.
+If unavailable or timed out, record TIMEOUT/NOT_EXECUTED and let OpenClaw run
+the deterministic test path. Do not count a timeout as PASS.
+
+## Apply
+
+1. Create a new clean append-only branch and isolated worktree.
+2. Validate the delivery tarball and `SHA256SUMS`.
+3. Run the external `scripts/apply_gateway_patch.sh` with `SOURCE_DIR` and
+   `WORKTREE`; do not alter unrelated paths.
+4. Review all added code, especially:
+   - exact contract and optimistic state-version checks;
+   - event/decision idempotency;
+   - SQLite leases and retry behavior;
+   - Workspace Agent `202` asynchronous callback flow;
+   - Responses background creation and polling;
+   - file-inbox and Git-ref polling;
+   - traversal/symlink protections;
+   - OpenClaw lifecycle synchronization;
+   - systemd sandbox;
+   - install and rollback transactions.
+
+## Tests
+
+Run from the final source tree:
+
+- Python compile for all gateway and helper files;
+- unit tests;
+- JSON schema/config parsing;
+- Bash syntax;
+- `systemd-analyze verify`;
+- event duplicate and payload-conflict tests;
+- stale state-version rejection;
+- lease/double-claim test;
+- Workspace trigger failure and Responses fallback;
+- response queued/in-progress/completed polling;
+- file-inbox recovery after HTTP failure;
+- Git-ref initial baseline and subsequent-change event;
+- task start/end and project summary synchronization;
+- dispatch traversal and symlink rejection;
+- retry/backoff/dead-letter;
+- install dry-run;
+- rollback test in an isolated fixture;
+- `git diff --check`;
+- full repository tests;
+- final Gitleaks.
+
+## Commit and review
+
+1. Create an append-only implementation commit.
+2. Push without force.
+3. Confirm `WORKTREE_OID == BARE_OID == GITEA_OID`.
+4. Create an independent RESULT-only branch and exact-one result commit.
+5. Record the source bundle SHA-256, implementation OID, RESULT OID, tests,
+   Gitleaks, systemd validation and remaining external configuration blockers.
+
+## Forbidden
+
+No reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation,
+secret disclosure, fabricated test result, production deployment or B3 evidence
+fabrication.
+
+Success:
+
+`GATEWAY_CODE_REVIEW=PASS IMPLEMENTATION=<oid> RESULT=<oid> OID_MATCH=YES`
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Codex V2R1 adaptive execution
+CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
+Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
+Execute P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK now:
+- read-only verify Repair3 e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4
+- read-only verify RESULT 49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045
+- verify lineage from 8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575, exact4, tests, Gitleaks and RESULT-only scope
+- do not modify Repair3 code in this unit
+Act as fallback for OpenClaw only on timeout/unavailability. Use GPT-5.6 only if actually exposed; otherwise strongest visible model. Prefer OpenClaw when quality is comparable or volume is high; prefer Codex for complex/security-critical work.
+Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
+Report:
+CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=codex STATUS=<status> IMPLEMENTATION=<oid-or-NONE> RESULT=<oid-or-NONE> OID_MATCH=<YES-or-NO> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
+Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
-
-```yaml
-task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
-created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
-timezone: Asia/Shanghai
-owner_approved: true
-user_action_required: false
-risk: high
-production_business_change: false
-```
-
-## 目标
-
-根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
-
-实施：
-
-1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`；
-2. 统一 `UMask=0002`；
-3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL；
-4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree；
-5. 启用任务启动前自检；
-6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰；
-7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源，禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
-
-## 强制通知
-
-收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner：
-
-```text
-【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行；生产业务版本不变。
-```
-
-任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK，立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
-
-## 1. 变更前检查与封存
-
-```bash
-set -euo pipefail
-cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
-pwd
-id
-umask
-git status --short --branch
-git rev-parse HEAD
-systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
-```
-
-将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash，禁止 `git clean -fd`。
-
-记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
-
-## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
-
-识别并停止实际写入服务：
-
-```bash
-systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
-systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
-systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
-```
-
-只停止写入者，不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
-
-## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
-
-对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装：
-
-```text
-config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
-```
-
-目标：
-
-```yaml
-User: aiman
-Group: gitops
-SupplementaryGroups: gitops
-UMask: 0002
-```
-
-执行：
-
-```bash
-systemctl daemon-reload
-systemctl cat <service>
-```
-
-不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
-
-## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
-
-执行治理补丁中的脚本：
-
-```bash
-bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
-```
-
-验收：
-
-```yaml
-bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
-owner: aiman
-group: gitops
-directory_mode: 2775
-default_acl: inherited
-```
-
-## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
-
-以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行：
-
-```bash
-sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
-  umask 0002
-  cd /data/aios-gitops
-  scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
-'
-```
-
-将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为：
-
-```text
-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
-```
-
-## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
-
-每个任务在执行前必须运行：
-
-```bash
-scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
-```
-
-任何一项失败时不得开始任务：
-
- 用户不是 aiman；
- 不在 gitops 组；
- umask 不是 0002；
- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
- worktree 不干净；
- task/result/git dir 不可写；
- 存在 Git lock。
-
-## 7. 启动服务
-
-```bash
-systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
-systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
-systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
-```
-
-验证：
-
-```bash
-systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
-ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
-```
-
-## 8. 并发验收
-
-创建两个独立任务：
-
-```text
-OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
-ChatGPT:  TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
-```
-
-分别使用：
-
-```text
-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
-/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
-```
-
-两个任务同时执行：
-
-1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`；
-2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`；
-3. 创建深层子目录，验证默认 ACL；
-4. commit；
-5. push；
-6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
-
-验收必须全部通过：
-
-```yaml
-permission_denied: 0
-untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
-git_lock_collisions: 0
-openclaw_commit_push: PASS
-chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
-deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
-shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
-```
-
-## 9. 回滚
-
-若迁移失败：
-
-1. 停止新服务；
-2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计；
-3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份；
-4. `daemon-reload`；
-5. 恢复原服务状态；
-6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
-7. 生产业务保持不变。
-
-## 10. 结果文件
-
-提交：
-
-```text
-.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
-```
-
-首段必须包含：
-
-```yaml
-status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
-task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
-created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
-timezone: Asia/Shanghai
-user_action_required: false
-runtime_identity:
-  user:
-  group:
-  umask:
-bare_repo:
-worktree_root:
-controller_worktree:
-services:
-default_acl:
-preflight:
-concurrency_test:
-  openclaw_branch:
-  openclaw_commit:
-  chatgpt_branch:
-  chatgpt_commit:
-  permission_denied_count:
-  untracked_overwrite_count:
-  git_lock_collision_count:
-owner_notifications:
-  received_message_id:
-  terminal_message_id:
-rollback:
-remaining_risks:
-next_step:
-```
-
-提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
-
-## 完成微信模板
-
-PASS：
-
-```text
-【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002；OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
-```
-
-阻塞：
-
-```text
-【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>；已保留原workspace和回滚能力，生产业务未变化。
-```
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# OpenClaw A0 Three-Party Self-Healing and Release Supervision
+
+CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
+
+## Mission
+
+Close the GPT/OpenClaw/Codex unattended loop before any main merge or production release. OpenClaw is the default state writer and long-running supervisor, but work may be reassigned dynamically under the shared contract.
+
+## Authoritative inputs
+
+- Governance contract: `cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc`
+- Governance dispatch head before this task: `9195470ceb78fd57ffface3dcc38f40b75efa9d8`
+- Gateway integration implementation: `c3984ca2b4388875d2875b4fdfdf95a2984f6ab3`
+- Gateway integration RESULT: `4e63b1559aa3fc07b1384154c97b2c90b84353ed`
+- Three-party self-healer candidate branch: `patch/a0-three-party-self-healing-20260718-20260718T043256`
+- Production baseline: `V1R4C6`
+- Release status: `paused`
+
+## Priority invariant
+
+Continuously evaluate exactly three parties:
+
+1. `central_gpt` — Orchestrator Gateway plus a valid Workspace Agent or Responses API decision channel.
+2. `openclaw` — OpenClaw watcher, lifecycle sync, durable task execution and heartbeat.
+3. `codex` — Codex watcher, auto-claim, lifecycle sync, durable task execution and heartbeat.
+
+When exactly two parties are HEALTHY and the third is explicitly UNHEALTHY, create a P0 repair work unit for the unique unhealthy party before every other task. UNKNOWN is not UNHEALTHY and must fail closed. Do not repair when fewer than two are healthy or any health result is ambiguous.
+
+## A0-SH1: supervise implementation completion
+
+Codex owns the high-risk code changes. Independently verify that the final implementation contains:
+
+- strict root-owned configuration validation and no symlink chain;
+- fixed built-in party adapters rather than arbitrary untrusted repair commands;
+- bounded stdout/stderr redaction so tokens and secrets cannot enter audit logs;
+- exclusive lease, cooldown, circuit breaker and stale lease recovery;
+- event trigger plus periodic polling;
+- OpenClaw lifecycle events: `TASK_DISPATCHED`, `TASK_STARTED`, `TASK_ENDED`, `DECISION_APPLIED`, `PROJECT_SUMMARY`, `PROJECT_COMPLETED`;
+- durable file outbox fallback when HTTP callback is unavailable;
+- systemd service and timer;
+- health and repair adapters for central GPT, OpenClaw and Codex;
+- install, verify and rollback scripts;
+- deterministic tests for all health combinations and failures.
+
+Reject the current candidate if it only contains `automation/three_party_self_healer.py` without these controls.
+
+## A0-SH2: live three-party validation
+
+After Codex implementation RESULT passes, deploy only to a non-production acceptance context and run:
+
+1. All-three healthy steady state for at least three poll intervals.
+2. GPT unhealthy while OpenClaw and Codex healthy: GPT repair becomes P0 and recovers.
+3. OpenClaw unhealthy while GPT and Codex healthy: OpenClaw repair becomes P0 and recovers.
+4. Codex unhealthy while GPT and OpenClaw healthy: Codex repair becomes P0 and recovers.
+5. One healthy plus two unhealthy: no repair; fail closed.
+6. Any UNKNOWN health: no repair; fail closed.
+7. Repair timeout: retry with backoff, then circuit open.
+8. Service restart: state, lease and pending work recover.
+9. HTTP event path unavailable: file inbox polling recovers.
+10. Git webhook unavailable: Git ref polling detects change.
+11. Duplicate event ID: no duplicate dispatch.
+12. Main Workspace Agent channel unavailable: Responses fallback takes over only with a valid approved credential.
+13. OpenClaw receives every task start/end and project summary notification.
+14. Two consecutive unattended decision/execution/result cycles complete with no chat message or manual dispatch.
+
+Do not use dummy API keys or environment-variable presence as proof of a valid central decision channel.
+
+## A0-SH3: authoritative closure
+
+Only after independent verification of the above create one append-only state update and an exact-one RESULT file. Required output:
+
+```text
+AUTOMATION_CLOSED=PASS
+CENTRAL_GPT_HEALTH=PASS
+OPENCLAW_AUTO_CLAIM=PASS
+CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM=PASS
+THREE_PARTY_SELF_HEALING=PASS
+EVENT_TRIGGER=PASS
+POLLING=PASS
+OPENCLAW_LIFECYCLE_SYNC=PASS
+TWO_CYCLE_UNATTENDED_LOOP=PASS
+RESTART_RECOVERY=PASS
+ROLLBACK=PASS
+```
+
+Any missing item keeps `AUTOMATION_CLOSED=NO`.
+
+## Release continuation
+
+After and only after `AUTOMATION_CLOSED=PASS`, automatically resume the governed release sequence:
+
+1. Real B3 evidence intake and independent review.
+2. B4 implementation and validation.
+3. Full integration, regression, security and migration tests.
+4. Normal PR/GitOps merge to main; never direct-push main.
+5. Immutable release artifact, digest, SBOM and signature.
+6. Staging and rollback exercise.
+7. Canary and monitoring validation.
+8. Owner/admin GitOps production deployment using existing approved release controls.
+9. Production smoke tests and production RESULT-only commit.
+
+External facts that cannot be fabricated — real WeChat credentials/raw-wire, valid secret references and owner-only release approval — remain fail-closed blockers. The loop must monitor them and resume automatically when they become available.
+
+## Forbidden
+
+- reset, amend, rebase, force push;
+- direct push to main;
+- controller mutation;
+- secret disclosure;
+- dummy credentials presented as production credentials;
+- fabricated B3 evidence;
+- timeout or skipped checks recorded as PASS;
+- production release before `AUTOMATION_CLOSED=PASS`.
+
+Progress format:
+
+```text
+CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> AGENT=openclaw STATUS=<status> COMMIT=<oid-or-NONE> BLOCKER=<stable-reason-or-NONE>
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# OpenClaw task: deploy and supervise AIOS Orchestrator Gateway v1
+
+Contract: `cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc`
+
+You are the default orchestrator and deployment supervisor.
+
+## Preconditions
+
+- Codex has applied and independently reviewed this source bundle on a clean,
+  append-only branch.
+- Implementation and RESULT OIDs are identical across worktree, bare repo and
+  Gitea.
+- Final Gitleaks and repository tests are PASS.
+- No force push, reset, amend or rebase occurred.
+
+## Responsibilities
+
+1. Validate the source bundle SHA-256 and `SHA256SUMS`.
+2. Review the generated systemd service, poll timer, tmpfiles and sysusers files.
+3. Install through `scripts/install_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh`.
+4. Configure one or both central-model channels:
+   - published Workspace Agent API channel with `agtch_...` trigger ID and a
+     Workspace Agent access token stored outside Git; or
+   - Responses API fallback with an approved model and API key stored outside Git.
+5. Publish the callback endpoint securely and configure the Workspace Agent
+   action from `workspace-agent/orchestrator-decision-action.openapi.yaml`.
+6. Confirm that the Workspace Agent instructions match
+   `workspace-agent/CENTRAL_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS.md`.
+7. Enable both:
+   - the continuously running gateway service;
+   - the independent `aios-orchestrator-gateway-poll.timer`.
+8. Verify HTTP event ingestion, file-inbox polling, Git-ref polling,
+   Workspace Agent trigger acceptance, callback decision, Responses background
+   polling fallback, dispatch queue generation, retry leases and loop guards.
+9. Verify OpenClaw receives and synchronizes:
+   - TASK_DISPATCHED
+   - TASK_STARTED
+   - TASK_ENDED
+   - PROJECT_SUMMARY
+   - PROJECT_COMPLETED
+10. Run a harmless bootstrap work unit through OpenClaw and Codex and confirm
+    duplicate event submission is idempotent.
+11. Run rollback, reinstall and heartbeat/health verification.
+12. Create one RESULT-only review recording exact commits, artifact digest,
+    tests, systemd security, polling recovery, lifecycle synchronization and
+    rollback.
+
+## Fail-closed boundaries
+
+- Do not put Workspace Agent tokens, API keys, callback tokens or gateway
+  credentials in Git, logs, command arguments or RESULT files.
+- Do not claim the gateway resolves the existing B3 credential/raw-wire blocker.
+- Do not advance B4 or production merely because this gateway is healthy.
+- Do not bypass owner/admin production release approvals.
+- Do not use reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push or bare-ref edits.
+
+## Required final status
+
+Success:
+
+`ORCHESTRATOR_GATEWAY_LIVE=PASS POLLING=PASS OPENCLAW_SYNC=PASS ROLLBACK=PASS`
+
+Blocker:
+
+`ORCHESTRATOR_GATEWAY_LIVE=BLOCKED reason=<stable_reason>`
+
+Keep `BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED` until the
+existing production contract advances all release gates.
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# OpenClaw V2R1 adaptive orchestration
+CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
+Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
+You are default orchestrator and sole authoritative state writer.
+Execute immediately:
+1. R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER: discover approved provider metadata and owner-probe source without reading or outputting secrets. Environment variables alone are not approved secret refs.
+2. P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE: inventory approved restricted B3 evidence locations; validate existing facts; never synthesize evidence.
+3. Independently verify Codex results before advancing.
+Prefer OpenClaw for comparable-quality, large, repetitive, long-running, infrastructure and cost-sensitive work. Prefer Codex strongest actually available model for complex code, security boundaries, architecture and high-risk review. On timeout mark TIMEOUT and switch agent; never infer PASS.
+Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
+Report:
+CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=openclaw STATUS=<status> COMMIT=<oid-or-NONE> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
+Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 e4a1f86ef92ec1d3ff724eb75cf9c01758c1cc997e1afadc1c8b561bce5b813a  FULL_PACKAGE_MANIFEST.json
 c59c0288d4d999fbd79a2f275d4fb8c369029cb8bb721f95408308cc51eaa3a2  README.md
-b090062a92aeb14211bbfc1fcd43b5ee4f315d30054b437f3bcdac657210ee95  VERSION
-a664714bc1e13160cdd0dc32de460c65a83a3a95aa5cdad1833b1b650ab90e9d  active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_model_api.py
+1095953d5764d9c72f02e84b1d525e265d3a67a5bdb451ab9ef51a8e8b3032b8  VERSION
+ee6e4fc6bc98a590fbc3585b62707e2562115e5a3f722e69a7c464d966bdc458  active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_model_api.py
 0ffadf6ee1f297842bc44c6e753010fd2b7b02b1f5fb0d7e0676b7bec898db08  active-runtime/app/aios_v5_webops_app.py
 0ffadf6ee1f297842bc44c6e753010fd2b7b02b1f5fb0d7e0676b7bec898db08  active-runtime/app/aios_webops_app.py
 0eb12e0161371464605577707c84df413b555277933f9eb4488ab38032ff699b  active-runtime/migrations/001_webops_core_sqlite.sql
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ee6e4fc6bc98a590fbc3585b62707e2562115e5a3f722e69a7c464d966bdc458  adapters/gitop
 013813b58d7844f3860d6f9bb484f84f92487652b573976c474bb35c91df8ae8  adapters/openclaw/openclaw_gitops_commands.py
 7a34ccdfdcdc132fe5daf01cd1acd9d9b7adbd0429d575b65e0771962ccedc62  adapters/webops/gitops_model_menu_fragment.html
 86b0cb6ee3192565b080672e5305dabba1283486442e630c71244ebac4910916  config/digital_life.yaml
-5a27d48db343dcb723bcc1d9d8222aa3f72094c57cc43640aebe6558963bd20f  config/domains.env
+a3872f24e4cd64288758846ecd0b374db4aa41111feec3b17c41438136d6d5d0  config/domains.env
 7a6f82cbddfc5c74bd37229e4f37fe4e73430ae585b4846abd1a80d852f2fed0  config/gitops_short_links.yaml
 4139d915bdd733171734d5d5d3411e6fc4f8f202c49af4321d706da176da690b  config/model_registry.yaml
 8d6202d3da60366c96a208f5e5eed1f09fd36d122f4cabdc038c21ce2e72ea16  config/npm_custom_locations.yaml
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ d8cea35eb6c1300d20804ef480312d26dbdc2ad3a2d26b9430c6ca4808155a95  fixes/patch_ru
 0eb12e0161371464605577707c84df413b555277933f9eb4488ab38032ff699b  migrations/001_webops_core_sqlite.sql
 6d61da88e7d6b208e7eee7195b521dc47cb68587f91987d7a0dd1c8801ef168d  migrations/002_seed_owner_admin_user.sql
 a2c0c7699e1eb46cfdeabfc905cb79b71ed14fb6bcf81ecc99ec47975cf05767  migrations/004_gitops_custom_llm_runtime.sql
-ca49f4165b50171968485ffa5535bc33d2158237ea55af10a3888a5fa0f7a535  package_verify_full.sh
+b77bce1ca78cede27de6594e25f6ce5bb0c4990c0953eeb79f7e2608d2515c32  package_verify_full.sh
 f65b7fba5d6bdac3070ff4309830e286cd6319a80ab2e55263e46022fed2bf7f  scripts/apply_migrations.py
 bc0452d261def2366cdefd845e62d7177b42806f93ba78294ece29a8a369157e  scripts/backup_before_fix.sh
 bdb439086c86b3b23f8240cb2bef0f757a6be242d21d13a79eb1e44434efbe2e  scripts/create_patch.sh
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ bdb439086c86b3b23f8240cb2bef0f757a6be242d21d13a79eb1e44434efbe2e  scripts/create
 1fdeecf0315f3ab4ec461c3376128054df9ac48e2fe5a3f64a138cd7d710d44d  scripts/generate_release_manifest.py
 80c6c10f259245681c42932f3f5f9b9a0fbd9cadce6a3f495d82cbdbc8618c73  scripts/healthcheck.sh
 3795cadfa6429a434c955913dbdcbf552181c88301a196b4b458f4f5dd206cd8  scripts/init_gitops_baseline.sh
-e76cd986d2387b76439e4a7fe503e48a2de8fc70fb52c45a13641c9d943f108f  scripts/install_v1r1c0_gitops_model_overlay.sh
+4d54a4ed6d35bbb6e9fe2924f3cfceeea9c3eed898017788f6c5ab8041394a47  scripts/install_v1r1c0_gitops_model_overlay.sh
 0064539ac1e1bd32dc8062ecc307ad2bc8520895009583a72d46868d1cf44e3c  scripts/install_webops_overlay.sh
 9fadafc4b4d098c006d159cb3b401eb19cf9ab9c5fa4b5cb109e946501c0b8e1  scripts/owner_wechat_notify_worker.py
-f537c58fc08685601f47fac5c0a3a2856e3ce9806c1918848c87a194a49c28a0  scripts/package_contract_check_v1r1c0.sh
-14ab40a7c342e21e8315def14d552dcff4b214d23f1f4be493e9d3fc2cee1a2f  scripts/release_version.sh
+e0abd8ad44d4f088108f2046fd9d7bbd4465af50f79bd3b9fcbb72a8c61bee65  scripts/package_contract_check_v1r1c0.sh
+abef8df642c6d233af4a03c512876b02b326e19c924020b8dd8cc74236d18817  scripts/release_version.sh
 bbdb3f9992b203ddc2a6a83241052663de4f021d0705724bd9df05acaa99b022  scripts/rollback_last_delta.sh
 0814c26ecf6732cf2c24f5f414ad0128a159768cfbbeb21d557274064feb1188  scripts/rollback_version.sh
 da84a5cc61c1d54a7d1e96e4b0a7186e192edf3ec12d694fc9d7608c3b1086ef  scripts/run_acceptance_with_autofix.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# AIOS Codex automatic command watcher
+
+The watcher polls the governed `commands/active` queue without a chat trigger. It uses SQLite transactions for exclusive leases, records the exact command digest, rejects contract drift, retries transient failures, dead-letters exhausted work, and resumes from the last durable phase so an end-event retry does not execute a work unit twice.
+
+Commands are JSON documents validated by `schemas/codex-command.schema.json`. `acceptance_probe` is the only built-in action and has no external side effect. Production `codex` work requires an administrator-provisioned absolute executor path; the instruction is passed on standard input, never argv or environment. The executor receives a sanitized environment and must obtain credentials through its approved file or exec provider. If the executor is absent, the task fails closed and follows the retry/dead-letter policy.
+
+The watcher provides at-most-once execution. It writes the `EXECUTING` phase before launching an external executor; if the host dies after an external effect but before a result is durably recorded, recovery does not replay the work and instead dead-letters the ambiguity for human review. Start and end event JSON is persisted before transmission, so response-loss retries reuse the exact event ID and payload and are deduplicated by the Gateway.
+
+Lifecycle evidence is appended to `/var/log/aios-codex-watcher/audit.jsonl` as `CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM`, `TASK_STARTED`, `TASK_EXECUTED`, `TASK_ENDED`, and `EVENT_POSTED`. Inputs, tokens, stdout, and stderr are not logged; only result digests are retained.
+
+Install from a reviewed commit with `sudo scripts/install_aios_codex_watcher.sh`. The installer creates a content-addressed release, atomically updates `current`, writes a receipt, and enables the five-second systemd timer. The existing Gateway inbound token file is referenced in place and never copied.
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# AIOS Orchestrator Gateway v0.2
+
+This component turns the current passive GPT orchestration pattern into a
+durable, unattended loop:
+
+```text
+Gitea/OpenClaw/Codex event
+  -> HTTP event endpoint or polled file inbox
+  -> durable SQLite state machine
+  -> Workspace Agent API trigger
+  -> strict callback decision
+  -> Responses API background fallback and polling
+  -> OpenClaw/Codex dispatch queues
+  -> start/end/result events
+  -> next orchestration cycle
+```
+
+## Reliability mechanisms
+
+The gateway does not depend on one timer, webhook or model call:
+
+- HTTP event ingestion.
+- Periodic file-inbox polling for missed webhooks and offline producers.
+- Local bare-Git ref polling for `main`, governance, patch and result refs.
+- Workspace Agent retries with a stable event `Idempotency-Key`.
+- Workspace Agent callback timeout and Responses API background fallback.
+- Responses status polling until completion or fail-closed terminal status.
+- SQLite optimistic state versions, idempotency records and processing leases.
+- Exponential retry with a maximum retry count and dead-letter state.
+- Same-blocker and maximum-hop guards to stop non-progress loops.
+- A systemd timer runs `--poll-once` as an independent reliability watchdog.
+
+Workspace Agent trigger runs are asynchronous and do not expose a retrievable
+final response. The central Workspace Agent must therefore call the
+`submit_orchestration_decision` action.
+
+## OpenClaw synchronization
+
+Every lifecycle stage is durably written to the OpenClaw synchronization queue:
+
+- `TASK_DISPATCHED`
+- `TASK_STARTED`
+- `TASK_ENDED`
+- `DECISION_APPLIED`
+- `PROJECT_SUMMARY`
+- `PROJECT_COMPLETED`
+
+An optional authenticated OpenClaw HTTP endpoint can receive the same records.
+A failed HTTP delivery remains in the lifecycle retry queue. OpenClaw remains
+the default project-status synchronizer and authoritative progress presenter.
+
+## Agent execution contract
+
+Each dispatched JSON envelope contains:
+
+- exact contract commit;
+- source event;
+- clean base commit;
+- primary and fallback agent;
+- allowed paths;
+- required checks;
+- forbidden operations;
+- completion event callback format.
+
+OpenClaw and Codex must send a `work_unit_started` event before execution and a
+`work_unit_completed`, `work_unit_blocked`, or `work_unit_failed` event when
+they stop. This guarantees that OpenClaw can synchronize every task start,
+finish, and overall project summary.
+
+## Security
+
+- Model and callback credentials are read only from root-owned secret files.
+- Credentials never enter Git, dispatch payloads or logs.
+- The gateway runs as a dedicated unprivileged user.
+- Dispatch and sync paths are protected against traversal and symlink targets.
+- All state changes require the exact contract commit and current state version.
+- Production evidence, credentials and approvals stay fail-closed.
+- Git history operations remain controlled by the committed governance contract.
+
+## Deployment sequence
+
+1. Apply this source bundle to a clean append-only branch.
+2. Run unit, repository, shell, JSON, systemd and Gitleaks checks.
+3. Configure one or both model channels:
+   - published Workspace Agent API channel and Workspace Agent access token;
+   - Responses API key and approved fallback model.
+4. Publish the decision callback as a Workspace Agent action or MCP tool.
+5. Install the service through `scripts/install_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh`.
+6. Run `scripts/verify_aios_orchestrator_gateway.sh`.
+7. Submit a harmless event and verify:
+   - trigger acceptance;
+   - strict decision callback;
+   - dispatch file;
+   - OpenClaw task-start/task-end/project-summary synchronization;
+   - duplicate idempotency;
+   - polling recovery after suppressing the HTTP webhook.
+
+The installer copies an explicit gateway-only allowlist into a release directory
+named by its SHA-256 digest, atomically updates `/opt/aios-orchestrator-gateway/current`,
+and persists `/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/install-receipt.json` with the
+current and previous release. `--dry-run` performs source validation and emits
+`AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_INSTALL_DRY_RUN=PASS` without changing installed state.
+
+Rollback reads that root-owned `0600` receipt, verifies both release directory
+names and `SOURCE_DIGEST` files, coordinates the gateway and poll units, and
+atomically switches `current` to the previous release. Repeating the same
+rollback is a no-op and emits `NOOP_ALREADY_ROLLED_BACK`.
@@ -1 +1 @@
-V2R1C4
+V1R4C6
@@ -1,379 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Task-scoped continuous authorization controller for the AIOS Candidate writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-import base64, fcntl, hashlib, json, os, pwd, grp, re, socket, sqlite3, stat, subprocess, sys, tempfile, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
-from typing import Any
-
-TASK='AIOS-AUTONOMOUS-RELEASE-FULL-IMPLEMENTATION-20260726'
-AUTH_ID='authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726'
-BRANCH='patch/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726'
-BASE='875d41c3101093149414292067fd700dc214d4d3'
-REPO='aios/aios'
-WRITER_AUDIENCE='chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer'
-ACTOR='chatgpt-gitops-bot'
-WRITER_INSTANCE='writer-6e32f321-1240-46f8-9693-0b0631d9c77b'
-CHILD_OPERATION_MAX_USES=20
-ROOT=Path('/data/aios-gitops')
-WORKTREE=ROOT/'worktrees/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726'
-BARE=ROOT/'repo.git'
-TASK_ROOT=ROOT/'runtime/tasks'/TASK
-AUTH_DIR=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/task-authorizations')
-PARENT=AUTH_DIR/'authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726.json'
-STATE_DIR=Path('/var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-authorization')
-STATE=STATE_DIR/'state.json'
-LOCK=STATE_DIR/'controller.lock'
-AUDIT=TASK_ROOT/'continuous-authorization.audit.jsonl'
-SOCKET_DIR=Path('/run/aios-autonomous-release-authorization')
-SOCKET_PATH=SOCKET_DIR/'controller.sock'
-PROJECTION=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/credentials/chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer')
-REGISTRY=Path('/var/lib/aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer/token-registry.sqlite3')
-WRITER_LEDGER=Path('/var/lib/aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer/operation-ledger.sqlite3')
-ASKPASS=Path('/usr/libexec/aios-autonomous-release-authorization/gitea_askpass.py')
-PATH_POLICY=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/policies-chatgpt-autonomous-release/autonomous-release-path-policy.json')
-ROUTE_BINDING=Path('/etc/aios-gitops/action-route-bindings/chatgpt-autonomous-release-20260726.json')
-OID_RE=re.compile(r'^[0-9a-f]{40}$')
-OP_RE=re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}$')
-TERMINAL={'COMPLETED','CANCELLED','FAILED_FINAL','REVOKED','REVOKED_IDLE_TIMEOUT','REVOKED_WALL_CLOCK','RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED'}
-
-sys.path.insert(0,'/usr/libexec/aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer-fullprofile-8ac2f90f')
-from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
-
-def now() -> datetime: return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-def stamp() -> str: return now().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat()
-def canonical(value: Any) -> bytes: return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
-def fail(code: str, status: int=503, **details: Any) -> None: raise ControlError(code,status,details)
-class ControlError(RuntimeError):
- def __init__(self,code:str,status:int=503,details:dict[str,Any]|None=None): self.code,self.status,self.details=code,status,details or {}; super().__init__(code)
-
-def owned_regular(path:Path, mode:int) -> os.stat_result:
- try: info=os.lstat(path)
- except FileNotFoundError: fail('authorization_config_missing')
- if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)&~mode: fail('authorization_config_permissions_rejected')
- return info
-
-def load_json(path:Path,mode:int=0o600) -> dict[str,Any]:
- owned_regular(path,mode)
- try: value=json.loads(path.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
- except Exception: fail('authorization_config_json_rejected')
- if not isinstance(value,dict): fail('authorization_config_schema_rejected')
- return value
-
-def atomic_json(path:Path,value:dict[str,Any],mode:int=0o600) -> None:
- path.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
- raw=canonical(value)+b'\n'
- fd,tmp=tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.new-',dir=path.parent)
- try:
-  os.fchmod(fd,mode); os.write(fd,raw); os.fsync(fd); os.close(fd); os.chown(tmp,0,0); os.replace(tmp,path)
-  os.chmod(path,mode)
- finally:
-  try: os.close(fd)
-  except OSError: pass
-  if os.path.exists(tmp): os.unlink(tmp)
-
-def append_audit(event:dict[str,Any]) -> None:
- TASK_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
- flags=os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_APPEND|getattr(os,'O_NOFOLLOW',0)
- fd=os.open(AUDIT,flags,0o600)
- try: os.write(fd,canonical({'at':stamp(),'task_id':TASK,'secrets_included':False,**event})+b'\n'); os.fsync(fd)
- finally: os.close(fd)
-
-def parent() -> dict[str,Any]:
- p=load_json(PARENT)
- required={'schema_version','development_authorization_id','authorization_type','task_id','actor_identity','audience','repository','exact_branch','approved_base_oid','allowed_path_roots','allowed_exact_paths','allowed_operations','created_at','valid_until','maximum_wall_clock_seconds','idle_timeout_seconds','manual_reapproval_per_commit','maximum_concurrent_writes','path_policy_sha256','writer_instance_id'}
- if set(p)!=required or p.get('schema_version')!=1: fail('parent_authorization_schema_rejected')
- fixed={'development_authorization_id':AUTH_ID,'authorization_type':'TASK_SCOPED_CONTINUOUS_DEVELOPMENT','task_id':TASK,'actor_identity':ACTOR,'audience':WRITER_AUDIENCE,'repository':REPO,'exact_branch':BRANCH,'approved_base_oid':BASE,'manual_reapproval_per_commit':False,'maximum_concurrent_writes':1,'writer_instance_id':WRITER_INSTANCE}
- if any(p.get(k)!=v for k,v in fixed.items()): fail('parent_authorization_binding_rejected')
- if p.get('maximum_wall_clock_seconds')!=86400 or p.get('idle_timeout_seconds')!=2700: fail('parent_authorization_lifetime_rejected')
- if not isinstance(p.get('allowed_path_roots'),list) or not isinstance(p.get('allowed_exact_paths'),list) or not isinstance(p.get('allowed_operations'),list): fail('parent_authorization_scope_rejected')
- raw=PATH_POLICY.read_bytes()
- if hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()!=p.get('path_policy_sha256'): fail('parent_authorization_path_policy_changed')
- return p
-
-def parse_time(v:Any) -> datetime:
- try:
-  d=datetime.fromisoformat(str(v).replace('Z','+00:00'))
-  return d.astimezone(timezone.utc)
- except Exception: fail('authorization_time_rejected')
-
-def components(path:str)->tuple[str,...]:
- if not isinstance(path,str) or not path or path!=path.strip() or '\\' in path or '\x00' in path: fail('authorization_path_rejected',403)
- pp=PurePosixPath(path); wp=PureWindowsPath(path)
- parts=tuple(path.split('/'))
- if pp.is_absolute() or wp.is_absolute() or bool(wp.drive) or any(x in {'','.','..'} for x in parts): fail('authorization_path_rejected',403)
- return parts
-
-def path_allowed(p:dict[str,Any],path:str)->bool:
- item=components(path)
- for root in p['allowed_path_roots']:
-  r=components(str(root).rstrip('/'))
-  if item[:len(r)]==r: return True
- return any(item==components(x) for x in p['allowed_exact_paths'])
-
-def git(*args:str,cwd:Path|None=None,env:dict[str,str]|None=None)->str:
- e=os.environ.copy(); e.update(env or {}); e['GIT_CONFIG_COUNT']='1'; e['GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0']='safe.directory'; e['GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0']=str(WORKTREE)
- r=subprocess.run(['git',*args],cwd=cwd,text=True,capture_output=True,env=e)
- if r.returncode: fail('authorization_git_probe_failed',503)
- return r.stdout.strip()
-
-def credential_lines()->list[str]:
- cp=Path(os.environ.get('CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY',''))/'gitea_git_http'
- try:
-  info=os.lstat(cp); lines=cp.read_text(encoding='utf-8').splitlines()
- except OSError: fail('authorization_gitea_credential_unavailable')
- if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or len(lines)!=2 or lines[0]!='gitops-bot' or not lines[1]: fail('authorization_gitea_credential_rejected')
- return lines
-
-def remote_oid()->str:
- credential_lines()
- e={'GIT_ASKPASS':str(ASKPASS),'GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT':'0'}
- out=git('ls-remote','--heads','http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git',f'refs/heads/{BRANCH}',cwd=WORKTREE,env=e)
- fields=out.split()
- if len(fields)!=2 or not OID_RE.fullmatch(fields[0]): fail('authorization_git_ls_remote_rejected')
- return fields[0]
-
-def api_oid()->str:
- user,password=credential_lines(); branch=urllib.parse.quote(BRANCH,safe='')
- encoded=base64.b64encode((user+':'+password).encode()).decode()
- request=urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/repos/aios/aios/branches/'+branch,headers={'Authorization':'Basic '+encoded,'Host':'g.cnnetmkt.top'})
- try:
-  with urllib.request.urlopen(request,timeout=10) as response: value=json.loads(response.read())
- except Exception: fail('authorization_gitea_api_unavailable')
- oid=str(value.get('commit',{}).get('id',''))
- if not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid): fail('authorization_gitea_api_oid_rejected')
- return oid
-
-def four_way(expected:str)->None:
- local=git('rev-parse','HEAD',cwd=WORKTREE)
- bare=git('--git-dir',str(BARE),'rev-parse',f'refs/heads/{BRANCH}')
- remote=remote_oid(); api=api_oid()
- if any(x!=expected for x in (local,bare,remote,api)): fail('RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED',409,current_head_oid=local)
- if git('status','--porcelain',cwd=WORKTREE)!='': fail('authorization_worktree_dirty',409)
-
-def state()->dict[str,Any]:
- s=load_json(STATE)
- required={'schema_version','development_authorization_id','task_id','status','current_head_oid','last_activity_at','writer_child','test_child','inflight','updated_at'}
- if set(s)!=required or s.get('schema_version')!=1 or s.get('development_authorization_id')!=AUTH_ID or s.get('task_id')!=TASK or not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(s.get('current_head_oid',''))): fail('authorization_state_schema_rejected')
- return s
-
-def save_state(s:dict[str,Any])->None: s['updated_at']=stamp(); atomic_json(STATE,s)
-
-def lock():
- STATE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True); os.chmod(STATE_DIR,0o700)
- f=open(LOCK,'a+b'); os.chmod(LOCK,0o600); fcntl.flock(f.fileno(),fcntl.LOCK_EX); return f
-
-def route_binding_valid(p:dict[str,Any])->None:
- b=load_json(ROUTE_BINDING,0o640)
- identities=b.get('action_identities')
- if b.get('task_id')!=TASK or b.get('writer_instance_id')!=WRITER_INSTANCE or b.get('repository')!=REPO or b.get('branch')!=BRANCH or b.get('approved_base_oid')!=BASE or b.get('path_policy_sha256')!=p.get('path_policy_sha256') or not isinstance(identities,list) or len(identities)!=1 or identities[0].get('account')!=ACTOR:
-  fail('authorization_route_binding_changed',409)
-
-def task_live(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],*,touch:bool)->None:
- route_binding_valid(p)
- if s['status'] in TERMINAL: fail('authorization_task_terminal',409)
- if now()>=parse_time(p['valid_until']):
-  s['status']='REVOKED_WALL_CLOCK'; save_state(s); cleanup(s,'wall_clock'); fail('authorization_task_terminal',409)
- if (now()-parse_time(s['last_activity_at'])).total_seconds()>p['idle_timeout_seconds']:
-  s['status']='REVOKED_IDLE_TIMEOUT'; save_state(s); cleanup(s,'idle_timeout'); fail('authorization_task_terminal',409)
- if touch: s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s)
-
-def projection_token()->str|None:
- if not PROJECTION.exists(): return None
- try:
-  info=os.lstat(PROJECTION)
-  if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid!=0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)!=0o600: fail('authorization_projection_rejected')
-  token=PROJECTION.read_text(encoding='utf-8').strip()
-  return token if len(token.encode())>=32 else None
- except OSError: fail('authorization_projection_rejected')
-
-def write_projection(token:str)->None:
- PROJECTION.parent.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True)
- fd,tmp=tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.writer-',dir=PROJECTION.parent)
- try:
-  os.fchmod(fd,0o600); os.write(fd,(token+'\n').encode()); os.fsync(fd); os.close(fd); os.chown(tmp,0,0); os.replace(tmp,PROJECTION); os.chmod(PROJECTION,0o600)
- finally:
-  try: os.close(fd)
-  except OSError: pass
-  if os.path.exists(tmp): os.unlink(tmp)
-
-def post_revoke_401(token:str)->None:
- req=urllib.request.Request('http://127.0.0.1:19893/api/runtime-status',headers={'Authorization':'Bearer '+token})
- try: urllib.request.urlopen(req,timeout=5)
- except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
-  if e.code==401:return
- except Exception: pass
- fail('authorization_old_credential_revocation_unverified')
-
-def rotate_child(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],reason:str)->str:
- old=projection_token(); registry=TokenRegistry(REGISTRY)
- old_record=registry.find(old) if old else None
- if old_record and (old_record.get('task_id')!=TASK or old_record.get('development_authorization_id')!=AUTH_ID):
-  if parse_time(old_record.get('expires_at'))>=now(): fail('authorization_existing_projection_binding_rejected')
-  if not registry.revoke(str(old_record['token_id'])): fail('authorization_historical_child_revoke_failed')
-  post_revoke_401(old)
-  append_audit({'event':'historical_expired_child_revoked','old_credential_http_status':401})
-  old_record=None
- issued=now().replace(microsecond=0); expires=issued+timedelta(minutes=20)
- prefixes=[str(x).rstrip('/')+'/' for x in p['allowed_path_roots']]
- grant={'token_id':'continuous-child-'+issued.strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ')+'-'+os.urandom(3).hex(),'credential_id':'credential-'+issued.strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ')+'-'+os.urandom(3).hex(),'development_authorization_id':AUTH_ID,'audience':WRITER_AUDIENCE,'task_id':TASK,'actor_identity':ACTOR,'writer_instance_id':WRITER_INSTANCE,'repository_identity':REPO,'source_cidrs':['127.0.0.1/32'],'allowed_branch':BRANCH,'current_expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'approved_base_oid':BASE,'allowed_operations':p['allowed_operations'],'allowed_paths':p['allowed_exact_paths'],'allowed_path_prefixes':prefixes,'not_before':issued.isoformat(),'expires_at':expires.isoformat(),'renewable':False,'max_uses':{operation:CHILD_OPERATION_MAX_USES for operation in p['allowed_operations']},'issued_by':'task_authorization_controller'}
- token,record=registry.issue(grant)
- try:
-  write_projection(token)
-  if old_record:
-   if not registry.revoke(str(old_record['token_id'])): fail('authorization_old_child_revoke_failed')
-   post_revoke_401(old)
- except Exception:
-  registry.revoke(str(record['token_id']))
-  try: PROJECTION.unlink()
-  except FileNotFoundError: pass
-  raise
- s['writer_child']={'credential_id':record['credential_id'],'issued_at':record['not_before'],'expires_at':record['expires_at'],'current_expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'rotation_reason':reason}
- save_state(s); append_audit({'event':'child_grant_rotated','reason':reason,'current_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'old_grant_revoked':bool(old_record),'old_credential_http_status':401 if old_record else None})
- return token
-
-def child_operation_quota_exhausted(rec:dict[str,Any],registry:TokenRegistry)->bool:
- token_id=str(rec.get('token_id',''))
- allowed=rec.get('allowed_operations')
- limits=rec.get('max_uses')
- if not token_id or not isinstance(allowed,list) or not isinstance(limits,dict): fail('authorization_child_quota_schema_rejected')
- for operation in allowed:
-  maximum=limits.get(operation)
-  if not isinstance(operation,str) or not isinstance(maximum,int) or maximum<1: fail('authorization_child_quota_schema_rejected')
-  if registry.usage(token_id,operation)>=maximum: return True
- return False
-
-def ensure_child(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],reason:str)->str:
- token=projection_token(); meta=s.get('writer_child') or {}
- expired=True
- try: expired=(parse_time(meta.get('expires_at'))-now()).total_seconds()<=300
- except Exception: pass
- if not token or expired or meta.get('current_expected_head_oid')!=s['current_head_oid']:
-  return rotate_child(p,s,reason)
- registry=TokenRegistry(REGISTRY)
- rec=registry.find(token)
- if not rec or rec.get('revoked') or rec.get('development_authorization_id')!=AUTH_ID or rec.get('current_expected_head_oid')!=s['current_head_oid']:
-  return rotate_child(p,s,reason)
- if child_operation_quota_exhausted(rec,registry):
-  return rotate_child(p,s,'operation_quota_exhausted')
- return token
-
-def ledger_verified(operation_id:str,commit_oid:str)->None:
- with sqlite3.connect(WRITER_LEDGER) as db:
-  row=db.execute('select operation_id,branch,commit_oid,state,verification_status from writer_operations where operation_id=?',(operation_id,)).fetchone()
- if not row or row[1]!=BRANCH or row[2]!=commit_oid or row[3]!='COMPLETED' or row[4]!='bare+gitea': fail('authorization_writer_ledger_rejected',409)
-
-def reconcile(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],previous:str,new:str,operation_id:str)->dict[str,Any]:
- inflight=s.get('inflight')
- if not isinstance(inflight,dict) or inflight.get('previous_head_oid')!=previous or inflight.get('operation_id')!=operation_id: fail('authorization_inflight_rejected',409)
- if previous!=s['current_head_oid'] or not OID_RE.fullmatch(new): fail('authorization_head_transition_rejected',409)
- ledger_verified(operation_id,new); four_way(new)
- s['current_head_oid']=new; s['inflight']=None; s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s)
- ensure_child(p,s,'head_advance')
- append_audit({'event':'authorization_head_advanced','previous_head_oid':previous,'new_commit_oid':new,'four_way_ref_status':True,'worktree_clean':True})
- return {'authorization_current_head_oid':new,'automatic_head_advance':True,'four_way_ref_status':True}
-
-def prepare(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],data:dict[str,Any])->dict[str,Any]:
- required={'expected_current_head_oid','operation_id','idempotency_key','exact_path','content_digest','commit_message_digest','branch','path','message'}
- if set(data)!=required: fail('authorization_request_schema_rejected',403)
- if data['branch']!=BRANCH or data['path']!=data['exact_path'] or not path_allowed(p,str(data['path'])): fail('authorization_path_rejected',403)
- if data['expected_current_head_oid']!=s['current_head_oid'] or not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(data['expected_current_head_oid'])): fail('BRANCH_HEAD_CHANGED',409,current_head_oid=s['current_head_oid'])
- if not OP_RE.fullmatch(str(data['operation_id'])) or not OP_RE.fullmatch(str(data['idempotency_key'])): fail('authorization_operation_id_rejected',403)
- if not all(isinstance(data[k],str) and re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{64}',data[k]) for k in ('content_digest','commit_message_digest')): fail('authorization_digest_rejected',403)
- if hashlib.sha256(data['message'].encode()).hexdigest()!=data['commit_message_digest']: fail('authorization_commit_message_digest_rejected',403)
- inflight=s.get('inflight')
- if inflight:
-  if inflight.get('operation_id')==data['operation_id'] and inflight.get('idempotency_key')==data['idempotency_key']: return {'expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'idempotency_key':data['idempotency_key']}
-  fail('BRANCH_HEAD_CHANGED',409,current_head_oid=s['current_head_oid'])
- four_way(s['current_head_oid'])
- s['inflight']={'operation_id':data['operation_id'],'idempotency_key':data['idempotency_key'],'previous_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'path':data['path'],'created_at':stamp()}; s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s)
- append_audit({'event':'write_prepared','operation_id':data['operation_id'],'path':data['path'],'expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid']})
- return {'expected_head_oid':s['current_head_oid'],'idempotency_key':data['idempotency_key']}
-
-def test_authorize(p:dict[str,Any],s:dict[str,Any],operation:str)->dict[str,Any]:
- allowed={'pytest_dormant','pytest_autonomous_release','compileall_autonomous_release','git_diff_check'}
- if operation not in allowed: fail('candidate_test_executor_operation_rejected',403)
- four_way(s['current_head_oid'])
- child=s.get('test_child') or {}; refresh=True
- try: refresh=(parse_time(child.get('expires_at'))-now()).total_seconds()<=300
- except Exception: pass
- if refresh:
-  issued=now().replace(microsecond=0); child={'test_authorization_id':'test-authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726','grant_id':'test-child-'+issued.strftime('%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ'),'issued_at':issued.isoformat(),'expires_at':(issued+timedelta(minutes=20)).isoformat()}; s['test_child']=child
- s['last_activity_at']=stamp(); save_state(s); append_audit({'event':'test_authorized','operation':operation})
- return {'test_authorization_id':child['test_authorization_id'],'operation':operation,'expires_at':child['expires_at']}
-
-def cleanup(s:dict[str,Any],reason:str)->None:
- old=projection_token()
- if old:
-  reg=TokenRegistry(REGISTRY); rec=reg.find(old)
-  if rec: reg.revoke(str(rec['token_id']))
-  try: PROJECTION.unlink()
-  except FileNotFoundError: pass
-  try: post_revoke_401(old)
-  except ControlError: pass
- for unit in ('aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-route.service','aios-chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer.service'):
-  subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/systemctl','stop',unit],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=20)
- subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/systemctl','stop','aios-autonomous-release-dormant-test-executor@*.service'],stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,timeout=20)
- try: ROUTE_BINDING.unlink()
- except FileNotFoundError: pass
- try: SOCKET_PATH.unlink()
- except FileNotFoundError: pass
- append_audit({'event':'authorization_cleanup','reason':reason,'projection_removed':not PROJECTION.exists(),'route_overlay_removed':not ROUTE_BINDING.exists(),'task_services_stop_requested':True})
-
-def request(data:dict[str,Any])->dict[str,Any]:
- op=data.get('op'); f=lock()
- try:
-  p=parent(); s=state(); task_live(p,s,touch=False)
-  if op=='describe_authorization':
-   four_way(s['current_head_oid'])
-   return {'development_authorization_id':AUTH_ID,'task_id':TASK,'actor_identity':ACTOR,'audience':WRITER_AUDIENCE,'repository':REPO,'branch':BRANCH,'approved_base_oid':BASE,'authorization_status':s['status'],'current_head_oid':s['current_head_oid']}
-  if op=='get_writer_token':
-   four_way(s['current_head_oid']); token=ensure_child(p,s,'scheduled_or_requested_rotation'); return {'token':token,'current_head_oid':s['current_head_oid']}
-  if op=='prepare_write':
-   ensure_child(p,s,'pre_write_quota_check')
-   return prepare(p,s,data.get('request') if isinstance(data.get('request'),dict) else {})
-  if op=='reconcile_commit':
-   r=data.get('result') if isinstance(data.get('result'),dict) else {}; return reconcile(p,s,str(r.get('previous_head_oid','')),str(r.get('new_commit_oid','')),str(r.get('operation_id','')))
-  if op=='fail_write':
-   r=data.get('result') if isinstance(data.get('result'),dict) else {}; inflight=s.get('inflight')
-   if isinstance(inflight,dict) and inflight.get('operation_id')==r.get('operation_id'): s['inflight']=None; save_state(s)
-   return {'cleared':True}
-  if op=='authorize_test': return test_authorize(p,s,str(data.get('operation','')))
-  fail('authorization_operation_rejected',403)
- finally:
-  fcntl.flock(f.fileno(),fcntl.LOCK_UN); f.close()
-
-def peer_allowed(conn:socket.socket)->bool:
- try:
-  import struct
-  _pid,uid,gid=struct.unpack('3i',conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET,socket.SO_PEERCRED,12))
-  return uid==pwd.getpwnam('aiman').pw_uid and gid==grp.getgrnam('gitops').gr_gid
- except Exception: return False
-
-def serve()->None:
- SOCKET_DIR.mkdir(parents=True,exist_ok=True); os.chown(SOCKET_DIR,0,grp.getgrnam('gitops').gr_gid); os.chmod(SOCKET_DIR,0o750)
- try: SOCKET_PATH.unlink()
- except FileNotFoundError: pass
- with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX,socket.SOCK_STREAM) as server:
-  server.bind(str(SOCKET_PATH)); os.chown(SOCKET_PATH,0,grp.getgrnam('gitops').gr_gid); os.chmod(SOCKET_PATH,0o660); server.listen(32); server.settimeout(1.0)
-  last=0.0
-  while True:
-   if time.monotonic()-last>30:
-    last=time.monotonic()
-    try:
-     f=lock(); p=parent(); s=state(); task_live(p,s,touch=False); four_way(s['current_head_oid']); ensure_child(p,s,'scheduled_rotation'); fcntl.flock(f.fileno(),fcntl.LOCK_UN); f.close()
-    except ControlError as e:
-     append_audit({'event':'scheduled_check_blocked','error':e.code})
-     if e.code=='authorization_task_terminal': return
-    except Exception: append_audit({'event':'scheduled_check_blocked','error':'authorization_controller_internal_error'})
-   try: conn,_=server.accept()
-   except socket.timeout: continue
-   with conn:
-    if not peer_allowed(conn): conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':False,'status':403,'error':'authorization_peer_rejected'})+b'\n'); continue
-    try:
-     raw=conn.recv(131072); data=json.loads(raw.decode()); result=request(data); conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':True,'result':result})+b'\n')
-    except ControlError as e: conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':False,'status':e.status,'error':e.code,**e.details})+b'\n')
-    except Exception as exc:
-     append_audit({'event':'controller_internal_error','error_type':type(exc).__name__})
-     conn.sendall(canonical({'ok':False,'status':503,'error':'authorization_controller_internal_error'})+b'\n')
-if __name__=='__main__': serve()
@@ -1,567 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Task-bound bridge from the legacy ChatGPT Action to an isolated Writer V2."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import sqlite3
-import socket
-import stat
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.parse
-import urllib.request
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
-from typing import Any
-
-
-CONFIG_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_BINDING"])
-POLICY_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_PATH_POLICY"])
-KNOWN_IDENTITIES_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_KNOWN_IDENTITIES"])
-STATE_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_STATE"])
-AUDIT_PATH = Path(os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_AUDIT"])
-HOST = os.environ.get("AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
-PORT = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_PORT", "19894"))
-EXPECTED_TASK_ID = os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_TASK_ID"]
-EXPECTED_ROUTE_HEADER = os.environ["AIOS_ACTION_ROUTE_HEADER"]
-AUTHORIZATION_SOCKET = Path(os.environ["AIOS_CONTINUOUS_AUTHORIZATION_SOCKET"])
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
-SECRET_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)"
-    r"\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})"
-)
-SECRET_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|"
-    r"-----BEGIN (?:OPENSSH |RSA |EC )?PRIVATE KEY-----)"
-)
-ALLOWED_REQUEST_FIELDS = frozenset({"base","branch","content","create_branch","message","path","task_id","development_authorization_id","actor_identity","audience","approved_base_oid","expected_current_head_oid","operation_id","idempotency_key","exact_path","content_digest","commit_message_digest"})
-
-
-class RouteError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400, **details: Any):
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.status = status
-        self.details = details
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(
-        value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def load_root_managed_json(
-    path: Path, *, expected_mode: int = 0o640
-) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bytes]:
-    info = os.lstat(path)
-    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_config_type_rejected", 503)
-    if info.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & ~expected_mode:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_config_permissions_rejected", 503)
-    raw = path.read_bytes()
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(raw)
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_config_json_rejected", 503) from None
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_config_object_required", 503)
-    return value, raw
-
-
-def load_binding() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    binding, _ = load_root_managed_json(CONFIG_PATH)
-    required = {
-        "schema_version",
-        "task_id",
-        "writer_instance_id",
-        "repository",
-        "branch",
-        "approved_base_oid",
-        "writer_url",
-        "path_policy_sha256",
-        "action_identities",
-    }
-    if set(binding) != required or binding.get("schema_version") != 1:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_binding_schema_rejected", 503)
-    if binding["task_id"] != EXPECTED_TASK_ID:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_task_binding_rejected", 503)
-    if binding["repository"] != "aios/aios":
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_repository_rejected", 503)
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(str(binding["approved_base_oid"])):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_base_oid_rejected", 503)
-    if binding["writer_url"] != "http://127.0.0.1:19893":
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_upstream_rejected", 503)
-    identities = binding.get("action_identities")
-    if not isinstance(identities, list) or len(identities) != 1:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_action_identity_rejected", 503)
-    identity = identities[0]
-    if (
-        not isinstance(identity, dict)
-        or set(identity) != {"account", "token_sha256"}
-        or identity.get("account") != "chatgpt-gitops-bot"
-        or not re.fullmatch(
-            r"[0-9a-f]{64}", str(identity.get("token_sha256", ""))
-        )
-    ):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_action_identity_rejected", 503)
-    return binding
-
-
-def allowed_path_scope(binding: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[set[str], tuple[str, ...]]:
-    policy, raw = load_root_managed_json(POLICY_PATH)
-    actual = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-    if actual != binding["path_policy_sha256"]:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_digest_mismatch", 503)
-    if policy.get("allowed_branch") != binding["branch"]:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_branch_mismatch", 503)
-    operation = (policy.get("allowed_operations") or {}).get("commit_file.atomic")
-    paths = operation.get("exact_paths") if isinstance(operation, dict) else None
-    prefixes = operation.get("prefix_paths") if isinstance(operation, dict) else None
-    if not isinstance(paths, list) or not paths or not all(
-        isinstance(x, str) for x in paths
-    ):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
-    if not isinstance(prefixes, list) or not prefixes or not all(
-        isinstance(x, str) and x.endswith("/") for x in prefixes
-    ):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
-    if any(not valid_relative_path(x[:-1]) for x in prefixes):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
-    if any(not valid_relative_path(x) for x in paths):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_path_policy_rejected", 503)
-    return set(paths), tuple(prefixes)
-
-
-def valid_relative_path(path: str) -> bool:
-    if not isinstance(path, str) or not path or path != path.strip():
-        return False
-    if "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
-        return False
-    try:
-        decoded = urllib.parse.unquote(path, errors="strict")
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
-        return False
-    if decoded != path:
-        return False
-    posix = PurePosixPath(path)
-    windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
-    return not (
-        posix.is_absolute()
-        or windows.is_absolute()
-        or bool(windows.drive)
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in path.split("/"))
-    )
-
-
-def path_allowed(binding: dict[str, Any], path: str) -> bool:
-    if not valid_relative_path(path):
-        return False
-    exact_paths, prefixes = allowed_path_scope(binding)
-    return path in exact_paths or any(path.startswith(prefix) for prefix in prefixes)
-
-
-def bearer(headers: Any) -> str:
-    value = headers.get("Authorization", "")
-    if not value.startswith("Bearer "):
-        raise RouteError("unauthorized", 401)
-    token = value[7:].strip()
-    if not token:
-        raise RouteError("unauthorized", 401)
-    return token
-
-
-def authorize_action(headers: Any, binding: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(bearer(headers).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-    identity = binding["action_identities"][0]
-    if not hmac.compare_digest(identity["token_sha256"], digest):
-        known, _ = load_root_managed_json(KNOWN_IDENTITIES_PATH)
-        identities = known.get("identities")
-        if known.get("schema_version") != 1 or not isinstance(identities, list):
-            raise RouteError("writer_route_identity_catalog_rejected", 503)
-        observed = "unregistered"
-        allowed_accounts = {
-            "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
-            "gitops-write-bot",
-            "codex-gitops-bot",
-        }
-        for candidate in identities:
-            if not isinstance(candidate, dict) or set(candidate) != {
-                "account",
-                "token_sha256",
-            }:
-                raise RouteError("writer_route_identity_catalog_rejected", 503)
-            account = str(candidate.get("account", ""))
-            token_sha256 = str(candidate.get("token_sha256", ""))
-            if account not in allowed_accounts or not re.fullmatch(
-                r"[0-9a-f]{64}", token_sha256
-            ):
-                raise RouteError("writer_route_identity_catalog_rejected", 503)
-            if hmac.compare_digest(token_sha256, digest):
-                observed = account
-        raise RouteError(
-            "writer_route_action_identity_rejected",
-            403,
-            accepted_action_identity=str(identity["account"]),
-            observed_action_identity=observed,
-            identity_alias_accepted=False,
-        )
-    return str(identity["account"])
-
-
-def authorization_call(operation: str, **payload: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = {"op": operation, **payload}
-    try:
-        with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as client:
-            client.settimeout(15)
-            client.connect(str(AUTHORIZATION_SOCKET))
-            client.sendall(canonical_json(request))
-            raw = client.recv(131072)
-        response = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (OSError, TimeoutError, UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        raise RouteError("authorization_controller_unavailable", 503) from None
-    if not isinstance(response, dict) or not response.get("ok"):
-        if not isinstance(response, dict):
-            raise RouteError("authorization_controller_response_rejected", 503)
-        details = {k: v for k, v in response.items() if k not in {"ok", "status", "error"}}
-        raise RouteError(str(response.get("error") or "authorization_controller_rejected"), int(response.get("status") or 503), **details)
-    result = response.get("result")
-    if not isinstance(result, dict):
-        raise RouteError("authorization_controller_response_rejected", 503)
-    return result
-
-
-def writer_token() -> str:
-    value = authorization_call("get_writer_token").get("token")
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_credential_rejected", 503)
-    return value
-
-
-def writer_call(
-    binding: dict[str, Any],
-    method: str,
-    path: str,
-    payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-    data = canonical_json(payload) if payload is not None else None
-    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + writer_token()}
-    if data is not None:
-        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-    request = urllib.request.Request(
-        binding["writer_url"] + path, data=data, method=method, headers=headers
-    )
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=90) as response:
-            body = json.loads(response.read())
-            return response.status, body
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        try:
-            body = json.loads(exc.read())
-        except Exception:
-            body = {"error": "writer_route_upstream_non_json_error"}
-        return exc.code, body
-    except (OSError, TimeoutError):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_upstream_unavailable", 503) from None
-
-
-def validate_request(data: Any, binding: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if not isinstance(data, dict):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_object_required")
-    if not {"branch", "path", "content"}.issubset(data):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_incomplete")
-    if not set(data).issubset(ALLOWED_REQUEST_FIELDS):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_fields_rejected")
-    if data["branch"] != binding["branch"]:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    if data.get("create_branch") not in (None, False):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    if data.get("base", "main") not in {"main", binding["approved_base_oid"]}:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    path = data["path"]
-    if not isinstance(path, str) or not path_allowed(binding, path):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    content = data["content"]
-    if not isinstance(content, str) or "\x00" in content or "\r" in content:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_content_rejected")
-    if len(content.encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_content_too_large", 413)
-    if SECRET_RE.search(content) or SECRET_VALUE_RE.search(content):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_secret_content_rejected", 403)
-    message = data.get("message") or f"chore(chatgpt): update {path}"
-    if not isinstance(message, str) or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200 or "\x00" in message or "\n" in message or "\r" in message:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_message_rejected")
-    return {"branch": binding["branch"], "path": path, "content": content, "message": message}
-
-
-def complete_request(data: dict[str, Any], normalized: dict[str, Any], binding: dict[str, Any], account: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    authorization = authorization_call("describe_authorization")
-    expected = {
-        "task_id": binding["task_id"],
-        "development_authorization_id": authorization.get("development_authorization_id"),
-        "actor_identity": account,
-        "audience": authorization.get("audience"),
-        "branch": binding["branch"],
-        "approved_base_oid": binding["approved_base_oid"],
-    }
-    required = {
-        "task_id": EXPECTED_TASK_ID,
-        "development_authorization_id": "authz-aios-autonomous-release-20260726",
-        "actor_identity": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
-        "audience": "chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer",
-        "branch": binding["branch"],
-        "approved_base_oid": binding["approved_base_oid"],
-    }
-    if expected != required or authorization.get("authorization_status") != "ACTIVE" or authorization.get("current_head_oid") is None:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    for key, value in required.items():
-        if key in data and data[key] != value:
-            raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    if "exact_path" in data and data["exact_path"] != normalized["path"]:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    current_head = str(authorization["current_head_oid"])
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(current_head):
-        raise RouteError("authorization_current_head_rejected", 503)
-    if "expected_current_head_oid" in data and data["expected_current_head_oid"] != current_head:
-        raise RouteError("BRANCH_HEAD_CHANGED", 409, current_head_oid=current_head)
-    content_digest = hashlib.sha256(normalized["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-    message_digest = hashlib.sha256(normalized["message"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-    if "content_digest" in data and data["content_digest"] != content_digest:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    if "commit_message_digest" in data and data["commit_message_digest"] != message_digest:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    seed = {**required, "expected_current_head_oid": current_head, "path": normalized["path"], "content_digest": content_digest, "commit_message_digest": message_digest}
-    request_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(seed)).hexdigest()
-    idempotency_key = "action-" + request_digest
-    operation_id = hashlib.sha256((EXPECTED_TASK_ID + "\0" + idempotency_key).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-    if "idempotency_key" in data and data["idempotency_key"] != idempotency_key:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    if "operation_id" in data and data["operation_id"] != operation_id:
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_request_binding_failed", 403)
-    return {**normalized, **required, "expected_current_head_oid": current_head, "operation_id": operation_id, "idempotency_key": idempotency_key, "exact_path": normalized["path"], "content_digest": content_digest, "commit_message_digest": message_digest, "request_digest": request_digest}
-
-
-def current_writer_head(binding: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    status, body = writer_call(binding, "GET", "/api/runtime-status")
-    if status != 200:
-        raise RouteError(
-            "writer_route_runtime_status_failed", 503, upstream_status=status
-        )
-    required = {
-        "service": "chatgpt-autonomous-release-writer",
-        "writes_enabled": True,
-        "allowed_branch": binding["branch"],
-        "approved_base_oid": binding["approved_base_oid"],
-        "path_policy_sha256": binding["path_policy_sha256"],
-    }
-    if any(body.get(key) != value for key, value in required.items()):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_runtime_binding_mismatch", 503)
-    head = str(body.get("workspace_head_oid", ""))
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(head):
-        raise RouteError("writer_route_runtime_head_rejected", 503)
-    return head
-
-
-def operation_binding(
-    request_digest: str, binding: dict[str, Any]
-) -> tuple[str, str]:
-    STATE_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    with sqlite3.connect(STATE_PATH, timeout=30, isolation_level=None) as db:
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        db.execute(
-            """
-            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS action_operations (
-                request_digest TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                expected_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
-                idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-            )
-            """
-        )
-        row = db.execute(
-            "SELECT expected_head_oid,idempotency_key FROM action_operations "
-            "WHERE request_digest=?",
-            (request_digest,),
-        ).fetchone()
-        if row:
-            return str(row[0]), str(row[1])
-    head = current_writer_head(binding)
-    key = "action-" + request_digest
-    with sqlite3.connect(STATE_PATH, timeout=30, isolation_level=None) as db:
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-        db.execute(
-            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO action_operations"
-            "(request_digest,expected_head_oid,idempotency_key,created_at) "
-            "VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
-            (request_digest, head, key, utc_now()),
-        )
-        row = db.execute(
-            "SELECT expected_head_oid,idempotency_key FROM action_operations "
-            "WHERE request_digest=?",
-            (request_digest,),
-        ).fetchone()
-        db.execute("COMMIT")
-    return str(row[0]), str(row[1])
-
-
-def append_audit(event: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
-    AUDIT_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
-    fd = os.open(AUDIT_PATH, flags, 0o600)
-    try:
-        os.write(fd, canonical_json(event) + b"\n")
-        os.fsync(fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-
-
-class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    server_version = "AIOSActionTaskRouter/1"
-
-    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: Any) -> None:
-        return
-
-    def send_json(self, status: int, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
-        body = json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
-        self.send_response(status)
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
-        self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(body)
-
-    def do_GET(self) -> None:
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        if path != "/health":
-            return self.send_json(404, {"error": "not_found"})
-        try:
-            binding = load_binding()
-            self.send_json(
-                200,
-                {
-                    "status": "ok",
-                    "service": "aios-action-task-router",
-                    "task_id": binding["task_id"],
-                    "writer_instance_id": binding["writer_instance_id"],
-                    "branch": binding["branch"],
-                },
-            )
-        except RouteError as exc:
-            self.send_json(exc.status, {"error": exc.code, **exc.details})
-
-    def do_POST(self) -> None:
-        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-        if path != "/api/file":
-            return self.send_json(404, {"error": "not_found"})
-        if self.client_address[0] not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1"}:
-            return self.send_json(403, {"error": "writer_route_source_rejected"})
-        if self.headers.get("X-AIOS-Route-Task") != EXPECTED_ROUTE_HEADER:
-            return self.send_json(403, {"error": "writer_route_header_rejected"})
-        try:
-            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-            if not 0 < length <= 1_100_000:
-                raise RouteError("writer_route_content_length_rejected", 413)
-            try:
-                data = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
-            except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-                raise RouteError("writer_route_request_json_rejected") from None
-            binding = load_binding()
-            account = authorize_action(self.headers, binding)
-            normalized = validate_request(data, binding)
-            normalized = complete_request(data, normalized, binding, account)
-            prepared = authorization_call("prepare_write", request={key: normalized[key] for key in ("expected_current_head_oid", "operation_id", "idempotency_key", "exact_path", "content_digest", "commit_message_digest", "branch", "path", "message")})
-            expected_head = str(prepared["expected_head_oid"])
-            writer_payload = {"branch": normalized["branch"], "path": normalized["path"], "content": normalized["content"], "message": normalized["message"], "expected_head_oid": expected_head, "idempotency_key": str(prepared["idempotency_key"])}
-            request_digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json({"task_id": binding["task_id"], "operation_id": normalized["operation_id"], "idempotency_key": normalized["idempotency_key"], "content_digest": normalized["content_digest"], "commit_message_digest": normalized["commit_message_digest"]})).hexdigest()
-            status, result = writer_call(
-                binding, "POST", "/api/commit-file", writer_payload
-            )
-            audit = {
-                "at": utc_now(),
-                "task_id": binding["task_id"],
-                "writer_instance_id": binding["writer_instance_id"],
-                "account": account,
-                "branch": normalized["branch"],
-                "path": normalized["path"],
-                "request_digest": request_digest,
-                "expected_head_oid": expected_head,
-                "status": status,
-                "operation_id": result.get("operation_id"),
-                "commit_oid": result.get("commit_oid"),
-                "error": result.get("error"),
-                "secrets_included": False,
-            }
-            append_audit(audit)
-            if status != 200:
-                try:
-                    authorization_call("fail_write", result={"operation_id": normalized["operation_id"]})
-                except RouteError:
-                    pass
-                return self.send_json(status, result)
-            advanced = authorization_call("reconcile_commit", result={"previous_head_oid": expected_head, "new_commit_oid": result.get("commit_oid"), "operation_id": result.get("operation_id")})
-            return self.send_json(
-                200,
-                {
-                    "status": "committed",
-                    "branch": normalized["branch"],
-                    "path": normalized["path"],
-                    "commit": {
-                        "status": "committed",
-                        "branch": normalized["branch"],
-                        "rev": result.get("commit_oid"),
-                        "previous_head_oid": expected_head,
-                        "new_tree_oid": result.get("new_tree_oid"),
-                        "push_status": result.get("push_status"),
-                        "four_way_ref_status": advanced.get("four_way_ref_status") is True,
-                        "sync": {"status": "verified", "target": "bare+git-ls-remote+gitea-api"},
-                    },
-                    "writer_instance_id": binding["writer_instance_id"],
-                    "operation_id": result.get("operation_id"),
-                    "idempotent": result.get("idempotent"),
-                    "secrets_included": False,
-                },
-            )
-        except RouteError as exc:
-            if exc.code == "writer_route_action_identity_rejected":
-                try:
-                    append_audit(
-                        {
-                            "at": utc_now(),
-                            "task_id": EXPECTED_TASK_ID,
-                            "event": "action_identity_rejected",
-                            "accepted_action_identity": exc.details.get(
-                                "accepted_action_identity"
-                            ),
-                            "observed_action_identity": exc.details.get(
-                                "observed_action_identity"
-                            ),
-                            "identity_alias_accepted": False,
-                            "secrets_included": False,
-                        }
-                    )
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-            self.send_json(exc.status, {"error": exc.code, **exc.details})
-        except Exception:
-            self.send_json(500, {"error": "writer_route_internal_error"})
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    load_binding()
-    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler)
-    server.serve_forever()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -5,81 +5,28 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any

-try:
-    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
-except ModuleNotFoundError:
-    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
-    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
-
-from gitea_tag_publication import (
-    GiteaTagClient,
-    GitTagBackend,
-    PublicationConflict,
-    PublicationPending,
-    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
-    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
-    PublicationRequest,
-    TagPublisher,
-    redact,
-    validate_version,
-)
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
 from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
-from silent_release_hardening import (
-    ApprovalKeyRing,
-    ApprovalRevocationStore,
-    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
-    SagaConflict,
-    SignedApprovalVerifier,
-    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
-    SilentReleaseActionService,
-)
-try:
-    from authoritative_git import (
-        AuthoritativeGitError,
-        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
-        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
-        authoritative_branches,
-        authoritative_diff,
-        authoritative_commit,
-        authoritative_tags,
-        repository_snapshot,
-        run_authoritative_git,
-    )
-except ModuleNotFoundError:
-    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
-    from authoritative_git import (
-        AuthoritativeGitError,
-        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
-        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
-        authoritative_branches,
-        authoritative_diff,
-        authoritative_commit,
-        authoritative_tags,
-        repository_snapshot,
-        run_authoritative_git,
-    )

 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
+sys.path.insert(0, str(WS))
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.action_bridge import (
+    CallbackBridgeError,
+    submit_orchestration_decision,
+)
+
 SECRETS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_SECRETS_DIR', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'secrets')))
 TOKEN_FILE = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_FILE', str(SECRETS / 'gitops.tokens')))
 HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
+ORCHESTRATOR_OPENAPI = WS / 'workspace-agent' / 'orchestrator-decision-action.openapi.yaml'
+ORCHESTRATOR_CONTRACT_COMMIT = os.getenv('AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CONTRACT_COMMIT', '')
+ORCHESTRATOR_CALLBACK_SECRET_REF = os.getenv('AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_CALLBACK_SECRET_REF', '')
+_resolver = os.getenv('AIOS_ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_REF_RESOLVER', '')
+ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_REF_RESOLVER = Path(_resolver) if _resolver else None
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
-AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
-REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
-SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
-    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
-    '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
-))
-SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
-    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
-)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
-SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
-    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
-    '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
-))
 monitor = ActionMonitor()

 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -88,43 +35,7 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
  {'id':'base.gpt-5.5','provider':'openai','model':'gpt-5.5','display_name':'GPT-5.5','scope':'global'},
 ]
 SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
-SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(
-    r'(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])'
-    r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})'
-)
-
-READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
-    '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
-    '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
-    '/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
-    '/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
-    '/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
-    '/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
-    '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
-    '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
-    '/api/release-acceptance',
-    '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getReleasePlan', '/getReleaseAcceptance',
-    '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga', '/getCapabilityStatus',
-    '/getRecoveryStatus',
-})
-SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
-    '/createReleaseCandidate',
-    '/createReleaseIntent',
-    '/submitSignedApproval',
-    '/submitOwnerApproval',
-    '/startDeployment',
-})
-
-def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
-    if method == 'GET':
-        return False
-    if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
-        return False
-    decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
-    if decision.allowed:
-        return False
-    handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
-    return True
+SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')

 def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
 def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
@@ -136,41 +47,6 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
 def jload(p: Path, default):
    try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
    except Exception: return default
-
-def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
-    digest=hashlib.sha256()
-    with path.open('rb') as source:
-        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
-            digest.update(chunk)
-    return digest.hexdigest()
-
-def _build_silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
-    verifier=None
-    if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
-        verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
-            ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
-            ApprovalRevocationStore(
-                SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
-            ),
-        )
-    policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
-    policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
-    return SilentReleaseActionService(
-        SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
-        execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
-        approval_verifier=verifier,
-        expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-        policy_sha256=policy_sha,
-    )
-
-# Construct once during service startup. If production execution is enabled
-# without every trusted builder/orchestrator dependency, construction fails
-# closed before the HTTP server accepts traffic.
-_SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE = _build_silent_release_service()
-
-
-def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
-    return _SILENT_RELEASE_SERVICE
 def relpath(path: str) -> str:
    x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
    if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -244,13 +120,9 @@ def ensure_git():
    if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
 def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
    ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
-    exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
-    if exists:
-        sh(['checkout',b], True)
-    elif create:
-        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
-    else:
-        raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
+    if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
+        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
+    else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
    return b
 def write_file(path, content):
    if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -260,19 +132,6 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
    if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
        return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
    if BARE_REPO.exists():
-        common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
-        if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
-            head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
-            stored = subprocess.run(
-                ['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
-                text=True, capture_output=True,
-            )
-            if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
-                raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
-            return {
-                'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
-                'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
-            }
        ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -282,68 +141,15 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}

 def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
-    raise RuntimeError(
-        'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
-        'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
-    )
-
-def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
-    oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
-    if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
-        raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
-    try:
-        return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
-    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
-        raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
-
-def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
-    if not re.fullmatch(r'V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', str(tag or '')):
-        raise ValueError('invalid release version')
-    try:
-        result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
-            check=False,
-            git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-        )
-    except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
-    return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
-
-def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
-    required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
-    missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
-    if missing:
-        raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
-    return PublicationRequest(
-        (q['version'])[0],
-        (q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
-        (q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
-        (q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
-    )
-
-def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
-    snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-        git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-        repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-    )
-    if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
-        raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
-    return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
-
-
-def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
-    authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
-    return TagPublisher(
-        WS,
-        GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
-        GiteaTagClient(
-            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
-            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
-            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
-            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
-        ),
-        os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
-    )
+    if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
+    if BARE_REPO.exists():
+        ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
+        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
+        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
+        return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
+    p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
+    if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
+    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}

 def commit(paths, msg):
    ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -363,16 +169,6 @@ def patches():
    for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
    return out

-def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
-        data = jload(candidate, {})
-        if data.get('target_commit'):
-            return {
-                'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
-                'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
-            }
-    return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
-
 class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
    def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -394,236 +190,46 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
        return a
    def do_GET(self):
-        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
-        if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
        try:
            if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
            if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
+            if path == '/api/orchestrator-decision.openapi.yaml':
+                return self.sendt(ORCHESTRATOR_OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if ORCHESTRATOR_OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
            if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
            if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
-                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
-                data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                ))
-                return self.sendj(data)
+                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
            if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                )
-                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
-                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
-                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                try:
-                    tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
-                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': str(exc),
-                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
-                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
-                return self.sendj({
-                    'registry_versions': registry,
-                    'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
-                    'repository_available': True,
-                    'query_error': None,
-                    'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
-                    'versions_dir': registry,
-                    'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
-                    'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
-                })
+                return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
            if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
-                frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
-                to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
-                try:
-                    diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
-                except ValueError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
-                except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
-                except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
-                except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
-                return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':diff})
-            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
-                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                )
-                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
-                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
-                        'authoritative_branches': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                try:
-                    branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
-                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-                    return self.sendj({
-                        'repository_available': False,
-                        'query_error': str(exc),
-                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
-                        'authoritative_branches': [],
-                    }, 503)
-                metadata = patches()
-                branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
-                metadata_names = {
-                    item.get('branch') for item in metadata
-                    if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
-                }
-                orphan = [
-                    item for item in metadata
-                    if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
-                ]
-                missing = [
-                    item for item in branches
-                    if item['name'] not in metadata_names
-                ]
-                return self.sendj({
-                    'metadata_patches': metadata,
-                    'authoritative_branches': branches,
-                    'orphan_metadata': orphan,
-                    'branches_without_metadata': missing,
-                    'repository_available': True,
-                    'query_error': None,
-                    'patches': metadata,
-                    'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
-                })
+                frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
+            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
            if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
            if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
                svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
-                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
-                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
-                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
-                )
-                workspace_branch = None
-                if (WS / '.git').exists():
-                    result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
-                    workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
-                payload = {
-                    'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
-                    'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
-                    'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
-                    **runtime_release_info(),
-                    **snapshot,
-                    'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
-                }
-                return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
+                return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
            if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
                latest=monitor.latest()
                ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
                return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
-            if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
-                version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
-                try:
-                    version=validate_version(version)
-                    status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
-                except ValueError:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
-                return self.sendj(status)
-            if path == '/api/release-consistency':
-                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
-                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
-            if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
-                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
-                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
-            if path in (
-                '/getReleaseCandidate',
-                '/getReleasePlan',
-                '/getReleaseAcceptance',
-                '/getApprovalEnvelope',
-                '/getReleaseSaga',
-                '/getCapabilityStatus',
-            ):
-                candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
-                if not candidate_id:
-                    return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
-                service=silent_release_service()
-                if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
-                    return self.sendj(
-                        service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
-                    )
-                if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
-                    return self.sendj(
-                        service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
-                    )
-                if path == '/getReleasePlan':
-                    return self.sendj(service.get_release_plan(candidate_id))
-                if path == '/getReleaseAcceptance':
-                    return self.sendj(service.get_acceptance(candidate_id))
-                if path == '/getCapabilityStatus':
-                    return self.sendj(
-                        service.get_capability_status(candidate_id)
-                    )
-                return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
-            if path == '/getRecoveryStatus':
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().get_recovery_status()
-                )
                        # Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
            if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
                return self.ai_evolution_page()
            if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
                return self.ai_evolution_data()
            return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
-        except ValueError as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
        except Exception as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
    def do_PUT(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
-        data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
        if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
    def do_POST(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
-        data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
        try:
-            if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
-                a=self.need('release:candidate')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
-                )
-            if path == '/createReleaseIntent':
-                a=self.need('release:candidate')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().create_release_intent(data)
-                )
-            if path in ('/submitOwnerApproval','/submitSignedApproval'):
-                a=self.need('release:approve')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
-                )
-            if path == '/startDeployment':
-                a=self.need('release:deploy')
-                if not a: return
-                return self.sendj(
-                    silent_release_service().start_deployment(
-                        str(data.get('candidate_id') or '')
-                    )
-                )
+            if path == '/v1/orchestrator/decisions': return self.orchestration_decision(data)
            if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
            if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
            if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -634,30 +240,28 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
            if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
            if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
            return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
-        except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
-        except SagaConflict as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
        except Exception as e:
-            error=redact(e)
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
-    def do_PATCH(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
-        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
-    def do_DELETE(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
-        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
-        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+    def orchestration_decision(self,data):
+        a=self.need('orchestrator:decision')
+        if not a: return
+        if not ORCHESTRATOR_CONTRACT_COMMIT or ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_REF_RESOLVER is None:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'CALLBACK_CONFIGURATION_UNAVAILABLE'},503)
+        try:
+            result=submit_orchestration_decision(
+                data,
+                contract_commit=ORCHESTRATOR_CONTRACT_COMMIT,
+                secret_ref=ORCHESTRATOR_CALLBACK_SECRET_REF,
+                resolver=ORCHESTRATOR_SECRET_REF_RESOLVER,
+            )
+        except CallbackBridgeError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':exc.category},exc.status_code)
+        except Exception:
+            # The outer request handler records exception strings. Keep this
+            # secret-bearing boundary metadata-only even for unexpected faults.
+            return self.sendj({'error':'CALLBACK_INTERNAL_ERROR'},500)
+        return self.sendj(result,202)
    def branch(self,data):
        a=self.need('branch:create');
        if not a: return
@@ -681,41 +285,12 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        if not a: return
        ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
        if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-        if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
-            return self.sendj({
-                'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
-                'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
-            },400)
-        try:
-            target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
-            evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
+        if data.get('confirm') != True:
+            self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
+            return
        if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
-            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
-        request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
-        main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
-        publisher=publication_publisher()
-        try:
-            publication=publisher.publish(request)
-        except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
-        except PublicationConflict as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
-        except PublicationPending as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
-        except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
-            audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
-            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
-        main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
-        if main_after != main_before:
-            raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
-        result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
-        audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
-        self.sendj(result)
+            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
+        out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
    def rollback(self,data):
        a=self.need('rollback:request');
        if not a: return
@@ -810,10 +385,7 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
        cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
        bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
        current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
-        try:
-            tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
-        except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
-            return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
+        tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
        versions=[]
        if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
            for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -851,7 +423,7 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer


 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','orchestrator_openapi':'/api/orchestrator-decision.openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /v1/orchestrator/decisions','POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'orchestrator_decision_scope':'orchestrator:decision','orchestrator_callback_credential':'secret_ref_only','direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}

 def main():
    print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Mapping
-
-_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GitWriteDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    status_code: int
-    error: str
-    reason: str
-    workspace: str
-
-    def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return {
-            "status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
-            "error": self.error,
-            "reason": self.reason,
-            "workspace": self.workspace,
-        }
-
-
-def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
-    return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
-
-
-def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
-    values = os.environ if env is None else env
-    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
-    canonical = _real(lexical)
-    shown = str(lexical)
-    if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
-    if lexical != canonical:
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
-    controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
-    role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
-    if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
-    writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
-    try:
-        canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
-    except ValueError:
-        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
-    return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-"""Task-scoped hardened wrapper around the existing Action API."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import subprocess
-from pathlib import Path
-import urllib.parse
-
-import aios_chatgpt_actions_api as api
-import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
-from isolated_writer_authz import AuthorizationError, authorize
-from isolated_writer_commit_file import AtomicCommitFile, CommitFileError, OperationLedger
-from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
-
-_reject = api.reject_non_read_http
-_write_file = api.write_file
-_sync_branch = api.sync_branch
-_original_do_get = api.H.do_GET
-api.OPENAPI = Path(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_OPENAPI", str(api.OPENAPI)))
-
-
-def _registry() -> TokenRegistry:
-    return TokenRegistry(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2"]))
-
-
-def _atomic_writer() -> AtomicCommitFile:
-    return AtomicCommitFile(
-        workspace=api.WS,
-        bare_repo=api.BARE_REPO,
-        ledger=OperationLedger(Path(os.environ["AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER"])),
-        remote=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", ""),
-        audit=policy.append_audit_record,
-    )
-
-
-def _bearer(handler) -> str:
-    value = handler.headers.get("Authorization", "")
-    return value[7:].strip() if value.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
-
-
-def _authorize(handler, *, method: str, path: str, branch=None, target_path=None):
-    grant = authorize(
-        _registry(),
-        _bearer(handler),
-        method=method,
-        path=path,
-        source_ip=str(handler.client_address[0]),
-        workspace=api.WS,
-        branch=branch,
-        target_path=target_path,
-    )
-    grant.record["_source_ip"] = str(handler.client_address[0])
-    return grant
-
-
-def _authorization_error(handler, exc: AuthorizationError):
-    return handler.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
-
-
-def _isolated_runtime_status(handler):
-    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    return handler.sendj({
-        "service": os.getenv(
-            "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
-            "aios-isolated-writer.service",
-        ),
-        "status": "active",
-        "runtime_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE"),
-        "workspace_role": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE"),
-        "writes_enabled": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").lower()
-        in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"},
-        "allowed_branch": policy.allowed_branch(),
-        "approved_base_oid": policy.allowed_base_oid(),
-        "workspace_branch": branch,
-        "workspace_head_oid": head,
-        "repository_identity": os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY"),
-        "token_policy_version": 2,
-        "atomic_commit_file": True,
-        "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
-    })
-
-
-def _isolated_do_get(self):
-    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-    if path in {"/health", "/api/health"}:
-        return self.sendj({
-            "status": "ok",
-            "service": os.getenv(
-                "AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE",
-                "aios-isolated-writer.service",
-            ),
-        })
-    if path not in {"/api/runtime-status", "/api/baseline", "/api/patches"}:
-        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
-    try:
-        _authorize(self, method="GET", path=path)
-    except AuthorizationError as exc:
-        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
-    if path == "/api/runtime-status":
-        return _isolated_runtime_status(self)
-    return _original_do_get(self)
-
-
-def _read_commit_file_body(handler):
-    try:
-        length = int(handler.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-    except ValueError:
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_content_length_rejected") from None
-    if length <= 0:
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
-    if length > 1_100_000:
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_too_large", 413)
-    raw = handler.rfile.read(length)
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_json_rejected") from None
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
-    return value
-
-
-def _isolated_do_post(self):
-    path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
-    if path != "/api/commit-file":
-        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_operation_forbidden"}, 403)
-    try:
-        data = _read_commit_file_body(self)
-        branch = str(data.get("branch") or "")
-        target_path = str(data.get("path") or "")
-        grant = _authorize(
-            self,
-            method="POST",
-            path=path,
-            branch=branch,
-            target_path=target_path,
-        )
-        if api.content_has_secret(str(data.get("content") or "")):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_secret_content_rejected", 403)
-        result = _atomic_writer().execute(grant, data)
-        return self.sendj(result)
-    except AuthorizationError as exc:
-        return _authorization_error(self, exc)
-    except CommitFileError as exc:
-        return self.sendj({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
-    except PermissionError:
-        return self.sendj({"error": "isolated_writer_policy_rejected"}, 403)
-
-
-def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
-    if _reject(handler, method, path):
-        return True
-    try:
-        policy.validate_endpoint(method, path, api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
-        return False
-    except PermissionError as exc:
-        handler.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
-        return True
-
-
-def checkout(branch, base="main", create=False):
-    api.ensure_git()
-    target = api.branch_name(branch)
-    policy.validate_branch_request({"branch": target, "base": base})
-    exists = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--verify", target])["code"] == 0
-    if exists:
-        if api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"] != target:
-            api.sh(["checkout", target], True)
-    elif create:
-        api.sh(["checkout", "-b", target, base], True)
-    else:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_missing")
-    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
-    return target
-
-
-def write_file(path, content):
-    policy.validate_path(path, api.WS)
-    return _write_file(path, content)
-
-
-def sync_branch(branch: str):
-    policy.validate_sync_branch(branch)
-    local = _sync_branch(branch)
-    remote = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_PUSH_REMOTE", "").strip()
-    if remote != "gitea-http":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_gitea_remote_rejected")
-    head = api.sh(["rev-parse", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    pushed = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "push", "--porcelain", remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}"],
-        cwd=api.WS,
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-    )
-    if pushed.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_push_failed")
-    verified = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
-        cwd=api.WS,
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-    )
-    if verified.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_verification_failed")
-    fields = verified.stdout.strip().split()
-    if len(fields) != 2 or fields[0] != head or fields[1] != f"refs/heads/{branch}":
-        raise RuntimeError("isolated_writer_gitea_oid_mismatch")
-    return {
-        "status": "verified",
-        "target": "authoritative-bare+gitea",
-        "branch": branch,
-        "oid": head,
-        "local": local.get("status"),
-    }
-
-
-def commit(paths, msg):
-    policy.validate_commit_paths(paths, api.WS)
-    api.ensure_git()
-    selected = [api.relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ["."]
-    api.sh(["add", *selected], True)
-    policy.validate_staged_paths(api.WS)
-    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    if not api.sh(["status", "--short"])["stdout"]:
-        return {"status": "no_changes", "branch": branch, "sync": sync_branch(branch)}
-    out = api.sh(["commit", "-m", msg], True)
-    branch = api.sh(["rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"]
-    return {
-        "status": "committed",
-        "branch": branch,
-        "rev": api.sh(["rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], True)["stdout"],
-        "git": out,
-        "sync": sync_branch(branch),
-    }
-
-
-def audit(actor, action, target, payload):
-    policy.append_audit_record(
-        {
-            "at": api.now(),
-            "actor": actor,
-            "action": action,
-            "target": target,
-            "payload": api.sanitize(payload),
-        }
-    )
-
-
-def _validate_request(self, data, validate):
-    try:
-        validate(data)
-        return True
-    except PermissionError as exc:
-        self.sendj({"error": str(exc)}, 403)
-        return False
-
-
-def _checked_branch(self, data):
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    return _branch(self, data)
-
-
-def _checked_file(self, data):
-    data = dict(data)
-    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    if not _validate_request(
-        self,
-        {"path": data.get("path", "")},
-        lambda item: policy.validate_path(item["path"], api.WS),
-    ):
-        return
-    return _file(self, data)
-
-
-def _checked_commit(self, data):
-    data = dict(data)
-    data.setdefault("branch", policy.allowed_branch())
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    return _commit(self, data)
-
-
-def _checked_patch(self, data):
-    data = dict(data)
-    data["branch"] = policy.allowed_branch()
-    if not _validate_request(self, data, policy.validate_branch_request):
-        return
-    return _patch(self, data)
-
-
-_branch, _file, _commit, _patch = api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch
-api.reject_non_read_http = reject_non_read_http
-api.checkout, api.write_file, api.sync_branch, api.commit, api.audit = (
-    checkout,
-    write_file,
-    sync_branch,
-    commit,
-    audit,
-)
-api.H.branch, api.H.file, api.H.commit, api.H.patch = (
-    _checked_branch,
-    _checked_file,
-    _checked_commit,
-    _checked_patch,
-)
-api.H.do_GET = _isolated_do_get
-api.H.do_POST = _isolated_do_post
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    policy.require_service_invariants(api.WS, api.BARE_REPO)
-    api.ThreadingHTTPServer((api.HOST, api.PORT), api.H).serve_forever()
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-"""Task-bound Integration Refresh control-plane primitives."""
-
-from .integration_merge_writer import IntegrationMergeWriter, MergeError, MergeRequest
-from .integration_refresh import (
-    AppendOnlyAudit,
-    Binding,
-    GiteaBranchReadProjection,
-    GrantStore,
-    IntegrationRefreshProvisioner,
-    ProvisioningError,
-)
-
-__all__ = [
-    "AppendOnlyAudit",
-    "Binding",
-    "GiteaBranchReadProjection",
-    "GrantStore",
-    "IntegrationMergeWriter",
-    "IntegrationRefreshProvisioner",
-    "MergeError",
-    "MergeRequest",
-    "ProvisioningError",
-]
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-"""Constrained integration-only merge writer with rollback and reconciliation states."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import subprocess
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-
-
-class MergeError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409):
-        super().__init__(code); self.code, self.status = code, status
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class MergeRequest:
-    integration_branch: str
-    source_branch: str
-    approved_source_oid: str
-
-
-class IntegrationMergeWriter:
-    def __init__(self, workspace: Path | str, remote: str, projection):
-        self.workspace, self.remote, self.projection = Path(workspace), remote, projection
-
-    def _git(self, *args: str, check=True) -> str:
-        p = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
-        if check and p.returncode:
-            raise MergeError("git_operation_failed", 500)
-        return p.stdout.strip()
-
-    def merge(self, request: MergeRequest) -> dict:
-        def bad(value: str) -> bool:
-            return (
-                value == "main"
-                or value.startswith("main/")
-                or value == "governance"
-                or value.startswith("governance/")
-                or value == "approvals"
-                or value.startswith("refs/")
-                or value.startswith("tags/")
-            )
-        if (bad(request.integration_branch) or bad(request.source_branch) or
-                not request.integration_branch.startswith("integration/") or
-                re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", request.approved_source_oid) is None):
-            raise MergeError("integration_merge_scope_rejected", 403)
-        for branch in (request.integration_branch, request.source_branch):
-            if subprocess.run(["git", "check-ref-format", "--branch", branch], cwd=self.workspace,
-                              text=True, capture_output=True).returncode:
-                raise MergeError("integration_merge_scope_rejected", 403)
-        if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != request.integration_branch:
-            raise MergeError("integration_branch_checkout_required")
-        before = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-        remote_before = self.projection(request.integration_branch)
-        if remote_before != before:
-            raise MergeError("integration_remote_advanced")
-        source = self._git("rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/heads/{request.source_branch}^{{commit}}")
-        if source != request.approved_source_oid:
-            raise MergeError("integration_source_not_approved", 403)
-        attempt = subprocess.run(["git", "merge", "--no-ff", "--no-commit", request.source_branch], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
-        if attempt.returncode:
-            subprocess.run(["git", "merge", "--abort"], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
-            raise MergeError("integration_merge_conflict")
-        try:
-            self._git("commit", "-m", "merge(integration): approved source")
-            merged = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-            parents = self._git("show", "-s", "--format=%P", "HEAD").split()
-            if parents != [before, source]:
-                raise MergeError("integration_parent_invariant_failed", 500)
-            pushed = subprocess.run(["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{request.integration_branch}"], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
-            if pushed.returncode:
-                try:
-                    observed = self.projection(request.integration_branch)
-                except Exception:
-                    return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
-                if observed == before:
-                    self._git("reset", "--hard", before)
-                    return {"state": "PUSH_FAILED_RESTORED", "pre_merge_oid": before}
-                return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
-            try:
-                observed = self.projection(request.integration_branch)
-            except Exception:
-                return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
-            if observed != merged:
-                return {"state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
-            return {"state": "COMPLETED", "pre_merge_oid": before, "merge_oid": merged}
-        except MergeError:
-            if self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD") != before:
-                self._git("reset", "--hard", before)
-            raise
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed, task-bound integration refresh provisioning primitives.
-
-This module deliberately has no HTTP or credential-provider dependency.  The
-caller supplies a branch-read projection and an apply callback, making the
-authorization and recovery boundary independently testable.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import argparse
-import secrets
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-import re
-from contextlib import contextmanager
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Callable
-
-
-class ProvisioningError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code, self.status = code, status
-
-
-def _now() -> datetime:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _digest(secret: str) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(secret.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _canonical(value: dict) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _is_oid(value: object) -> bool:
-    return isinstance(value, str) and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", value) is not None
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Binding:
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    branch: str
-    actor_identity: str
-    audience: str
-    paths: tuple[str, ...]
-    quota: int
-
-
-class AppendOnlyAudit:
-    """Append only redacted JSONL audit, durable before a result is returned."""
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._lock = threading.Lock()
-
-    def append(self, event: dict) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            safe = {key: value for key, value in event.items() if key not in {"token", "credential", "authorization"}}
-            previous = "0" * 64
-            if self.path.exists():
-                lines = self.path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
-                if lines:
-                    previous = json.loads(lines[-1])["event_hash"]
-            safe["previous_event_hash"] = previous
-            safe["event_hash"] = _canonical(safe)
-            encoded = (json.dumps(safe, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode()
-            fd = os.open(self.path, os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
-            try:
-                os.write(fd, encoded)
-                os.fsync(fd)
-            finally:
-                os.close(fd)
-
-
-class GrantStore:
-    """Digest-only short grant registry; SQLite transactions serialize quota use."""
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        with self._db() as db:
-            db.execute("""CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS grants(
-                token_digest TEXT PRIMARY KEY, binding_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                expires_at TEXT NOT NULL, quota INTEGER NOT NULL, uses INTEGER NOT NULL,
-                revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0)""")
-
-    @contextmanager
-    def _db(self):
-        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=15, isolation_level=None)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        try:
-            yield db
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-
-    def issue(self, binding: Binding, *, ttl_seconds: int = 300) -> str:
-        if ttl_seconds < 1 or ttl_seconds > 1800 or binding.quota < 1 or not binding.paths:
-            raise ValueError("invalid_short_grant")
-        token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
-        payload = json.dumps(binding.__dict__ | {"paths": list(binding.paths)}, sort_keys=True)
-        with self._db() as db:
-            db.execute("INSERT INTO grants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,0)", (_digest(token), payload,
-                (_now() + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds)).isoformat(), binding.quota, 0))
-        return token
-
-    def rotate(self, old_token: str, binding: Binding, *, revocation_probe, ttl_seconds: int = 300) -> str:
-        self.revoke(old_token)
-        try: status = revocation_probe(old_token)
-        except TimeoutError as exc: raise ProvisioningError("revocation_probe_timeout", 503) from exc
-        if status != 401: raise ProvisioningError("revocation_probe_rejected", 503)
-        return self.issue(binding, ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds)
-
-    def revoke(self, token: str) -> None:
-        with self._db() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            db.execute("UPDATE grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_digest=?", (_digest(token),))
-            db.execute("COMMIT")
-
-    def consume(self, token: str, binding: Binding, path: str) -> None:
-        with self._db() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            row = db.execute("SELECT * FROM grants WHERE token_digest=?", (_digest(token),)).fetchone()
-            if not row or row["revoked"]:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("credential_rejected", 401)
-            if _now() >= datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"]):
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("credential_expired", 401)
-            stored = json.loads(row["binding_json"])
-            requested = binding.__dict__ | {"paths": list(binding.paths)}
-            if stored != requested or path not in stored["paths"]:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("grant_binding_rejected")
-            if row["uses"] >= row["quota"]:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("grant_quota_exhausted")
-            db.execute("UPDATE grants SET uses=uses+1 WHERE token_digest=?", (_digest(token),))
-            db.execute("COMMIT")
-
-
-class GiteaBranchReadProjection:
-    """Normalizes a trusted task-scoped Gitea reader; every ambiguity fails closed."""
-    def __init__(self, reader: Callable[[str, str], dict]):
-        self.reader = reader
-
-    def head(self, repository: str, branch: str) -> str:
-        try:
-            reply = self.reader(repository, branch)
-        except TimeoutError as exc:
-            raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_timeout", 503) from exc
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_unavailable", 503) from exc
-        if not isinstance(reply, dict) or reply.get("status") in {401, 403}:
-            raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_forbidden", 503)
-        oid = reply.get("oid")
-        if reply.get("status") != 200 or not _is_oid(oid):
-            raise ProvisioningError("gitea_projection_invalid", 503)
-        return oid.lower()
-
-
-class IntegrationRefreshProvisioner:
-    _locks: dict[tuple[str, str], threading.Lock] = {}
-    _locks_guard = threading.Lock()
-
-    def __init__(self, *, grants: GrantStore, projection: GiteaBranchReadProjection,
-                 ledger_path: Path | str, audit: AppendOnlyAudit, approved_binding: Binding):
-        self.grants, self.projection, self.audit, self.approved_binding = grants, projection, audit, approved_binding
-        self.ledger_path = Path(ledger_path); self.ledger_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        with self._ledger() as db:
-            db.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refreshes(operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, digest TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL, result_oid TEXT)")
-
-    @contextmanager
-    def _ledger(self):
-        db = sqlite3.connect(self.ledger_path)
-        try:
-            yield db
-            db.commit()
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-
-    def refresh(self, *, token: str, binding: Binding, path: str, operation_id: str,
-                target_head_oid: str, apply: Callable[[], str]) -> dict:
-        if not operation_id or not _is_oid(target_head_oid):
-            raise ProvisioningError("refresh_request_rejected")
-        if binding != self.approved_binding:
-            raise ProvisioningError("grant_binding_rejected")
-        request = {"binding": binding.__dict__ | {"paths": list(binding.paths)}, "path": path, "target": target_head_oid}
-        digest = _canonical(request)
-        with self._locks_guard:
-            lock = self._locks.setdefault((binding.repository, binding.branch), threading.Lock())
-        with lock, self._ledger() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            row = db.execute("SELECT * FROM refreshes WHERE operation_id=?", (operation_id,)).fetchone()
-            new_operation = row is None
-            if row:
-                if row[1] != digest:
-                    db.execute("ROLLBACK"); raise ProvisioningError("operation_id_reuse_rejected", 409)
-                if row[2] == "COMPLETED":
-                    db.execute("COMMIT")
-                    return {"state": row[2], "operation_id": operation_id, "oid": row[3], "idempotent": True}
-                if row[2] not in {"PENDING", "RECOVERABLE"}:
-                    db.execute("COMMIT")
-                    return {"state": row[2], "operation_id": operation_id, "oid": row[3], "idempotent": True}
-            else:
-                db.execute("INSERT INTO refreshes VALUES(?,?,?,NULL)", (operation_id, digest, "PENDING"))
-            db.execute("COMMIT")
-            if new_operation:
-                self.grants.consume(token, binding, path)
-            current = self.projection.head(binding.repository, binding.branch)
-            if current != target_head_oid.lower():
-                self._state(operation_id, "STALE_TARGET")
-                raise ProvisioningError("stale_target_head", 409)
-            try:
-                oid = apply()
-                if not _is_oid(oid):
-                    raise ProvisioningError("apply_result_invalid", 500)
-                # Detect a competing remote advancement before claiming completion.
-                observed = self.projection.head(binding.repository, binding.branch)
-                if observed != oid.lower():
-                    self._state(operation_id, "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
-                    raise ProvisioningError("remote_concurrent_advance", 409)
-                self._state(operation_id, "COMPLETED", oid)
-                self.audit.append({"operation_id": operation_id, "task_id": binding.task_id, "repository": binding.repository,
-                                   "branch": binding.branch, "actor_identity": binding.actor_identity, "audience": binding.audience, "path": path, "state": "COMPLETED"})
-                return {"state": "COMPLETED", "operation_id": operation_id, "oid": oid, "idempotent": False}
-            except ProvisioningError:
-                raise
-            except Exception as exc:
-                self._state(operation_id, "RECOVERABLE")
-                self.audit.append({"operation_id": operation_id, "task_id": binding.task_id, "repository": binding.repository,
-                                   "branch": binding.branch, "actor_identity": binding.actor_identity, "audience": binding.audience, "path": path, "state": "RECOVERABLE"})
-                raise ProvisioningError("refresh_apply_failed", 503) from exc
-
-    def _state(self, operation_id: str, state: str, oid: str | None = None) -> None:
-        with self._ledger() as db:
-            db.execute("UPDATE refreshes SET state=?, result_oid=COALESCE(?,result_oid) WHERE operation_id=?", (state, oid, operation_id))
-
-
-def _sandbox_preflight(state_dir: Path) -> int:
-    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED") != "false":
-        raise ProvisioningError("global_gitops_writes_must_remain_disabled", 500)
-    state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    audit = AppendOnlyAudit(state_dir / "preflight-audit.jsonl")
-    audit.append({"event": "SANDBOX_PREFLIGHT", "writes_enabled": False})
-    print(json.dumps({"status": "READY", "mode": "sandbox", "writes_enabled": False}, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--sandbox-preflight", action="store_true", required=True)
-    parser.add_argument("--state-dir", type=Path, required=True)
-    options = parser.parse_args()
-    raise SystemExit(_sandbox_preflight(options.state_dir))
@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed policy used only by the task-scoped Action writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import json
-import stat
-import subprocess
-import re
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
-from urllib.parse import unquote
-
-import isolated_writer_path_policy as path_policy
-
-WRITE_ENDPOINTS = frozenset({"/api/commit-file"})
-ALLOWED_ROOTS = (
-    "active-runtime",
-    "docs",
-    "patches",
-    "reports",
-    "scripts",
-    "test",
-    "tests",
-)
-DENIED_ROOTS = ("baseline", "config", "deploy", "deployments", "ops", "runtime", "services")
-_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
-_FALSE = frozenset({"0", "false", "no", "off"})
-_DENY_FLAGS = (
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_MAIN_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_TAG_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_BASELINE_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_REGISTRY_WRITE",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_ROLLBACK",
-    "AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOW_DEPLOYMENT",
-)
-
-
-def enforcement_required() -> bool:
-    return os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ISOLATED_WRITER_ENFORCEMENT", "") == "required"
-
-
-def allowed_branch() -> str:
-    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "").strip()
-    if not value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_missing_allowed_branch")
-    return value
-
-
-def allowed_base_oid() -> str:
-    value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BASE_OID", "").strip().lower()
-    if len(value) != 40 or any(ch not in "0123456789abcdef" for ch in value):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_invalid_allowed_base_oid")
-    return value
-
-
-def _git(workspace: Path, *args: str) -> str:
-    result = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=workspace, text=True, capture_output=True)
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_git_validation_failed")
-    return result.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def require_service_invariants(workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "").strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_write_gate_required")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_RUNTIME_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_role_required")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "") != "isolated-writer":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_role_required")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_policy_v2_required")
-    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", "").strip():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_service_audience_required")
-    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_REGISTRY_V2", "").strip():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_token_registry_required")
-    if not os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITER_OPERATION_LEDGER", "").strip():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_ledger_required")
-    path_policy.configured_path_policy()
-    for name in _DENY_FLAGS:
-        if os.getenv(name, "").strip().lower() not in _FALSE:
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_forbidden_capability_flag")
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "") != "aios/aios":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_repository_identity_rejected")
-    configured_bare_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "").strip()
-    if not configured_bare_value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
-    configured_bare = Path(configured_bare_value)
-    if configured_bare.resolve(strict=True) != bare_repo.resolve(strict=True):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_authoritative_repo_rejected")
-    writer_root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "").strip()
-    if not writer_root_value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root")
-    writer_root = Path(writer_root_value).resolve(strict=True)
-    lexical_workspace = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
-    canonical_workspace = lexical_workspace.resolve(strict=True)
-    if lexical_workspace != canonical_workspace:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
-    try:
-        canonical_workspace.relative_to(writer_root)
-    except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_outside_approved_root") from None
-    if _git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != allowed_branch():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_current_branch_rejected")
-    approved_base = allowed_base_oid()
-    try:
-        _git(workspace, "cat-file", "-e", f"{approved_base}^{{commit}}")
-        subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", approved_base, "HEAD"],
-            cwd=workspace,
-            check=True,
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        )
-    except (PermissionError, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_approved_base_not_ancestor") from None
-    if _git(workspace, "merge-base", approved_base, "HEAD") != approved_base:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_merge_base_rejected")
-    common = Path(_git(workspace, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"))
-    if not common.is_absolute():
-        common = (workspace / common).resolve()
-    if common.resolve() != bare_repo.resolve():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_common_repo_rejected")
-
-
-def approved_audit_log_path() -> Path:
-    root_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_AUDIT_ROOT", "").strip()
-    log_value = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUDIT_LOG", "").strip()
-    if not root_value or not log_value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_missing")
-    lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(root_value))
-    lexical_log = Path(os.path.abspath(log_value))
-    root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
-    if lexical_root != root or root.is_symlink() or not root.is_dir():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_root_rejected")
-    try:
-        lexical_log.relative_to(root)
-    except ValueError:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_path_outside_approved_root") from None
-    if lexical_log.parent.resolve(strict=True) != lexical_log.parent:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_parent_symlink_rejected")
-    if lexical_log.exists() and lexical_log.is_symlink():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_symlink_rejected")
-    os.chmod(root, 0o750)
-    os.chmod(lexical_log.parent, 0o750)
-    return lexical_log
-
-
-def append_audit_record(record: dict) -> None:
-    path = approved_audit_log_path()
-    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_APPEND | os.O_CREAT
-    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
-        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
-    descriptor = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
-    try:
-        info = os.fstat(descriptor)
-        if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_audit_log_not_regular")
-        os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
-        line = json.dumps(
-            _audit_sanitize(record),
-            ensure_ascii=False,
-            sort_keys=True,
-            separators=(",", ":"),
-        ).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
-        os.write(descriptor, line)
-        os.fsync(descriptor)
-    finally:
-        os.close(descriptor)
-    parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
-    try:
-        os.fsync(parent_fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(parent_fd)
-
-
-def _audit_sanitize(value):
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {
-            key: (
-                "[REDACTED]"
-                if any(
-                    marker in str(key).lower()
-                    for marker in (
-                        "authorization",
-                        "credential",
-                        "password",
-                        "secret",
-                        "token",
-                        "private_key",
-                    )
-                )
-                and str(key).lower() != "token_id"
-                else _audit_sanitize(inner)
-            )
-            for key, inner in value.items()
-        }
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [_audit_sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str) and re.search(
-        r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])",
-        value,
-    ):
-        return "[REDACTED]"
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_endpoint(method: str, path: str, workspace: Path, bare_repo: Path) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    if method != "POST" or path not in WRITE_ENDPOINTS:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
-    require_service_invariants(workspace, bare_repo)
-
-
-def validate_branch_request(data: dict) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    branch = allowed_branch() if "branch" not in data else str(data.get("branch") or "").strip()
-    if branch != allowed_branch():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected")
-    if str(data.get("base", "main")).strip() != "main":
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_base_rejected")
-    if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_force_rejected")
-
-
-def validate_path(path: str, workspace: Path | None = None) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(path, str):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    value = path
-    if not value or value != value.strip() or "\x00" in value or "\\" in value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    try:
-        decoded = unquote(value, errors="strict")
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
-    if decoded != value:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    windows = PureWindowsPath(value)
-    posix = PurePosixPath(value)
-    parts = value.split("/")
-    if (
-        posix.is_absolute()
-        or windows.is_absolute()
-        or bool(windows.drive)
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
-    ):
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    first = parts[0]
-    service_exact_path = False
-    if first in DENIED_ROOTS:
-        try:
-            path_policy.require_service_path("commit_file.atomic", value)
-            service_exact_path = True
-        except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
-            raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
-    if value != "README.md" and first not in ALLOWED_ROOTS and not service_exact_path:
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_outside_allowed_roots")
-    if workspace is not None:
-        lexical_root = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
-        root = lexical_root.resolve(strict=True)
-        if lexical_root != root:
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_workspace_symlink_rejected")
-        current = root
-        for part in parts:
-            current = current / part
-            if current.is_symlink():
-                raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_symlink_rejected")
-        candidate = (root / value).resolve(strict=False)
-        try:
-            candidate.relative_to(root)
-        except ValueError:
-            raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_path_escapes_workspace") from None
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_content_for_path(path: str, content: str) -> None:
-    if path.split("/", 1)[0] not in DENIED_ROOTS:
-        return
-    try:
-        path_policy.validate_content("commit_file.atomic", path, content)
-    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
-        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
-
-
-def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
-    try:
-        return path_policy.configured_path_policy_sha256()
-    except path_policy.PathPolicyError as exc:
-        raise PermissionError(str(exc)) from None
-
-
-def validate_commit_paths(paths: list[str], workspace: Path | None = None) -> None:
-    if enforcement_required():
-        for path in paths:
-            if str(path).strip() != ".":
-                validate_path(str(path), workspace)
-
-
-def validate_staged_paths(workspace: Path) -> None:
-    if not enforcement_required():
-        return
-    for path in _git(workspace, "diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines():
-        validate_path(path, workspace)
-
-
-def validate_sync_branch(branch: str) -> None:
-    if enforcement_required() and branch != allowed_branch():
-        raise PermissionError("isolated_writer_sync_branch_rejected")
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import re
-import subprocess
-import urllib.parse
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Iterable
-
-_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "cat-file",
-        "config",
-        "diff",
-        "for-each-ref",
-        "ls-remote",
-        "merge-base",
-        "push",
-        "remote",
-        "rev-parse",
-        "show-ref",
-        "tag",
-    }
-)
-_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
-_TIMEOUT = 8.0
-
-
-class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
-    """A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
-
-
-class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
-    """A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
-
-
-class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
-    """A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
-
-
-def _redact(text: str) -> str:
-    value = str(text or "")
-    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
-    value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
-    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
-    return value
-
-
-def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
-    raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
-    if not raw:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    path = Path(raw)
-    if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    try:
-        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-    if not resolved.is_dir():
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    return resolved
-
-
-def _run(
-    git_dir: Path,
-    args: list[str],
-    *,
-    check: bool,
-    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
-) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
-    if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-    try:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            timeout=timeout,
-            env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
-        )
-    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
-    if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
-    if check and result.returncode != 0:
-        detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError(
-            "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
-        )
-    return result
-
-
-def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
-    value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
-    if not value:
-        return ""
-    if "://" in value:
-        value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
-    elif ":" in value:
-        value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
-    value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
-    value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
-    parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
-    if len(parts) >= 2:
-        value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
-    return value.strip("/").lower()
-
-
-def verify_repository(
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    repository_identity: str | None = None,
-) -> tuple[Path, str]:
-    path = _configured_path(git_dir)
-    expected = str(
-        repository_identity
-        or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
-    ).strip().strip("/")
-    if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
-    if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
-    actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
-    if actual != expected.lower():
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
-    return path, expected
-
-
-def run_authoritative_git(
-    args: list[str],
-    *,
-    check: bool = True,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
-) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
-    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
-    return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
-
-
-def authoritative_head_oid(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
-    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-    return oid
-
-
-def authoritative_tags(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        [
-            "for-each-ref",
-            "refs/tags",
-            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
-        ],
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
-    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
-        name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
-        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
-            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-        peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
-            git_dir=git_dir,
-        )
-        peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
-        if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
-            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-        tags.append(
-            {
-                "name": name,
-                "tag_oid": oid.lower(),
-                "object_type": object_type,
-                "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
-            }
-        )
-    return tags
-
-
-def authoritative_branches(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        [
-            "for-each-ref",
-            "refs/heads",
-            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
-        ],
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
-    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
-        name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
-        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
-            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-        branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
-    return branches
-
-
-def authoritative_commit(
-    oid: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
-    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
-    if resolved != value:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
-    return resolved
-
-
-def authoritative_lineage(
-    ancestor: str,
-    descendant: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> None:
-    authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
-    authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
-    result = run_authoritative_git(
-        ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
-        check=False,
-        git_dir=git_dir,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
-
-
-_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
-
-
-def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
-    return bool(
-        _SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
-        and ".." not in value
-        and "//" not in value
-        and "@{" not in value
-        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
-        and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
-    )
-
-
-def validate_git_revision(
-    value: str,
-    field: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    revision = str(value or "").strip()
-    if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
-    if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
-        try:
-            return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
-        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
-            raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
-    if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
-    if revision.startswith("refs/"):
-        if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
-            raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
-        candidates = [revision]
-    else:
-        candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
-    matches: list[str] = []
-    for candidate in candidates:
-        result = run_authoritative_git(
-            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
-            check=False,
-            git_dir=git_dir,
-        )
-        oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
-        if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-            matches.append(oid)
-    if not matches:
-        raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
-    if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
-        raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
-    return matches[0]
-
-
-def authoritative_diff(
-    from_revision: str,
-    to_revision: str,
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
-    from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
-    to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
-    args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
-    result = run_authoritative_git(args, git_dir=path)
-    return {
-        "code": 0,
-        "stdout": result.stdout,
-        "stderr": "",
-        "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
-        "from_oid": from_oid,
-        "to_oid": to_oid,
-    }
-
-
-def repository_snapshot(
-    *,
-    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
-    repository_identity: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    configured = bool(
-        str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
-    )
-    try:
-        path, identity = verify_repository(
-            git_dir=git_dir,
-            repository_identity=repository_identity,
-        )
-        head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
-        return {
-            "repository_available": True,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
-            "authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
-            "authoritative_head_oid": head,
-            "repository_identity": identity,
-            "query_error": None,
-        }
-    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
-        return {
-            "repository_available": False,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
-            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
-            "authoritative_git_dir": None,
-            "authoritative_head_oid": None,
-            "repository_identity": str(
-                repository_identity
-                or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
-            ).strip() or None,
-            "query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
-        }
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed operation authorization for an isolated Git writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import ipaddress
-import os
-import re
-import subprocess
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-from isolated_writer_token_registry import TokenRegistry
-
-
-ROUTE_OPERATIONS = {
-    ("GET", "/api/runtime-status"): "runtime.status.read",
-    ("GET", "/api/baseline"): "baseline.read",
-    ("GET", "/api/patches"): "patches.read",
-    ("POST", "/api/commit-file"): "commit_file.atomic",
-}
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
-
-
-class AuthorizationError(PermissionError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 403):
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.status = status
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthorizedGrant:
-    record: dict[str, Any]
-    operation: str
-    use_count: int
-
-    @property
-    def token_id(self) -> str:
-        return str(self.record["token_id"])
-
-    @property
-    def task_id(self) -> str:
-        return str(self.record["task_id"])
-
-
-def operation_for(method: str, path: str) -> str:
-    operation = ROUTE_OPERATIONS.get((method.upper(), path))
-    if not operation:
-        raise AuthorizationError("isolated_writer_operation_forbidden")
-    return operation
-
-
-def _parse_time(value: Any) -> datetime:
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(str(value).replace("Z", "+00:00"))
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid") from None
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_time_invalid")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _git_is_ancestor(workspace: Path, base: str, branch: str) -> bool:
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", base, branch],
-        cwd=workspace,
-        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-    )
-    return result.returncode == 0
-
-
-def _validate_grant(
-    grant: dict[str, Any],
-    *,
-    audience: str,
-    source_ip: str,
-    operation: str,
-    branch: str | None,
-    path: str | None,
-    workspace: Path,
-    current_time: datetime,
-) -> None:
-    if int(grant.get("schema_version", 0)) != 2:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_required", 401)
-    if str(grant.get("audience") or "") != audience:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_audience_rejected")
-    try:
-        peer = ipaddress.ip_address(source_ip)
-        networks = [ipaddress.ip_network(str(value), strict=True) for value in grant.get("source_cidrs", [])]
-    except ValueError:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected") from None
-    if not networks or not any(peer in network for network in networks):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_source_rejected")
-    created = _parse_time(grant.get("created_at"))
-    not_before = _parse_time(grant.get("not_before"))
-    expires = _parse_time(grant.get("expires_at"))
-    if expires <= not_before or (expires - created).total_seconds() > 1800:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_lifetime_rejected")
-    if current_time < not_before:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_not_yet_valid", 401)
-    if current_time >= expires:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_expired", 401)
-    if bool(grant.get("revoked")):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_revoked", 401)
-    operations = grant.get("allowed_operations")
-    if not isinstance(operations, list) or operation not in operations:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_operation_rejected")
-    expected_branch = str(grant.get("allowed_branch") or "")
-    configured_branch = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", "")
-    if expected_branch != configured_branch:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
-    if branch is not None and branch != expected_branch:
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_branch_rejected")
-    if path is not None:
-        paths = grant.get("allowed_paths")
-        if not isinstance(paths, list) or path not in paths:
-            raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_path_rejected")
-    base = str(grant.get("approved_base_oid") or "").lower()
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_rejected")
-    if not _git_is_ancestor(workspace, base, expected_branch):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_base_not_ancestor")
-
-
-def authorize(
-    registry: TokenRegistry,
-    token: str,
-    *,
-    method: str,
-    path: str,
-    source_ip: str,
-    workspace: Path,
-    branch: str | None = None,
-    target_path: str | None = None,
-    current_time: datetime | None = None,
-) -> AuthorizedGrant:
-    if os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_POLICY_VERSION_REQUIRED", "") != "2":
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_policy_v2_not_required")
-    if not token:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
-    grant = registry.find(token)
-    if grant is None:
-        raise AuthorizationError("unauthorized", 401)
-    operation = operation_for(method, path)
-    _validate_grant(
-        grant,
-        audience=os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""),
-        source_ip=source_ip,
-        operation=operation,
-        branch=branch,
-        path=target_path,
-        workspace=workspace,
-        current_time=current_time or datetime.now(timezone.utc),
-    )
-    limits = grant.get("max_uses")
-    if not isinstance(limits, dict):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing")
-    try:
-        used = registry.consume(str(grant["token_id"]), operation, int(limits[operation]))
-    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
-        raise AuthorizationError("writer_token_use_limit_missing") from None
-    except PermissionError as exc:
-        code = str(exc)
-        raise AuthorizationError(code, 401 if code == "writer_token_revoked" else 403) from None
-    return AuthorizedGrant(grant, operation, used)
@@ -1,403 +0,0 @@
-"""Atomic, idempotent commit-file Saga for the isolated writer."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import fcntl
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import sqlite3
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import threading
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-import aios_isolated_writer_policy as policy
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}")
-IDEMPOTENCY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,127}")
-STATES = frozenset({
-    "PENDING", "FILE_WRITTEN", "COMMITTED", "PUSHED", "VERIFIED", "COMPLETED",
-    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
-})
-_LOCKS: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
-_LOCKS_GUARD = threading.Lock()
-_LEDGER_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
-
-
-class CommitFileError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 400):
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.status = status
-
-
-class SimulatedCrash(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-def canonical_digest(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    payload = {
-        "branch": data["branch"],
-        "path": data["path"],
-        "content_sha256": hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
-        "message": data["message"],
-        "expected_head_oid": data["expected_head_oid"],
-    }
-    encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
-
-
-class OperationLedger:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
-            raise PermissionError("writer_operation_ledger_symlink_rejected")
-        with _LEDGER_INIT_LOCK:
-            with self.connect() as db:
-                db.execute(
-                    """
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS writer_operations (
-                        operation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                        operation_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        branch TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        path TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        content_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        pre_head_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        commit_oid TEXT,
-                        push_status TEXT,
-                        verification_status TEXT,
-                        state TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
-                        updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
-                        error_code TEXT
-                    )
-                    """
-                )
-        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
-
-    def connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        return db
-
-    def get_or_create(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        key = data["idempotency_key"]
-        with self.connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if row:
-                db.commit()
-                record = dict(row)
-                if record["operation_digest"] != digest:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_conflict", 409)
-                if (
-                    record["token_id"] != grant.token_id
-                    or record["task_id"] != grant.task_id
-                ):
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_owner_conflict", 409)
-                return record
-            operation_id = hashlib.sha256(
-                f"{grant.task_id}\0{key}".encode("utf-8")
-            ).hexdigest()
-            content_sha = hashlib.sha256(data["content"].encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-            db.execute(
-                """
-                INSERT INTO writer_operations(
-                    operation_id,token_id,task_id,idempotency_key,operation_digest,
-                    branch,path,content_sha256,pre_head_oid,state
-                ) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
-                """,
-                (
-                    operation_id, grant.token_id, grant.task_id, key, digest,
-                    data["branch"], data["path"], content_sha,
-                    data["expected_head_oid"], "PENDING",
-                ),
-            )
-            db.commit()
-        return self.get(key)
-
-    def get(self, key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        with self.connect() as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM writer_operations WHERE idempotency_key=?", (key,)
-            ).fetchone()
-        if row is None:
-            raise KeyError(key)
-        return dict(row)
-
-    def update(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if state not in STATES:
-            raise ValueError("invalid writer operation state")
-        allowed = {"commit_oid", "push_status", "verification_status", "error_code"}
-        assignments = ["state=?", "updated_at=CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"]
-        values: list[Any] = [state]
-        for name, value in fields.items():
-            if name not in allowed:
-                raise ValueError("invalid ledger field")
-            assignments.append(f"{name}=?")
-            values.append(value)
-        values.append(key)
-        with self.connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            db.execute(
-                f"UPDATE writer_operations SET {','.join(assignments)} WHERE idempotency_key=?",
-                values,
-            )
-            db.commit()
-        return self.get(key)
-
-
-class AtomicCommitFile:
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        workspace: Path,
-        bare_repo: Path,
-        ledger: OperationLedger,
-        remote: str,
-        audit,
-        crash_after_state: str | None = None,
-    ):
-        self.workspace = workspace
-        self.bare_repo = bare_repo
-        self.ledger = ledger
-        self.remote = remote
-        self.audit = audit
-        self.crash_after_state = crash_after_state
-
-    def _git(self, *args: str, check: bool = True) -> str:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", *args], cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True
-        )
-        if check and result.returncode != 0:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_git_operation_failed", 500)
-        return result.stdout.strip()
-
-    def _transition(self, key: str, state: str, **fields: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        record = self.ledger.update(key, state, **fields)
-        if self.crash_after_state == state:
-            raise SimulatedCrash(state)
-        return record
-
-    def _validate(self, data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if not isinstance(data, dict):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_object_required")
-        required = ("branch", "path", "content", "message", "expected_head_oid", "idempotency_key")
-        if any(field not in data for field in required):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_incomplete")
-        if data.get("force") or data.get("force_push"):
-            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_force_rejected", 403)
-        if set(data) != set(required):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_request_fields_rejected")
-        item = {field: data[field] for field in required}
-        if item["branch"] != policy.allowed_branch():
-            raise CommitFileError("isolated_writer_branch_rejected", 403)
-        try:
-            item["path"] = policy.validate_path(item["path"], self.workspace)
-        except PermissionError as exc:
-            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
-        if not isinstance(item["content"], str) or "\x00" in item["content"]:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_rejected")
-        try:
-            policy.validate_content_for_path(item["path"], item["content"])
-        except PermissionError as exc:
-            raise CommitFileError(str(exc), 403) from None
-        if len(item["content"].encode("utf-8")) > 1_048_576:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_content_too_large", 413)
-        message = item["message"]
-        if (
-            not isinstance(message, str)
-            or not 1 <= len(message) <= 200
-            or "\x00" in message
-            or "\n" in message
-            or "\r" in message
-        ):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_message_rejected")
-        if not isinstance(item["expected_head_oid"], str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(item["expected_head_oid"]):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_expected_head_rejected")
-        if not isinstance(item["idempotency_key"], str) or not IDEMPOTENCY_RE.fullmatch(item["idempotency_key"]):
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_idempotency_key_rejected")
-        return item
-
-    def _atomic_write(self, relative: str, content: str) -> None:
-        target = self.workspace / relative
-        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".writer-", dir=target.parent)
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "wb", closefd=True) as stream:
-                stream.write(content.encode("utf-8"))
-                stream.flush()
-                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
-            os.replace(temporary, target)
-            parent_fd = os.open(target.parent, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0))
-            try:
-                os.fsync(parent_fd)
-            finally:
-                os.close(parent_fd)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                os.unlink(temporary)
-
-    def _verify_remote(self, branch: str, oid: str) -> None:
-        bare = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare_repo), "rev-parse", f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
-            text=True, capture_output=True,
-        )
-        if bare.returncode != 0 or bare.stdout.strip() != oid:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_authoritative_bare_oid_mismatch", 500)
-        remote = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "ls-remote", "--heads", self.remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
-            cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
-        )
-        if remote.returncode != 0:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_verification_failed", 503)
-        fields = remote.stdout.strip().split()
-        if len(fields) != 2:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_ref_missing", 503)
-        if fields[0] != oid:
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_oid_conflict", 409)
-
-    def execute(self, grant: Any, raw_data: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = self._validate(raw_data)
-        digest = canonical_digest(data)
-        branch = data["branch"]
-        with _LOCKS_GUARD:
-            lock = _LOCKS.setdefault(branch, threading.Lock())
-        lock_path = self.ledger.path.parent / f"{hashlib.sha256(branch.encode()).hexdigest()}.lock"
-        with lock, open(lock_path, "a+b") as branch_lock:
-            fcntl.flock(branch_lock.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
-            return self._execute_locked(grant, data, digest)
-
-    def _execute_locked(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        key = data["idempotency_key"]
-        record = self.ledger.get_or_create(grant, data, digest)
-        if record["state"] == "COMPLETED":
-            return self._result(record, idempotent=True)
-        if self._git("rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD") != data["branch"]:
-            record = self._transition(
-                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_current_branch_conflict"
-            )
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_current_branch_conflict", 409)
-        head = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-        commit_oid = record.get("commit_oid")
-        if head != record["pre_head_oid"] and head != commit_oid:
-            record = self._transition(
-                key, "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED", error_code="writer_branch_head_conflict"
-            )
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "manual_review_required")
-            raise CommitFileError("writer_branch_head_conflict", 409)
-        try:
-            state = record["state"]
-            if state == "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED":
-                raise CommitFileError("writer_manual_review_required", 409)
-            if state == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE":
-                if record.get("push_status") == "confirmed":
-                    state = "PUSHED"
-                else:
-                    state = "COMMITTED" if commit_oid else "FILE_WRITTEN"
-            if state == "PENDING":
-                self._atomic_write(data["path"], data["content"])
-                record = self._transition(key, "FILE_WRITTEN")
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "FILE_WRITTEN":
-                actual_sha = hashlib.sha256(
-                    (self.workspace / data["path"]).read_bytes()
-                ).hexdigest()
-                if actual_sha != record["content_sha256"]:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_file_content_conflict", 409)
-                staged_before = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only", check=False).splitlines()
-                if staged_before:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
-                self._git("add", "--", data["path"])
-                staged = self._git("diff", "--cached", "--name-only").splitlines()
-                if staged != [data["path"]]:
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_extra_staged_files_rejected", 409)
-                self._git("commit", "-m", data["message"])
-                commit_oid = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-                record = self._transition(key, "COMMITTED", commit_oid=commit_oid)
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "COMMITTED":
-                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
-                pushed = subprocess.run(
-                    ["git", "push", "--porcelain", self.remote, f"HEAD:refs/heads/{data['branch']}"],
-                    cwd=self.workspace, text=True, capture_output=True,
-                )
-                if pushed.returncode != 0:
-                    self._transition(
-                        key, "FAILED_RECOVERABLE",
-                        push_status="failed", error_code="writer_gitea_push_failed",
-                    )
-                    raise CommitFileError("writer_gitea_push_failed", 503)
-                record = self._transition(key, "PUSHED", push_status="confirmed")
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "PUSHED":
-                commit_oid = str(record["commit_oid"])
-                self._verify_remote(data["branch"], commit_oid)
-                record = self._transition(
-                    key, "VERIFIED", verification_status="bare+gitea"
-                )
-                state = record["state"]
-            if state == "VERIFIED":
-                record = self._transition(key, "COMPLETED", error_code=None)
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, record, "completed")
-            return self._result(record, idempotent=False)
-        except SimulatedCrash:
-            raise
-        except CommitFileError as exc:
-            latest = self.ledger.get(key)
-            if latest["state"] not in {"FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"}:
-                failure_state = (
-                    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-                    if exc.code in {
-                        "writer_gitea_oid_conflict",
-                        "writer_file_content_conflict",
-                        "writer_current_branch_conflict",
-                    }
-                    else "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
-                )
-                latest = self._transition(key, failure_state, error_code=exc.code)
-            self._audit(grant, data, digest, latest, "failed")
-            raise
-
-    def _audit(self, grant: Any, data: dict[str, Any], digest: str, record: dict[str, Any], result: str) -> None:
-        self.audit({
-            "token_id": grant.token_id,
-            "task_id": grant.task_id,
-            "audience": grant.record["audience"],
-            "source_ip": grant.record.get("_source_ip", "socket-peer"),
-            "operation": grant.operation,
-            "branch": data["branch"],
-            "path": data["path"],
-            "idempotency_key": data["idempotency_key"],
-            "operation_digest": digest,
-            "path_policy_sha256": policy.configured_path_policy_sha256(),
-            "pre_head_oid": record["pre_head_oid"],
-            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
-            "result": result,
-        })
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _result(record: dict[str, Any], *, idempotent: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "state": record["state"],
-            "operation_id": record["operation_id"],
-            "branch": record["branch"],
-            "path": record["path"],
-            "commit_oid": record.get("commit_oid"),
-            "push_status": record.get("push_status"),
-            "verification_status": record.get("verification_status"),
-            "idempotent": idempotent,
-        }
@@ -1,422 +0,0 @@
-"""Strict service-level exact-path policy for isolated Git writers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import grp
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import stat
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from functools import lru_cache
-from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
-from typing import Any
-from urllib.parse import unquote
-
-
-MAX_POLICY_BYTES = 65_536
-POLICY_FIELDS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "schema_version",
-        "policy_id",
-        "audience",
-        "repository_identity",
-        "allowed_branch",
-        "allowed_operations",
-    }
-)
-OPERATION_FIELDS = frozenset({"exact_paths", "max_content_bytes", "content_profile"})
-SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS = frozenset({"commit_file.atomic"})
-SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES = frozenset({"systemd-codex-review-worker-v1"})
-_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:|bearer\s+|(?:token|password|secret)\s*[:=])"
-)
-_SYSTEMD_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*\Z")
-_SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096
-_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES = {
-    "Unit": frozenset({"Description", "After", "Wants"}),
-    "Service": frozenset(
-        {
-            "Type",
-            "User",
-            "Group",
-            "WorkingDirectory",
-            "Environment",
-            "ExecStart",
-            "Restart",
-            "RestartSec",
-            "NoNewPrivileges",
-            "PrivateTmp",
-            "PrivateDevices",
-            "ProtectSystem",
-            "ProtectHome",
-            "ProtectKernelTunables",
-            "ProtectKernelModules",
-            "ProtectControlGroups",
-            "LockPersonality",
-            "RestrictSUIDSGID",
-            "RestrictRealtime",
-            "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
-            "RuntimeDirectory",
-            "StateDirectory",
-            "CacheDirectory",
-            "ReadOnlyPaths",
-            "ReadWritePaths",
-            "UMask",
-        }
-    ),
-    "Install": frozenset({"WantedBy"}),
-}
-_SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES = frozenset(
-    {
-        ("Service", "Environment"),
-        ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"),
-        ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"),
-    }
-)
-_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES = {
-    ("Unit", "Description"): "AIOS Codex Review/Test Worker",
-    ("Unit", "After"): "network-online.target",
-    ("Unit", "Wants"): "network-online.target",
-    ("Service", "Type"): "simple",
-    ("Service", "User"): "aiman",
-    ("Service", "Group"): "gitops",
-    (
-        "Service",
-        "WorkingDirectory",
-    ): "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker/current",
-    (
-        "Service",
-        "ExecStart",
-    ): "/usr/bin/python3 -m task_plane.workers.codex_review_test",
-    ("Service", "Restart"): "on-failure",
-    ("Service", "RestartSec"): "2",
-    ("Service", "NoNewPrivileges"): "true",
-    ("Service", "PrivateTmp"): "true",
-    ("Service", "PrivateDevices"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectSystem"): "strict",
-    ("Service", "ProtectHome"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectKernelTunables"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectKernelModules"): "true",
-    ("Service", "ProtectControlGroups"): "true",
-    ("Service", "LockPersonality"): "true",
-    ("Service", "RestrictSUIDSGID"): "true",
-    ("Service", "RestrictRealtime"): "true",
-    ("Service", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute"): "true",
-    ("Service", "RuntimeDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ("Service", "StateDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ("Service", "CacheDirectory"): "aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ("Service", "UMask"): "0077",
-    ("Install", "WantedBy"): "multi-user.target",
-}
-_SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES = {
-    ("Service", "Environment"): (
-        "AIOS_CODEX_WORKER_MODE=shadow",
-        "AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false",
-        "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1",
-    ),
-    ("Service", "ReadOnlyPaths"): (
-        "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
-        "/usr/libexec/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ),
-    ("Service", "ReadWritePaths"): (
-        "/run/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-        "/var/lib/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-        "/var/cache/aios-codex-review-test-worker",
-    ),
-}
-
-
-class PathPolicyError(PermissionError):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OperationPolicy:
-    exact_paths: tuple[str, ...]
-    max_content_bytes: int
-    content_profile: str
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ServicePathPolicy:
-    schema_version: int
-    policy_id: str
-    audience: str
-    repository_identity: str
-    allowed_branch: str
-    allowed_operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy]
-    sha256: str
-
-    def operation(self, name: str) -> OperationPolicy:
-        try:
-            return self.allowed_operations[name]
-        except KeyError:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_operation_rejected") from None
-
-    def require_exact_path(self, operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
-        selected = self.operation(operation)
-        if path not in selected.exact_paths:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_rejected")
-        return selected
-
-
-def _canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return (
-        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-        + "\n"
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def validate_relative_path_syntax(path: str) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(path, str):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    if not path or path != path.strip() or "\x00" in path or "\\" in path:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    try:
-        decoded = unquote(path, errors="strict")
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected") from None
-    if decoded != path:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    posix = PurePosixPath(path)
-    windows = PureWindowsPath(path)
-    parts = path.split("/")
-    if (
-        posix.is_absolute()
-        or windows.is_absolute()
-        or bool(windows.drive)
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_rejected")
-    return path
-
-
-def _require_fields(value: dict[str, Any], allowed: frozenset[str], code: str) -> None:
-    if set(value) != allowed:
-        raise PathPolicyError(code)
-
-
-def _parse_policy(document: Any, canonical: bytes) -> ServicePathPolicy:
-    if not isinstance(document, dict):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_object_required")
-    _require_fields(document, POLICY_FIELDS, "isolated_writer_path_policy_fields_rejected")
-    if document["schema_version"] != 1:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_schema_rejected")
-    text_fields = (
-        "policy_id",
-        "audience",
-        "repository_identity",
-        "allowed_branch",
-    )
-    if any(
-        not isinstance(document[field], str) or not document[field].strip()
-        for field in text_fields
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_value_rejected")
-    raw_operations = document["allowed_operations"]
-    if not isinstance(raw_operations, dict) or not raw_operations:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
-    if not set(raw_operations).issubset(SUPPORTED_OPERATIONS):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operations_rejected")
-    operations: dict[str, OperationPolicy] = {}
-    for name, raw in raw_operations.items():
-        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_rejected")
-        _require_fields(
-            raw,
-            OPERATION_FIELDS,
-            "isolated_writer_path_policy_operation_fields_rejected",
-        )
-        paths = raw["exact_paths"]
-        if (
-            not isinstance(paths, list)
-            or not paths
-            or any(not isinstance(item, str) for item in paths)
-        ):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
-        validated = tuple(validate_relative_path_syntax(item) for item in paths)
-        if len(set(validated)) != len(validated):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_paths_rejected")
-        maximum = raw["max_content_bytes"]
-        if not isinstance(maximum, int) or isinstance(maximum, bool) or not 1 <= maximum <= 1_048_576:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_size_rejected")
-        profile = raw["content_profile"]
-        if profile not in SUPPORTED_CONTENT_PROFILES:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
-        operations[name] = OperationPolicy(validated, maximum, profile)
-    return ServicePathPolicy(
-        schema_version=1,
-        policy_id=document["policy_id"],
-        audience=document["audience"],
-        repository_identity=document["repository_identity"],
-        allowed_branch=document["allowed_branch"],
-        allowed_operations=operations,
-        sha256=hashlib.sha256(canonical).hexdigest(),
-    )
-
-
-def load_path_policy(
-    path: Path,
-    *,
-    expected_owner_uid: int = 0,
-    expected_group_gid: int | None = None,
-    expected_parent_mode: int = 0o750,
-    expected_file_mode: int = 0o640,
-) -> ServicePathPolicy:
-    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(path)))
-    if lexical.is_symlink():
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
-    try:
-        parent_info = lexical.parent.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
-        file_info = lexical.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
-    except FileNotFoundError:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_missing") from None
-    if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_info.st_mode):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_rejected")
-    if stat.S_ISLNK(file_info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(file_info.st_mode):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_rejected")
-    if lexical.resolve(strict=True) != lexical:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_symlink_rejected")
-    if (
-        parent_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
-        or stat.S_IMODE(parent_info.st_mode) != expected_parent_mode
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_parent_permissions_rejected")
-    if (
-        file_info.st_uid != expected_owner_uid
-        or stat.S_IMODE(file_info.st_mode) != expected_file_mode
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_permissions_rejected")
-    if expected_group_gid is not None and (
-        parent_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid or file_info.st_gid != expected_group_gid
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected")
-    if file_info.st_size <= 0 or file_info.st_size > MAX_POLICY_BYTES:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_file_size_rejected")
-    raw = lexical.read_bytes()
-    try:
-        document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_json_rejected") from None
-    canonical = _canonical_json(document)
-    if raw != canonical:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_not_canonical")
-    return _parse_policy(document, canonical)
-
-
-@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
-def configured_path_policy() -> ServicePathPolicy | None:
-    configured = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_PATH_POLICY_FILE", "").strip()
-    if not configured:
-        return None
-    if not Path(configured).is_absolute():
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_path_rejected")
-    try:
-        gitops_gid = grp.getgrnam("gitops").gr_gid
-    except KeyError:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_group_rejected") from None
-    loaded = load_path_policy(Path(configured), expected_group_gid=gitops_gid)
-    if loaded.audience != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_SERVICE_AUDIENCE", ""):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_audience_rejected")
-    if loaded.repository_identity != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_repository_rejected")
-    if loaded.allowed_branch != os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_ALLOWED_BRANCH", ""):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_branch_rejected")
-    return loaded
-
-
-def clear_path_policy_cache() -> None:
-    configured_path_policy.cache_clear()
-
-
-def require_service_path(operation: str, path: str) -> OperationPolicy:
-    loaded = configured_path_policy()
-    if loaded is None:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_path_policy_required")
-    return loaded.require_exact_path(operation, path)
-
-
-def configured_path_policy_sha256() -> str | None:
-    loaded = configured_path_policy()
-    return None if loaded is None else loaded.sha256
-
-
-def validate_content(operation: str, path: str, content: str) -> None:
-    selected = require_service_path(operation, path)
-    try:
-        encoded = content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
-    except (AttributeError, UnicodeEncodeError):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
-    if len(encoded) > selected.max_content_bytes:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_service_content_too_large")
-    if selected.content_profile == "systemd-codex-review-worker-v1":
-        _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content)
-        return
-    raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_path_policy_profile_rejected")
-
-
-def _validate_systemd_codex_review_worker(content: str) -> None:
-    if not isinstance(content, str):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    try:
-        content.encode("utf-8", errors="strict")
-    except UnicodeEncodeError:
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected") from None
-    if (
-        "\x00" in content
-        or "\r" in content
-        or _SECRET_RE.search(content)
-        or not content.endswith("\n")
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-
-    sections: set[str] = set()
-    values: dict[tuple[str, str], list[str]] = {}
-    section: str | None = None
-    for line in content.splitlines():
-        if len(line.encode("utf-8")) > _SYSTEMD_MAX_LINE_BYTES:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        if not line:
-            continue
-        if line[0].isspace() or line.startswith(("#", ";")):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        if line.startswith("[") and line.endswith("]"):
-            candidate = line[1:-1]
-            if (
-                not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(candidate)
-                or candidate not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES
-                or candidate in sections
-            ):
-                raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-            sections.add(candidate)
-            section = candidate
-            continue
-        if section is None or "=" not in line:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        directive, value = line.split("=", 1)
-        if (
-            not _SYSTEMD_NAME_RE.fullmatch(directive)
-            or directive not in _SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES[section]
-            or not value
-            or value != value.strip()
-        ):
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        key = (section, directive)
-        if key in values and key not in _SYSTEMD_MULTI_DIRECTIVES:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-        values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
-
-    if sections != set(_SYSTEMD_ALLOWED_DIRECTIVES):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    if set(values) != set(_SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES) | set(
-        _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES
-    ):
-        raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_SINGLE_VALUES.items():
-        if values.get(key) != [expected]:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
-    for key, expected in _SYSTEMD_EXACT_MULTI_VALUES.items():
-        observed = values.get(key, [])
-        if len(observed) != len(set(observed)) or tuple(observed) != expected:
-            raise PathPolicyError("isolated_writer_systemd_profile_rejected")
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-"""Digest-only, task-scoped token registry for isolated writers."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import os
-import grp
-import pwd
-import secrets
-import sqlite3
-import stat
-import threading
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-_REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK = threading.Lock()
-
-
-def utc_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
-
-
-def token_digest(token: str) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-class TokenRegistry:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path | str):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self._prepare()
-
-    def _prepare(self) -> None:
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if self.path.parent.is_symlink() or self.path.is_symlink():
-            raise PermissionError("writer_token_registry_symlink_rejected")
-        with _REGISTRY_INIT_LOCK:
-            with self._connect() as db:
-                db.executescript(
-                    """
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_grants (
-                        token_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                        token_digest TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                        grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-                        created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                    );
-                    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS token_uses (
-                        token_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        operation TEXT NOT NULL,
-                        use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
-                        PRIMARY KEY(token_id, operation),
-                        FOREIGN KEY(token_id) REFERENCES token_grants(token_id)
-                    );
-                    """
-                )
-        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-        return db
-
-    def issue(self, grant: dict[str, Any], token: str | None = None) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
-        value = token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
-        if len(value.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
-            raise ValueError("writer_token_entropy_insufficient")
-        record = dict(grant)
-        record["schema_version"] = 2
-        record["token_digest"] = token_digest(value)
-        record["revoked"] = False
-        record.setdefault("created_at", utc_now())
-        required = (
-            "token_id",
-            "audience",
-            "task_id",
-            "source_cidrs",
-            "allowed_branch",
-            "approved_base_oid",
-            "allowed_operations",
-            "allowed_paths",
-            "not_before",
-            "expires_at",
-            "max_uses",
-            "issued_by",
-        )
-        if any(not record.get(field) for field in required):
-            raise ValueError("writer_token_grant_incomplete")
-        encoded = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                db.execute(
-                    """
-                    INSERT INTO token_grants(token_id, token_digest, grant_json, revoked, created_at)
-                    VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)
-                    """,
-                    (
-                        str(record["token_id"]),
-                        str(record["token_digest"]),
-                        encoded,
-                        0,
-                        str(record["created_at"]),
-                    ),
-                )
-                db.execute("COMMIT")
-            except Exception:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                raise
-        return value, record
-
-    def find(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-        candidate = token_digest(token)
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            rows = db.execute(
-                "SELECT token_digest, grant_json, revoked FROM token_grants"
-            ).fetchall()
-        match = None
-        for row in rows:
-            if hmac.compare_digest(str(row["token_digest"]), candidate):
-                match = dict(json.loads(str(row["grant_json"])))
-                match["revoked"] = bool(row["revoked"])
-        return match
-
-    def consume(self, token_id: str, operation: str, maximum: int) -> int:
-        if maximum < 1:
-            raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            try:
-                row = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT revoked FROM token_grants WHERE token_id=?",
-                    (token_id,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if row is None or bool(row["revoked"]):
-                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_revoked")
-                used_row = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
-                    (token_id, operation),
-                ).fetchone()
-                used = int(used_row["use_count"]) if used_row else 0
-                if used >= maximum:
-                    raise PermissionError("writer_token_operation_exhausted")
-                current = used + 1
-                db.execute(
-                    """
-                    INSERT INTO token_uses(token_id, operation, use_count)
-                    VALUES(?,?,?)
-                    ON CONFLICT(token_id, operation)
-                    DO UPDATE SET use_count=excluded.use_count
-                    """,
-                    (token_id, operation, current),
-                )
-                db.execute("COMMIT")
-                return current
-            except Exception:
-                db.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                raise
-
-    def revoke(self, token_id: str) -> bool:
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            changed = db.execute(
-                "UPDATE token_grants SET revoked=1 WHERE token_id=? AND revoked=0",
-                (token_id,),
-            ).rowcount
-            db.execute("COMMIT")
-        return bool(changed)
-
-    def usage(self, token_id: str, operation: str) -> int:
-        with self._connect() as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT use_count FROM token_uses WHERE token_id=? AND operation=?",
-                (token_id, operation),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return int(row["use_count"]) if row else 0
-
-
-def _write_secret_file(
-    path: Path,
-    token: str,
-    *,
-    owner: str | None = None,
-    group: str | None = None,
-) -> None:
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
-        raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_symlink_rejected")
-    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
-    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
-        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
-    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
-    try:
-        if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
-            raise PermissionError("writer_token_file_not_regular")
-        if owner is not None or group is not None:
-            uid = pwd.getpwnam(owner).pw_uid if owner is not None else -1
-            gid = grp.getgrnam(group).gr_gid if group is not None else -1
-            os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
-        os.write(fd, token.encode("utf-8"))
-        os.fsync(fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--registry", required=True)
-    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
-    issue = sub.add_parser("issue")
-    issue.add_argument("--grant-file", required=True)
-    issue.add_argument("--token-file", required=True)
-    issue.add_argument("--owner")
-    issue.add_argument("--group")
-    revoke = sub.add_parser("revoke")
-    revoke.add_argument("--token-id", required=True)
-    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
-    registry = TokenRegistry(args.registry)
-    if args.command == "issue":
-        grant = json.loads(Path(args.grant_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        token, record = registry.issue(grant)
-        _write_secret_file(
-            Path(args.token_file),
-            token,
-            owner=args.owner,
-            group=args.group,
-        )
-        print(json.dumps({"token_id": record["token_id"], "created": True}, sort_keys=True))
-        return 0
-    changed = registry.revoke(args.token_id)
-    print(json.dumps({"token_id": args.token_id, "revoked": changed}, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -1,564 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Execution-readiness adapters and the fail-closed Shadow controller service."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import base64
-import dataclasses
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import subprocess
-import threading
-import time
-from http import HTTPStatus
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Protocol
-from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
-
-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import (
-    Ed25519PrivateKey,
-)
-
-from silent_release_controller import _sanitize, utc_now
-from silent_release_hardening import (
-    BuilderAttestation,
-    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
-    ReleaseRecoveryWorker,
-    SignedApprovalVerifier,
-    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
-    SilentReleaseActionService,
-    TrustedCandidateBundle,
-    _canonical_json,
-    _durable_json,
-    _safe_child,
-)
-
-
-class BuilderSigner(Protocol):
-    @property
-    def key_id(self) -> str:
-        ...
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
-        ...
-
-
-class LocalTestBuilderSigner:
-    """Ephemeral in-memory signer. It is forbidden for production execution."""
-
-    test_only = True
-
-    def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
-        self._key_id = str(key_id)
-        self._private_key = private_key
-
-    @property
-    def key_id(self) -> str:
-        return self._key_id
-
-    @classmethod
-    def generate(
-        cls, key_id: str = "shadow-builder-test-key"
-    ) -> "LocalTestBuilderSigner":
-        return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
-
-    @property
-    def public_key(self):
-        return self._private_key.public_key()
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
-        return self._private_key.sign(payload)
-
-
-class ExternalKmsBuilderSigner:
-    """Signer facade whose private operation remains in KMS/HSM."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        key_id: str,
-        credential_reference: str,
-        sign_callback: Callable[[str, bytes], bytes],
-    ):
-        if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
-            ("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
-        ):
-            raise ValueError("production builder requires a KMS/HSM reference")
-        self._key_id = str(key_id)
-        self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
-        self._sign_callback = sign_callback
-
-    @property
-    def key_id(self) -> str:
-        return self._key_id
-
-    def sign(self, payload: bytes) -> bytes:
-        return bytes(self._sign_callback(self.credential_reference, payload))
-
-
-class SignedTrustedBuilderAdapter:
-    """Signs evidence produced by a trusted collector, never caller evidence."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        collector: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], TrustedCandidateBundle],
-        signer: BuilderSigner,
-    ):
-        self.collector = collector
-        self.signer = signer
-
-    def build(self, intent: Mapping[str, Any]) -> TrustedCandidateBundle:
-        forbidden = {
-            "artifact_sha256",
-            "canary",
-            "checks",
-            "manifest_sha256",
-            "tests",
-            "tree_oid",
-        }
-        if forbidden.intersection(intent):
-            raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
-                "trusted builder rejects caller-supplied evidence"
-            )
-        unsigned = self.collector(dict(intent))
-        if unsigned.attestation is not None:
-            raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
-                "collector cannot self-attest its evidence"
-            )
-        candidate = unsigned.candidate
-        test_sha = hashlib.sha256(
-            _canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.tests))
-        ).hexdigest()
-        canary_sha = hashlib.sha256(
-            _canonical_json(_sanitize(candidate.canary))
-        ).hexdigest()
-        attestation_id = "builder-attestation-" + hashlib.sha256(
-            (
-                candidate.candidate_id
-                + "\0"
-                + candidate.source_commit
-                + "\0"
-                + candidate.artifact_sha256
-            ).encode("utf-8")
-        ).hexdigest()[:24]
-        attestation = BuilderAttestation(
-            builder_attestation_id=attestation_id,
-            builder_key_id=self.signer.key_id,
-            source_commit=candidate.source_commit,
-            tree_oid=candidate.tree_oid,
-            artifact_sha256=candidate.artifact_sha256,
-            manifest_sha256=candidate.manifest_sha256,
-            package_closure_sha256=(
-                unsigned.release_plan.deployment.package_closure_sha256
-            ),
-            test_evidence_sha256=test_sha,
-            canary_evidence_sha256=canary_sha,
-            issued_at=utc_now(),
-            signature="",
-        )
-        attestation = dataclasses.replace(
-            attestation,
-            signature=base64.b64encode(
-                self.signer.sign(attestation.canonical_bytes())
-            ).decode("ascii"),
-        )
-        return dataclasses.replace(unsigned, attestation=attestation)
-
-
-class ApprovalBackendAdapter(Protocol):
-    @property
-    def available(self) -> bool:
-        ...
-
-    def verify(
-        self,
-        approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
-        *,
-        candidate,
-        release_plan,
-        policy_sha256: str,
-    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
-        ...
-
-
-class LocalTestApprovalSigner:
-    """Test-only approval signer used solely for Shadow acceptance."""
-
-    test_only = True
-
-    def __init__(self, key_id: str, private_key: Ed25519PrivateKey):
-        self.key_id = str(key_id)
-        self.private_key = private_key
-
-    @classmethod
-    def generate(
-        cls, key_id: str = "shadow-owner-test-key"
-    ) -> "LocalTestApprovalSigner":
-        return cls(key_id, Ed25519PrivateKey.generate())
-
-    def sign(
-        self, approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval
-    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
-        unsigned = dataclasses.replace(
-            approval, key_id=self.key_id, signature=""
-        )
-        return dataclasses.replace(
-            unsigned,
-            signature=base64.b64encode(
-                self.private_key.sign(unsigned.canonical_bytes())
-            ).decode("ascii"),
-        )
-
-
-class ProductionApprovalBackendAdapter:
-    """Verification-only production adapter configured by a secret/KMS ref."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        verifier: SignedApprovalVerifier,
-        credential_reference: str,
-    ):
-        if not str(credential_reference).startswith(
-            ("kms://", "hsm://", "secret-manager://")
-        ):
-            raise ValueError(
-                "production approval backend requires a KMS/secret reference"
-            )
-        self.verifier = verifier
-        self.credential_reference = str(credential_reference)
-
-    @property
-    def available(self) -> bool:
-        return True
-
-    def verify(
-        self,
-        approval: SignedReleasePlanApproval,
-        *,
-        candidate,
-        release_plan,
-        policy_sha256: str,
-    ) -> SignedReleasePlanApproval:
-        return self.verifier.verify_release_plan(
-            approval, candidate, release_plan, policy_sha256
-        )
-
-
-class UnavailableProductionApprovalBackend:
-    credential_reference = None
-
-    @property
-    def available(self) -> bool:
-        return False
-
-    def verify(self, *args, **kwargs):
-        raise CapabilityAuthorizationError(
-            "production approval backend is not configured"
-        )
-
-
-class LeaderLock:
-    def __init__(self, path: Path):
-        self.path = Path(path)
-        self.handle = None
-
-    def __enter__(self):
-        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        os.chmod(self.path.parent, 0o700)
-        self.handle = self.path.open("a+", encoding="utf-8")
-        os.chmod(self.path, 0o600)
-        try:
-            import fcntl
-
-            fcntl.flock(
-                self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB
-            )
-        except BlockingIOError as exc:
-            self.handle.close()
-            self.handle = None
-            raise RuntimeError("silent release leader is already active") from exc
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
-        if self.handle is not None:
-            try:
-                import fcntl
-
-                fcntl.flock(self.handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
-            finally:
-                self.handle.close()
-                self.handle = None
-
-
-class PersistentSilentReleaseController:
-    """Idempotent main-event controller with durable startup/recovery reports."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        root: Path,
-        service: SilentReleaseActionService,
-        *,
-        main_probe: Callable[[], str],
-        recovery_worker: ReleaseRecoveryWorker | None = None,
-    ):
-        self.root = Path(root)
-        self.service = service
-        self.main_probe = main_probe
-        self.recovery_worker = recovery_worker
-        self.leader_path = self.root / "controller.leader.lock"
-        self.status_path = self.root / "controller-status.json"
-
-    def startup_verify(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        checked = 0
-        failed = 0
-        for journal in sorted(self.service.sagas.root.glob("*.events.jsonl")):
-            candidate_id = journal.name[: -len(".events.jsonl")]
-            saga = self.service.sagas.load(candidate_id)
-            checked += 1
-            if not saga.journal_integrity:
-                failed += 1
-        status = {
-            "checked_sagas": checked,
-            "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
-            "failed_closed": failed,
-            "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
-            "side_effects_executed": False,
-            "status": "READY" if failed == 0 else "FAIL_CLOSED",
-        }
-        _durable_json(self.status_path, status)
-        return status
-
-    def run_once(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        with LeaderLock(self.leader_path):
-            startup = self.startup_verify()
-            if startup["status"] != "READY":
-                result = {
-                    "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
-                    "intent": None,
-                    "notification": None,
-                    "recovery": None,
-                    "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
-                    "side_effects_executed": False,
-                    "startup": startup,
-                    "status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
-                }
-                _durable_json(self.status_path, result)
-                return _sanitize(result)
-            source_commit = str(self.main_probe())
-            event_id = f"main-{source_commit}"
-            intent = self.service.create_release_intent(
-                {"event_id": event_id, "source_commit": source_commit}
-            )
-            notification = None
-            if intent.get("candidate_id"):
-                notification = self.service.ensure_owner_notification(
-                    str(intent["candidate_id"])
-                )
-            recovery = (
-                self.recovery_worker.run_once()
-                if self.recovery_worker is not None
-                else self.service.get_recovery_status()
-            )
-            result = {
-                "execution_enabled": self.service.execution_enabled,
-                "intent": intent,
-                "notification": notification,
-                "recovery": recovery,
-                "shadow_mode": not self.service.execution_enabled,
-                "side_effects_executed": False,
-                "startup": startup,
-            }
-            _durable_json(self.status_path, result)
-            return _sanitize(result)
-
-
-class ShadowActionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    service: SilentReleaseActionService
-    controller: PersistentSilentReleaseController
-
-    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
-        return
-
-    def _json(self, payload: Mapping[str, Any], status=HTTPStatus.OK):
-        body = json.dumps(_sanitize(dict(payload)), sort_keys=True).encode()
-        self.send_response(int(status))
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(body)
-
-    def _body(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        size = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-        if size > 1024 * 1024:
-            raise ValueError("request body is too large")
-        return json.loads(self.rfile.read(size) or b"{}")
-
-    def do_GET(self):
-        parsed = urlparse(self.path)
-        query = parse_qs(parsed.query)
-        candidate_id = str((query.get("candidate_id") or [""])[0])
-        try:
-            if parsed.path == "/healthz":
-                return self._json(
-                    {
-                        "execution_enabled": False,
-                        "shadow_mode": True,
-                        "side_effects_executed": False,
-                        "status": "ok",
-                    }
-                )
-            routes = {
-                "/getReleaseCandidate": self.service.get_release_candidate,
-                "/getReleasePlan": self.service.get_release_plan,
-                "/getReleaseAcceptance": self.service.get_acceptance,
-                "/getReleaseSaga": self.service.get_release_saga,
-                "/getCapabilityStatus": self.service.get_capability_status,
-            }
-            if parsed.path in routes:
-                return self._json(routes[parsed.path](candidate_id))
-            if parsed.path == "/getRecoveryStatus":
-                return self._json(self.service.get_recovery_status())
-            self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
-        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as exc:
-            self._json(
-                {"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
-            )
-
-    def do_POST(self):
-        parsed = urlparse(self.path)
-        try:
-            body = self._body()
-            if parsed.path == "/createReleaseIntent":
-                return self._json(self.service.create_release_intent(body))
-            if parsed.path in {
-                "/submitSignedApproval",
-                "/submitOwnerApproval",
-            }:
-                return self._json(self.service.submit_owner_approval(body))
-            if parsed.path == "/startDeployment":
-                return self._json(
-                    self.service.start_deployment(
-                        str(body.get("candidate_id") or "")
-                    )
-                )
-            self._json({"error": "not_found"}, HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND)
-        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError, CapabilityAuthorizationError) as exc:
-            self._json(
-                {"error": type(exc).__name__}, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST
-            )
-
-
-def git_main_probe(repository: Path) -> Callable[[], str]:
-    repository = Path(repository)
-
-    def probe() -> str:
-        completed = subprocess.run(
-            [
-                "git",
-                f"--git-dir={repository}",
-                "rev-parse",
-                "refs/heads/main",
-            ],
-            check=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            timeout=15,
-            env={"PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", "")},
-        )
-        return completed.stdout.strip()
-
-    return probe
-
-
-def serve_shadow(
-    *,
-    state_root: Path,
-    repository: Path,
-    host: str,
-    port: int,
-    poll_seconds: float,
-) -> None:
-    service = SilentReleaseActionService.shadow(state_root)
-    controller = PersistentSilentReleaseController(
-        state_root,
-        service,
-        main_probe=git_main_probe(repository),
-    )
-    controller.run_once()
-    stop = threading.Event()
-
-    def controller_loop() -> None:
-        while not stop.wait(poll_seconds):
-            try:
-                controller.run_once()
-            except Exception as exc:  # fail closed and keep the API available
-                _durable_json(
-                    controller.status_path,
-                    {
-                        "error": type(exc).__name__,
-                        "execution_enabled": False,
-                        "shadow_mode": True,
-                        "side_effects_executed": False,
-                        "status": "FAIL_CLOSED",
-                    },
-                )
-
-    handler = type(
-        "ConfiguredShadowActionHandler",
-        (ShadowActionHandler,),
-        {"service": service, "controller": controller},
-    )
-    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
-    api_thread = threading.Thread(
-        target=server.serve_forever,
-        name="silent-release-shadow-api",
-        daemon=False,
-    )
-    controller_thread = threading.Thread(
-        target=controller_loop,
-        name="silent-release-shadow-controller",
-        daemon=True,
-    )
-    api_thread.start()
-    controller_thread.start()
-    try:
-        while api_thread.is_alive():
-            api_thread.join(timeout=1)
-    finally:
-        stop.set()
-        server.shutdown()
-        server.server_close()
-        controller_thread.join(timeout=max(1.0, poll_seconds + 1.0))
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--state-root", required=True, type=Path)
-    parser.add_argument("--repository", required=True, type=Path)
-    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
-    parser.add_argument("--port", default=18891, type=int)
-    parser.add_argument("--poll-seconds", default=30.0, type=float)
-    arguments = parser.parse_args()
-    if arguments.poll_seconds <= 0:
-        raise SystemExit("poll seconds must be positive")
-    if os.environ.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false").lower() != "false":
-        raise SystemExit("GitOps writes must remain disabled")
-    if (
-        os.environ.get(
-            "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED", "false"
-        ).lower()
-        != "false"
-    ):
-        raise SystemExit("Silent Release execution must remain disabled")
-    serve_shadow(
-        state_root=arguments.state_root,
-        repository=arguments.repository,
-        host=arguments.host,
-        port=arguments.port,
-        poll_seconds=arguments.poll_seconds,
-    )
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-"""Task Plane runtime package."""
-
-from .models import (
-    EvidenceEnvelope,
-    ProbeEvidence,
-    ProbeOutcome,
-    TaskPlan,
-    TaskRecord,
-    TaskStatus,
-    TaskStateTransitionError,
-)
-
-__all__ = [
-    "EvidenceEnvelope",
-    "ProbeEvidence",
-    "ProbeOutcome",
-    "TaskPlan",
-    "TaskRecord",
-    "TaskStatus",
-    "TaskStateTransitionError",
-]
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-"""Adapters for executing tasks via worker backends."""
-
-from .base import WorkerAdapter
-from .openclaw import OpenClawAdapter
-from .codex import CodexAdapter
-from .hermes import HermesAdapter
-from .a2a import A2AAdapter
-from .systemd_worker import SystemdWorkerAdapter
-
-__all__ = [
-    "WorkerAdapter",
-    "OpenClawAdapter",
-    "CodexAdapter",
-    "HermesAdapter",
-    "A2AAdapter",
-    "SystemdWorkerAdapter",
-]
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .base import WorkerAdapter
-
-
-class A2AAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
-    worker_name = "a2a"
-
-    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
-        return ["task.exchange", "agent.handoff"]
-
-    def claim(self, task):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
-
-    def execute(self, task, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
-
-    def heartbeat(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
-
-    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
-
-    def probe(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
-
-    def cancel(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
-
-    def collect_result(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-"""Base worker adapter contract."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import abc
-
-
-class WorkerAdapter(abc.ABC):
-    worker_name = "base"
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def claim(self, task):
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def execute(self, task, claim):
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def heartbeat(self, claim):
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def probe(self, claim):
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def cancel(self, claim):
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def collect_result(self, claim):
-        raise NotImplementedError
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .base import WorkerAdapter
-
-
-class CodexAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
-    worker_name = "codex"
-
-    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
-        return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.python", "review.security"]
-
-    def claim(self, task):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
-
-    def execute(self, task, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
-
-    def heartbeat(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
-
-    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
-
-    def probe(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
-
-    def cancel(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
-
-    def collect_result(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .base import WorkerAdapter
-
-
-class HermesAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
-    worker_name = "hermes"
-
-    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
-        return ["architecture.review", "policy.review", "threat.model"]
-
-    def claim(self, task):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
-
-    def execute(self, task, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
-
-    def heartbeat(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
-
-    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
-
-    def probe(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
-
-    def cancel(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
-
-    def collect_result(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .base import WorkerAdapter
-
-
-class OpenClawAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
-    worker_name = "openclaw"
-
-    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
-        return ["code.read", "code.write.patch", "test.execute", "runtime.shadow"]
-
-    def claim(self, task):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
-
-    def execute(self, task, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
-
-    def heartbeat(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
-
-    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
-
-    def probe(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
-
-    def cancel(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
-
-    def collect_result(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .base import WorkerAdapter
-
-
-class SystemdWorkerAdapter(WorkerAdapter):
-    worker_name = "systemd_worker"
-
-    def capabilities(self) -> list[str]:
-        return ["systemd.exec", "runtime.shell"]
-
-    def claim(self, task):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "claimed"}
-
-    def execute(self, task, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "task_id": task.task_id, "status": "SHADOW_VERIFIED", "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "execution_mode": "shadow", "production_side_effects": False}
-
-    def heartbeat(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "alive"}
-
-    def report_progress(self, claim, progress):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "progress": progress}
-
-    def probe(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status}
-
-    def cancel(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": "cancelled"}
-
-    def collect_result(self, claim):
-        return {"worker": self.worker_name, "claim_id": claim.claim_id, "result": "not_collected"}
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-"""Agent registry abstraction."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .errors import NotFoundError
-
-
-class AgentRegistry:
-    def __init__(self):
-        self._agents: dict[str, dict] = {}
-
-    def register(self, agent_id: str, metadata: dict) -> None:
-        self._agents[agent_id] = {"agent_id": agent_id, **metadata}
-
-    def unregister(self, agent_id: str) -> None:
-        if agent_id not in self._agents:
-            raise NotFoundError("agent")
-        del self._agents[agent_id]
-
-    def list(self) -> list[dict]:
-        return list(self._agents.values())
-
-    def get(self, agent_id: str) -> dict:
-        try:
-            return self._agents[agent_id]
-        except KeyError:
-            raise NotFoundError("agent")
@@ -1,557 +0,0 @@
-"""Task Plane HTTP API implementation (stdlib-only)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import time
-import uuid
-import urllib.parse
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
-from typing import Any, Callable
-
-from .delegation import DelegationEngine
-from .errors import (
-    ConflictError,
-    ForbiddenError,
-    NotFoundError,
-    PayloadTooLargeError,
-    TaskPlaneHTTPError,
-    UnauthorizedError,
-    ValidationError,
-)
-from .evidence import EvidenceService
-from .journal import TaskJournal
-from .lease import LeaseManager
-from .models import (
-    EvidenceEnvelope,
-    ResultEnvelope,
-    TaskPlan,
-    TaskRecord,
-    iso8601_now,
-    contains_secret_text,
-    validate_identifier,
-)
-from .policy import PolicyEngine
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
-
-
-def _json_payload(data: dict[str, Any], status: int = 200) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
-    body = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
-    return status, body
-
-
-def _bounded_int(value: Any, name: str, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
-    try:
-        number = int(value)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}") from exc
-    if not minimum <= number <= maximum:
-        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}")
-    return number
-
-
-class TaskPlaneService:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore, policy: PolicyEngine | None = None):
-        self.store = store
-        self.policy = policy or PolicyEngine(
-            execution_enabled=False,
-            identity_capabilities={
-                "anon": {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.audit"}
-            },
-        )
-        self.journal = TaskJournal(store)
-        self.lease = LeaseManager(store)
-        self.workers = WorkerRegistry(store)
-        self.evidence = EvidenceService(store)
-        self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
-        self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
-
-    def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if body.get("parent_task_id"):
-            raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
-        issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
-        actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
-        try:
-            plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
-        task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
-        return task.to_dict()
-
-    def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
-        return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
-
-    def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
-
-    def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
-        return self.workers.get(worker_id).to_dict()
-
-    def list_workers(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
-        return [w.to_dict() for w in self.workers.list()]
-
-    def register_worker(self, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        actor = str(body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("identity") or "")
-        is_admin = actor in self.policy.admin_identities
-        try:
-            existing = self.store.get_worker(str(body.get("worker_id") or ""))
-        except NotFoundError:
-            existing = None
-        if existing is not None and str(body.get("identity") or "") != existing.identity:
-            raise ConflictError("worker identity takeover rejected")
-        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_registration(actor, body)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed(
-            "worker.admin" if is_admin else "worker.register", actor
-        )
-        try:
-            worker = self.workers.register(
-                body,
-                actor_identity=actor,
-                is_admin=is_admin,
-                expected_revision=body.get("expected_revision"),
-            )
-        except (TypeError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid worker registration") from exc
-        return worker.to_dict()
-
-    def worker_heartbeat(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        interval = payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds")
-        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
-        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.register", actor)
-        return self.workers.heartbeat(
-            worker_id,
-            heartbeat_interval_seconds=interval,
-            actor_identity=actor,
-            expected_revision=payload.get("expected_revision"),
-        ).to_dict()
-
-    def disable_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
-        return self.store.disable_worker(
-            worker_id,
-            actor_identity=actor,
-            expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
-            reason=str(payload.get("reason") or "disabled by administrator"),
-        ).to_dict()
-
-    def restore_worker(self, worker_id: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        actor = str(payload.get("actor_identity") or "")
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("worker.admin", actor)
-        return self.store.restore_worker(
-            worker_id,
-            actor_identity=actor,
-            expected_revision=int(payload.get("expected_revision")),
-        ).to_dict()
-
-    def claim(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor)
-        worker_id = body.get("worker_id")
-        if not worker_id:
-            raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
-
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
-        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
-            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
-        )
-        claim = self.lease.claim(
-            task_id=task_id,
-            worker_id=worker_id,
-            worker_identity=actor,
-            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
-            expected_revision=task.revision,
-            operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
-        )
-        return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, **claim.to_dict()}
-
-    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
-        if not claim_id:
-            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
-        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
-        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
-            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
-        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
-            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
-        )
-        claim = self.lease.heartbeat(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
-        return {"claim_id": claim_id, "lease_until": claim.lease_until}
-
-    def progress(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
-        if not claim_id:
-            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        progress = body.get("progress")
-        stage = body.get("stage", "RUNNING")
-        message = body.get("message")
-        if progress is None:
-            raise ValidationError("progress required")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
-        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
-        if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
-            if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
-                raise ValidationError(
-                    "credential-secret progress must contain metadata only"
-                )
-        lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
-            body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
-        )
-        claim = self.store.record_progress(
-            task_id,
-            claim_id,
-            actor,
-            progress=progress,
-            stage=str(stage),
-            message=None if message is None else str(message),
-            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
-        )
-        return {"claim_id": claim.claim_id, "status": claim.status, "progress": progress}
-
-    def complete(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
-        if not claim_id:
-            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-
-        status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
-        outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
-        evidences = body.get("evidence", [])
-        if not isinstance(outputs, list):
-            raise ValidationError("outputs must be list")
-        if not isinstance(evidences, list):
-            raise ValidationError("evidence must be list")
-        if any(not isinstance(ev, dict) for ev in evidences):
-            raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
-        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
-        self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
-        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
-            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
-        if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
-            allowed_result_keys = {
-                "kind",
-                "hash",
-                "sha256",
-                "count",
-                "status",
-                "error_code",
-                "signature",
-                "attestation_ref",
-            }
-            for entry in [*outputs, *evidences]:
-                if (
-                    not isinstance(entry, dict)
-                    or set(entry) - allowed_result_keys
-                    or contains_secret_text(entry)
-                ):
-                    raise ValidationError(
-                        "credential-secret result must contain hash/count/status only"
-                    )
-
-        result = ResultEnvelope(
-            task_id=task_id,
-            claim_id=claim_id,
-            worker_identity=actor,
-            status=status,
-            outputs=outputs,
-            evidence=evidences,
-            started_at=str(body.get("started_at") or iso8601_now()),
-            completed_at=str(body.get("completed_at") or iso8601_now()),
-            result_digest=body.get("result_digest"),
-            signature=body.get("signature"),
-            attestation_ref=body.get("attestation_ref"),
-            operation_digest=claim.operation_digest,
-        )
-        evidence_decision = self.policy.evidence_verifier.verify(task, evidences)
-        if not evidence_decision.allowed:
-            raise ForbiddenError(evidence_decision.reason)
-        result_decision = self.policy.verify_result(result, task)
-        if not result_decision.allowed:
-            raise ForbiddenError(result_decision.reason)
-        result.result_digest = result.computed_digest()
-        previous = self.store._last_evidence_hash(task_id)
-        evidence_entries = []
-        for evidence in evidences:
-            envelope = EvidenceEnvelope.create(
-                task_id=task_id,
-                claim_id=claim_id,
-                kind=str(evidence.get("kind") or evidence.get("type") or "generic"),
-                worker_identity=actor,
-                payload=evidence,
-                previous_evidence_hash=previous,
-                signature=evidence.get("signature"),
-                attestation_ref=evidence.get("attestation_ref"),
-            )
-            evidence_entries.append(envelope)
-            previous = envelope.evidence_digest
-        self.store.complete_claim_with_evidence_and_event(
-            task_id,
-            claim_id,
-            status
-            if status
-            in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "CANCELLED"}
-            else "COMPLETED",
-            result.to_dict(),
-            evidence_entries,
-        )
-        return result.to_dict()
-
-    def fail(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        claim_id = body.get("claim_id")
-        if not claim_id:
-            raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
-        reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
-        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
-        if claim.worker_identity != actor:
-            raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
-        status = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" if body.get("recoverable", False) else "FAILED_FINAL"
-        self.store.fail_claim_with_event(task_id, claim_id, status, str(reason))
-        return {"task_id": task_id, "status": status, "reason": reason}
-
-    def cancel(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
-        reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
-        updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
-            task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
-        )
-        return updated.to_dict()
-
-    def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
-        parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
-        if "task" in body:
-            try:
-                child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
-            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-                raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
-        else:
-            plan_body = dict(body)
-            plan_body.pop("actor_identity", None)
-            try:
-                child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(plan_body)
-            except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-                raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
-        child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
-        child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
-        return child.to_dict()
-
-    def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        return self.store.list_events(task_id)
-
-    def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        return self.evidence.list(task_id)
-
-    def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
-        if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        return self.store.list_children(task_id)
-
-
-class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-    service: TaskPlaneService | None = None
-    authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None
-    max_body_bytes = 1_000_000
-
-    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: Any) -> None:
-        # BaseHTTPRequestHandler logs the raw request target; suppress it so
-        # attacker-controlled paths or query strings cannot leak credentials.
-        return
-
-    def _json(self) -> tuple[str | None, dict[str, Any]]:
-        try:
-            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid content length") from exc
-        if length < 0:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid content length")
-        if length > self.max_body_bytes:
-            raise PayloadTooLargeError("payload exceeds limit")
-        raw = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
-        if not raw:
-            return None, {}
-        try:
-            decoded = raw.decode("utf-8")
-            payload = json.loads(decoded)
-            if not isinstance(payload, dict):
-                raise ValidationError("JSON payload must be an object")
-            return decoded, payload
-        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid JSON payload") from exc
-
-    def _response(self, status: int, payload: Any) -> None:
-        encoded = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
-        self.send_response(status)
-        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
-        self.end_headers()
-        self.wfile.write(encoded)
-
-    def _authenticated_identity(self) -> str:
-        authenticator = type(self).authenticator
-        if authenticator is None:
-            raise UnauthorizedError("authentication unavailable")
-        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
-        if not header.startswith("Bearer "):
-            raise UnauthorizedError("bearer authentication required")
-        token = header[7:]
-        if not token or any(ord(ch) < 33 for ch in token):
-            raise UnauthorizedError("invalid bearer token")
-        identity = authenticator(token)
-        if not identity:
-            raise UnauthorizedError("invalid credentials")
-        return str(identity)
-
-    def _handle(self, handler):
-        try:
-            if self.service is None:
-                raise TaskPlaneHTTPError("service not configured")
-            result = handler()
-            if isinstance(result, tuple):
-                status, payload = result
-            else:
-                status, payload = 200, result
-            self._response(status, payload)
-        except TaskPlaneHTTPError as exc:
-            self._response(exc.status_code, exc.to_payload())
-        except Exception as exc:  # defensive
-            if isinstance(exc, TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-                raise
-            self._response(
-                500,
-                {"error": "internal_error", "message": "internal server error"},
-            )
-
-    def do_GET(self):  # noqa: N802
-        def route():
-            path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
-            parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
-            for part in parts[1:]:
-                if part not in {"events", "evidence", "children", "heartbeat"}:
-                    try:
-                        validate_identifier(part, "resource identifier")
-                    except ValueError as exc:
-                        raise ValidationError("invalid resource identifier") from exc
-            identity = self._authenticated_identity()
-
-            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
-                return 200, self.service.list_tasks(identity)
-            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "tasks":
-                task_id = parts[1]
-                return 200, self.service.get_task(task_id, identity)
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "events":
-                return 200, self.service.get_events(parts[1], identity)
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "evidence":
-                return 200, self.service.get_evidence(parts[1], identity)
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "children":
-                return 200, self.service.get_children(parts[1], identity)
-            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "workers":
-                return 200, self.service.list_workers(identity)
-            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers":
-                return 200, self.service.get_worker(parts[1], identity)
-            raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
-
-        self._handle(route)
-
-    def do_POST(self):  # noqa: N802
-        def route():
-            body_text, body = self._json()
-            identity = self._authenticated_identity()
-            path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
-            parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
-            headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in self.headers.items()}
-
-            if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0] == "tasks":
-                issuer = body.get("issuer")
-                if issuer and (
-                    not isinstance(issuer, dict) or issuer.get("id") != identity
-                ):
-                    raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
-                body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
-                return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
-            if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
-                raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
-            body["actor_identity"] = identity
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "claim":
-                return 200, self.service.claim(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
-                return 200, self.service.heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "progress":
-                return 200, self.service.progress(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "result":
-                return 200, self.service.complete(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "fail":
-                return 200, self.service.fail(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "cancel":
-                return 200, self.service.cancel(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "tasks" and parts[2] == "delegate":
-                return 200, self.service.delegate(parts[1], body or {})
-
-            if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[1] == "register":
-                if (
-                    body.get("identity") != identity
-                    and identity not in self.service.policy.admin_identities
-                ):
-                    raise ForbiddenError("worker identity mismatch")
-                return 201, self.service.register_worker(body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "heartbeat":
-                return 200, self.service.worker_heartbeat(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "disable":
-                return 200, self.service.disable_worker(parts[1], body or {})
-            if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "workers" and parts[2] == "restore":
-                return 200, self.service.restore_worker(parts[1], body or {})
-            raise NotFoundError("unknown endpoint")
-
-        self._handle(route)
-
-
-def run_server(
-    host: str,
-    port: int,
-    service: TaskPlaneService,
-    *,
-    authenticator: Callable[[str], str | None] | None = None,
-):
-    handler = TaskPlaneRequestHandler
-    handler.service = service
-    handler.authenticator = authenticator
-    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
-    server.serve_forever()
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-"""Capability matcher helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from fnmatch import fnmatch
-
-
-def _normalize_capability(capability: str) -> str:
-    return capability.strip().lower()
-
-
-def capability_matches(granted: str, required: str) -> bool:
-    granted = _normalize_capability(granted)
-    required = _normalize_capability(required)
-    if granted == required:
-        return True
-    # A granted wildcard such as "test.*" should match required "test.unit"
-    if "*" in granted:
-        return fnmatch(required, granted)
-    # A required wildcard is treated as a suffix/prefix requirement for callers.
-    if "*" in required:
-        return fnmatch(granted, required)
-    return False
-
-
-def has_capabilities(granted_caps: list[str], required_caps: list[str]) -> bool:
-    granted = [_normalize_capability(c) for c in granted_caps]
-    for required in required_caps:
-        required = _normalize_capability(required)
-        if not any(capability_matches(g, required) for g in granted):
-            return False
-    return True
-
-
-def normalize_capabilities(caps: list[str]) -> list[str]:
-    return sorted({_normalize_capability(cap) for cap in caps})
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-"""Delegation guardrails."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .errors import ConflictError, ForbiddenError, NotFoundError
-from .models import Budget, TaskPlan, TaskRecord
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-class DelegationEngine:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def can_delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan) -> bool:
-        parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
-        if parent.status == "COMPLETED":
-            raise ConflictError("cannot delegate completed task")
-        if parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth <= 0:
-            raise ConflictError("max delegation depth not configured")
-
-        depth = self._depth(parent_id)
-        if depth >= parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth:
-            raise ConflictError("max delegation depth reached")
-
-        if child_plan.parent_task_id not in {None, parent_id}:
-            raise ConflictError("delegation parent mismatch")
-        current = parent_id
-        while current:
-            if child_plan.task_id and current == child_plan.task_id:
-                raise ConflictError("delegation cycle")
-            current = self.store.parent_of(current)
-        return True
-
-    def delegate(self, parent_id: str, child_plan: TaskPlan, *, caller: str) -> TaskRecord:
-        self.can_delegate(parent_id, child_plan)
-        parent = self.store.get_task(parent_id)
-        if child_plan.required_capabilities and not set(child_plan.required_capabilities).issubset(
-            set(parent.task_plan.required_capabilities or [])
-        ):
-            raise ForbiddenError("child capabilities exceed parent constraints")
-        risk_rank = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
-        if risk_rank.get(child_plan.risk, 99) > risk_rank.get(parent.task_plan.risk, -1):
-            raise ForbiddenError("child risk exceeds parent constraints")
-        child_plan.parent_task_id = parent_id
-        child_plan.correlation_id = parent.task_plan.correlation_id or parent.task_id
-        child_plan.preferred_workers = parent.task_plan.preferred_workers
-        child_plan.max_delegation_depth = min(
-            child_plan.max_delegation_depth,
-            parent.task_plan.max_delegation_depth,
-        )
-        child_plan.approval_policy = parent.task_plan.approval_policy
-
-        parent_budget = self.store.get_task_budget(parent_id)
-        required = Budget()
-        for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
-            available = getattr(parent_budget, name)
-            requested = getattr(child_plan.budgets, name)
-            if name == "attempts" and requested is None:
-                requested = 1
-            if available is not None:
-                requested = 0 if requested is None else requested
-                if requested > available:
-                    raise ConflictError(f"budget exceeded for {name}")
-                setattr(child_plan.budgets, name, requested)
-            setattr(required, name, requested)
-
-        # A retried identical delegation is a read, not a second budget charge.
-        if child_plan.task_id:
-            try:
-                existing = self.store.get_task(child_plan.task_id)
-            except NotFoundError:
-                existing = None
-            if existing is not None:
-                if (
-                    existing.task_plan.parent_task_id == parent_id
-                    and existing.task_plan.operation_digest()
-                    == child_plan.operation_digest()
-                ):
-                    return existing
-                raise ConflictError("delegation task_id conflict")
-
-        return self.store.delegate_task_with_budget_and_events(
-            parent_id, child_plan, caller=caller
-        )
-
-    def _depth(self, task_id: str) -> int:
-        return self.store._compute_depth(task_id)
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-"""Error types for task plane operations."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-
-class TaskPlaneError(Exception):
-    """Base exception for API-compatible failures."""
-
-    status_code = 500
-    error_code = "task_plane_error"
-
-    def __init__(self, message: str, *, code: str | None = None, details: dict | None = None):
-        super().__init__(message)
-        self.message = message
-        self.details = details or {}
-        if code:
-            self.error_code = code
-
-    def to_payload(self) -> dict:
-        return {"error": self.error_code, "message": self.message, "details": self.details}
-
-
-class TaskPlaneHTTPError(TaskPlaneError):
-    """Base class with explicit HTTP status."""
-
-    status_code = 500
-
-
-class ValidationError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 400
-    error_code = "validation_error"
-
-
-class UnauthorizedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 401
-    error_code = "unauthorized"
-
-
-class ForbiddenError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 403
-    error_code = "forbidden"
-
-
-class NotFoundError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 404
-    error_code = "not_found"
-
-
-class ConflictError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 409
-    error_code = "conflict"
-
-
-class PayloadTooLargeError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 413
-    error_code = "payload_too_large"
-
-
-class FailedDependencyError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 424
-    error_code = "failed_dependency"
-
-
-class LockedError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 423
-    error_code = "locked"
-
-
-class ServiceUnavailableError(TaskPlaneHTTPError):
-    status_code = 503
-    error_code = "service_unavailable"
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-"""CloudEvents-compatible event envelope and durable outbox helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Callable, Protocol
-
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-@dataclass
-class CloudEvent:
-    specversion: str = "1.0"
-    id: str = ""
-    type: str = ""
-    source: str = "spiffe://aios/task-plane"
-    subject: str = ""
-    datacontenttype: str = "application/json"
-    data: dict | None = None
-
-    @property
-    def time(self) -> str:
-        return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-    def asdict(self) -> dict:
-        return {
-            "specversion": self.specversion,
-            "id": self.id,
-            "type": self.type,
-            "source": self.source,
-            "subject": self.subject,
-            "time": self.time,
-            "datacontenttype": self.datacontenttype,
-            "data": self.data or {},
-        }
-
-
-NOT_DELIVERED = "NOT_DELIVERED"
-DELIVERED = "DELIVERED"
-FAILED_DELIVERY = "FAILED"
-
-
-class NotificationAdapter(Protocol):
-    name: str
-
-    def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
-        """Return a provider receipt, or None when delivery is unconfirmed."""
-
-
-class CallbackNotificationAdapter:
-    """Adapter seam for webhook, NATS, GPT, dashboard, and WeChat transports."""
-
-    def __init__(self, name: str, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
-        self.name = name
-        self._callback = callback
-
-    def deliver(self, envelope: dict) -> str | None:
-        return self._callback(envelope)
-
-
-class WebhookAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
-    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
-        super().__init__("webhook", callback)
-
-
-class NatsJetStreamAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
-    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
-        super().__init__("nats-jetstream", callback)
-
-
-class GPTResultCallbackAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
-    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
-        super().__init__("gpt-result-callback", callback)
-
-
-class DashboardAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
-    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
-        super().__init__("dashboard", callback)
-
-
-class WeChatGatewayAdapter(CallbackNotificationAdapter):
-    def __init__(self, callback: Callable[[dict], str | None]):
-        super().__init__("wechat-gateway", callback)
-
-
-class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def dispatch(self, message_id: str, adapter: NotificationAdapter) -> dict:
-        row = self.store.get_outbox_message(message_id)
-        import json
-
-        envelope = json.loads(row["payload"])
-        try:
-            receipt = adapter.deliver(envelope)
-        except Exception:
-            return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
-                message_id,
-                receipt=None,
-                error=f"{adapter.name} delivery failed",
-            )
-        return self.store.record_outbox_delivery(
-            message_id,
-            receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
-            error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
-        )
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-"""Evidence helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-def evidence_digest(payload: dict) -> str:
-    body = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-    return hashlib.sha256(body.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-class EvidenceService:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def add(self, task_id: str, kind: str, payload: dict, worker_identity: str) -> str:
-        return self.store.add_evidence(task_id, kind, payload, worker_identity)
-
-    def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
-        return self.store.list_evidence(task_id)
-
-    def verify(self, task_id: str, required_kinds: list[str]) -> bool:
-        evidences = self.list(task_id)
-        observed = {e["kind"] for e in evidences}
-        return set(required_kinds).issubset(
-            observed
-        ) and self.store.verify_evidence_integrity(task_id)
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-"""Event journaling helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .errors import ValidationError
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-class TaskJournal:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def append(self, task_id: str, event_type: str, data: dict, *, subject: str | None = None) -> None:
-        if not event_type:
-            raise ValidationError("event_type required")
-        self.store.append_event(task_id, event_type, data, subject=subject)
-
-    def list(self, task_id: str) -> list[dict]:
-        return self.store.list_events(task_id)
-
-    def check_chain(self, task_id: str) -> bool:
-        return self.store.verify_event_chain(task_id)
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-"""Claim and lease management helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from .errors import LockedError
-from .models import ProbeEvidence
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-class LeaseManager:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def claim(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, worker_identity: str, lease_seconds: int, expected_revision: int, operation_digest: str):
-        return self.store.claim_task(task_id, worker_id, worker_identity, lease_seconds, expected_revision, operation_digest)
-
-    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, lease_seconds: int):
-        claim = self.store.heartbeat_claim(task_id, claim_id, lease_seconds)
-        return claim
-
-    def probe(self, claim_id: str):
-        claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
-        if claim.status != "ACTIVE":
-            raise LockedError("claim not active")
-        return claim
-
-    def recover(self, task_id: str, claim_id: str, probe: ProbeEvidence):
-        return self.store.recover_expired_claim(
-            task_id,
-            claim_id,
-            probe,
-        )
@@ -1,829 +0,0 @@
-"""Core data models for the task plane."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import re
-import time
-import uuid
-import urllib.parse
-from enum import StrEnum
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
-
-
-SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
-    "secret",
-    "password",
-    "token",
-    "api_key",
-    "access_token",
-    "refresh_token",
-    "authorization",
-    "private_key",
-    "client_secret",
-    "credential",
-}
-IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}")
-TYPE_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}")
-RISK_LEVELS = {"low", "medium", "high"}
-DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS = {
-    "public",
-    "internal",
-    "confidential",
-    "credential-secret",
-}
-SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS = (
-    re.compile(r"(?i)\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
-    re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\b"),
-    re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
-    re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-)
-TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
-    "schema_version",
-    "task_id",
-    "task_type",
-    "issuer",
-    "intent",
-    "required_capabilities",
-    "preferred_workers",
-    "risk",
-    "approval_policy",
-    "dependencies",
-    "max_delegation_depth",
-    "budgets",
-    "evidence_requirements",
-    "parent_task_id",
-    "correlation_id",
-    "metadata",
-    "data_classification",
-    "execution_zone",
-    "network_policy",
-    "logging_policy",
-    "allowed_input_paths",
-    "allowed_output_paths",
-    "output_policy",
-}
-
-
-def _now_ts() -> float:
-    return time.time()
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
-    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-
-
-def compute_sha256_hex(value: Any) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-def contains_secret_text(value: Any) -> bool:
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in SECRET_TEXT_PATTERNS)
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value.values())
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-        return any(contains_secret_text(item) for item in value)
-    return False
-
-
-def validate_relative_paths(values: Any, name: str) -> list[str]:
-    paths = _normalize_list(values)
-    for value in paths:
-        decoded = urllib.parse.unquote(value)
-        parts = value.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
-        if (
-            decoded != value
-            or "\\" in value
-            or value.startswith("/")
-            or re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", value)
-            or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts)
-        ):
-            raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
-    return paths
-
-
-def validate_identifier(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
-    text = str(value or "")
-    if (
-        not IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text)
-        or urllib.parse.unquote(text) != text
-        or any(ord(ch) < 32 or ord(ch) == 127 for ch in text)
-    ):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
-    return text
-
-
-def validate_type(value: Any, name: str) -> str:
-    text = str(value or "")
-    if not TYPE_RE.fullmatch(text):
-        raise ValueError(f"invalid {name}")
-    return text
-
-
-def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        redacted = {}
-        for key, inner in value.items():
-            lowered = str(key).lower()
-            if lowered in SENSITIVE_KEYS or lowered.endswith(
-                ("_password", "_secret", "_access_token", "_refresh_token", "_private_key")
-            ):
-                redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]"
-            else:
-                redacted[key] = redact_value(inner)
-        return redacted
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
-    if isinstance(value, tuple):
-        return tuple(redact_value(v) for v in value)
-    return value
-
-
-class TaskStateTransitionError(ValueError):
-    pass
-
-
-class TaskStatus(StrEnum):
-    CREATED = "CREATED"
-    QUEUED = "QUEUED"
-    CLAIMED = "CLAIMED"
-    RUNNING = "RUNNING"
-    WAITING_CHILD = "WAITING_CHILD"
-    VERIFYING = "VERIFYING"
-    COMPLETED = "COMPLETED"
-    FAILED_RECOVERABLE = "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"
-    FAILED_FINAL = "FAILED_FINAL"
-    CANCELLED = "CANCELLED"
-    MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-
-
-TASK_STATES = {
-    status.value for status in TaskStatus
-}
-
-
-TASK_NEXT_STATES = {
-    "CREATED": {"QUEUED", "CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED"},
-    "QUEUED": {"CLAIMED", "CANCELLED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL"},
-    "CLAIMED": {"RUNNING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
-    "RUNNING": {"VERIFYING", "WAITING_CHILD", "COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
-    "WAITING_CHILD": {"RUNNING", "VERIFYING", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
-    "VERIFYING": {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"},
-    "COMPLETED": set(),
-    "FAILED_RECOVERABLE": {"CLAIMED", "RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
-    "FAILED_FINAL": set(),
-    "CANCELLED": set(),
-    "MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED": {"RUNNING", "CANCELLED"},
-}
-
-
-@dataclass
-class Budget:
-    time_seconds: int | None = None
-    attempts: int | None = None
-    tokens: int | None = None
-    cost: float | None = None
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "Budget":
-        if not data:
-            return cls()
-        if not isinstance(data, dict) or set(data) - {
-            "time_seconds",
-            "attempts",
-            "tokens",
-            "cost",
-        }:
-            raise ValueError("invalid budget")
-        for name in ("time_seconds", "attempts", "tokens", "cost"):
-            value = data.get(name)
-            if value is not None:
-                try:
-                    if float(value) < 0:
-                        raise ValueError("budget values must be non-negative")
-                except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
-                    raise ValueError("invalid budget value") from exc
-        return cls(
-            time_seconds=_to_positive_int(data.get("time_seconds")),
-            attempts=_to_positive_int(data.get("attempts")),
-            tokens=_to_positive_int(data.get("tokens")),
-            cost=_to_float(data.get("cost")),
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "time_seconds": self.time_seconds,
-            "attempts": self.attempts,
-            "tokens": self.tokens,
-            "cost": self.cost,
-        }
-
-    def merge(self, other: "Budget") -> "Budget":
-        return Budget(
-            time_seconds=_first_non_none(self.time_seconds, other.time_seconds),
-            attempts=_first_non_none(self.attempts, other.attempts),
-            tokens=_first_non_none(self.tokens, other.tokens),
-            cost=_first_non_none(self.cost, other.cost),
-        )
-
-
-@dataclass
-class TaskPlan:
-    schema_version: int = 1
-    task_id: str | None = None
-    task_type: str = "code.change"
-    issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    intent: str | None = None
-    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    preferred_workers: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    risk: str = "medium"
-    approval_policy: str = "patch-only"
-    dependencies: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    max_delegation_depth: int = 5
-    budgets: Budget = field(default_factory=Budget)
-    evidence_requirements: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    parent_task_id: str | None = None
-    correlation_id: str | None = None
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
-    data_classification: str = "internal"
-    execution_zone: str = "isolated-development"
-    network_policy: str = "controlled"
-    logging_policy: str = "redacted"
-    allowed_input_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    allowed_output_paths: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    output_policy: str = "standard"
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> "TaskPlan":
-        if not isinstance(data, dict):
-            raise ValueError("task plan payload must be an object")
-        unknown = set(data) - TASK_PLAN_KEYS
-        if unknown:
-            raise ValueError("unknown task plan fields")
-        if "task_id" not in data or data["task_id"] is None:
-            data = dict(data)
-            data["task_id"] = f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
-        risk = str(data.get("risk", "medium"))
-        if risk not in RISK_LEVELS:
-            raise ValueError("invalid risk")
-        issuer = data.get("issuer", {})
-        if not isinstance(issuer, dict):
-            raise ValueError("issuer must be an object")
-        schema_version = int(data.get("schema_version", 1))
-        if schema_version != 1:
-            raise ValueError("unsupported schema_version")
-        max_depth = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_delegation_depth"), default=5)
-        if max_depth is None or max_depth > 32:
-            raise ValueError("invalid max_delegation_depth")
-        classification = str(data.get("data_classification", "internal"))
-        if classification not in DATA_CLASSIFICATIONS:
-            raise ValueError("invalid data_classification")
-        execution_zone = validate_type(
-            data.get("execution_zone", "isolated-development"), "execution_zone"
-        )
-        network_policy = validate_type(
-            data.get("network_policy", "controlled"), "network_policy"
-        )
-        logging_policy = validate_type(
-            data.get("logging_policy", "redacted"), "logging_policy"
-        )
-        output_policy = validate_type(
-            data.get("output_policy", "standard"), "output_policy"
-        )
-        if contains_secret_text(
-            {
-                "intent": data.get("intent"),
-                "metadata": data.get("metadata", {}),
-            }
-        ):
-            raise ValueError("task content contains secret material")
-        if classification == "credential-secret":
-            if execution_zone != "secure-file-transformer":
-                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires secure-file-transformer")
-            if network_policy != "denied":
-                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires network denied")
-            if logging_policy != "metadata-only":
-                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
-            if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
-                raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
-        return cls(
-            schema_version=schema_version,
-            task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
-            task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
-            issuer=issuer,
-            intent=data.get("intent"),
-            required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
-            preferred_workers=_normalize_list(data.get("preferred_workers", [])),
-            risk=risk,
-            approval_policy=validate_type(
-                data.get("approval_policy", "patch-only"), "approval_policy"
-            ),
-            dependencies=_normalize_list(data.get("dependencies", [])),
-            max_delegation_depth=max_depth,
-            budgets=Budget.from_dict(data.get("budgets")),
-            evidence_requirements=_normalize_list(data.get("evidence_requirements", [])),
-            parent_task_id=data.get("parent_task_id"),
-            correlation_id=data.get("correlation_id"),
-            metadata=data.get("metadata", {}) if isinstance(data.get("metadata", {}), dict) else {},
-            data_classification=classification,
-            execution_zone=execution_zone,
-            network_policy=network_policy,
-            logging_policy=logging_policy,
-            allowed_input_paths=validate_relative_paths(
-                data.get("allowed_input_paths", []), "allowed_input_paths"
-            ),
-            allowed_output_paths=validate_relative_paths(
-                data.get("allowed_output_paths", []), "allowed_output_paths"
-            ),
-            output_policy=output_policy,
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self, *, redact: bool = False) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = {
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "task_type": self.task_type,
-            "issuer": self.issuer,
-            "intent": self.intent,
-            "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),
-            "preferred_workers": list(self.preferred_workers),
-            "risk": self.risk,
-            "approval_policy": self.approval_policy,
-            "dependencies": list(self.dependencies),
-            "max_delegation_depth": self.max_delegation_depth,
-            "budgets": self.budgets.to_dict(),
-            "evidence_requirements": list(self.evidence_requirements),
-            "parent_task_id": self.parent_task_id,
-            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
-            "metadata": dict(self.metadata),
-            "data_classification": self.data_classification,
-            "execution_zone": self.execution_zone,
-            "network_policy": self.network_policy,
-            "logging_policy": self.logging_policy,
-            "allowed_input_paths": list(self.allowed_input_paths),
-            "allowed_output_paths": list(self.allowed_output_paths),
-            "output_policy": self.output_policy,
-        }
-        if redact:
-            payload = redact_value(payload)
-        return payload
-
-    def operation_digest(self) -> str:
-        return compute_sha256_hex(self.to_dict())
-
-
-@dataclass
-class TaskRecord:
-    task_id: str
-    status: str
-    revision: int
-    task_plan: TaskPlan
-    created_at: float
-    updated_at: float
-    root_task_id: str
-    idempotency_key: str | None = None
-    failure_reason: str | None = None
-
-    def with_status(self, status: str) -> "TaskRecord":
-        allowed = TASK_NEXT_STATES.get(self.status, set())
-        if status != self.status and (not allowed and self.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}):
-            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
-        if status not in TASK_STATES:
-            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Invalid status {status}")
-        if status != self.status and self.status in TASK_NEXT_STATES and status not in TASK_NEXT_STATES[self.status]:
-            raise TaskStateTransitionError(f"Cannot transition {self.status} -> {status}")
-        return TaskRecord(
-            task_id=self.task_id,
-            status=status,
-            revision=self.revision + 1,
-            task_plan=self.task_plan,
-            created_at=self.created_at,
-            updated_at=_now_ts(),
-            root_task_id=self.root_task_id,
-            idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
-            failure_reason=self.failure_reason,
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self, *, include_task=True, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = {
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "status": self.status,
-            "revision": self.revision,
-            "root_task_id": self.root_task_id,
-            "parent_task_id": self.task_plan.parent_task_id,
-            "created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at),
-            "updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at),
-            "failure_reason": self.failure_reason,
-        }
-        if include_task:
-            payload["plan"] = self.task_plan.to_dict(redact=redact_payload)
-        if self.idempotency_key:
-            payload["idempotency_key"] = self.idempotency_key
-        return payload
-
-
-@dataclass
-class WorkerRegistration:
-    worker_id: str
-    worker_type: str
-    identity: str
-    capabilities: list[str]
-    trust_zone: str
-    max_concurrency: int
-    heartbeat_interval_seconds: int
-    supported_protocols: list[str]
-    registered_at: float
-    last_heartbeat: float
-    status: str = "active"
-    disabled: bool = False
-    owner_identity: str = ""
-    registration_revision: int = 1
-    registration_policy: str = "self"
-    created_at: float = 0.0
-    updated_at: float = 0.0
-    disabled_reason: str | None = None
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any]) -> "WorkerRegistration":
-        if not isinstance(data, dict):
-            raise ValueError("worker registration payload must be an object")
-        now = _now_ts()
-        worker_id = validate_identifier(data.get("worker_id"), "worker_id")
-        worker_type = validate_type(data.get("worker_type"), "worker_type")
-        identity = str(data.get("identity") or "").strip()
-        if not identity or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in identity):
-            raise ValueError("invalid identity")
-        max_concurrency = _to_positive_int(data.get("max_concurrency"), default=1)
-        heartbeat_interval = _to_positive_int(
-            data.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds"), default=15
-        )
-        if not max_concurrency:
-            raise ValueError("max_concurrency must be positive")
-        if not heartbeat_interval:
-            raise ValueError("heartbeat_interval_seconds must be positive")
-        return cls(
-            worker_id=worker_id,
-            worker_type=worker_type,
-            identity=identity,
-            capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("capabilities", [])),
-            trust_zone=str(data.get("trust_zone") or "default"),
-            max_concurrency=max_concurrency,
-            heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval,
-            supported_protocols=_normalize_list(
-                data.get("supported_protocols", ["aios-task-v1"])
-            ),
-            registered_at=float(data.get("registered_at") or now),
-            last_heartbeat=float(data.get("last_heartbeat") or now),
-            status=str(data.get("status") or "active"),
-            disabled=bool(data.get("disabled", False)),
-            owner_identity=str(data.get("owner_identity") or identity),
-            registration_revision=int(data.get("registration_revision") or 1),
-            registration_policy=str(data.get("registration_policy") or "self"),
-            created_at=float(data.get("created_at") or data.get("registered_at") or now),
-            updated_at=float(data.get("updated_at") or now),
-            disabled_reason=data.get("disabled_reason"),
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = {
-            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
-            "worker_type": self.worker_type,
-            "identity": self.identity,
-            "capabilities": list(self.capabilities),
-            "trust_zone": self.trust_zone,
-            "max_concurrency": self.max_concurrency,
-            "heartbeat_interval_seconds": self.heartbeat_interval_seconds,
-            "supported_protocols": list(self.supported_protocols),
-            "registered_at": _fmt_ts(self.registered_at),
-            "last_heartbeat": _fmt_ts(self.last_heartbeat),
-            "status": self.status,
-            "disabled": self.disabled,
-            "owner_identity": self.owner_identity,
-            "registration_revision": self.registration_revision,
-            "registration_policy": self.registration_policy,
-            "created_at": _fmt_ts(self.created_at or self.registered_at),
-            "updated_at": _fmt_ts(self.updated_at or self.last_heartbeat),
-            "disabled_reason": self.disabled_reason,
-        }
-        if redact_payload:
-            payload = redact_value(payload)
-        return payload
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class EvidenceEnvelope:
-    schema_version: int
-    evidence_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    claim_id: str
-    kind: str
-    worker_identity: str
-    payload: dict[str, Any]
-    created_at: float
-    previous_evidence_hash: str
-    evidence_digest: str
-    signature: str | None = None
-    attestation_ref: str | None = None
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        *,
-        task_id: str,
-        claim_id: str,
-        kind: str,
-        worker_identity: str,
-        payload: dict[str, Any],
-        previous_evidence_hash: str,
-        signature: str | None = None,
-        attestation_ref: str | None = None,
-        evidence_id: str | None = None,
-        created_at: float | None = None,
-    ) -> "EvidenceEnvelope":
-        envelope = cls(
-            schema_version=1,
-            evidence_id=evidence_id or f"evd-{uuid.uuid4()}",
-            task_id=validate_identifier(task_id, "task_id"),
-            claim_id=validate_identifier(claim_id, "claim_id"),
-            kind=validate_type(kind, "evidence kind"),
-            worker_identity=str(worker_identity),
-            payload=redact_value(payload),
-            created_at=float(created_at or _now_ts()),
-            previous_evidence_hash=str(previous_evidence_hash or ""),
-            evidence_digest="",
-            signature=signature,
-            attestation_ref=attestation_ref,
-        )
-        return dataclass_replace(
-            envelope, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(envelope.digest_payload())
-        )
-
-    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            "evidence_id": self.evidence_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
-            "kind": self.kind,
-            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
-            "payload": self.payload,
-            "created_at": self.created_at,
-            "previous_evidence_hash": self.previous_evidence_hash,
-            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
-        }
-
-    def verify(
-        self,
-        *,
-        expected_task_id: str,
-        expected_claim_id: str,
-        expected_previous_hash: str,
-        attestation_verifier: Any = None,
-    ) -> bool:
-        if (
-            self.schema_version != 1
-            or self.task_id != expected_task_id
-            or self.claim_id != expected_claim_id
-            or self.previous_evidence_hash != expected_previous_hash
-            or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
-        ):
-            return False
-        if self.signature or self.attestation_ref:
-            return True if attestation_verifier is None else bool(attestation_verifier(self))
-        return True
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            **self.digest_payload(),
-            "evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
-            "signature": self.signature,
-        }
-
-
-class ProbeOutcome(StrEnum):
-    NOT_APPLIED = "NOT_APPLIED"
-    APPLIED_VERIFIED = "APPLIED_VERIFIED"
-    INDETERMINATE = "INDETERMINATE"
-    CONFLICT = "CONFLICT"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ProbeEvidence:
-    schema_version: int
-    probe_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    claim_id: str
-    worker_id: str
-    worker_identity: str
-    operation_digest: str
-    outcome: ProbeOutcome
-    observed_at: float
-    expires_at: float
-    probe_executor_identity: str
-    evidence_digest: str
-    signature: str | None = None
-    attestation_ref: str | None = None
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(cls, **data: Any) -> "ProbeEvidence":
-        outcome = data["outcome"]
-        if not isinstance(outcome, ProbeOutcome):
-            outcome = ProbeOutcome(str(outcome))
-        probe = cls(
-            schema_version=1,
-            probe_id=data.get("probe_id") or f"probe-{uuid.uuid4()}",
-            task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
-            claim_id=validate_identifier(data["claim_id"], "claim_id"),
-            worker_id=validate_identifier(data["worker_id"], "worker_id"),
-            worker_identity=str(data["worker_identity"]),
-            operation_digest=str(data["operation_digest"]),
-            outcome=outcome,
-            observed_at=float(data["observed_at"]),
-            expires_at=float(data["expires_at"]),
-            probe_executor_identity=str(data["probe_executor_identity"]),
-            evidence_digest="",
-            signature=data.get("signature"),
-            attestation_ref=data.get("attestation_ref"),
-        )
-        return dataclass_replace(
-            probe, evidence_digest=compute_sha256_hex(probe.digest_payload())
-        )
-
-    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            "probe_id": self.probe_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
-            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
-            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
-            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
-            "outcome": self.outcome.value,
-            "observed_at": self.observed_at,
-            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
-            "probe_executor_identity": self.probe_executor_identity,
-            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
-        }
-
-    def verify(self, *, now: float, attestation_verifier: Any) -> bool:
-        if (
-            self.schema_version != 1
-            or self.expires_at <= now
-            or self.observed_at > now
-            or self.evidence_digest != compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
-            or not (self.signature or self.attestation_ref)
-        ):
-            return False
-        return bool(attestation_verifier and attestation_verifier(self))
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            **self.digest_payload(),
-            "evidence_digest": self.evidence_digest,
-            "signature": self.signature,
-        }
-
-
-def dataclass_replace(value: Any, **changes: Any) -> Any:
-    from dataclasses import replace
-
-    return replace(value, **changes)
-
-
-@dataclass
-class WorkerClaim:
-    claim_id: str
-    task_id: str
-    worker_id: str
-    worker_identity: str
-    claimed_at: float
-    lease_until: float
-    attempt: int
-    task_revision: int
-    operation_digest: str
-    status: str = "ACTIVE"
-
-    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = {
-            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
-            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
-            "claimed_at": _fmt_ts(self.claimed_at),
-            "lease_until": _fmt_ts(self.lease_until),
-            "attempt": self.attempt,
-            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
-            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
-            "status": self.status,
-        }
-        if redact_payload:
-            payload = redact_value(payload)
-        return payload
-
-
-@dataclass
-class ResultEnvelope:
-    task_id: str
-    claim_id: str
-    worker_identity: str
-    status: str
-    outputs: list[dict[str, Any]]
-    evidence: list[dict[str, Any]]
-    started_at: str
-    completed_at: str
-    result_digest: str | None = None
-    signature: str | None = None
-    attestation_ref: str | None = None
-    operation_digest: str | None = None
-    trust_status: str = "untrusted_shadow_result"
-
-    def digest_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
-            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
-            "status": self.status,
-            "outputs": self.outputs,
-            "evidence": self.evidence,
-            "started_at": self.started_at,
-            "completed_at": self.completed_at,
-            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
-            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
-        }
-
-    def computed_digest(self) -> str:
-        return compute_sha256_hex(self.digest_payload())
-
-    def to_dict(self, redact_payload: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        payload = {
-            "task_id": self.task_id,
-            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
-            "worker_identity": self.worker_identity,
-            "status": self.status,
-            "outputs": self.outputs,
-            "evidence": self.evidence,
-            "started_at": self.started_at,
-            "completed_at": self.completed_at,
-            "result_digest": self.result_digest,
-            "signature": self.signature,
-            "attestation_ref": self.attestation_ref,
-            "operation_digest": self.operation_digest,
-            "trust_status": self.trust_status,
-        }
-        if redact_payload:
-            payload = redact_value(payload)
-        return payload
-
-
-def _normalize_list(value: Any) -> list[str]:
-    if not isinstance(value, list):
-        raise ValueError("expected list")
-    if len(value) > 128 or any(
-        not isinstance(v, str)
-        or not v
-        or len(v) > 256
-        or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in v)
-        for v in value
-    ):
-        raise ValueError("invalid list item")
-    return list(value)
-
-
-def _to_positive_int(value: Any, default: int | None = None) -> int | None:
-    if value is None:
-        return default
-    try:
-        number = int(value)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return default
-    return number if number >= 0 else default
-
-
-def _to_float(value: Any) -> float | None:
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    try:
-        return float(value)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return None
-
-
-def _first_non_none(primary: Any, fallback: Any) -> Any:
-    if primary is not None:
-        return primary
-    return fallback
-
-
-def iso8601_now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _fmt_ts(value: float | None) -> str | None:
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    return datetime.fromtimestamp(value, tz=timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-"""Policy and verification logic (fail-closed)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Callable
-
-from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
-from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
-
-
-RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
-READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS = frozenset(
-    {"claim", "result", "fail", "progress", "heartbeat"}
-)
-ALL_ACTION_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
-    {
-        "task.creator",
-        "worker.self_register",
-        "worker.admin",
-        "task.claim",
-        "task.cancel",
-        "task.delegate",
-        "task.read",
-        "task.audit",
-    }
-)
-
-
-@dataclass
-class PolicyDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    reason: str = ""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ReadonlyWorkerProfile:
-    """A narrowly-scoped identity allowed to process safe Shadow tasks only."""
-
-    worker_id: str
-    identity: str
-    capabilities: frozenset[str]
-    task_types: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"code.review", "test.execute"})
-
-    def permits_task(self, task: TaskRecord) -> bool:
-        plan = task.task_plan
-        if plan.task_type not in self.task_types or plan.risk != "low":
-            return False
-        if plan.data_classification not in {"public", "internal"}:
-            return False
-        if plan.metadata.get("production_side_effects") is not False:
-            return False
-        return set(plan.required_capabilities).issubset(self.capabilities)
-
-
-class IdentityVerifier:
-    def __init__(self, trusted_identities: set[str] | None = None):
-        self.trusted_identities = trusted_identities
-
-    def verify(self, identity: str) -> bool:
-        if self.trusted_identities is None:
-            return True
-        return identity in self.trusted_identities
-
-
-class EvidenceVerifier:
-    def __init__(self, mandatory: list[str] | None = None):
-        self.mandatory = set(mandatory or [])
-
-    def verify(self, task: TaskRecord, evidences: list[dict]) -> PolicyDecision:
-        required = set(task.task_plan.evidence_requirements or [])
-        if not required and not self.mandatory:
-            return PolicyDecision(True)
-        observed = {e.get("kind") for e in evidences}
-        missing = required.union(self.mandatory) - observed
-        if missing:
-            return PolicyDecision(False, f"missing evidence: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}")
-        return PolicyDecision(True)
-
-
-class PolicyEngine:
-    """
-    Fail-closed policy engine with minimal but explicit decisions.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        identity_verifier: IdentityVerifier | None = None,
-        evidence_verifier: EvidenceVerifier | None = None,
-        execution_enabled: bool = False,
-        max_risk: str = "medium",
-        result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
-        probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
-        identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
-        admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
-        readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
-        readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        if max_risk not in RISK_RANK:
-            raise ValueError("invalid max_risk")
-        self.identity_verifier = identity_verifier or IdentityVerifier()
-        self.evidence_verifier = evidence_verifier or EvidenceVerifier()
-        self.execution_enabled = execution_enabled
-        self.max_risk = max_risk
-        self.result_signature_verifier = result_signature_verifier
-        self.probe_attestation_verifier = probe_attestation_verifier
-        self.identity_capabilities = {
-            identity: set(capabilities)
-            for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
-        }
-        self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
-        self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
-        self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
-            profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
-        }
-
-    def _readonly_worker_allows(
-        self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
-    ) -> bool:
-        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
-        return bool(
-            self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled
-            and action in READONLY_WORKER_ACTIONS
-            and profile is not None
-            and (task is None or profile.permits_task(task))
-        )
-
-    def assert_readonly_worker_binding(self, actor: str, worker_id: str) -> None:
-        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
-        if profile is not None and profile.worker_id != worker_id:
-            raise ForbiddenError("worker identity binding mismatch")
-
-    def assert_readonly_worker_registration(self, actor: str, payload: dict) -> None:
-        profile = self.readonly_worker_profiles.get(actor)
-        if profile is None:
-            return
-        if (
-            str(payload.get("worker_id") or "") != profile.worker_id
-            or str(payload.get("identity") or "") != profile.identity
-            or set(payload.get("capabilities") or []) != set(profile.capabilities)
-            or str(payload.get("trust_zone") or "") != "isolated-review"
-            or int(payload.get("max_concurrency") or 0) != 1
-            or int(payload.get("heartbeat_interval_seconds") or 0) != 15
-        ):
-            raise ForbiddenError("readonly worker registration mismatch")
-
-    def verify_result(
-        self, result: ResultEnvelope, task: TaskRecord | None = None
-    ) -> PolicyDecision:
-        computed = result.computed_digest()
-        if result.result_digest and result.result_digest != computed:
-            return PolicyDecision(False, "result digest mismatch")
-        sensitive = bool(
-            task
-            and (
-                task.task_plan.data_classification
-                in {"confidential", "credential-secret"}
-                or any(
-                    capability.startswith(
-                        ("code.write", "deploy", "secret", "production")
-                    )
-                    for capability in task.task_plan.required_capabilities
-                )
-            )
-        )
-        if sensitive and not (result.signature or result.attestation_ref):
-            return PolicyDecision(False, "trusted result proof required")
-        if result.signature is not None or result.attestation_ref is not None:
-            if self.result_signature_verifier is None:
-                return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature verifier unavailable")
-            if not self.result_signature_verifier(result):
-                return PolicyDecision(False, "result signature invalid")
-            result.trust_status = "trusted_result"
-        else:
-            result.trust_status = "untrusted_shadow_result"
-        return PolicyDecision(True)
-
-    def authorize(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None) -> PolicyDecision:
-        context = context or {}
-        if not self.identity_verifier.verify(actor):
-            return PolicyDecision(False, "identity untrusted")
-
-        action_capabilities = {
-            "create": "task.creator",
-            "read": "task.read",
-            "audit": "task.audit",
-            "claim": "task.claim",
-            "result": "task.claim",
-            "fail": "task.claim",
-            "progress": "task.claim",
-            "heartbeat": "task.claim",
-            "cancel": "task.cancel",
-            "delegate": "task.delegate",
-            "worker.register": "worker.self_register",
-            "worker.admin": "worker.admin",
-        }
-        required_capability = action_capabilities.get(action)
-        if required_capability:
-            granted = set(
-                self.identity_capabilities.get(
-                    actor, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
-                )
-            )
-            if required_capability not in granted:
-                return PolicyDecision(False, f"action {action} not permitted")
-
-        if action in {"claim", "result", "fail", "cancel", "progress", "delegate", "heartbeat"} and not self.execution_enabled:
-            if not self._readonly_worker_allows(action, actor, task):
-                return PolicyDecision(False, "execution disabled")
-
-        if action == "delegate" and task and task.status not in {"COMPLETED", "FAILED_FINAL", "CANCELLED"}:
-            risk = str(context.get("risk", task.task_plan.risk))
-            if RISK_RANK.get(risk, 2) > RISK_RANK.get(self.max_risk, 1):
-                return PolicyDecision(False, f"risk {risk} exceeds policy")
-
-        return PolicyDecision(True)
-
-    def assert_allowed(self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None = None, context: dict | None = None):
-        decision = self.authorize(action, actor, task, context=context)
-        if not decision.allowed:
-            if decision.reason == "identity untrusted":
-                raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
-            if decision.reason == "execution disabled":
-                raise LockedError("execution disabled")
-            raise ForbiddenError(decision.reason)
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-"""Task scheduler primitives."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import time
-from .errors import NotFoundError
-from .capabilities import has_capabilities
-from .models import WorkerClaim
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-class TaskScheduler:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def next_queued_task(self, worker_id: str):
-        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
-        tasks = sorted(
-            self.store.list_tasks(),
-            key=lambda task: (
-                -int(task.task_plan.metadata.get("priority", 0)),
-                task.created_at,
-                task.task_id,
-            ),
-        )
-        for task in tasks:
-            if task.status not in {"CREATED", "QUEUED", "FAILED_RECOVERABLE"}:
-                continue
-            if task.task_plan.task_type == "worker.registry.audit":
-                continue
-            if task.status == "FAILED_RECOVERABLE" and not self.store.task_has_retryable_probe(
-                task.task_id
-            ):
-                continue
-            if not has_capabilities(
-                worker.capabilities, task.task_plan.required_capabilities
-            ):
-                continue
-            if any(
-                self.store.get_task(dependency).status != "COMPLETED"
-                for dependency in task.task_plan.dependencies
-            ):
-                continue
-            if (
-                task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret"
-                and worker.worker_type != "secure_file_transformer"
-                and "secure_file_transformer" not in worker.capabilities
-            ):
-                continue
-            return task
-        return None
-
-    def schedule_for_worker(self, worker_id: str, lease_seconds: int = 15) -> WorkerClaim:
-        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
-        if worker.disabled:
-            from .errors import LockedError
-
-            raise LockedError("worker disabled")
-        if time.time() > worker.last_heartbeat + (
-            worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3
-        ):
-            from .errors import LockedError
-
-            raise LockedError("worker offline")
-        task = self.next_queued_task(worker_id)
-        if task is None:
-            raise NotFoundError("no queued tasks available")
-        claim = self.store.claim_task(
-            task.task_id,
-            worker_id,
-            worker.identity,
-            lease_seconds=lease_seconds,
-            expected_revision=task.revision,
-            operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
-        )
-        return claim
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-"""Worker registry abstraction and read helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import time
-
-from .capabilities import has_capabilities
-from .errors import NotFoundError
-from .models import WorkerRegistration
-from .store import TaskPlaneStore
-
-
-class WorkerRegistry:
-    def __init__(self, store: TaskPlaneStore):
-        self.store = store
-
-    def register(
-        self,
-        payload: dict,
-        *,
-        actor_identity: str,
-        is_admin: bool,
-        expected_revision: int | None,
-    ) -> WorkerRegistration:
-        reg = WorkerRegistration.from_dict(payload)
-        return self.store.register_worker(
-            reg,
-            actor_identity=actor_identity,
-            is_admin=is_admin,
-            expected_revision=expected_revision,
-        )
-
-    def heartbeat(
-        self,
-        worker_id: str,
-        heartbeat_interval_seconds: int | None = None,
-        *,
-        actor_identity: str,
-        expected_revision: int | None,
-    ) -> WorkerRegistration:
-        return self.store.heartbeat_worker(
-            worker_id,
-            heartbeat_interval_seconds=heartbeat_interval_seconds,
-            actor_identity=actor_identity,
-            expected_revision=expected_revision,
-        )
-
-    def list(self):
-        return self.store.list_workers()
-
-    def get(self, worker_id: str) -> WorkerRegistration:
-        try:
-            return self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
-        except NotFoundError:
-            raise
-
-    def can_execute(self, worker_id: str, required_capabilities: list[str]) -> bool:
-        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
-        return has_capabilities(worker.capabilities, required_capabilities)
-
-    def is_online(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
-        worker = self.store.get_worker(worker_id)
-        deadline = worker.last_heartbeat + (worker.heartbeat_interval_seconds * 3)
-        return not worker.disabled and (time.time() if now is None else now) <= deadline
-
-    def stale_workers(self, *, now: float | None = None) -> list[WorkerRegistration]:
-        current = time.time() if now is None else now
-        return [worker for worker in self.list() if not self.is_online(worker.worker_id, now=current)]
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Prove two real central-decision to Gateway-dispatch to Codex lifecycle cycles."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import time
+import uuid
+
+from health_probe_common import (
+    ProbeError, gateway_base, load_config, read_token, request_json, state_version,
+)
+
+
+REQUIRED_MARKERS = {"CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM", "TASK_STARTED", "TASK_EXECUTED", "TASK_ENDED", "EVENT_POSTED"}
+
+
+def marker_counts(path: Path, command_id: str) -> dict[str, int]:
+    counts = {marker: 0 for marker in REQUIRED_MARKERS}
+    with path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        for line in handle:
+            try:
+                record = json.loads(line)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                continue
+            marker = record.get("marker")
+            if record.get("command_id") == command_id and marker in counts:
+                counts[marker] += 1
+    return counts
+
+
+def watcher_status(database: Path, command_id: str) -> str | None:
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=2) as db:
+        row = db.execute("SELECT status FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,)).fetchone()
+    return None if row is None else str(row[0])
+
+
+def wait_for_cycle(config: dict[str, object], token: str, cycle: int) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    endpoint = str(config["gateway_event_url"])
+    project = str(config["project_key"])
+    event_id = f"a0-cycle-{cycle}-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
+    work_unit_id = f"A0-CODEX-CYCLE-{cycle}-" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]
+    event = {
+        "schema_version": 1,
+        "project_key": project,
+        "contract_commit": config["contract_commit"],
+        "event_id": event_id,
+        "source_agent": "system",
+        "event_type": "a0_unattended_acceptance_requested",
+        "work_unit_id": work_unit_id,
+        "status": "READY",
+        "state_version": state_version(endpoint, project, token),
+        "implementation_commit": None,
+        "result_commit": None,
+        "blocker": None,
+        "evidence_refs": [],
+        "payload": {
+            "acceptance_contract": {
+                "verdict": "DISPATCH",
+                "work_unit_id": work_unit_id,
+                "track_id": "A0_AUTOMATION",
+                "gate_id": "A0_AUTOMATION_CLOSED",
+                "primary_agent": "codex",
+                "fallback_agent": "openclaw",
+                "clean_base_commit": config["probe_clean_base_commit"],
+                "allowed_paths": [],
+                "required_checks": ["acceptance_probe"],
+                "forbidden_operations": ["production_mutation", "git_mutation"],
+                "instruction": "Run the fixed side-effect-free acceptance probe only.",
+            }
+        },
+    }
+    request_json(endpoint, token, method="POST", payload=event)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + int(config["cycle_timeout_seconds"])
+    channel = None
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        _, status = request_json(endpoint + "/" + event_id, token)
+        if status.get("status") == "TRIGGER_FAILED":
+            raise ProbeError("central_trigger_failed")
+        if status.get("status") == "DECIDED" and status.get("decision_applied") is True:
+            channel = status.get("trigger_channel")
+            break
+        time.sleep(float(config["poll_interval_seconds"]))
+    if channel not in {"workspace_agent", "responses_api"}:
+        raise ProbeError("central_decision_timeout")
+
+    database = Path(str(config["codex_database_path"]))
+    audit = Path(str(config["codex_audit_log"]))
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if database.exists() and audit.exists() and watcher_status(database, work_unit_id) == "COMPLETED":
+            counts = marker_counts(audit, work_unit_id)
+            if all(counts[marker] == 1 for marker in REQUIRED_MARKERS):
+                for suffix in ("started", "ended"):
+                    _, lifecycle = request_json(endpoint + "/" + work_unit_id + ":" + suffix, token)
+                    if lifecycle.get("event_id") != work_unit_id + ":" + suffix:
+                        raise ProbeError("gateway_lifecycle_missing")
+                return event_id, str(channel)
+        time.sleep(float(config["poll_interval_seconds"]))
+    raise ProbeError("gateway_dispatch_or_codex_lifecycle_timeout")
+
+
+def project_summaries_since(database: Path, project: str, since: int) -> int:
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=2) as db:
+        row = db.execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM lifecycle WHERE project_key=? AND kind='PROJECT_SUMMARY' AND created_at>=?",
+            (project, since),
+        ).fetchone()
+    return 0 if row is None else int(row[0])
+
+
+def run(config_path: Path) -> int:
+    config = load_config(config_path)
+    endpoint = str(config["gateway_event_url"])
+    gateway_base(endpoint)
+    token = read_token(Path(str(config["gateway_token_file"])))
+    started = int(time.time())
+    results = [wait_for_cycle(config, token, cycle) for cycle in (1, 2)]
+    if len({item[0] for item in results}) != 2:
+        raise ProbeError("duplicate_cycle_event")
+    if project_summaries_since(
+        Path(str(config["gateway_database_path"])), str(config["project_key"]), started
+    ) < 2:
+        raise ProbeError("project_summary_not_persisted")
+    return 0
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--config", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        return run(args.config)
+    except (KeyError, OSError, ProbeError, sqlite3.Error, ValueError):
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Prove a real central-model decision through the authenticated Gateway."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import stat
+import sys
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+import uuid
+
+from health_probe_common import (
+    ProbeError, atomic_receipt, gateway_base, load_config, read_token,
+    request_json, state_version,
+)
+
+PENDING_PATH = Path("/run/aios-health/central-gpt.pending.json")
+
+
+def _load_pending(
+    path: Path, contract: str, *, owners: set[int] | None = None
+) -> tuple[str, int] | None:
+    allowed_owners = {0} if owners is None else owners
+    if not path.exists():
+        return None
+    info = path.lstat()
+    if (
+        not path.is_absolute()
+        or stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode)
+        or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode)
+        or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & ~0o640
+        or (os.name == "posix" and info.st_uid not in allowed_owners)
+        or path.resolve(strict=True) != Path(os.path.abspath(path))
+    ):
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_pending_marker")
+    value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != {"contract_commit", "event_id", "state_version"}:
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_pending_marker")
+    event_id = value["event_id"]
+    version = value["state_version"]
+    if (
+        value["contract_commit"] != contract
+        or not isinstance(event_id, str)
+        or not event_id.startswith("health-central-")
+        or len(event_id) != 47
+        or not isinstance(version, int)
+        or version < 0
+    ):
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_pending_marker")
+    return event_id, version
+
+
+def _clear_pending(path: Path) -> None:
+    if not path.exists():
+        return
+    info = path.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_pending_marker")
+    path.unlink()
+
+
+def _safe_reason(exc: BaseException) -> str:
+    reason = str(exc)
+    if reason and len(reason) <= 64 and all(char.islower() or char.isdigit() or char == "_" for char in reason):
+        return reason
+    return "probe_error"
+
+
+def run(config_path: Path, pending_path: Path = PENDING_PATH) -> int:
+    config = load_config(config_path)
+    endpoint = config["gateway_event_url"]
+    gateway_base(endpoint)
+    token = read_token(Path(config["gateway_token_file"]))
+    project = config["project_key"]
+    contract = config["contract_commit"]
+    pending = _load_pending(pending_path, contract)
+    is_new = pending is None
+    if is_new:
+        event_id = "health-central-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
+        version = state_version(endpoint, project, token)
+        atomic_receipt(
+            pending_path,
+            {"contract_commit": contract, "event_id": event_id, "state_version": version},
+        )
+    else:
+        event_id, version = pending
+    event = {
+        "schema_version": 1,
+        "project_key": project,
+        "contract_commit": contract,
+        "event_id": event_id,
+        "source_agent": "system",
+        "event_type": "central_gpt_health_probe",
+        "work_unit_id": "CENTRAL-GPT-HEALTH",
+        "status": "READY",
+        "state_version": version,
+        "implementation_commit": None,
+        "result_commit": None,
+        "blocker": None,
+        "evidence_refs": [],
+        "payload": {"probe": "side_effect_free", "nonce": event_id},
+    }
+    should_post = is_new
+    if not is_new:
+        try:
+            _, observed = request_json(endpoint + "/" + event_id, token)
+        except ProbeError as exc:
+            if str(exc) != "gateway_http_404":
+                raise
+            should_post = True
+    else:
+        observed = None
+    if should_post:
+        try:
+            status, _ = request_json(endpoint, token, method="POST", payload=event)
+        except ProbeError as exc:
+            if str(exc) == "gateway_fail_closed_409":
+                _clear_pending(pending_path)
+            raise
+        if status not in {200, 202}:
+            raise ProbeError("event_not_accepted")
+        observed = None
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + int(config["central_timeout_seconds"])
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        _, observed = request_json(endpoint + "/" + event_id, token)
+        if observed.get("status") in {"DECIDED", "TRIGGER_FAILED", "DEAD_LETTER"}:
+            break
+        time.sleep(float(config["poll_interval_seconds"]))
+    if isinstance(observed, dict) and observed.get("status") == "DEAD_LETTER":
+        _clear_pending(pending_path)
+        raise ProbeError("central_event_dead_letter")
+    if not isinstance(observed, dict) or observed.get("status") != "DECIDED" or observed.get("decision_applied") is not True:
+        raise ProbeError("central_decision_not_proven")
+    channel = observed.get("trigger_channel")
+    if channel not in {"workspace_agent", "responses_api", "codex_local"}:
+        raise ProbeError("central_channel_not_proven")
+    _clear_pending(pending_path)
+    now = int(time.time())
+    atomic_receipt(
+        Path(config["central_receipt_path"]),
+        {
+            "subject": "central_gpt",
+            "health": "HEALTHY",
+            "live_probe_succeeded": True,
+            "observed_at_epoch": now,
+            "event_id": event_id,
+            "decision_applied": True,
+            "state_version_after": observed["state_version_after"],
+            "workspace_agent": {"validated_live": channel == "workspace_agent"},
+            "responses_api": {"validated_live": channel == "responses_api"},
+            "codex_local": {"validated_live": channel == "codex_local"},
+        },
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--config", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        return run(args.config)
+    except (KeyError, OSError, ProbeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        print(f"CENTRAL_GPT_PROBE=BLOCKED reason={_safe_reason(exc)}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.codex_local import CodexLocalClient
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.config import Config
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.models import Event
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.securefs import read_secure_json
+
+
+LOG = logging.getLogger("aios-codex-central-decision")
+
+
+class CodexCentralWorker:
+    def __init__(self, config: Config, client: CodexLocalClient | None = None):
+        if config.central_channel != "codex_local" or config.codex_queue_dir is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("codex_local_not_selected")
+        self.config = config
+        self.client = client or CodexLocalClient()
+        self.root = config.codex_queue_dir
+        self.pending = self.root / "pending"
+        self.processing = self.root / "processing"
+        self.processed = self.root / "processed"
+        self.dead = self.root / "dead-letter"
+
+    def recover_interrupted(self) -> None:
+        for path in sorted(self.processing.glob("*.json")):
+            target = self.pending / path.name
+            if target.exists():
+                path.unlink()
+            else:
+                path.replace(target)
+
+    def run_one(self) -> bool:
+        candidates = sorted(self.pending.glob("*.json"))
+        if not candidates:
+            return False
+        source = candidates[0]
+        claimed = self.processing / source.name
+        try:
+            source.replace(claimed)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return False
+        wrapper = read_secure_json(claimed, expected_uid=None)
+        attempts = wrapper.get("attempts")
+        next_attempt_at = wrapper.get("next_attempt_at")
+        event = Event.from_dict(wrapper.get("event"))
+        if (
+            not isinstance(attempts, int) or attempts < 0
+            or not isinstance(next_attempt_at, (int, float)) or next_attempt_at < 0
+        ):
+            self._dead_letter(claimed)
+            return True
+        if next_attempt_at > time.time():
+            claimed.replace(self.pending / claimed.name)
+            return False
+        if event.contract_commit != self.config.contract_commit:
+            self._dead_letter(claimed)
+            return True
+        try:
+            decision = self.client.decide(event)
+            self._submit(decision.to_dict(), event.event_id)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            LOG.warning("codex_decision_failed category=%s", type(exc).__name__)
+            wrapper["attempts"] = attempts + 1
+            wrapper["next_attempt_at"] = int(time.time()) + self.config.retry_base_seconds
+            self._rewrite(claimed, wrapper)
+            if wrapper["attempts"] > self.config.max_retries:
+                self._dead_letter(claimed)
+            else:
+                claimed.replace(self.pending / claimed.name)
+            return True
+        claimed.replace(self.processed / claimed.name)
+        return True
+
+    def _submit(self, decision: dict, event_id: str) -> None:
+        body = json.dumps(decision, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode()
+        url = f"http://{self.config.host}:{self.config.port}/v1/orchestrator/decisions"
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            url, data=body, method="POST",
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": f"Bearer {self.config.callback_token()}",
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Idempotency-Key": event_id,
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response:
+                if response.status not in {200, 202}:
+                    raise RuntimeError("gateway_decision_rejected")
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
+            raise RuntimeError("gateway_decision_unavailable") from exc
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _rewrite(path: Path, value: dict) -> None:
+        temp = path.with_name(f".{path.name}.tmp-{os.getpid()}")
+        fd = os.open(temp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0), 0o640)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump(value, handle, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True)
+            handle.flush(); os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temp, path)
+
+    def _dead_letter(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        target = self.dead / path.name
+        if target.exists():
+            path.unlink()
+        else:
+            path.replace(target)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--gateway-config", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--once", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(levelname)s %(name)s %(message)s")
+    worker = CodexCentralWorker(Config.from_file(args.gateway_config))
+    worker.recover_interrupted()
+    if args.once:
+        worker.run_one()
+        return 0
+    while True:
+        if not worker.run_one():
+            time.sleep(2)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+import uuid
+
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.codex_local import CodexLocalClient
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.config import Config
+from services.aios_orchestrator_gateway.models import Event
+
+
+def _atomic_receipt(path: Path, value: dict) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    fd, temp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".codex-health-", dir=path.parent)
+    try:
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump(value, handle, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True)
+            handle.flush(); os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.chmod(temp, 0o600)
+        os.replace(temp, path)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temp): os.unlink(temp)
+
+
+def run(config_path: Path, receipt: Path) -> int:
+    config = Config.from_file(config_path)
+    if config.central_channel != "codex_local":
+        raise RuntimeError("codex_local_not_selected")
+    event_id = "codex-health-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
+    event = Event.from_dict({
+        "schema_version": 1, "project_key": config.project_key,
+        "contract_commit": config.contract_commit, "event_id": event_id,
+        "source_agent": "system", "event_type": "codex_local_health_probe",
+        "work_unit_id": "CODEX-LOCAL-HEALTH", "status": "READY",
+        "state_version": 0, "implementation_commit": None,
+        "result_commit": None, "blocker": "health_probe_has_no_release_evidence",
+        "evidence_refs": [], "payload": {"allowed_work_unit_ids": []},
+    })
+    decision = CodexLocalClient().decide(event)
+    if decision.verdict == "DISPATCH" or decision.next_work_units:
+        raise RuntimeError("unsafe_health_decision")
+    _atomic_receipt(receipt, {
+        "subject": "codex_local", "health": "HEALTHY",
+        "codex_login_status": 0, "codex_exec": 0,
+        "decision_schema_valid": True, "observed_at_epoch": int(time.time()),
+    })
+    print("CODEX_CENTRAL_HEALTH=PASS")
+    return 0
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--gateway-config", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--receipt", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        return run(args.gateway_config, args.receipt)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        reason = str(exc)
+        safe = reason if reason.replace("_", "").isalnum() and len(reason) <= 64 else type(exc).__name__
+        print(f"CODEX_CENTRAL_HEALTH=BLOCKED reason={safe}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Queue one fixed no-side-effect command and prove the watcher lifecycle."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import time
+import uuid
+
+from health_probe_common import (
+    ProbeError, atomic_receipt, gateway_base, load_config, read_token,
+    request_json, state_version,
+)
+
+
+MARKERS = {"CODEX_AUTO_CLAIM", "TASK_STARTED", "TASK_EXECUTED", "TASK_ENDED", "EVENT_POSTED"}
+
+
+def _write_command(path: Path, value: dict[str, object]) -> None:
+    directory = path.parent
+    info = directory.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & 0o002:
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_command_queue")
+    data = (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode()
+    fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0), 0o640)
+    try:
+        os.write(fd, data)
+        os.fsync(fd)
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+def _status(database: Path, command_id: str) -> str | None:
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=2) as db:
+        row = db.execute("SELECT status FROM commands WHERE command_id=?", (command_id,)).fetchone()
+    return None if row is None else str(row[0])
+
+
+def _markers(path: Path, command_id: str) -> dict[str, int]:
+    result = {name: 0 for name in MARKERS}
+    with path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        for line in handle:
+            try:
+                item = json.loads(line)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                continue
+            if item.get("command_id") == command_id and item.get("marker") in result:
+                result[item["marker"]] += 1
+    return result
+
+
+def run(config_path: Path) -> int:
+    config = load_config(config_path)
+    endpoint = config["gateway_event_url"]
+    gateway_base(endpoint)
+    token = read_token(Path(config["gateway_token_file"]))
+    command_id = "health-codex-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
+    version = state_version(endpoint, config["project_key"], token)
+    command = {
+        "schema_version": 1,
+        "command_id": command_id,
+        "project_key": config["project_key"],
+        "work_unit_id": command_id,
+        "contract_commit": config["contract_commit"],
+        "state_version": version,
+        "execution": {"kind": "acceptance_probe", "input": "fixed-side-effect-free-health-probe-v1"},
+    }
+    _write_command(Path(config["codex_command_queue"]) / f"{command_id}.json", command)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + int(config["codex_timeout_seconds"])
+    database = Path(config["codex_database_path"])
+    audit = Path(config["codex_audit_log"])
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if database.exists() and audit.exists() and _status(database, command_id) == "COMPLETED":
+            counts = _markers(audit, command_id)
+            if all(counts[name] == 1 for name in MARKERS):
+                for suffix in ("started", "ended"):
+                    _, event = request_json(endpoint + "/" + command_id + ":" + suffix, token)
+                    if event.get("event_id") != command_id + ":" + suffix:
+                        raise ProbeError("gateway_lifecycle_missing")
+                atomic_receipt(
+                    Path(config["codex_receipt_path"]),
+                    {
+                        "subject": "codex",
+                        "health": "HEALTHY",
+                        "live_probe_succeeded": True,
+                        "observed_at_epoch": int(time.time()),
+                        "command_id": command_id,
+                        "lifecycle_complete": True,
+                        "duplicate_side_effects": False,
+                    },
+                )
+                return 0
+        time.sleep(float(config["poll_interval_seconds"]))
+    raise ProbeError("codex_lifecycle_not_proven")
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--config", required=True, type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        return run(args.config)
+    except (KeyError, OSError, ProbeError, sqlite3.Error, ValueError):
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,940 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Durable GPT + one-executor quorum and failover controller.
+
+The controller persists decisions before dispatch and never stores credentials.
+Health is accepted only from metadata-only, live-probe receipts.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+import urllib.parse
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from enum import Enum
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+ALLOWED_LIFECYCLE_EVENTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "TASK_DISPATCHED",
+        "TASK_STARTED",
+        "TASK_ENDED",
+        "DECISION_APPLIED",
+        "PROJECT_SUMMARY",
+        "PROJECT_COMPLETED",
+    }
+)
+EXECUTORS = ("openclaw", "codex")
+SECRET_KEYS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "secret",
+        "token",
+        "password",
+        "api_key",
+        "authorization",
+        "credential",
+        "private_key",
+        "environment",
+        "env",
+        "argv",
+        "stdout",
+        "stderr",
+    }
+)
+
+
+class Health(str, Enum):
+    HEALTHY = "HEALTHY"
+    UNHEALTHY = "UNHEALTHY"
+    UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+
+
+class ControllerError(RuntimeError):
+    """Fail-closed controller error."""
+
+
+class EventConflict(ControllerError):
+    """An event id was reused with a different payload."""
+
+
+class StaleStateVersion(ControllerError):
+    """A dispatch attempted to overwrite a newer task state."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class QuorumDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    priority: str
+    status: str
+    active_executor: str | None
+    standby_executor: str | None
+    repair_required: bool
+
+
+def canonical_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True)
+
+
+def digest_json(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _contains_forbidden_key(value: Any) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for key, child in value.items():
+            normalized = str(key).strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
+            if normalized in SECRET_KEYS or _contains_forbidden_key(child):
+                return True
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return any(_contains_forbidden_key(item) for item in value)
+    return False
+
+
+def validate_metadata_only(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if _contains_forbidden_key(value):
+        raise ControllerError("secret-bearing or output-bearing fields are forbidden")
+
+
+def atomic_json_write(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any], mode: int = 0o600) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+    validate_secure_directory(path.parent)
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=str(path.parent))
+    try:
+        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(canonical_json(value))
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
+
+
+def validate_secure_directory(path: Path, *, expected_uid: int | None = None) -> None:
+    info = path.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode):
+        raise ControllerError(f"unsafe directory type rejected: {path}")
+    if os.name == "posix" and path.resolve(strict=True) != Path(os.path.abspath(path)):
+        raise ControllerError(f"symlinked directory component rejected: {path}")
+    if os.name == "posix" and info.st_mode & 0o022:
+        raise ControllerError(f"group/world-writable directory rejected: {path}")
+    if expected_uid is not None and info.st_uid != expected_uid:
+        raise ControllerError(f"unexpected owner for directory {path}")
+
+
+def read_secure_json(path: Path, *, expected_uid: int | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    info = path.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode):
+        raise ControllerError(f"symlink rejected: {path}")
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+        raise ControllerError(f"not a regular file: {path}")
+    if os.name == "posix" and info.st_mode & 0o022:
+        raise ControllerError(f"group/world-writable file rejected: {path}")
+    validate_secure_directory(path.parent, expected_uid=expected_uid)
+    if os.name == "posix" and path.resolve(strict=True) != Path(os.path.abspath(path)):
+        raise ControllerError(f"symlinked file component rejected: {path}")
+    if expected_uid is not None and info.st_uid != expected_uid:
+        raise ControllerError(f"unexpected owner for {path}")
+    with path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        value = json.load(handle)
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ControllerError(f"JSON object required: {path}")
+    validate_metadata_only(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def read_gateway_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if not path.is_absolute():
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token path must be absolute")
+    try:
+        info = path.lstat()
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token unavailable") from exc
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token must be a regular non-symlink file")
+    if stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & ~0o640:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token mode exceeds 0640")
+    if os.name == "posix" and info.st_uid not in {0, os.geteuid()}:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token owner is not approved")
+    if os.name == "posix" and path.resolve(strict=True) != Path(os.path.abspath(path)):
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token has a symlinked path component")
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
+    fd = os.open(path, flags)
+    try:
+        opened = os.fstat(fd)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(opened.st_mode) or opened.st_ino != info.st_ino or opened.st_dev != info.st_dev:
+            raise ControllerError("gateway token changed during validation")
+        data = os.read(fd, 16_385)
+        if os.read(fd, 1):
+            raise ControllerError("gateway token too large")
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+    if not data or len(data) > 16_384 or b"\n" in data or b"\r" in data:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token format rejected")
+    try:
+        token = data.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token encoding rejected") from exc
+    if not token:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway token unavailable")
+    return token
+
+
+def validate_health_receipt(
+    receipt: Mapping[str, Any],
+    subject: str,
+    *,
+    now: float | None = None,
+    max_age_seconds: int = 60,
+) -> Health:
+    validate_metadata_only(receipt)
+    if receipt.get("subject") != subject:
+        return Health.UNKNOWN
+    try:
+        health = Health(str(receipt.get("health", "UNKNOWN")))
+    except ValueError:
+        return Health.UNKNOWN
+    if health is not Health.HEALTHY:
+        return health
+    if receipt.get("live_probe_succeeded") is not True:
+        return Health.UNKNOWN
+    observed_at = receipt.get("observed_at_epoch")
+    if not isinstance(observed_at, (int, float)):
+        return Health.UNKNOWN
+    now = time.time() if now is None else now
+    if observed_at > now + 5 or now - observed_at > max_age_seconds:
+        return Health.UNKNOWN
+    if subject == "central_gpt":
+        workspace = receipt.get("workspace_agent")
+        responses = receipt.get("responses_api")
+        workspace_ok = isinstance(workspace, Mapping) and workspace.get("validated_live") is True
+        responses_ok = isinstance(responses, Mapping) and responses.get("validated_live") is True
+        if not (workspace_ok or responses_ok):
+            return Health.UNKNOWN
+    return Health.HEALTHY
+
+
+def choose_executor(workload: str) -> str:
+    if workload in {"complex_code", "security_boundary", "architecture", "complex_code_security_architecture"}:
+        return "codex"
+    return "openclaw"
+
+
+def evaluate_quorum(
+    central_gpt: Health,
+    openclaw: Health,
+    codex: Health,
+    workload: str,
+) -> QuorumDecision:
+    if central_gpt is not Health.HEALTHY:
+        status = "BLOCKED_CENTRAL_GPT_UNKNOWN" if central_gpt is Health.UNKNOWN else "BLOCKED_CENTRAL_GPT_UNHEALTHY"
+        return QuorumDecision(False, "P0", status, None, None, True)
+
+    healthy = [name for name, health in (("openclaw", openclaw), ("codex", codex)) if health is Health.HEALTHY]
+    if not healthy:
+        has_unknown = Health.UNKNOWN in {openclaw, codex}
+        status = "BLOCKED_EXECUTOR_HEALTH_UNKNOWN" if has_unknown else "BLOCKED_NO_HEALTHY_EXECUTOR"
+        return QuorumDecision(False, "P1", status, None, None, True)
+
+    if len(healthy) == 1:
+        active = healthy[0]
+        standby = "codex" if active == "openclaw" else "openclaw"
+        return QuorumDecision(True, "P3", "EXECUTOR_QUORUM_PASS", active, standby, False)
+
+    active = choose_executor(workload)
+    standby = "codex" if active == "openclaw" else "openclaw"
+    return QuorumDecision(True, "NONE", "EXECUTOR_QUORUM_PASS", active, standby, False)
+
+
+class QuorumStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path):
+        self.path = path
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+        expected_uid = os.geteuid() if os.name == "posix" else None
+        validate_secure_directory(path.parent, expected_uid=expected_uid)
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            info = path.lstat()
+            if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_nlink != 1:
+                raise ControllerError(f"unsafe database path rejected: {path}")
+            if expected_uid is not None and info.st_uid != expected_uid:
+                raise ControllerError(f"unexpected database owner: {path}")
+        self.db = sqlite3.connect(str(path), isolation_level=None, timeout=30)
+        if os.name == "posix":
+            path.chmod(0o600)
+        self.db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        self.db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        self.db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        self._initialize()
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self.db.close()
+
+    def _initialize(self) -> None:
+        self.db.executescript(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS events (
+                event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                source TEXT NOT NULL,
+                status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                created_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tasks (
+                work_unit TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                contract_commit TEXT NOT NULL,
+                event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                state_version INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                workload TEXT NOT NULL,
+                status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                active_executor TEXT,
+                standby_executor TEXT,
+                checkpoint TEXT,
+                lease_owner TEXT,
+                lease_until REAL,
+                interrupted_executor TEXT,
+                recovery_priority TEXT NOT NULL,
+                updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS lifecycle (
+                sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+                work_unit TEXT NOT NULL,
+                event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                executor TEXT,
+                state_version INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                metadata_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                created_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS effects (
+                effect_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                work_unit TEXT NOT NULL,
+                payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                created_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbox (
+                outbox_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                destination TEXT NOT NULL,
+                payload_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+                next_attempt REAL NOT NULL,
+                created_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS blockers (
+                blocker_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                occurrences INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                status TEXT NOT NULL,
+                updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS observed_refs (
+                ref_name TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS summaries (
+                work_unit TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                summary_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                summary_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                created_at REAL NOT NULL
+            );
+            CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS lifecycle_once
+            ON lifecycle(work_unit, event_type, COALESCE(executor, ''), state_version);
+            """
+        )
+
+    def ingest_event(self, event_id: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], source: str) -> bool:
+        validate_metadata_only(payload)
+        encoded = canonical_json(payload)
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(encoded.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        existing = self.db.execute("SELECT payload_digest FROM events WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,)).fetchone()
+        if existing:
+            if existing["payload_digest"] != digest:
+                self.db.execute("UPDATE events SET status='DEAD_LETTER_CONFLICT' WHERE event_id=?", (event_id,))
+                raise EventConflict(f"event id payload conflict: {event_id}")
+            return False
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO events VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+            (event_id, digest, encoded, source, "ACCEPTED", time.time()),
+        )
+        return True
+
+    def upsert_task(
+        self,
+        *,
+        work_unit: str,
+        contract_commit: str,
+        event_id: str,
+        state_version: int,
+        workload: str,
+        decision: QuorumDecision,
+        checkpoint: str | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        now = time.time()
+        self.db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            current = self.db.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE work_unit=?", (work_unit,)).fetchone()
+            if current and state_version < current["state_version"]:
+                raise StaleStateVersion(f"stale state version for {work_unit}")
+            interrupted: str | None = None
+            recovery_priority = decision.priority
+            status = "BLOCKED"
+            if decision.allowed:
+                status = "READY"
+                if current and current["active_executor"] and current["active_executor"] != decision.active_executor:
+                    interrupted = current["active_executor"]
+                    recovery_priority = "P2"
+                    status = "INTERRUPTED_AGENT_FAILOVER"
+                    if checkpoint is None:
+                        checkpoint = current["checkpoint"]
+            if current:
+                if contract_commit != current["contract_commit"] or event_id != current["event_id"]:
+                    raise ControllerError("failover must preserve contract_commit and event_id")
+                if (
+                    current["state_version"] == state_version
+                    and current["active_executor"] == decision.active_executor
+                    and current["status"] in {"RUNNING", "COMPLETED"}
+                ):
+                    self.db.execute("COMMIT")
+                    return current["status"]
+                self.db.execute(
+                    """UPDATE tasks SET state_version=?, workload=?, status=?, active_executor=?,
+                    standby_executor=?, checkpoint=?, interrupted_executor=?, recovery_priority=?, updated_at=? WHERE work_unit=?""",
+                    (
+                        state_version,
+                        workload,
+                        status,
+                        decision.active_executor,
+                        decision.standby_executor,
+                        checkpoint,
+                        interrupted,
+                        recovery_priority,
+                        now,
+                        work_unit,
+                    ),
+                )
+            else:
+                self.db.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO tasks VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                    (
+                        work_unit,
+                        contract_commit,
+                        event_id,
+                        state_version,
+                        workload,
+                        status,
+                        decision.active_executor,
+                        decision.standby_executor,
+                        checkpoint,
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                        interrupted,
+                        recovery_priority,
+                        now,
+                    ),
+                )
+            self.db.execute("COMMIT")
+            return status
+        except Exception:
+            self.db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+            raise
+
+    def claim_lease(self, work_unit: str, worker: str, ttl_seconds: int, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
+        now = time.time() if now is None else now
+        self.db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            task = self.db.execute(
+                "SELECT active_executor, status, lease_owner, lease_until FROM tasks WHERE work_unit=?",
+                (work_unit,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if not task:
+                raise ControllerError(f"unknown work unit: {work_unit}")
+            if worker != task["active_executor"]:
+                self.db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                return False
+            if task["status"] in {"BLOCKED", "COMPLETED"}:
+                self.db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                return False
+            lease_live = task["lease_owner"] and task["lease_until"] and task["lease_until"] > now
+            if lease_live and task["lease_owner"] != worker:
+                self.db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                return False
+            self.db.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET lease_owner=?, lease_until=?, status='RUNNING', updated_at=? WHERE work_unit=?",
+                (worker, now + ttl_seconds, now, work_unit),
+            )
+            self.db.execute("COMMIT")
+            return True
+        except Exception:
+            if self.db.in_transaction:
+                self.db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+            raise
+
+    def dispatch_task(
+        self,
+        *,
+        work_unit: str,
+        contract_commit: str,
+        event_id: str,
+        state_version: int,
+        workload: str,
+        decision: QuorumDecision,
+        checkpoint: str | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        status = self.upsert_task(
+            work_unit=work_unit,
+            contract_commit=contract_commit,
+            event_id=event_id,
+            state_version=state_version,
+            workload=workload,
+            decision=decision,
+            checkpoint=checkpoint,
+        )
+        if decision.allowed and status != "COMPLETED":
+            metadata = {
+                "contract_commit": contract_commit,
+                "event_id": event_id,
+                "status": status,
+            }
+            self.append_lifecycle(work_unit, "TASK_DISPATCHED", decision.active_executor, state_version, metadata)
+            self.enqueue(
+                f"dispatch:{work_unit}:{state_version}:{decision.active_executor}",
+                "gateway",
+                {"event_type": "TASK_DISPATCHED", "work_unit": work_unit, **metadata},
+            )
+        return status
+
+    def start_task(self, work_unit: str, executor: str, state_version: int, lease_ttl_seconds: int) -> bool:
+        if not self.claim_lease(work_unit, executor, lease_ttl_seconds):
+            return False
+        self.append_lifecycle(work_unit, "TASK_STARTED", executor, state_version, {"status": "RUNNING"})
+        self.enqueue(
+            f"started:{work_unit}:{state_version}:{executor}",
+            "gateway",
+            {"event_type": "TASK_STARTED", "work_unit": work_unit, "executor": executor, "state_version": state_version},
+        )
+        return True
+
+    def end_task(
+        self,
+        work_unit: str,
+        executor: str,
+        state_version: int,
+        result: str,
+        summary: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        project_completed: bool = False,
+    ) -> None:
+        validate_metadata_only(summary)
+        self.db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            task = self.db.execute("SELECT active_executor,state_version FROM tasks WHERE work_unit=?", (work_unit,)).fetchone()
+            if not task or task["active_executor"] != executor:
+                raise ControllerError("only the active executor may end a task")
+            if task["state_version"] != state_version:
+                raise StaleStateVersion(f"stale state version for {work_unit}")
+            self.db.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET status='COMPLETED', lease_owner=NULL, lease_until=NULL, updated_at=? WHERE work_unit=?",
+                (time.time(), work_unit),
+            )
+            self.append_lifecycle(work_unit, "TASK_ENDED", executor, state_version, {"result": result})
+            self.append_lifecycle(work_unit, "DECISION_APPLIED", executor, state_version, {"result": result})
+            self.append_lifecycle(work_unit, "PROJECT_SUMMARY", executor, state_version, summary)
+            if project_completed:
+                self.append_lifecycle(work_unit, "PROJECT_COMPLETED", executor, state_version, {"result": result})
+            self.persist_summary(work_unit, summary)
+            outbound = (
+                ("TASK_ENDED", {"result": result}),
+                ("DECISION_APPLIED", {"result": result}),
+                ("PROJECT_SUMMARY", dict(summary)),
+            )
+            for event_type, metadata in outbound:
+                self.enqueue(
+                    f"{event_type.lower()}:{work_unit}:{state_version}:{executor}",
+                    "gateway",
+                    {
+                        "event_type": event_type,
+                        "work_unit": work_unit,
+                        "executor": executor,
+                        "state_version": state_version,
+                        **metadata,
+                    },
+                )
+            if project_completed:
+                self.enqueue(
+                    f"project_completed:{work_unit}:{state_version}:{executor}",
+                    "gateway",
+                    {
+                        "event_type": "PROJECT_COMPLETED",
+                        "work_unit": work_unit,
+                        "executor": executor,
+                        "state_version": state_version,
+                        "result": result,
+                    },
+                )
+            self.db.execute("COMMIT")
+        except Exception:
+            if self.db.in_transaction:
+                self.db.execute("ROLLBACK")
+            raise
+
+    def record_effect(self, effect_id: str, work_unit: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
+        validate_metadata_only(payload)
+        digest = digest_json(payload)
+        existing = self.db.execute("SELECT payload_digest FROM effects WHERE effect_id=?", (effect_id,)).fetchone()
+        if existing:
+            if existing["payload_digest"] != digest:
+                raise EventConflict(f"effect id payload conflict: {effect_id}")
+            return False
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO effects VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
+            (effect_id, work_unit, digest, "COMPLETED", time.time()),
+        )
+        return True
+
+    def append_lifecycle(
+        self,
+        work_unit: str,
+        event_type: str,
+        executor: str | None,
+        state_version: int,
+        metadata: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        if event_type not in ALLOWED_LIFECYCLE_EVENTS:
+            raise ControllerError(f"unsupported lifecycle event: {event_type}")
+        validate_metadata_only(metadata)
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO lifecycle(work_unit,event_type,executor,state_version,metadata_json,created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+            (work_unit, event_type, executor, state_version, canonical_json(metadata), time.time()),
+        )
+
+    def persist_summary(self, work_unit: str, summary: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+        validate_metadata_only(summary)
+        encoded = canonical_json(summary)
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(encoded.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO summaries VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
+            (work_unit, digest, encoded, time.time()),
+        )
+
+    def enqueue(self, outbox_id: str, destination: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
+        validate_metadata_only(payload)
+        encoded = canonical_json(payload)
+        digest = hashlib.sha256(encoded.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        existing = self.db.execute("SELECT payload_digest FROM outbox WHERE outbox_id=?", (outbox_id,)).fetchone()
+        if existing:
+            if existing["payload_digest"] != digest:
+                raise EventConflict(f"outbox id payload conflict: {outbox_id}")
+            return False
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO outbox VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+            (outbox_id, destination, digest, encoded, "PENDING", 0, time.time(), time.time()),
+        )
+        return True
+
+    def record_blocker(self, blocker_key: str, threshold: int) -> str:
+        now = time.time()
+        row = self.db.execute("SELECT occurrences FROM blockers WHERE blocker_key=?", (blocker_key,)).fetchone()
+        occurrences = (row["occurrences"] if row else 0) + 1
+        status = "DEAD_LETTER" if occurrences > threshold else "RETRY"
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO blockers VALUES(?,?,?,?) ON CONFLICT(blocker_key) DO UPDATE SET occurrences=excluded.occurrences,status=excluded.status,updated_at=excluded.updated_at",
+            (blocker_key, occurrences, status, now),
+        )
+        return status
+
+    def deliver_outbox(self, sender: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], None], max_attempts: int, now: float | None = None) -> tuple[int, int]:
+        now = time.time() if now is None else now
+        sent = 0
+        failed = 0
+        rows = self.db.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM outbox WHERE status='PENDING' AND next_attempt<=? ORDER BY created_at,outbox_id LIMIT 100",
+            (now,),
+        ).fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            payload = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
+            validate_metadata_only(payload)
+            try:
+                sender(payload)
+            except Exception:
+                attempts = row["attempts"] + 1
+                status = "DEAD_LETTER" if attempts >= max_attempts else "PENDING"
+                delay = min(300, 2 ** min(attempts, 8))
+                self.db.execute(
+                    "UPDATE outbox SET attempts=?,status=?,next_attempt=? WHERE outbox_id=?",
+                    (attempts, status, now + delay, row["outbox_id"]),
+                )
+                failed += 1
+            else:
+                self.db.execute(
+                    "UPDATE outbox SET attempts=attempts+1,status='SENT',next_attempt=? WHERE outbox_id=?",
+                    (now, row["outbox_id"]),
+                )
+                sent += 1
+        return sent, failed
+
+    def observe_ref(self, ref_name: str, oid: str) -> bool:
+        row = self.db.execute("SELECT oid FROM observed_refs WHERE ref_name=?", (ref_name,)).fetchone()
+        changed = row is not None and row["oid"] != oid
+        self.db.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO observed_refs VALUES(?,?,?) ON CONFLICT(ref_name) DO UPDATE SET oid=excluded.oid,updated_at=excluded.updated_at",
+            (ref_name, oid, time.time()),
+        )
+        return changed
+
+
+def spool_after_http_failure(
+    sender: Callable[[Mapping[str, Any]], None],
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    spool_dir: Path,
+    event_id: str,
+) -> bool:
+    validate_metadata_only(payload)
+    try:
+        sender(payload)
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        atomic_json_write(spool_dir / f"{event_id}.json", {"event_id": event_id, "payload": dict(payload)})
+        return False
+
+
+def poll_file_inbox(store: QuorumStore, inbox_dir: Path) -> int:
+    if not inbox_dir.exists():
+        return 0
+    validate_secure_directory(inbox_dir, expected_uid=os.geteuid() if os.name == "posix" else None)
+    count = 0
+    for path in sorted(inbox_dir.glob("*.json")):
+        if path.is_symlink():
+            raise ControllerError(f"symlink inbox entry rejected: {path}")
+        item = read_secure_json(path, expected_uid=os.geteuid() if os.name == "posix" else None)
+        event_id = item.get("event_id")
+        payload = item.get("payload")
+        if not isinstance(event_id, str) or not isinstance(payload, dict):
+            raise ControllerError(f"invalid inbox envelope: {path}")
+        if store.ingest_event(event_id, payload, "file-inbox"):
+            count += 1
+        path.unlink()
+    return count
+
+
+def resolve_git_ref(repo: Path, ref_name: str) -> str:
+    if not repo.is_absolute():
+        raise ControllerError("Git repository path must be absolute")
+    info = repo.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode):
+        raise ControllerError("Git repository must be a non-symlink directory")
+    if os.name == "posix" and repo.resolve(strict=True) != Path(os.path.abspath(repo)):
+        raise ControllerError("Git repository has a symlinked path component")
+    if os.name == "posix" and info.st_mode & 0o002:
+        raise ControllerError("world-writable Git repository rejected")
+    try:
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                "-c",
+                f"safe.directory={repo}",
+                "-C",
+                str(repo),
+                "rev-parse",
+                "--verify",
+                ref_name,
+            ],
+            check=True,
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        raise ControllerError("Git ref unavailable") from exc
+    oid = completed.stdout.strip()
+    if len(oid) != 40 or any(character not in "0123456789abcdef" for character in oid.lower()):
+        raise ControllerError("invalid Git object id")
+    return oid
+
+
+def poll_git_refs(
+    store: QuorumStore,
+    repo: Path,
+    refs: Iterable[str],
+    resolver: Callable[[Path, str], str] = resolve_git_ref,
+) -> int:
+    changed = 0
+    for ref_name in refs:
+        if not ref_name.startswith("refs/") or ".." in ref_name or ref_name.endswith("/"):
+            raise ControllerError(f"invalid Git ref: {ref_name}")
+        oid = resolver(repo, ref_name)
+        if store.observe_ref(ref_name, oid):
+            event_id = f"gitref:{ref_name}:{oid}"
+            if store.ingest_event(event_id, {"ref": ref_name, "oid": oid}, "git-ref-poll"):
+                changed += 1
+    return changed
+
+
+def responses_fallback_allowed(
+    workspace_agent_ok: bool,
+    receipt: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    now: float | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    validate_metadata_only(receipt)
+    if workspace_agent_ok:
+        return False
+    responses = receipt.get("responses_api")
+    return (
+        validate_health_receipt(receipt, "central_gpt", now=now) is Health.HEALTHY
+        and isinstance(responses, Mapping)
+        and responses.get("validated_live") is True
+    )
+
+
+def _validate_gateway_url(url: str) -> None:
+    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+    if (
+        parsed.scheme != "http"
+        or parsed.hostname != "127.0.0.1"
+        or parsed.port != 18920
+        or parsed.path != "/v1/orchestrator/events"
+        or parsed.params
+        or parsed.query
+        or parsed.fragment
+    ):
+        raise ControllerError("gateway endpoint must be the fixed loopback endpoint")
+
+
+def get_gateway_state(url: str, project_key: str, token: str, timeout: float = 5.0) -> int:
+    _validate_gateway_url(url)
+    state_url = url.removesuffix("/events") + "/state/" + urllib.parse.quote(project_key, safe="")
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        state_url,
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+        method="GET",
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+            payload = json.loads(response.read(262_145))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        if exc.code == 404:
+            return 0
+        raise ControllerError(f"gateway state rejected HTTP {exc.code}") from exc
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway state unavailable") from exc
+    version = payload.get("state_version") if isinstance(payload, Mapping) else None
+    if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 0:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway state version invalid")
+    return version
+
+
+def post_json(url: str, payload: Mapping[str, Any], token: str, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    validate_metadata_only(payload)
+    _validate_gateway_url(url)
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        url,
+        data=canonical_json(payload).encode("utf-8"),
+        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+        method="POST",
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+            if response.status < 200 or response.status >= 300:
+                raise ControllerError(f"gateway rejected HTTP {response.status}")
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        raise ControllerError(f"gateway rejected HTTP {exc.code}") from exc
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+        raise ControllerError("gateway unavailable") from exc
+
+
+def run_once(config_path: Path) -> int:
+    config = read_secure_json(config_path, expected_uid=0 if os.name == "posix" else None)
+    gateway_url = config["gateway_event_url"]
+    token = read_gateway_token(Path(config["gateway_token_file"]))
+    state_version = get_gateway_state(gateway_url, config["project_key"], token)
+    store = QuorumStore(Path(config["database_path"]))
+    try:
+        receipts: dict[str, Health] = {}
+        for subject in ("central_gpt", "openclaw", "codex"):
+            receipt_path = Path(config["health_receipts"][subject])
+            try:
+                receipt = read_secure_json(receipt_path, expected_uid=0 if os.name == "posix" else None)
+                receipts[subject] = validate_health_receipt(
+                    receipt,
+                    subject,
+                    max_age_seconds=int(config.get("max_health_age_seconds", 60)),
+                )
+            except (FileNotFoundError, ControllerError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                receipts[subject] = Health.UNKNOWN
+        decision = evaluate_quorum(
+            receipts["central_gpt"], receipts["openclaw"], receipts["codex"], config.get("default_workload", "large_repetitive_infrastructure_monitoring")
+        )
+        quorum_event_id = f"quorum-{time.time_ns()}"
+        store.enqueue(
+            quorum_event_id,
+            "gateway",
+            {
+                "schema_version": 1,
+                "project_key": config["project_key"],
+                "contract_commit": config["contract_commit"],
+                "event_id": quorum_event_id,
+                "source_agent": "system",
+                "event_type": "executor_quorum_evaluated",
+                "work_unit_id": "A0-AUTOMATION-QUORUM",
+                "status": "READY" if decision.allowed else "BLOCKED",
+                "state_version": state_version,
+                "implementation_commit": None,
+                "result_commit": None,
+                "blocker": None if decision.allowed else decision.status,
+                "evidence_refs": [],
+                "payload": {
+                    "allowed": decision.allowed,
+                    "priority": decision.priority,
+                    "quorum_status": decision.status,
+                    "active_executor": decision.active_executor,
+                    "standby_executor": decision.standby_executor,
+                },
+            },
+        )
+        poll_file_inbox(store, Path(config["file_inbox_path"]))
+        git_polling = config.get("git_ref_polling")
+        if isinstance(git_polling, Mapping):
+            poll_git_refs(store, Path(git_polling["repository"]), git_polling["refs"])
+        store.deliver_outbox(
+            lambda payload: post_json(gateway_url, payload, token),
+            max_attempts=int(config["blocker_retry_threshold"]),
+        )
+        return 0 if decision.allowed else 2
+    finally:
+        store.close()
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--config", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--once", action="store_true", required=True)
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: Iterable[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+    try:
+        return run_once(args.config)
+    except (ControllerError, KeyError, OSError, sqlite3.Error, json.JSONDecodeError) as error:
+        print(f"automation-quorum-controller: fail-closed: {type(error).__name__}", file=os.sys.stderr)
+        return 3
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Strict metadata-only helpers shared by root health probes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+import tempfile
+from typing import Any
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+
+
+class ProbeError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def secure_regular(path: Path, *, max_mode: int, owners: set[int]) -> os.stat_result:
+    if not path.is_absolute():
+        raise ProbeError("path_not_absolute")
+    info = path.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode):
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_file_type")
+    if stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) & ~max_mode:
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_file_mode")
+    if os.name == "posix" and info.st_uid not in owners:
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_file_owner")
+    if os.name == "posix" and path.resolve(strict=True) != Path(os.path.abspath(path)):
+        raise ProbeError("symlinked_path_component")
+    return info
+
+
+def load_config(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    secure_regular(path, max_mode=0o600, owners={0})
+    value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ProbeError("config_not_object")
+    return value
+
+
+def read_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    info = secure_regular(path, max_mode=0o640, owners={0, os.geteuid()})
+    if info.st_size <= 0 or info.st_size > 16_384:
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_token_size")
+    fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0))
+    try:
+        opened = os.fstat(fd)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(opened.st_mode) or opened.st_ino != info.st_ino or opened.st_dev != info.st_dev:
+            raise ProbeError("token_changed_during_validation")
+        data = os.read(fd, 16_385)
+        if os.read(fd, 1):
+            raise ProbeError("invalid_token_size")
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+    if b"\n" in data or b"\r" in data:
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_token_format")
+    try:
+        return data.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_token_encoding") from exc
+
+
+def gateway_base(endpoint: str) -> str:
+    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(endpoint)
+    if (
+        parsed.scheme != "http"
+        or parsed.hostname != "127.0.0.1"
+        or parsed.port != 18920
+        or parsed.path != "/v1/orchestrator/events"
+        or parsed.query
+        or parsed.fragment
+    ):
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_gateway_endpoint")
+    return endpoint.removesuffix("/events")
+
+
+def request_json(
+    url: str,
+    token: str,
+    *,
+    method: str = "GET",
+    payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    timeout: float = 10.0,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+    if data is not None:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    request = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+            body = json.loads(response.read(262_145))
+            if not isinstance(body, dict):
+                raise ProbeError("gateway_response_not_object")
+            return response.status, body
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        if exc.code in {401, 403, 409, 422}:
+            raise ProbeError(f"gateway_fail_closed_{exc.code}") from exc
+        raise ProbeError(f"gateway_http_{exc.code}") from exc
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise ProbeError("gateway_unavailable") from exc
+
+
+def state_version(endpoint: str, project_key: str, token: str) -> int:
+    url = gateway_base(endpoint) + "/state/" + urllib.parse.quote(project_key, safe="")
+    try:
+        _, value = request_json(url, token)
+    except ProbeError as exc:
+        if str(exc) == "gateway_http_404":
+            return 0
+        raise
+    version = value.get("state_version")
+    if not isinstance(version, int) or version < 0:
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_state_version")
+    return version
+
+
+def atomic_receipt(path: Path, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    if not path.is_absolute() or path.parent != Path("/run/aios-health"):
+        raise ProbeError("invalid_receipt_path")
+    parent = path.parent
+    info = parent.lstat()
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(info.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode):
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_receipt_directory")
+    if os.name == "posix" and (info.st_uid != 0 or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) != 0o750):
+        raise ProbeError("unsafe_receipt_directory_metadata")
+    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=parent)
+    try:
+        # Receipts contain availability metadata only. Give the dedicated
+        # aios-quorum group read access so its unprivileged controller can
+        # consume them, while retaining root ownership and no public access.
+        if os.name == "posix":
+            os.fchown(fd, 0, info.st_gid)
+        os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump(value, handle, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+            handle.write("\n")
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temporary, path)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temporary):
+            os.unlink(temporary)
@@ -1,25 +1,13 @@
 {
-  "current_baseline": "V2R1C2",
-  "previous_baseline": "V2R1C1",
-  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
-  "git": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
-  "promoted_by": "codex/owner-approved-gitops",
-  "promotion_reason": "Owner-authorized V2R1C2 Unified Portal production release after exact tag binding, complete evidence verification, and production acceptance PASS.",
-  "version": "V2R1C2",
-  "release_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
-  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
-  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
-  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
-  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
-  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
-  "production_port": 18920,
-  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
-  "constraints": {
-    "product_code_changed": true,
-    "production_redeployed": true,
-    "production_traffic_changed": true,
-    "tag_rewritten": false,
-    "force_push_allowed": false,
-    "rollback_assets_preserved": true
-  }
+    "current_baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C5",
+    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T21:00:00+08:00",
+    "git": "e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd",
+    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
+    "promotion_reason": "V1R4C6 admin search agent integration, search gateway, agent platform, VERSION bump, merge tests deploy pipeline — not yet deployed to production",
+    "constraints": {
+        "memory_search_enabled": false,
+        "force_push_allowed": false,
+        "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
+    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schemas/automation-quorum-controller.schema.json",
+  "project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin-production",
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "database_path": "/var/lib/aios-automation-quorum/controller.sqlite3",
+  "file_inbox_path": "/var/lib/aios-automation-quorum/inbox",
+  "default_workload": "large_repetitive_infrastructure_monitoring",
+  "health_receipts": {
+    "central_gpt": "/run/aios-health/central-gpt.json",
+    "openclaw": "/run/aios-health/openclaw.json",
+    "codex": "/run/aios-health/codex.json"
+  },
+  "git_ref_polling": {
+    "repository": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+    "refs": [
+      "refs/heads/task/governance/v2r1-personal-weixin-production-contract-20260717"
+    ]
+  },
+  "blocker_retry_threshold": 3,
+  "max_health_age_seconds": 60,
+  "lease_ttl_seconds": 120,
+  "gateway_event_url": "http://127.0.0.1:18920/v1/orchestrator/events",
+  "gateway_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "active_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/active",
+  "completed_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/completed",
+  "dead_letter_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/dead-letter",
+  "database_path": "/var/lib/aios-codex-watcher/state.sqlite3",
+  "audit_log_path": "/var/log/aios-codex-watcher/audit.jsonl",
+  "gateway_endpoint": "http://127.0.0.1:18920/v1/orchestrator/events",
+  "gateway_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token",
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "lease_seconds": 60,
+  "retry_seconds": 10,
+  "max_attempts": 5,
+  "poll_seconds": 5,
+  "executor_path": null,
+  "executor_args": [],
+  "executor_timeout_seconds": 1800
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin-production",
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "gateway_event_url": "http://127.0.0.1:18920/v1/orchestrator/events",
+  "gateway_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token",
+  "gateway_database_path": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/state.sqlite3",
+  "probe_clean_base_commit": "c3984ca2b4388875d2875b4fdfdf95a2984f6ab3",
+  "central_receipt_path": "/run/aios-health/central-gpt.json",
+  "codex_receipt_path": "/run/aios-health/codex.json",
+  "codex_command_queue": "/data/aios-gitops/workspace/agents/commands/active",
+  "codex_database_path": "/var/lib/aios-codex-watcher/state.sqlite3",
+  "codex_audit_log": "/var/log/aios-codex-watcher/audit.jsonl",
+  "central_timeout_seconds": 90,
+  "codex_timeout_seconds": 90,
+  "cycle_timeout_seconds": 180,
+  "poll_interval_seconds": 1
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+  "host": "127.0.0.1",
+  "port": 18920,
+  "database_path": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/state.sqlite3",
+  "event_inbox_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/events",
+  "decision_inbox_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbox/decisions",
+  "dispatch_outbox_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/outbox",
+  "openclaw_sync_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/openclaw-sync",
+  "command_queue_dir": "/var/lib/aios-orchestrator-gateway/commands",
+  "inbound_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/inbound.token",
+  "callback_token_file": "/etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway/callback.token",
+  "contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
+  "central_channel": "codex_local",
+  "codex_local": {
+    "queue_dir": "/var/lib/aios-codex-brain/queue",
+    "timeout_seconds": 300
+  },
+  "workspace_agent": {
+    "trigger_id": null,
+    "access_token_file": null
+  },
+  "responses_fallback": {
+    "api_key_file": null,
+    "model": null
+  },
+  "polling": {
+    "interval_seconds": 10,
+    "summary_interval_seconds": 300
+  },
+  "loop_controls": {
+    "callback_timeout_seconds": 900,
+    "lease_seconds": 60,
+    "retry_base_seconds": 10,
+    "max_retries": 5,
+    "max_same_blocker_retries": 3,
+    "max_hops_per_gate": 20
+  },
+  "openclaw_sync": {
+    "endpoint": null,
+    "token_file": null
+  },
+  "project_key": "v2r1-personal-weixin-production",
+  "git_poll": {
+    "enabled": true,
+    "bare_repo": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+    "ref_prefixes": [
+      "refs/heads/main",
+      "refs/heads/task/governance/",
+      "refs/heads/patch/",
+      "refs/heads/result/"
+    ],
+    "interval_seconds": 30
+  }
+}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "approval_plan_id": "v2r1c4-security-v3-candidate-plan",
-  "expected_base_oid": "473b86a2f1f5a5fe3b8ad42a6da26c29c78c4170",
-  "host": "127.0.0.1",
-  "port": 8080,
-  "release_branch": "patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "root": "/var/lib/aios-v2r1c4-candidate",
-  "tag_oid": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
-  "target_oid": "473b86a2f1f5a5fe3b8ad42a6da26c29c78c4170",
-  "target_tree_oid": "c6d1ceb28b0519fe460a26a6a2a7e3c0086b3a1f",
-  "version": "V2R1C4"
-}
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "actor_identity": "codex-chartgpt-bridge",
-  "allowed_branch_patterns": [
-    "patch/**",
-    "feature/**",
-    "fix/**",
-    "release-candidate/**"
-  ],
-  "allowed_operations": [
-    "commit_file.atomic"
-  ],
-  "allowed_path_patterns": [
-    "active-runtime/**",
-    "services/**",
-    "deploy/**",
-    "tests/**",
-    "docs/**",
-    "versions/**",
-    "release/**"
-  ],
-  "denied_branch_patterns": [
-    "main",
-    "master",
-    "governance/approvals",
-    "integration/**",
-    "production/**"
-  ],
-  "denied_operations": [
-    "force_push",
-    "history_rewrite",
-    "branch_delete",
-    "tag.write",
-    "registry.write",
-    "baseline.write",
-    "production.deploy",
-    "approval.submit",
-    "secret.read"
-  ],
-  "expires_at": "2027-07-29T00:00:00Z",
-  "policy_id": "STANDING-GOVERNED-DEVELOPMENT-WRITER-V1",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "writer_audience": "aios-governed-development-writer"
-}
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "actor_identity": "codex-chartgpt-bridge",
-  "allowed_operations": ["commit_file.atomic"],
-  "allowed_paths": ["services/**", "deploy/**", "tests/**", "docs/**", "release/**", "evidence/**"],
-  "branch": "patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
-  "credential_name": "gitea_http",
-  "credential_token_id": 1,
-  "credential_username": "aios-governed-development-writer",
-  "expected_base_oid": "473b86a2f1f5a5fe3b8ad42a6da26c29c78c4170",
-  "expected_index_sha256": "e8571df23aba77fd393b4d98beb0b94676dc547fdc25d6492a43b43ed90aee94",
-  "expected_policy_sha256": "462c850d0476266a33bf1227f4989d13e03d807fd8ebb684cbe389f4d49e92fe",
-  "expected_tree_oid": "c6d1ceb28b0519fe460a26a6a2a7e3c0086b3a1f",
-  "expires_at": "2026-08-05T00:00:00Z",
-  "git_common_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
-  "git_user_email": "chatgpt-final-release-writer@cnnetmkt.top",
-  "git_user_name": "chatgpt-final-release-writer",
-  "grant_id": "grant-v2r1c4-security-v3-candidate",
-  "max_operations": 200,
-  "max_total_bytes": 67108864,
-  "push_ref": "refs/heads/patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
-  "remote_name": "gitea-local-candidate",
-  "remote_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "task_id": "V2R1C4-SECURITY-INVARIANTS-V3",
-  "worktree_path": "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
-  "writer_audience": "aios-governed-development-writer"
-}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "authoritative_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
-  "poll_seconds": 5,
-  "receipts_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror/receipts",
-  "requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror/requests",
-  "source_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea-repositories/aios/aios.git"
-}
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "allowed_git_dir_roots": ["/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"],
-  "allowed_peer_uids": [0],
-  "audit_path": "/var/lib/aios-governance-publisher-evidence/audit.jsonl",
-  "base_branch": "governance/approvals",
-  "credential_name": "gitea_http",
-  "gitea_base_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000",
-  "head_prefix": "governance/request/",
-  "operation_ledger": "/var/lib/aios-governance-publisher-state/operations.sqlite",
-  "owner_reviewer": "owner",
-  "remote_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "socket_path": "/run/aios-governance-publisher-runtime/publisher.sock"
-}
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "authoritative_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
-  "input_bindings": {
-    "expected_input_owner_uid": 0,
-    "release_root_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-release-root.json",
-    "approval_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-approval-plan.json",
-    "artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/artifacts/V2R1C4.tar.zst",
-    "rollback_artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/artifacts/V2R1C4-rollback.tar.zst",
-    "sbom_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-sbom.json",
-    "test_evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-test-evidence.json",
-    "tag_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-tag-plan.json",
-    "deployment_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-deployment-plan.json",
-    "rollback_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release-inputs/V2R1C4-rollback-plan.json",
-    "registry_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/registry-plan.json",
-    "baseline_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/baseline-plan.txt",
-    "evidence_closure_path": "evidence/releases/V2R1C4/evidence-closure.json"
-  },
-  "approval": {
-    "gitea_db_path": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db",
-    "repo_id": 1,
-    "owner_user_id": 2,
-    "governance_ref": "refs/heads/governance/approvals",
-    "required_machine_contexts": [
-      "aios/branch-protection",
-      "aios/evidence-closure",
-      "aios/secret-scan",
-      "aios/state-machine",
-      "aios/validator"
-    ]
-  },
-  "merge_transport": {
-    "transport": "unix_json",
-    "socket_path": "/run/aios-gitops/integration-merge-writer.sock",
-    "timeout_seconds": 120
-  },
-  "tag_transport": {
-    "transport": "http_json",
-    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/create-tag",
-    "credential_name": "tag_api",
-    "timeout_seconds": 120,
-    "expected_statuses": [
-      200
-    ]
-  },
-  "remote_tag": {
-    "remote_url": "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git",
-    "gitea_base_url": "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git",
-    "repo_owner": "aios",
-    "repo_name": "aios",
-    "credential_name": "gitea_http"
-  },
-  "deployment": {
-    "artifact_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/artifacts/V2R1C4.tar.zst",
-    "artifact_manifest_member": "artifact-manifest.json",
-    "release_root": "/opt/aios/releases",
-    "current_symlink": "/opt/aios/current",
-    "previous_symlink": "/opt/aios/previous",
-    "state_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/deployment-state.json",
-    "service_units": [
-      "aios-gitops-model-api.service"
-    ],
-    "health_checks": [
-      {
-        "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/health",
-        "expected_status": 200,
-        "timeout_seconds": 10
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  "metadata": {
-    "registry_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release/versions/V2R1C4.json",
-    "baseline_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/release/PRODUCTION_BASELINE",
-    "registry_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/registry-plan.json",
-    "baseline_plan_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/baseline-plan.txt",
-    "metadata_snapshot_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/metadata-snapshots"
-  }
-}
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "approval_expires_at": "2026-08-05T00:00:00Z",
-  "approval_head_oid": "<40_HEX_OID>",
-  "approval_manifest_path": "approvals/release/V2R1C4-PRODUCTION-RELEASE-ENVELOPE.json",
-  "approval_manifest_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "approval_merge_oid": "<40_HEX_OID>",
-  "approval_plan_id": "<OWNER_APPROVED_PLAN_ID>",
-  "approval_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "approval_pr_number": 1,
-  "artifact_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "baseline_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "deployment_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "evidence_closure_oid": "<40_HEX_OID>",
-  "evidence_closure_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "expected_base_oid": "<40_HEX_BASE_OID>",
-  "owner_review_oid": 1,
-  "publisher_identity": "aios-governance-request-publisher",
-  "release_branch": "patch/v2r1c4-security-invariants-v3-20260729",
-  "release_root_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "repository": "aios/aios",
-  "registry_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "rollback_artifact_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "rollback_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "sbom_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "tag_plan_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "target_oid": "<40_HEX_TARGET_OID>",
-  "target_tree_oid": "<40_HEX_TREE_OID>",
-  "target_environment": "production",
-  "test_evidence_sha256": "<64_HEX_SHA256>",
-  "version": "V2R1C4",
-  "writer_identity": "aios-governed-development-writer"
-}
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "state_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/state.json",
-  "audit_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release/audit.jsonl",
-  "hooks": {
-    "verify_owner_approval": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "verify_owner_approval",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "merge_release": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "merge_release",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "create_tag": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "create_tag",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "verify_remote_tag": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "verify_remote_tag",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "deploy": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "deploy",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "health_check": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "health_check",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "rollback": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "rollback",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "verify_previous": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "verify_previous",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "restore": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "restore",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "verify_restored": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "verify_restored",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "update_registry": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "update_registry",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "update_baseline": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "update_baseline",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "verify_consistency": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "verify_consistency",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "snapshot_metadata": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "snapshot_metadata",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ],
-    "restore_metadata": [
-      "/usr/bin/aios-release-hook",
-      "restore_metadata",
-      "--config",
-      "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/release-actions.json"
-    ]
-  }
-}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "allowed_output_roots": [
-    "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/releases"
-  ],
-  "poll_seconds": 5,
-  "receipts_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/receipts",
-  "requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/requests",
-  "source_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea-repositories/aios/aios.git"
-}
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "poll_seconds": 10,
-  "receipts_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal/receipts",
-  "requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal/requests"
-}
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "admin_credential_name": "admin_gitea_http",
-  "expected_writer_username": "aios-governed-development-writer",
-  "gitea_base_url": "http://127.0.0.1:3000",
-  "grant_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant.json",
-  "journal_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/revocation-journal.json",
-  "receipt_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-evidence/revocation-receipt.json",
-  "revoked_grant_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant.revoked.json",
-  "terminal_trigger_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/terminal-revocation.json",
-  "writer_credential_name": "writer_gitea_http",
-  "writer_unit": "aios-governed-development-writer.service"
-}
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "exact_paths": [
-    "/usr/libexec/aios-autonomous-release-authorization/controller.py",
-    "/usr/libexec/aios-chatgpt-action-task-router-continuous-20260726/action_task_router.py"
-  ],
-  "output_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/projection/runtime-source-evidence.json",
-  "task_id": "V2R1C4-RELEASE-COMPLETION"
-}
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "gitea_db_path": "/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db",
-  "output_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher/status",
-  "owner_user_id": 2,
-  "poll_seconds": 5,
-  "repo_id": 1,
-  "requests_dir": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher/requests"
-}
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "allowed_peer_uids": [0],
-  "audit_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-evidence/audit.jsonl",
-  "grant_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant.json",
-  "grant_quota_ledger": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/grant-quota.sqlite",
-  "max_request_bytes": 4194304,
-  "operation_ledger": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state/operations.sqlite",
-  "policy_path": "/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/development-policy.json",
-  "socket_path": "/run/aios-development-writer-runtime/writer.sock",
-  "worktree_lock_path": "/var/lib/aios-development-writer-locks/worktree.lock"
-}
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema_version": 4,
-  "automatic": [
-    "build",
-    "test",
-    "artifact",
-    "canary",
-    "evidence"
-  ],
-  "owner": [
-    "signed_release_plan"
-  ],
-  "forbidden": [
-    "force_push",
-    "tag_rewrite",
-    "direct_main_push",
-    "baseline_mutation",
-    "registry_mutation"
-  ],
-  "runtime_deployment": {
-    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
-    "required_capability": "runtime_switch",
-    "tag_operations_allowed": false,
-    "baseline_mutation_allowed": false,
-    "registry_mutation_allowed": false,
-    "writer_default": false,
-    "rollback_required": true
-  },
-  "tag_release": {
-    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
-    "required_capability": "tag_publish",
-    "separate_controller": true,
-    "duplicate_conflict": "fail_closed",
-    "rewrite_allowed": false,
-    "force_push_allowed": false
-  },
-  "baseline_registry_finalize": {
-    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
-    "required_capability": "baseline_registry_finalize",
-    "separate_controller": true,
-    "remote_tag_verification_required": true,
-    "gitea_api_verification_required": true,
-    "registry_baseline_consistency_required": true
-  },
-  "approval": {
-    "algorithm": "Ed25519",
-    "trust_domain": "aios.production",
-    "maximum_lifetime_seconds": 3600,
-    "release_plan_sha256_required": true,
-    "not_before_required": true,
-    "replay_protection": true,
-    "revocation_fail_closed": true,
-    "key_rotation_supported": true,
-    "capabilities": [
-      "runtime_switch",
-      "tag_publish",
-      "baseline_registry_finalize"
-    ]
-  },
-  "execution": {
-    "environment_variable": "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED",
-    "default_enabled": false,
-    "shadow_side_effects_allowed": false,
-    "durable_saga_required": true,
-    "pre_switch_revalidation_required": true,
-    "trusted_candidate_builder_required": true,
-    "actual_plan_regeneration_required": true,
-    "startup_fail_closed_on_missing_component": true,
-    "recovery_worker_shadow_default": true,
-    "production_approval_backend_required": true,
-    "production_builder_signer": "kms-hsm-secret-manager-only",
-    "production_execution_without_backend": "unavailable"
-  },
-  "durability": {
-    "journal": "sha256-hash-chain",
-    "probe_journal": "sha256-hash-chain",
-    "exclusive_capability_claims": true,
-    "side_effect_probe_before_lease_takeover": true,
-    "side_effect_probe_before_failed_recoverable_retry": true,
-    "probe_results": [
-      "NOT_APPLIED",
-      "APPLIED_VERIFIED",
-      "INDETERMINATE",
-      "CONFLICT"
-    ],
-    "probe_operation_digest_required": true,
-    "probe_freshness_required": true,
-    "tamper_result": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED"
-  },
-  "tag_pending": {
-    "required_observations": [
-      "remote_git_ref",
-      "annotated_tag_object",
-      "peeled_target",
-      "gitea_api",
-      "gitea_listing",
-      "repository_identity"
-    ],
-    "indeterminate_result": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED",
-    "conflict_result": "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
-    "automatic_reconciliation": false
-  }
-}
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-version: 1
-policy_id: gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8
-
-runtime_identity:
-  user: aiman
-  group: gitops
-  umask: "0002"
-  prohibit_root_workspace_writes: true
-
-repository:
-  source_worktree: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
-  bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-  worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
-  remote: origin
-
-worktrees:
-  controller: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller
-  task_pattern: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/{agent}/{task_id}
-  allowed_agents:
-    - openclaw
-    - chatgpt
-    - controller
-  require_clean_start: true
-  remove_after_successful_push: true
-  retain_on_failure: true
-
-permissions:
-  owner: aiman
-  group: gitops
-  directory_mode: "2775"
-  file_mode: "0664"
-  default_acl:
-    user:aiman: rwx
-    group:gitops: rwx
-  apply_to:
-    - /data/aios-gitops
-    - /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
-
-preflight:
-  required_user: aiman
-  required_group: gitops
-  required_umask: "0002"
-  require_writable_git_dir: true
-  require_writable_task_dir: true
-  require_writable_result_dir: true
-  reject_shared_source_worktree: true
-  reject_existing_git_lock: true
-
-notifications:
-  owner_on_received: required
-  owner_on_terminal: required
-  preferred_channel: weixin
-  redact_secrets: true
-
-rollback:
-  preserve_source_worktree: true
-  remove_created_worktrees: true
-  restore_service_dropins: true
-  restore_service_state: true
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Install as a systemd drop-in for GitOps/OpenClaw writer services.
-# Example: /etc/systemd/system/<service>.service.d/10-runtime-identity.conf
-
-[Service]
-User=aiman
-Group=gitops
-SupplementaryGroups=gitops
-UMask=0002
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops
-Environment=AIOS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-Environment=AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees
-Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_USER=aiman
-Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_UMASK=0002
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal production metadata.
-# No secret values belong in this file; runtime integrations use references.
-
-AIOS_V2_HOST=127.0.0.1
-AIOS_V2_PORT=18920
-AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
-AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/run-provenance.sqlite3
-AIOS_EXTERNAL_TASK_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/external-task-truth.sqlite3
-AIOS_EXECUTOR_CATALOG_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/executor-catalog.json
-AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILES=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-RELEASE.json:/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
-AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILE=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
-
-AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION=V2R1C2
-AIOS_TARGET_VERSION=V2R1C2
-AIOS_BASELINE_VERSION=V2R1C1
-AIOS_PREVIOUS_VERSION=V2R1C1
-AIOS_RELEASE_STATUS=PRODUCTION
-AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
-AIOS_RELEASE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
-AIOS_RELEASE_TAG=V2R1C2
-AIOS_RELEASE_EVIDENCE_SHA256=2e27bb73b8e6297bd3077238f73a96d697fc3c3611c601c4dc9357e5fdcd8eee
-
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_CONTRACT_VERSION=aios.openclaw.command.v2
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM=Ed25519
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_PLUGIN_VERSION=2.1.0-rc.4
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID=openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519
-AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF=AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal Production
-After=network-online.target
-Wants=network-online.target
-Conflicts=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
-ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app/aios_web/release_application.py
-ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=aios
-Group=aios
-WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
-Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
-Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
-ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_V2_PORT" = "18920"
-ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID" = "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24"
-ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_TAG" = "V2R1C2"
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_web.release_application
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=3
-TimeoutStartSec=60
-TimeoutStopSec=30
-KillSignal=SIGTERM
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
-StateDirectory=aios-v2r1c2-production
-StateDirectoryMode=0750
-UMask=0027
-LimitNOFILE=65536
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS Autonomous Release Candidate (dormant shadow only)
-After=network-online.target
-Wants=network-online.target
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=aiman
-Group=gitops
-WorkingDirectory=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726/services/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_PRODUCTION_DEPLOYMENT_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_CANDIDATE_LOOPBACK_HOST=127.0.0.1
-Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_autonomous_release_candidate.service --host 127.0.0.1 --port 19951 --state /var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-candidate/state.sqlite3
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=2
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-LockPersonality=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-RuntimeDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-StateDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-CacheDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt-autonomous-completion-contract-20260726/services/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-ReadWritePaths=/run/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-ReadWritePaths=/var/cache/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-UMask=0077
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS Autonomous Release Candidate Worker (Dormant/Shadow Only)
-After=network.target
-ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate/aios_autonomous_release_candidate
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=aiman
-Group=gitops
-UMask=0077
-WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
-Environment=PYTHONPATH=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-Environment=AIOS_TASK_PLANE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_PRODUCTION_DEPLOYMENT_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_CANDIDATE_CONTROL_ENDPOINT=127.0.0.1:19951
-Environment=AIOS_OPENCLAW_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:openclaw-gateway-candidate
-Environment=AIOS_CODEX_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:codex-app-server-candidate
-Environment=AIOS_NATIVE_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:session-native-adapter-control-candidate
-Environment=AIOS_GITEA_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE=systemd-credential:gitea-admin-api-candidate
-ImportCredential=openclaw-gateway-candidate
-ImportCredential=codex-app-server-candidate
-ImportCredential=session-native-adapter-control-candidate
-ImportCredential=gitea-admin-api-candidate
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_autonomous_release_candidate.worker_service --state-directory /var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
-StateDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
-RuntimeDirectory=aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectKernelLogs=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-ProtectClock=true
-ProtectHostname=true
-LockPersonality=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
-IPAddressDeny=any
-IPAddressAllow=localhost
-ReadOnlyPaths=/opt/aios-autonomous-release-candidate
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-release-worker-candidate
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS autonomous execution renewal controller
-After=network-online.target
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=root
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-autonomous-renewal-controller --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal.json
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-ProtectKernelLogs=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-UMask=0027
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/renewal /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=5s
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_DB=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitops_model.sqlite3
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_FILE=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios-v23.git
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_HOST=127.0.0.1
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_PORT=18890
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/aios-gitops/orchestrator-callback.env
 ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /data/aios-gitops/workspace/active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=3
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS governance approval watcher
-After=network-online.target
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=root
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-governance-approval-watcher --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/watcher.json
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/gitea.db
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
-IPAddressDeny=any
-UMask=0027
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS dormant single-owner machine-status prerequisite
-RefuseManualStop=no
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-User=aiman
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component machine-status-producer --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
-ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS governance approval mirror worker
-After=network-online.target
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=root
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-governance-mirror-worker --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror.json
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-ProtectKernelLogs=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-UMask=0027
-ReadWritePaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git /var/lib/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/mirror /run/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=5s
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS dormant single-owner review adapter prerequisite
-RefuseManualStop=no
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-User=aiman
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_GOVERNANCE_ENABLED=false
-Environment=AIOS_SINGLE_OWNER_ACTIVATION_ACTIVE=false
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_single_owner_governance.service --component owner-review-adapter --self-check --checkpoint-dir /var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
-ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/runtime/single-owner-governance
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS governance request publisher
-After=network-online.target
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/publisher.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=aios-governance-request-publisher
-Group=gitops
-StateDirectory=aios-governance-publisher-state aios-governance-publisher-evidence aios-governance-publisher-locks
-StateDirectoryMode=0750
-RuntimeDirectory=aios-governance-publisher-runtime
-RuntimeDirectoryMode=0750
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-governance-request-publisher --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/publisher.json
-LoadCredentialEncrypted=gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governance-request-publisher.gitea_http
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
-IPAddressAllow=127.0.0.1
-IPAddressDeny=any
-UMask=0027
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS single-owner governance activation verifier
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-User=root
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-single-owner-governance --verify --bindings /etc/aios-gitops/single-owner-activation-bindings.json --state-root /var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation --lock-path /run/aios-gitops/governance-activation.lock
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-gitops/governance-activation /run/aios-gitops
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-UMask=0027
-
-# Deliberately not installable. Deployment remains disabled/inactive;
-# activation is an explicit approved CLI transaction, never an always-on unit.
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS governed development writer credential revoker
-After=network-online.target
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/development-policy.json
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-User=root
-Group=gitops
-Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED=false
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/aios-development-writer-revoker --config /etc/aios-gitops/autonomous-control-plane/revoker.json
-LoadCredentialEncrypted=writer_gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governed-development-writer.gitea_http
-LoadCredentialEncrypted=admin_gitea_http:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-governance-admin.gitea_http
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-ProtectKernelLogs=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-UMask=0027
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-development-writer-state /var/lib/aios-development-writer-evidence /var/lib/aios-development-writer-locks /run/aios-development-writer-runtime
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS governed development writer revocation timer
-
-[Timer]
-OnBootSec=5min
-OnUnitActiveSec=5min
-AccuracySec=30s
-Unit=aios-governed-development-writer-revoker.service
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=timers.target
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Codex	8976454bec	feat(codex): add Codex-authenticated local central decision channel	2026-07-19 00:00:09 +08:00
Codex	2d6eb9eccf	fix(codex): make pending recovery plan read-only	2026-07-18 18:34:40 +08:00
Codex	59edc85930	feat(codex): harden callback transport and pending recovery	2026-07-18 15:50:42 +08:00
Codex	815e39f36c	fix(codex): harden workspace trigger protocol	2026-07-18 14:51:57 +08:00
Codex	c679c8394f	fix(codex): make central GPT health probing single-flight	2026-07-18 13:44:06 +08:00
Codex	9ec60c162a	fix(quorum): treat persisted blocked state as healthy cycle	2026-07-18 11:59:27 +08:00
Codex	415d736f88	fix(quorum): read authoritative bare refs in sandbox	2026-07-18 11:57:52 +08:00
Codex	20bfb3e773	fix(quorum): restore controller executable mode	2026-07-18 11:56:31 +08:00
Codex	cf211ac4ac	fix(quorum): validate and trust exact Git ref source	2026-07-18 11:56:18 +08:00
Codex	a76153c637	fix(quorum): make health receipts group-readable	2026-07-18 11:53:50 +08:00
Codex	3ddab59f65	fix(codex): allow read-only probe WAL access	2026-07-18 11:47:02 +08:00
Codex	4b88d90531	fix(codex): preserve watcher access to probe commands	2026-07-18 11:42:37 +08:00
Codex	2a80c8ad7a	fix(codex): bound gateway polling work units	2026-07-18 10:42:51 +08:00
Codex	1e00541e50	fix(codex): bound central health event scheduling	2026-07-18 10:36:22 +08:00
Codex	cb4f13601c	fix(codex): fail over model trigger channel safely	2026-07-18 10:32:12 +08:00
Codex	6170627542	fix(codex): verify existing shared queue without mutation	2026-07-18 10:26:16 +08:00
Codex	56827247f0	fix(codex): align gateway sandbox with durable queue	2026-07-18 10:24:10 +08:00
Codex	84714c712a	fix(codex): recover failed gateway activation safely	2026-07-18 10:20:09 +08:00
Codex	87fe8aea91	fix(codex): make gateway activation transactional	2026-07-18 10:17:41 +08:00
Codex	e850db7437	feat(codex): close GPT plus executor unattended automation loop	2026-07-18 10:15:05 +08:00
Codex	e116146341	merge: integrate GPT plus one-executor governance and quorum	2026-07-18 09:43:06 +08:00
Codex	df78b26437	feat(orchestration): implement GPT plus one-executor quorum controller	2026-07-18 05:40:50 +08:00
Codex	87a5fac40d	chore(governance): adopt GPT plus one-executor automation quorum	2026-07-18 05:01:34 +08:00
Codex	08fe81efee	chore(orchestration): dispatch OpenClaw three-party self-healing and release supervision	2026-07-18 04:54:21 +08:00
Codex	c3984ca2b4	fix(codex): isolate watcher runtime directory ownership	2026-07-18 03:39:45 +08:00
Codex	0c7e2d3b89	feat(codex): add persistent automatic command watcher	2026-07-18 03:36:46 +08:00
Codex	1b3b74fd62	merge(codex): integrate AIOS gateway with baseline remediation	2026-07-18 03:01:30 +08:00
Codex	378cc4d56a	fix(codex): restore hardened WeChat send backend lineage	2026-07-18 03:00:32 +08:00
Codex	95fc4d37f0	feat(codex): add reliable AIOS central orchestration gateway	2026-07-18 02:26:14 +08:00
Codex	9195470ceb	chore(orchestration): dispatch adaptive OpenClaw and Codex work units	2026-07-17 22:13:38 +08:00
Codex	cbe33ecab8	chore(governance): refresh adaptive dual-agent production contract	2026-07-17 22:13:38 +08:00
Codex	e3fc48e5b9	chore(governance): refresh adaptive dual-agent production contract	2026-07-17 22:04:03 +08:00
Codex	ed3bcf76c7	chore(governance): add shared V2R1 production execution contract	2026-07-17 21:24:20 +08:00