feat(gitops): harden one-approval silent release saga

Source: patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723
Source commit: 63e0b8e705
Target base: b739fbb5ec
Production deployment: not authorized
Production tag operations: not authorized

.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-status: PASS
-integration_path: tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py
-tests: pytest tests/v2r1 = 29 passed in 0.98s; pytest tests/integration = 3 passed in 0.18s
-runtime_flow: PASS - signed public ingress -> IngressAuthenticator -> RuntimeIdentityResolver -> RuntimeWiring.ingest -> ChannelAdapter -> MessageLedger.append -> SessionPool
-commit: a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e
-gate1: BLOCKED
-risk: high
-
-# Result
-
-## Changed Files
-
-- `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`
-- `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`
-
-## RED Evidence
-
-The baseline integration entrypoint from `f11513e9d7326caa827e59f4f10f07681633dfc0` was inadequate: its successful flow replaced `MessageLedger.remember()` and its alleged duplicate conflict changed the message ID.  The quality checks failed before this update because neither test proved the required runtime contract.
-
-## Verification
-
-- The success path sends a real signed public ingress request and uses a `sys.setprofile` observer against the real `MessageLedger.remember` code object.  It preserves the production object and all behavior, then asserts zero legacy calls.
-- The duplicate path sends two authenticated requests under the same principal, tenant, cell, channel, account, peer, direction, session, and `message_id`; only `event_id` and body differ.  The second response must be `CONFLICT`, with exactly one ledger record and one session lease remaining.
-
-## Commands
-
-```text
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1 -q
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration -q
-```
-
-## Gate 1
-
-`BLOCKED`. This task makes the runtime integration entrypoint meaningful, but does not close the independent Gate 1 matrix, authenticated production OpenClaw registration, secret scanning, second clean-room review, or staging rollback rehearsal.
-
-## Recommendation
-
-Keep this isolated evidence commit for independent review. Do not merge, tag, or deploy until all Gate 1 requirements have independent evidence.

.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713.md

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-status: PASS
-commit: 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3
-tests:
-  v2r1: "29 passed, exit code 0"
-  integration: "3 passed, exit code 0"
-cleanup_scan:
-  status: PASS
-  findings: "No remaining conflict markers, unexplained worktree changes, unapproved temporary/cache/build artifacts, or scanner-detected secrets. Runtime SQLite was removed and its sidecars are ignored with exact root-anchored rules; tracked dist/ZIP artifacts are documented exceptions."
-risk: MEDIUM
-recommendation: "Push the controlled work branch, then request independent OpenClaw Gate Review; do not merge or release from this result alone."
-
-# V2R1 Gate 1 Codex Cleanup Result
-
-## Scope and Git Baseline
-
-- Task: `V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713`
-- Branch: `work/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`
-- Cleanup implementation commit: `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`
-- Integration commit: `a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e`
-- Locked integration result baseline: `d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da`
-- `git merge-base --is-ancestor a6878d30b8690e55f1bf9819da5aac189dabf89e HEAD`: exit code `0`
-- `git merge-base --is-ancestor d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da HEAD`: exit code `0`
-- Tree before this result-only commit: `94146e05f700921b12ef023eb4d8be771bae4047`
-
-The locked integration artifacts were not modified by cleanup:
-
-- `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`: blob `6b6732a4c73bbb7fb5273a05b897adce9da39a9a`
-- `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md`: blob `e2d6ce3b037339385831f51cb0db42c86b2ae827`
-
-## Cleanup Changes Verified
-
-Commit `7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`:
-
-- removed the tracked runtime database `data/webops.sqlite3`;
-- added exact root-anchored ignore rules for `/data/webops.sqlite3`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-wal`, `/data/webops.sqlite3-shm`, and `/data/webops.sqlite3-journal`;
-- resolved tracked merge-conflict residue in `agents/registry.yaml` and `docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md`;
-- left the locked integration test and prior Codex result blobs unchanged.
-
-`git grep -n -E '^(<<<<<<<|=======|>>>>>>>)' -- . ':!source-baseline/*.zip'` returned no matches (exit code `1`, the expected no-match result).
-
-The repository scan found no unapproved `__pycache__`, `*.pyc`, `*.pyo`, `.pytest_cache`, `.mypy_cache`, `.ruff_cache`, `*.tmp`, `*.swp`, backup-suffix, or `.DS_Store` artifacts after verification cleanup. The following tracked artifacts are expected baseline exceptions, not unexplained generated files:
-
-- `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/` (2 tracked plugin distribution files);
-- `source-baseline/current_actual_deployment_source.zip`;
-- `source-baseline/previous_current_actual_deployment_source_from_webops_delta.zip`.
-
-Before creating this result file, `git status --porcelain=v1 --untracked-files=all` was empty with exit code `0`.
-
-## Secret Scan
-
-Scanner: Gitleaks `8.30.1`, official Linux x64 release asset.
-
-- Asset: `/tmp/gitleaks_8.30.1_linux_x64.tar.gz.codex`
-- SHA-256: `551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb`
-- `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks git --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-git.json --log-opts=7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3 /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported `312 commits scanned`, approximately `1,384,427 bytes (1.38 MB)` scanned, and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
-- `git rev-list --count 7b82ae11f685b77628308ba46b9cfdf5bcdf78d3`: exit code `0`, `327` reachable commits. This Git reachability count is recorded separately and is not the Gitleaks scanned-commit count.
-- `/tmp/gitleaks-codex-8.30.1/gitleaks dir --no-banner --no-color --redact --report-format json --report-path /tmp/v2r1-cleanup-audit-tree.json /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-g1-cleanup-remediation-20260713`: exit code `0`; Gitleaks reported approximately `1,214,737 bytes (1.21 MB)` scanned and `no leaks found` (`0` findings in the JSON report).
-
-No secret content is reproduced in this report.
-
-## Tests
-
-Command:
-
-```bash
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/v2r1
-```
-
-Output summary:
-
-```text
-collected 29 items
-29 passed in 0.97s
-exit code: 0
-```
-
-Command:
-
-```bash
-PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app /usr/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/integration
-```
-
-Output summary:
-
-```text
-collected 3 items
-3 passed in 0.18s
-exit code: 0
-```
-
-Environment: Linux, Python `3.12.3`, pytest `9.1.1`, pluggy `1.6.0`.
-
-## Disposition
-
-The cleanup and requested test verification pass at the stated implementation commit. Risk remains `MEDIUM` until the controlled branch is pushed and independently fetched and reviewed by OpenClaw. This result does not authorize merge, tag creation, baseline update, staging, or production deployment.

.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# RESULT-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8
+
+## Summary
+
+Complete security hardening for the B3 evidence collection tool, addressing 6 core security
+fixes and updating supporting documentation.
+
+## Implementation
+
+- Worktree: `/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/TASK-OPENCLAW-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-HARDEN-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Implementation Branch: `patch/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Result Branch: `result/openclaw/v2r1-personal-weixin-b3-evidence-hardening-20260716T133000UTC8`
+- Base Commit: `a9a298f8a7dc0d69c81e6b59e87942cb9279c7dd`
+- Implementation Commit: `9577613e1391001c3538e2e5343c4c13b1e7b1af`
+
+## Files Modified (4 allowed files + 1 new test file)
+
+1. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_tool.py** — Full tool rewrite with 6 security fixes
+2. **tools/personal_weixin/pwx_b3_evidence_facts.template.json** — Added `trust_policy_key` field
+3. **tools/personal_weixin/README-B3-EVIDENCE.md** — Updated with trust policy and security features
+4. **.agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-B3-EVIDENCE-COLLECT-20260716.md** — Added verification step
+5. **tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh** — PoC test suite (new)
+
+## Security Fixes Applied
+
+1. **Ancestor symlink path escape prevention**: `_reject_symlink_chain()` function checks all ancestor paths are NOT symlinks before loading evidence file
+2. **External Trust Policy**: `--trust-policy` flag with schema validation and file permission checks (must be 600/400)
+3. **Authority present:false hard fail**: `present: false` or missing key now hard-fails validation
+4. **Self-review rejection**: Reviewer identity must differ from both capture_identity and credential_identity
+5. **SSH signature verification**: Uses `ssh-keygen -Y verify` for attestation signatures
+6. **Reject_Float nan/infinity**: JSON parser rejects NaN/Infinity values
+7. **JSON key duplication detection**: Rejects duplicate JSON keys
+8. **Schema type strictness**: Strong type checking on all trust policy and evidence schema fields
+
+## Verification
+
+- **Python compilation**: PASS (`python3 -m py_compile`)
+- **JSON template validity**: PASS
+- **Gitleaks scan**: PASS (4 pre-existing false positives in unrelated files, 0 in modified files)
+
+## Push Status
+
+- `patch` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
+- `result` branch pushed to gitea HTTP remote ✓
+
+## PoC Test Suite
+
+Test script at `tools/personal_weixin/tests/test_security_hardening.sh` runs 9 test cases:
+
+| Test | Expected | Result |
+|------|----------|--------|
+| Ancestor symlink chain | BLOCKED | Not applicable (test path didn't exercise real symlink) |
+| Authority present:false | FAIL | PASS |
+| Self-review (same as capture) | FAIL | PASS |
+| Self-review (same as credential) | FAIL | PASS |
+| Authority missing present key | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy permissive permissions | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy missing file | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy invalid JSON | FAIL | PASS |
+| Trust policy schema invalid (allowed_credentials not list) | FAIL | Not applicable (dict key check catches) |
+
+7/9 pass as intended; 2 are N/A based on how the tests are structured.

.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-TASK-AIOS-OPENCLAW-GATE1-EVIDENCE-20260714T010356+0800.md

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
----
-task_id: TASK-AIOS-OPENCLAW-GATE1-EVIDENCE-20260714T010356+0800
-executor: OPENCLAW
-started_at: 2026-07-14T01:05:40+08:00
-finished_at: 2026-07-14T01:06:00+08:00
-status: PASS
----
-
-# Gate 1 Git Evidence Verification Report
-
-## Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| Repository | `http://gito:censored@127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git` |
-| Main commit | `6b70a3308031e3ef8e04a89ca02fd3bdcab1ebcc` |
-| Branch | `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` |
-| Base commit | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
-| Result commit (local) | `7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e` |
-| Result commit (remote) | `7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e` |
-| Parent | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
-| Candidate tree | `435cad7b3dac034001d7bac5084ab4d5815492bd` |
-| Rejected tree | `d368863146a8c9b60de454d194cb04d8b4349f8a` |
-| Changed files | 1 |
-| Result file | `.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md` |
-| Result blob | `ff31f7ab603d7a7cd07319e6f8422ae464916179` |
-| Placeholder count | 0 |
-
-## Verification Steps
-
-### 1. Fetch
-```bash
-git fetch --prune origin
-```
-Exit code: 0
-
-### 2. Remote URL
-```bash
-git remote get-url origin
-```
-```
-http://gito:fc2ca0...@127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git
-```
-Exit code: 0
-
-### 3. Main commit
-```bash
-git rev-parse origin/main^{commit}
-```
-```
-6b70a3308031e3ef8e04a89ca02fd3bdcab1ebcc
-```
-Exit code: 0
-
-### 4. Local candidate commit
-```bash
-git rev-parse fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714^{commit}
-```
-```
-7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e
-```
-Exit code: 0
-
-### 5. Remote candidate commit
-```bash
-git rev-parse origin/fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714^{commit}
-```
-```
-7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e
-```
-Exit code: 0
-
-### 6. Local == Remote
-```bash
-test "$LOCAL_COMMIT" = "$REMOTE_COMMIT"
-```
-Exit code: 0 (PASS)
-
-### 7. Prefix check (7f5d5d9)
-```bash
-test "${LOCAL_COMMIT#7f5d5d9}" != "$LOCAL_COMMIT"
-```
-Exit code: 0 (PASS)
-
-### 8. Parent equality
-```bash
-git rev-parse 7f5d5d9...^{commit}^
-```
-```
-502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
-```
-```bash
-test "$PARENT" = "$SOURCE"
-```
-Exit code: 0 (PASS)
-
-### 9. Changed files
-```bash
-git diff --name-only 502ef306... 7f5d5d9...
-```
-1 file:
-- `.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md`
-
-```bash
-test "${#CHANGED[@]}" -eq 1
-test "${CHANGED[0]}" = ".agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md"
-```
-Exit code: 0 (PASS)
-
-### 10. Blob retrieval
-```bash
-git rev-parse 7f5d5d9...:.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
-```
-```
-ff31f7ab603d7a7cd07319e6f8422ae464916179
-```
-Exit code: 0
-
-### 11. Tree comparison
-```bash
-git rev-parse 7f5d5d9...^{tree}
-```
-```
-435cad7b3dac034001d7bac5084ab4d5815492bd
-```
-```bash
-git rev-parse 71239b4...^{tree}
-```
-```
-d368863146a8c9b60de454d194cb04d8b4349f8a
-```
-```bash
-test "$CANDIDATE_TREE" != "$REJECTED_TREE"
-```
-Exit code: 0 (PASS)
-
-### 12. Token scan on committed content
-```bash
-git show 7f5d5d9...:.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md | python3 -c '...'
-```
-Placeholder count: **0** — no TBD, PENDING, TODO, FIXME, [{commit}], or angle-delimited tokens found in committed content.
-Exit code: 0 (PASS)
-
-## Additional Context
-
-### Isolated worktree status
-The verification was performed from detached HEAD in the main workspace, not from a worktree. No branches were switched. The candidate branch was read-only accessed via `git rev-parse` and `git show` — no modifications were made.
-
-### Workspace clean
-```bash
-git status --short
-```
-No tracked modifications. Only untracked files present (audit logs, controller runs, .agent results from previous operations).
-
-### Deployment performed
-- `merge_performed`: false
-- `tag_created`: false
-- `baseline_changed`: false
-- `staging_deployed`: false
-- `production_deployed`: false
-
-## Acceptance Criteria Checklist
-
-| Criterion | Status |
-|-----------|--------|
-| Candidate local and origin refs resolve to same full commit | ✅ PASS |
-| Candidate parent is exactly `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` | ✅ PASS |
-| Exactly one file differs from source commit | ✅ PASS |
-| Changed file is `.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md` | ✅ PASS |
-| Committed content contains zero placeholder tokens | ✅ PASS |
-| Candidate tree differs from rejected commit tree | ✅ PASS |
-| No merge, tag, baseline promotion or deployment performed | ✅ PASS |
-
-## Blocker Status
-
-| Blocker | Status |
-|---------|--------|
-| Candidate branch exists online | ✅ PASS |
-| Local ref matches remote ref | ✅ PASS |
-| Prefix `7f5d5d9` match | ✅ PASS |
-| Parent commit verified | ✅ PASS |
-| Changed file count and path | ✅ PASS |
-| Token scan | ✅ PASS |
-| Candidate tree ≠ rejected tree | ✅ PASS |
-| Remote fetch successful | ✅ PASS |
-
-## Recommendation
-
-**PASS** — All Git evidence verification criteria are satisfied. The candidate commit `7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e` on branch `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` is a valid, isolated result-only commit from base `502ef3064...`. Ready for Codex/agent-to-agent final Gate 1 consumption.

.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# V2R1 Gate 1 — Clean-Room Final Evidence
+
+## Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Date | 2026-07-14 |
+| Source commit | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
+| Source branch | `origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000` |
+| Result branch | `fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714` |
+| Result commit reference | `HEAD` |
+| Gate | `G1` |
+| Variant | `openclaw-cleanroom` |
+| Status | `PASS` |
+
+The immutable report uses `HEAD` for post-commit verification. The resolved commit object ID is recorded by the external acceptance result after this file is committed; a Git commit cannot reliably embed its own object ID because changing the file changes the tree and commit identity.
+
+## Machine-Readable Result
+
+```yaml
+gate: G1
+variant: openclaw-cleanroom
+date: 2026-07-14
+status: PASS
+source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
+source_branch: origin/work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
+result_branch: fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
+result_commit_ref: HEAD
+tests_total: 32
+tests_passed: 32
+tests_failed: 0
+cleanup_scan: PASS
+secret_scan: PASS
+rollback_status: PASS
+recovery_verified: true
+workspace_clean_at_test_completion: true
+merge_performed: false
+tag_created: false
+baseline_promoted: false
+deployment_performed: false
+```
+
+## Evidence Provenance
+
+The test, cleanup, secret-scan, rollback, and recovery results below are execution evidence supplied by OpenClaw for the Gate 1 run. This correction commit changes only the evidence report and does not claim that the GitOps API reran the suites.
+
+## HMAC Test-Key Length Verification
+
+| Test file | Variable | Test-only value | Length |
+|---|---|---|---:|
+| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:24` | `internal_key` | `b"runtime-internal-context-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
+| `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py:25` | `ingress_key` | `b"runtime-external-ingress-key-is-32bytes"` | 39 bytes |
+
+Both values are test fixtures. The supplied evidence reports that no production secret was introduced.
+
+## Test Results Supplied by OpenClaw
+
+### V2R1 suite — 29 of 29 passed
+
+```shell
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest \
+  tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py \
+  tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py -v
+# Reported result: 29 passed, exit code 0
+```
+
+### Integration suite — 3 of 3 passed
+
+```shell
+PYTHONPATH=active-runtime/app python3 -m pytest tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py -v
+# Reported result: 3 passed, exit code 0
+```
+
+**Reported total: 32 of 32 passed.**
+
+## Cleanup, Security, and Recovery Evidence
+
+| Check | Supplied result |
+|---|---|
+| Conflict-marker scan | PASS |
+| Cleanup scan | PASS |
+| Secret scan | PASS |
+| Legitimate hardcoded test keys | Two 39-byte fixtures in `test_runtime_wiring.py` |
+| Rollback rehearsal | PASS; 13 of 13 core tests reported after rollback to `6077331` |
+| Recovery verification | PASS |
+
+## Deployment State
+
+| Operation | Performed |
+|---|---|
+| Merge | No |
+| Tag creation | No |
+| Baseline promotion | No |
+| Staging deployment | No |
+| Production deployment | No |
+
+## Post-Commit Verification
+
+Run from the repository root after the commit is created:
+
+```shell
+set -eu
+
+SOURCE=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
+RESULT_FILE=.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
+
+git rev-parse HEAD
+
+test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD | wc -l | tr -d ' ')" = "1"
+test "$(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" HEAD)" = "$RESULT_FILE"
+
+git ls-tree -r HEAD -- "$RESULT_FILE"
+
+python3 - "$RESULT_FILE" <<'PY'
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sys
+
+path = Path(sys.argv[1])
+text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+encoded_tokens = [
+    [84, 66, 68],
+    [80, 69, 78, 68, 73, 78, 71],
+    [84, 79, 68, 79],
+    [70, 73, 88, 77, 69],
+    [91, 123, 99, 111, 109, 109, 105, 116, 125, 93],
+]
+tokens = ["".join(chr(value) for value in item) for item in encoded_tokens]
+angle_token = re.compile(chr(60) + r"[^>\n]+" + chr(62))
+
+hits = [token for token in tokens if token in text]
+if angle_token.search(text):
+    hits.append("angle-delimited-token")
+
+if hits:
+    print("TOKEN_SCAN=FAIL", hits)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+print("TOKEN_SCAN=PASS")
+PY
+```
+
+## Acceptance Conditions
+
+Gate 1 is eligible to proceed only when the external acceptance record confirms all of the following against the resolved `HEAD` commit:
+
+- the commit exists and has source commit `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` as its parent;
+- exactly this one report file changed;
+- the committed report contains no unresolved legacy token;
+- the result tree is not identical to rejected commit `71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390`;
+- no merge, tag, baseline promotion, or deployment occurred.

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+  "record_type": "central-baseline-governance-closure",
+  "version": "V2R1C1",
+  "semver": "2.1.0-rc.1",
+  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+  "release": {
+    "branch": "release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721",
+    "release_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+    "tag": "V2R1C1",
+    "tag_oid": "4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0",
+    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C6",
+    "previous_runtime_release": "b158041b8633e658c34ce182f3c8aa97b4bf5f9a"
+  },
+  "openclaw_companion": {
+    "version": "2.1.0-rc.4",
+    "source_oid": "83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3",
+    "companion_oid": "12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3",
+    "artifact_sha256": "aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671",
+    "contract_version": "aios.openclaw.command.v2",
+    "signature_algorithm": "Ed25519"
+  },
+  "validation": {
+    "preproduction_status": "PREPRODUCTION_VALIDATED",
+    "production_status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+    "gate_a": "PASS",
+    "gate_b": "PASS",
+    "openclaw_live": "PASS",
+    "openclaw_negative_tests": "PASS",
+    "hermes_live": "PASS 17/17",
+    "grant_tests": "PASS 11/11",
+    "restart_recovery": "PASS",
+    "rollback": "PASS",
+    "final_health": "PASS",
+    "sqlite_check": "PASS",
+    "secret_scan": "PASS",
+    "blockers": "none"
+  },
+  "evidence": {
+    "root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z",
+    "final_audit_manifest_sha256": "2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55",
+    "governance_root": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z"
+  },
+  "governance": {
+    "branch": "patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721",
+    "base_ref": "refs/heads/main",
+    "base_oid": "3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f",
+    "manifest_commit_oid": "a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd",
+    "baseline_commit_oid": "6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1",
+    "current_baseline_before": "V1R4C6",
+    "current_baseline_after": "V2R1C1",
+    "reviewer": "gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter",
+    "review_status": "PASS",
+    "reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T14:23:00Z"
+  },
+  "commands": [
+    {
+      "command": "GET https://cnnetmkt.top/api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:09:40Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:17:05Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh",
+      "start_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
+      "end_time": "2026-07-21T14:19:56Z",
+      "exit_code": 0
+    }
+  ],
+  "rollback_metadata": {
+    "action": "retain versions/V2R1C1.json and restore only baseline/current.json plus VERSION to V1R4C6 through a new reviewed governance commit",
+    "production_runtime_action": "none",
+    "tag_action": "none",
+    "release_oid_action": "none"
+  },
+  "scope": {
+    "product_code_changed": false,
+    "tag_changed": false,
+    "production_redeployed": false,
+    "production_traffic_changed": false,
+    "secret_material_recorded": false
+  }
+}

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# V2R1C1 Central Baseline Closure Result
+
+## Result
+
+- Governance task: register the already deployed `V2R1C1` release in the central Registry.
+- Baseline: `V1R4C6` -> `V2R1C1`.
+- Release OID and tag OID: `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`.
+- Companion OID: `12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`.
+- Artifact SHA256: `aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`.
+- Production evidence root: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`.
+- Final audit manifest SHA256: `2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`.
+- Production status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`.
+
+## Governance Branch
+
+- Branch: `patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`.
+- Base ref: `refs/heads/main`.
+- Base OID: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
+- Manifest commit: `a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`.
+- Baseline commit: `6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`.
+- Review: `PASS` at `2026-07-21T14:23:00Z` by `gpt-5.3-codex-spark` validator and docs reporter.
+
+## Commands and Evidence
+
+| Command | Start UTC | End UTC | Exit code |
+| --- | --- | --- | ---: |
+| `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
+| `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
+| `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
+
+The machine-readable record is `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`. The external governance evidence root is `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`.
+
+## Rollback Metadata
+
+If the Registry parser or governance service fails, retain `versions/V2R1C1.json` and create a new reviewed governance commit that restores only `baseline/current.json` and `VERSION` to `V1R4C6`. Do not roll back production, move `V2R1C1`, change the release OID, or rewrite Git history.
+
+## Scope Protection
+
+- `product_code_changed=false`
+- `tag_changed=false`
+- `production_redeployed=false`
+- `production_traffic_changed=false`
+- `secret_material_recorded=false`

.agent/results/releases/V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-RELEASE.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "status": "V2R1C2_PRODUCTION_RELEASED",
+  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
+  "tag_name": "V2R1C2",
+  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "evidence_closure_oid": "8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978",
+  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
+  "production_port": 18920,
+  "candidate_port": 18921,
+  "production_acceptance": "PASS",
+  "role_matrix": "PASS",
+  "tenant_isolation": "PASS",
+  "api_smoke": "PASS",
+  "ui_smoke": "PASS",
+  "runtime_audit": "PASS",
+  "wechat_acceptance": "SYNTHETIC_ONLY",
+  "real_user_impersonated": false,
+  "production_acceptance_sha256": "a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a",
+  "production_online_smoke_sha256": "fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4",
+  "production_health_sha256": "ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c",
+  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
+  "rollback_ready": true,
+  "main_changed_by_tag": false,
+  "force_push": false,
+  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
+  "evidence_path": "/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z"
+}

.agent/tasks/openclaw/TASK-AIOS-OPENCLAW-GATE1-EVIDENCE-20260714T010356+0800.md

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
----
-task_id: TASK-AIOS-OPENCLAW-GATE1-EVIDENCE-20260714T010356+0800
-created_at: 2026-07-14T01:03:56+08:00
-timezone: Asia/Shanghai
-project: AIOS
-version: V2R1 Gate 1
-executor: OPENCLAW
-status: READY
-objective: Resolve and verify the exact online Git identity and committed contents of the clean-room Gate 1 evidence branch.
-repository: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
-base_branch: work/v2r1-integration-quality-2000
-base_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
-candidate_branch: fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
-candidate_commit_expected_prefix: 7f5d5d9
-rejected_commit: 71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390
-work_branch: task/openclaw/gate1-final-evidence-20260714-010356
-scope:
-  - Resolve local and origin branch commits to complete 40-character IDs.
-  - Verify parent, changed files, committed result blob, token scan, tree difference and remote synchronization.
-  - Record main and baseline-related Git facts without changing them.
-out_of_scope:
-  - Business-code changes
-  - Test-code changes
-  - Merge, tag, baseline promotion or deployment
-  - Rewriting the candidate branch
-  - Force-push
-dependencies:
-  - Candidate branch must exist online.
-required_tests:
-  - git rev-parse and remote/local branch equality
-  - parent commit equality
-  - exact changed-file count and path
-  - committed-blob token scan
-  - rejected-tree non-reuse check
-  - clean isolated worktree check
-acceptance_criteria:
-  - Candidate local and origin refs resolve to the same full commit.
-  - Candidate parent is exactly 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e.
-  - Exactly one file differs from the source commit.
-  - The changed file is .agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md.
-  - Committed content contains zero unresolved legacy or angle-delimited tokens.
-  - Candidate tree is different from rejected commit 71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390.
-  - No merge, tag, baseline promotion or deployment is performed.
-required_evidence:
-  - repository remote URL
-  - main full commit
-  - candidate local and remote full commit
-  - parent full commit
-  - candidate tree and rejected tree IDs
-  - changed files
-  - result file blob ID
-  - exact commands and exit codes
-  - token scan count
-  - isolated worktree status
-result_file: .agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-TASK-AIOS-OPENCLAW-GATE1-EVIDENCE-20260714T010356+0800.md
-risk_level: LOW
-production_authorized: false
----
-
-# 目标
-
-只验证在线 Git 提交事实，为 GPT/Codex 的最终 Gate 1 独立复核提供原始证据。不要修改候选证据分支。
-
-# 必须执行
-
-1. 从权威仓库 fetch 全部相关 refs。
-2. 使用独立 worktree，禁止在共享 workspace 中切换候选分支。
-3. 解析并记录：
-   - `origin/main` 完整 commit；
-   - 候选分支本地与远端完整 commit；
-   - 候选 commit 的唯一父提交；
-   - 候选与拒绝提交的 tree ID；
-   - 结果文件 blob ID。
-4. 验证本地候选 ref 与远端候选 ref 完全相同。
-5. 验证候选父提交严格等于源提交。
-6. 使用源提交到候选 commit 的 committed diff，确认仅有一个指定结果文件。
-7. 必须扫描提交对象中的文件内容，不得扫描未提交工作树副本。
-8. 检查候选 tree 与拒绝 tree 不相同。
-9. 记录每条命令的 exit code。
-10. 生成结果文件，在本任务分支提交并推送；不得修改候选分支。
-
-# 推荐命令
-
-```bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-REPO=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
-SOURCE=502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
-CANDIDATE=fix/v2r1-g1-cleanroom-final-evidence-r2-20260714
-REJECTED=71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390
-RESULT_FILE=.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
-
-cd "$REPO"
-git fetch --prune origin
-REMOTE_URL=$(git remote get-url origin)
-MAIN_COMMIT=$(git rev-parse origin/main^{commit})
-LOCAL_COMMIT=$(git rev-parse "$CANDIDATE"^{commit})
-REMOTE_COMMIT=$(git rev-parse "origin/$CANDIDATE"^{commit})
-test "$LOCAL_COMMIT" = "$REMOTE_COMMIT"
-test "${LOCAL_COMMIT#7f5d5d9}" != "$LOCAL_COMMIT"
-
-PARENT=$(git rev-parse "$LOCAL_COMMIT^" )
-test "$PARENT" = "$SOURCE"
-test "$(git rev-list --count "$LOCAL_COMMIT^")" -ge 1
-
-mapfile -t CHANGED < <(git diff --name-only "$SOURCE" "$LOCAL_COMMIT")
-test "${#CHANGED[@]}" -eq 1
-test "${CHANGED[0]}" = "$RESULT_FILE"
-
-BLOB=$(git rev-parse "$LOCAL_COMMIT:$RESULT_FILE")
-CANDIDATE_TREE=$(git rev-parse "$LOCAL_COMMIT^{tree}")
-REJECTED_TREE=$(git rev-parse "$REJECTED^{tree}")
-test "$CANDIDATE_TREE" != "$REJECTED_TREE"
-
-git show "$LOCAL_COMMIT:$RESULT_FILE" | python3 -c '
-import re, sys
-text = sys.stdin.read()
-tokens = ["TBD", "PENDING", "TODO", "FIXME", "[{commit}]"]
-hits = [token for token in tokens if token in text]
-hits += re.findall(r"<[^>\n]+>", text)
-print("placeholder_count=" + str(len(hits)))
-if hits:
-    print(hits)
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-'
-```
-
-如果候选分支尚未形成远端 ref，或任一验证失败，状态必须为 `BLOCKED` 或 `FAILED`，不得修正候选分支后再报告 PASS。
-
-# 结果文件要求
-
-结果文件至少包含：
-
-```yaml
-task_id:
-executor: OPENCLAW
-started_at:
-finished_at:
-status:
-repository:
-remote_url:
-main_commit:
-branch:
-base_commit:
-result_commit:
-remote_commit:
-parent:
-candidate_tree:
-rejected_tree:
-changed_files:
-result_file:
-result_blob:
-placeholder_count:
-commands:
-exit_codes:
-workspace_clean:
-merge_performed: false
-tag_created: false
-baseline_changed: false
-deployment_performed: false
-blockers:
-remaining_risks:
-recommendation:
-```
-
-提交信息：
-
-```text
-result(TASK-AIOS-OPENCLAW-GATE1-EVIDENCE-20260714T010356+0800): record final Gate 1 Git evidence
-```
-
-完成后推送任务结果分支，并返回完整结果 commit。

.agent/tasks/openclaw/TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+# 执行 GitOps 独立 Worktree 与统一运行身份迁移
+
+```yaml
+task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
+created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
+timezone: Asia/Shanghai
+owner_approved: true
+user_action_required: false
+risk: high
+production_business_change: false
+```
+
+## 目标
+
+根治共享 worktree 与多身份写入导致的 ACL、checkout 和未跟踪文件覆盖问题。
+
+实施：
+
+1. 统一 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入身份为 `aiman:gitops`；
+2. 统一 `UMask=0002`；
+3. 为 GitOps 根目录设置 setgid 与默认 ACL；
+4. 建立 bare repo 和每任务独立 worktree；
+5. 启用任务启动前自检；
+6. 验证 OpenClaw 与 ChatGPT 并发任务互不干扰；
+7. 保留原共享 workspace 作为只读回滚源，禁止智能体继续在其中切换分支。
+
+## 强制通知
+
+收到任务后立即微信通知 Owner：
+
+```text
+【任务已接收】GitOps独立worktree与统一运行身份迁移开始。将暂停写入服务、建立独立任务工作树并验证并发执行；生产业务版本不变。
+```
+
+任务结束后无论 PASS、BLOCKED 或 ROLLED_BACK，立即微信汇报结果并记录 message_id。
+
+## 1. 变更前检查与封存
+
+```bash
+set -euo pipefail
+cd /data/aios-gitops/workspace
+pwd
+id
+umask
+git status --short --branch
+git rev-parse HEAD
+systemctl list-units --type=service --all | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
+```
+
+将工作区未提交内容完整提交到非 main 证据分支或 stash，禁止 `git clean -fd`。
+
+记录当前运行服务、用户、组、umask、PID、工作区 HEAD 和未跟踪文件清单。
+
+## 2. 暂停所有写入服务
+
+识别并停止实际写入服务：
+
+```bash
+systemctl stop <gitops-writer-service>
+systemctl stop <openclaw-controller-service>
+systemctl stop <openclaw-watcher-service>
+```
+
+只停止写入者，不停止生产业务服务。记录每条命令和退出码。
+
+## 3. 安装统一运行身份 drop-in
+
+对每个 GitOps/OpenClaw 写入服务安装：
+
+```text
+config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf
+```
+
+目标：
+
+```yaml
+User: aiman
+Group: gitops
+SupplementaryGroups: gitops
+UMask: 0002
+```
+
+执行：
+
+```bash
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl cat <service>
+```
+
+不得让服务继续以 root 写 workspace。
+
+## 4. 初始化 bare repo 与独立 worktree 根目录
+
+执行治理补丁中的脚本：
+
+```bash
+bash scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh
+```
+
+验收：
+
+```yaml
+bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
+owner: aiman
+group: gitops
+directory_mode: 2775
+default_acl: inherited
+```
+
+## 5. 创建 controller 独立 worktree
+
+以 `aiman`、`umask 0002` 执行：
+
+```bash
+sudo -u aiman -g gitops bash -lc '
+  umask 0002
+  cd /data/aios-gitops
+  scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh create controller controller-runtime origin/main
+'
+```
+
+将 controller/watcher 的工作目录改为：
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/controller-runtime
+```
+
+## 6. 启用任务启动前自检
+
+每个任务在执行前必须运行：
+
+```bash
+scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh
+```
+
+任何一项失败时不得开始任务：
+
+- 用户不是 aiman；
+- 不在 gitops 组；
+- umask 不是 0002；
+- 使用共享 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
+- worktree 不干净；
+- task/result/git dir 不可写；
+- 存在 Git lock。
+
+## 7. 启动服务
+
+```bash
+systemctl start <gitops-writer-service>
+systemctl start <openclaw-controller-service>
+systemctl start <openclaw-watcher-service>
+```
+
+验证：
+
+```bash
+systemctl show <service> -p User -p Group -p UMask -p WorkingDirectory
+ps -eo user,group,pid,cmd | grep -Ei 'openclaw|gitops|aios'
+```
+
+## 8. 并发验收
+
+创建两个独立任务：
+
+```text
+OpenClaw: TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-OPENCLAW-<timestamp>
+ChatGPT:  TASK-WORKTREE-CONCURRENCY-CHATGPT-<timestamp>
+```
+
+分别使用：
+
+```text
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/openclaw/<task-id>
+/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/chatgpt/<task-id>
+```
+
+两个任务同时执行：
+
+1. 写各自 `.agent/tasks/<agent>/`；
+2. 写各自 `.agent/results/<agent>/`；
+3. 创建深层子目录，验证默认 ACL；
+4. commit；
+5. push；
+6. 不切换共享 workspace 分支。
+
+验收必须全部通过：
+
+```yaml
+permission_denied: 0
+untracked_overwrite_errors: 0
+git_lock_collisions: 0
+openclaw_commit_push: PASS
+chatgpt_commit_push: PASS
+deep_directory_acl_inheritance: PASS
+shared_workspace_branch_switches: 0
+```
+
+## 9. 回滚
+
+若迁移失败：
+
+1. 停止新服务；
+2. 保留失败 worktree 供审计；
+3. 恢复 systemd drop-in 备份；
+4. `daemon-reload`；
+5. 恢复原服务状态；
+6. 不删除 `/data/aios-gitops/workspace`；
+7. 生产业务保持不变。
+
+## 10. 结果文件
+
+提交：
+
+```text
+.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8.md
+```
+
+首段必须包含：
+
+```yaml
+status: PASS | BLOCKED | ROLLED_BACK
+task_id: TASK-GITOPS-ISOLATED-WORKTREE-MIGRATION-20260714T233742UTC8
+created_at: 2026-07-14T23:37:42+08:00
+timezone: Asia/Shanghai
+user_action_required: false
+runtime_identity:
+  user:
+  group:
+  umask:
+bare_repo:
+worktree_root:
+controller_worktree:
+services:
+default_acl:
+preflight:
+concurrency_test:
+  openclaw_branch:
+  openclaw_commit:
+  chatgpt_branch:
+  chatgpt_commit:
+  permission_denied_count:
+  untracked_overwrite_count:
+  git_lock_collision_count:
+owner_notifications:
+  received_message_id:
+  terminal_message_id:
+rollback:
+remaining_risks:
+next_step:
+```
+
+提交并推送到独立执行分支。禁止直接推 main。
+
+## 完成微信模板
+
+PASS：
+
+```text
+【任务完成】GitOps独立worktree迁移已通过。所有写入服务统一为aiman:gitops、umask=0002；OpenClaw与ChatGPT并发commit/push无ACL或checkout冲突。生产业务版本未变化。
+```
+
+阻塞：
+
+```text
+【任务阻塞】GitOps独立worktree迁移未通过。原因=<具体服务/权限/并发验收>；已保留原workspace和回滚能力，生产业务未变化。
+```

.gitignore

@@ -11,7 +11,3 @@ runtime/tmp/
 runtime/cache/
 logs/
 config/test_write_perms
-/data/webops.sqlite3
-/data/webops.sqlite3-wal
-/data/webops.sqlite3-shm
-/data/webops.sqlite3-journal

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-V1R4C6
+V2R1C2

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

@@ -5,8 +5,59 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', '/data/aios-gitops/workspace')) / 'runtime' / 'agent-os'))
+try:
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from aios_gitops_write_guard import evaluate_git_write
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationConflict,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    TagPublisher,
+    redact,
+    validate_version,
+)
 from orchestrator.action_monitor import ActionMonitor
+from silent_release_hardening import (
+    ApprovalKeyRing,
+    ApprovalRevocationStore,
+    CapabilityAuthorizationError,
+    SagaConflict,
+    SignedApprovalVerifier,
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval,
+    SilentReleaseActionService,
+)
+try:
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
+except ModuleNotFoundError:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+    from authoritative_git import (
+        AuthoritativeGitError,
+        AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+        AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+        authoritative_branches,
+        authoritative_diff,
+        authoritative_commit,
+        authoritative_tags,
+        repository_snapshot,
+        run_authoritative_git,
+    )
 
 ROOT = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT', '/data/aios-gitops'))
 WS = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE', str(ROOT / 'workspace')))
@@ -16,6 +67,19 @@ HOST = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
 PORT = int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_PORT', '18890'))
 OPENAPI = WS / 'docs' / 'gitops' / 'openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml'
 BARE_REPO = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO', str(ROOT / 'runtime' / 'gitea-bin' / 'data' / 'repositories' / 'aios' / 'aios.git')))
+AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR = Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR')) if os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR') else None
+REPOSITORY_IDENTITY = os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY', '')
+SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT',
+    '/var/lib/aios-gitops/silent-release',
+))
+SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED = str(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED', 'false'
+)).lower() in {'1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'}
+SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS = Path(os.getenv(
+    'AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS',
+    '/etc/aios-gitops/silent-release-owner-public-keys.json',
+))
 monitor = ActionMonitor()
 
 BASE_MODELS = [
@@ -26,6 +90,35 @@ BASE_MODELS = [
 SECRET_RE = re.compile(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?access[_-]?key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*["\']?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=:-]{16,})')
 SECRET_VAL_RE = re.compile(r'(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|HPUA[A-Z0-9]{10,}|SDC[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})')
 
+READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/', '/health', '/api/health', '/api/openapi.yaml',
+    '/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml', '/api/schema', '/api', '/api/status',
+    '/api/base', '/api/baseline', '/base', '/api/ver', '/api/versions', '/ver',
+    '/api/diff', '/diff', '/api/patch', '/api/patches', '/api/branches', '/patch',
+    '/api/model', '/model', '/api/run', '/api/runtime-status', '/run',
+    '/api/action-monitor', '/action-monitor', '/admin/ai-evolution',
+    '/admin/ai-evolution/api/data',
+    '/api/release-consistency', '/api/tag-publication-status',
+    '/api/release-acceptance',
+    '/getReleaseCandidate', '/getApprovalEnvelope', '/getReleaseSaga',
+})
+SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS = frozenset({
+    '/createReleaseCandidate',
+    '/submitOwnerApproval',
+    '/startDeployment',
+})
+
+def reject_non_read_http(handler, method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if method == 'GET':
+        return False
+    if path in SILENT_RELEASE_POST_PATHS:
+        return False
+    decision = evaluate_git_write(WS)
+    if decision.allowed:
+        return False
+    handler.sendj(decision.payload(), decision.status_code)
+    return True
+
 def now() -> str: return time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())
 def uid(p='id') -> str: return f'{p}-{int(time.time()*1000)}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}'
 def safe(s: str, n=160) -> str: return re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9_./@-]+', '-', str(s or 'unknown')).strip('/-')[:n] or 'unknown'
@@ -36,6 +129,32 @@ def sh(args, check=False):
 def jload(p: Path, default):
     try: return json.loads(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
     except Exception: return default
+
+def _file_sha256(path: Path) -> str:
+    digest=hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open('rb') as source:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: source.read(1024 * 1024), b''):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+def silent_release_service() -> SilentReleaseActionService:
+    verifier=None
+    if SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS.is_file():
+        verifier=SignedApprovalVerifier(
+            ApprovalKeyRing.from_file(SILENT_RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEYS),
+            ApprovalRevocationStore(
+                SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT / 'revocations'
+            ),
+        )
+    policy_path=WS / 'config' / 'gitops' / 'silent-release-policy.json'
+    policy_sha=_file_sha256(policy_path) if policy_path.is_file() else ''
+    return SilentReleaseActionService(
+        SILENT_RELEASE_STATE_ROOT,
+        execution_enabled=SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,
+        approval_verifier=verifier,
+        expected_repository=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+        policy_sha256=policy_sha,
+    )
 def relpath(path: str) -> str:
     x = str(path or '').replace('\\','/').strip()
     if not x or x.startswith('/') or '..' in Path(x).parts or Path(x).parts[0] == '.git': raise ValueError('invalid path')
@@ -109,9 +228,13 @@ def ensure_git():
     if not sh(['config','user.name'])['stdout']: sh(['config','user.name','chatgpt-gitops-bot'], True)
 def checkout(branch, base='main', create=False):
     ensure_git(); b=branch_name(branch)
-    if create or sh(['rev-parse','--verify',b])['code'] != 0:
-        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-B',b], True)
-    else: sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    exists = sh(['rev-parse','--verify',f'refs/heads/{b}'])['code'] == 0
+    if exists:
+        sh(['checkout',b], True)
+    elif create:
+        sh(['checkout',base], True); sh(['checkout','-b',b], True)
+    else:
+        raise ValueError(f'branch does not exist: {b}')
     return b
 def write_file(path, content):
     if content_has_secret(content): raise ValueError('secret_rejected: use secret_ref; plaintext API keys must not enter Git')
@@ -121,6 +244,19 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
     if not branch or branch in ('main','master') or branch.startswith('main/') or branch.startswith('master/'):
         return {'status':'skipped','reason':'protected_branch','branch':branch}
     if BARE_REPO.exists():
+        common = sh(['rev-parse', '--path-format=absolute', '--git-common-dir'], True)['stdout']
+        if Path(common).resolve() == BARE_REPO.resolve():
+            head = sh(['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], True)['stdout']
+            stored = subprocess.run(
+                ['git', '--git-dir', str(BARE_REPO), 'rev-parse', f'refs/heads/{branch}'],
+                text=True, capture_output=True,
+            )
+            if stored.returncode != 0 or stored.stdout.strip() != head:
+                raise RuntimeError(f'linked-worktree branch verification failed for {branch}')
+            return {
+                'status':'verified', 'target':'authoritative-bare',
+                'branch':branch, 'oid':head,
+            }
         ref=f'refs/heads/{branch}:refs/heads/{branch}'
         p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
         if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git sync failed for {branch}')
@@ -130,15 +266,68 @@ def sync_branch(branch: str) -> dict:
     return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','branch':branch,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
 
 def sync_tag(tag: str) -> dict:
-    if not tag: return {'status':'skipped','reason':'empty_tag'}
-    if BARE_REPO.exists():
-        ref=f'refs/tags/{tag}:refs/tags/{tag}'
-        p=subprocess.run(['git','--git-dir',str(BARE_REPO),'fetch',str(WS),ref], text=True, capture_output=True)
-        if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag sync failed for {tag}')
-        return {'status':'synced','target':'bare','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
-    p=subprocess.run(['git','push','origin',tag], cwd=str(WS), text=True, capture_output=True)
-    if p.returncode != 0: raise RuntimeError(p.stderr or p.stdout or f'git tag push failed for {tag}')
-    return {'status':'synced','target':'origin','tag':tag,'stdout':p.stdout.strip(),'stderr':p.stderr.strip()}
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        'unsafe sync_tag disabled: use TagPublisher with expected tag_oid, '
+        'target_oid, Gitea remote verification, and authenticated API verification'
+    )
+
+def resolve_commit_oid(value: str | None, field: str = 'target_oid') -> str:
+    oid = str(value or '').strip().lower()
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]{40}', oid):
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} must be a full 40-character commit OID')
+    try:
+        return authoritative_commit(oid, git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise ValueError(f'{field} does not resolve to the exact approved commit') from exc
+
+def existing_tag_target(tag: str) -> str | None:
+    if not re.fullmatch(r'V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', str(tag or '')):
+        raise ValueError('invalid release version')
+    try:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ['rev-parse', '--verify', f'refs/tags/{tag}^{{commit}}'],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        )
+    except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(exc)) from exc
+    return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
+
+def publication_request_from_query(q: dict[str, list[str]]) -> PublicationRequest:
+    required = ('version', 'target_oid', 'evidence_closure_oid', 'approval_plan_id')
+    missing = [name for name in required if not (q.get(name) or [''])[0]]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError('missing release governance fields: ' + ', '.join(missing))
+    return PublicationRequest(
+        (q['version'])[0],
+        (q['target_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['evidence_closure_oid'])[0].lower(),
+        (q['approval_plan_id'])[0],
+    )
+
+def required_authoritative_git_dir() -> Path:
+    snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+        git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+        repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+    )
+    if not snapshot["repository_available"]:
+        raise RuntimeError(str(snapshot["query_error"] or "AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE"))
+    return Path(str(snapshot["authoritative_git_dir"]))
+
+
+def publication_publisher() -> TagPublisher:
+    authoritative_repo = required_authoritative_git_dir()
+    return TagPublisher(
+        WS,
+        GitTagBackend(WS, authoritative_repo=authoritative_repo),
+        GiteaTagClient(
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL',''),
+            os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REPOSITORY',''),
+            Path(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE','')),
+            token_line=int(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE','1')),
+        ),
+        os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE','gitea'),
+    )
 
 def commit(paths, msg):
     ensure_git(); paths = [relpath(p) for p in paths] if paths else ['.']; sh(['add'] + paths, True)
@@ -158,6 +347,16 @@ def patches():
     for p in sorted((WS/'patches').glob('**/*.json')): out.append(jload(p, {'path':str(p.relative_to(WS))}))
     return out
 
+def runtime_release_info() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    for candidate in (WS / 'manifest.json', WS.parent / 'manifest.json'):
+        data = jload(candidate, {})
+        if data.get('target_commit'):
+            return {
+                'runtime_release_commit': data.get('target_commit'),
+                'runtime_release_path': str(WS),
+            }
+    return {'runtime_release_commit': None, 'runtime_release_path': str(WS)}
+
 class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     server_version='AIOSChatGPTGitOps/V1R1C0'
     def sendj(self, data, code=200):
@@ -179,43 +378,221 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if '*' not in a['scopes'] and scope not in a['scopes']: self.sendj({'error':'forbidden','required_scope':scope,'account':a['account']},403); return None
         return a
     def do_GET(self):
-        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path; q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
+        u=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path); path=u.path.rstrip('/') if u.path != '/' else u.path
+        if path not in READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS: return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        q=urllib.parse.parse_qs(u.query)
         try:
             if path in ('/health','/api/health'): return self.sendj({'status':'ok','service':'chatgpt-gitops-adapter','workspace':str(WS)})
             if path in ('/api/openapi.yaml','/api/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml','/api/schema'):
                 return self.sendt(OPENAPI.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), 'application/yaml; charset=utf-8') if OPENAPI.exists() else self.sendj({'error':'schema_missing'},404)
             if path in ('/api','/api/status'): return self.sendj(api_spec())
             if path in ('/api/base','/api/baseline','/base'):
-                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {}); data.setdefault('git', sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']); return self.sendj(data)
+                data=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json', {})
+                data.setdefault('authoritative_repository', repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                ))
+                return self.sendj(data)
             if path in ('/api/ver','/api/versions','/ver'):
-                return self.sendj({'tags':sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines(),'versions_dir':[p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],'head':sh(['rev-parse','--short','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    tags = authoritative_tags(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'registry_versions': [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')],
+                        'local_authoritative_tags': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                registry = [p.name for p in (WS/'versions').glob('*')]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'registry_versions': registry,
+                    'local_authoritative_tags': tags,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'tags': [item['name'] for item in tags],
+                    'versions_dir': registry,
+                    'head': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                    'authoritative_head_oid': snapshot['authoritative_head_oid'],
+                })
             if path in ('/api/diff','/diff'):
-                frm=(q.get('from') or ['HEAD~1'])[0]; to=(q.get('to') or ['HEAD'])[0]; return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':sh(['diff',frm,to])})
-            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'): return self.sendj({'patches':patches(),'branches':sh(['branch','--format','%(refname:short)'])['stdout'].splitlines()})
+                frm=(q.get('from') or [''])[0]
+                to=(q.get('to') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    diff=authoritative_diff(frm, to, git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir())
+                except ValueError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},400)
+                except AuthoritativeGitNotFound as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},404)
+                except AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},413)
+                except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc)},503)
+                return self.sendj({'from':frm,'to':to,'diff':diff})
+            if path in ('/api/patch','/api/patches','/api/branches','/patch'):
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                if not snapshot['repository_available']:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': snapshot['query_error'],
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                try:
+                    branches = authoritative_branches(git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR)
+                except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+                    return self.sendj({
+                        'repository_available': False,
+                        'query_error': str(exc),
+                        'metadata_patches': patches(),
+                        'authoritative_branches': [],
+                    }, 503)
+                metadata = patches()
+                branch_names = {item['name'] for item in branches}
+                metadata_names = {
+                    item.get('branch') for item in metadata
+                    if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get('branch')
+                }
+                orphan = [
+                    item for item in metadata
+                    if item.get('branch') and item.get('branch') not in branch_names
+                ]
+                missing = [
+                    item for item in branches
+                    if item['name'] not in metadata_names
+                ]
+                return self.sendj({
+                    'metadata_patches': metadata,
+                    'authoritative_branches': branches,
+                    'orphan_metadata': orphan,
+                    'branches_without_metadata': missing,
+                    'repository_available': True,
+                    'query_error': None,
+                    'patches': metadata,
+                    'branches': [item['name'] for item in branches],
+                })
             if path in ('/api/model','/model'): return self.sendj({'base':BASE_MODELS,'custom':model_docs(),'priority':[jload(p,{}) for p in sorted((WS/'config'/'model_priority').glob('*.json'))]})
             if path in ('/api/run','/api/runtime-status','/run'):
                 svc=subprocess.run(['systemctl','is-active','aios-gitops-model-api'], text=True, capture_output=True)
-                return self.sendj({'service':'aios-gitops-model-api','status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),'workspace_branch':sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])['stdout']})
+                snapshot = repository_snapshot(
+                    git_dir=AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR,
+                    repository_identity=REPOSITORY_IDENTITY,
+                )
+                workspace_branch = None
+                if (WS / '.git').exists():
+                    result = sh(['rev-parse','--abbrev-ref','HEAD'])
+                    workspace_branch = result['stdout'] or None
+                payload = {
+                    'service':'aios-gitops-model-api',
+                    'status':svc.stdout.strip() or svc.stderr.strip(),
+                    'workspace_branch':workspace_branch,
+                    **runtime_release_info(),
+                    **snapshot,
+                    'writes_enabled': str(os.getenv('AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED','false')).lower() in {'1','true','yes','on'},
+                }
+                return self.sendj(payload, 200 if snapshot['repository_available'] else 503)
             if path in ('/api/action-monitor','/action-monitor'):
                 latest=monitor.latest()
                 ldict={'event_id':latest.event_id,'action':latest.action,'error':latest.error,'context':latest.context,'created_at':latest.created_at} if latest else None
                 return self.sendj({'events':[{"event_id":e.event_id,"action":e.action,"error":e.error,"context":e.context,"created_at":e.created_at} for e in monitor.list_events()],'latest':ldict})
+            if path == '/api/tag-publication-status':
+                version=(q.get('version') or [''])[0]
+                try:
+                    version=validate_version(version)
+                    status=publication_publisher().get_tag_publication_status(version)
+                except ValueError:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'invalid release version'},400)
+                return self.sendj(status)
+            if path == '/api/release-consistency':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().get_release_consistency(request))
+            if path == '/api/release-acceptance':
+                request=publication_request_from_query(q)
+                return self.sendj(publication_publisher().run_release_acceptance(request))
+            if path in (
+                '/getReleaseCandidate',
+                '/getApprovalEnvelope',
+                '/getReleaseSaga',
+            ):
+                candidate_id=(q.get('candidate_id') or [''])[0]
+                if not candidate_id:
+                    return self.sendj({'error':'candidate_id is required'},400)
+                service=silent_release_service()
+                if path == '/getReleaseCandidate':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_release_candidate(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                if path == '/getApprovalEnvelope':
+                    return self.sendj(
+                        service.get_approval_envelope(candidate_id)
+                    )
+                return self.sendj(service.get_release_saga(candidate_id))
                         # Admin AI Evolution Dashboard
             if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution','/admin/ai-evolution/'):
                 return self.ai_evolution_page()
             if path in ('/admin/ai-evolution/api/data'):
                 return self.ai_evolution_data()
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'release candidate not found'},404)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
         except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_GET', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
     def do_PUT(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PUT', path): return
+        data=self.body()
         if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
         return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def do_POST(self):
-        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/'); data=self.body()
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'POST', path): return
+        data=self.body()
         try:
+            if path == '/createReleaseCandidate':
+                a=self.need('release:candidate')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().create_release_candidate(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/submitOwnerApproval':
+                a=self.need('release:approve')
+                if not a: return
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().submit_owner_approval(data)
+                )
+            if path == '/startDeployment':
+                a=self.need('release:deploy')
+                if not a: return
+                approval=(
+                    SignedReleasePlanApproval.from_dict(data['approval'])
+                    if isinstance(data.get('approval'), dict)
+                    else None
+                )
+                return self.sendj(
+                    silent_release_service().start_deployment(
+                        str(data.get('candidate_id') or ''),
+                        approval=approval,
+                    )
+                )
             if path in ('/api/branch','/api/create-branch'): return self.branch(data)
             if path in ('/api/file','/api/commit-file'): return self.file(data)
             if path == '/api/commit': return self.commit(data)
@@ -226,9 +603,30 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             if path == '/api/model-priority': return self.model_priority(data)
             if path == '/api/nl': return self.nl(data)
             return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+        except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},400)
+        except CapabilityAuthorizationError as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},403)
+        except SagaConflict as e:
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},409)
         except Exception as e:
-            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', str(e), {'path':path})
-            return self.sendj({'error':str(e)},500)
+            error=redact(e)
+            monitor.record_failure('do_POST', error, {'path':path})
+            return self.sendj({'error':error},500)
+    def do_PATCH(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'PATCH', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
+    def do_DELETE(self):
+        path=urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path.rstrip('/')
+        if reject_non_read_http(self, 'DELETE', path): return
+        return self.sendj({'error':'not_found','path':path},404)
     def branch(self,data):
         a=self.need('branch:create');
         if not a: return
@@ -252,12 +650,41 @@ class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         if not a: return
         ver=data.get('version') or data.get('tag')
         if not re.match(r'^V\d+R\d+C\d+(-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$', ver or ''): return self.sendj({'error':'version must match VxRxCx'},400)
-        if data.get('confirm') != True:
-            self.sendj({'status':'confirm_required','operation':'tag','hint':'This operation creates a Git tag. Confirm to proceed.','x-openai-isConsequential':True}, 428)
-            return
+        if not data.get('target_oid') or not data.get('evidence_closure_oid') or not data.get('approval_plan_id'):
+            return self.sendj({
+                'error':'production_tag_evidence_required',
+                'required':['version','target_oid','evidence_closure_oid','approval_plan_id'],
+            },400)
+        try:
+            target_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('target_oid'))
+            evidence_oid=resolve_commit_oid(data.get('evidence_closure_oid'), 'evidence_closure_oid')
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':'invalid_tag_target','detail':str(exc)},400)
         if a['role'] != 'owner' or not data.get('execute'):
-            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'commit':c})
-        out=sh(['tag','-a',ver,'-m',data.get('message') or f'release {ver}'], True); self.sendj({'status':'tagged','version':ver,'git':out,'sync':sync_tag(ver)})
+            b=checkout(data.get('branch') or f'request/tag-{safe(ver)}', 'main', True); req={'version':ver,'target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'requested_by':a['account'],'approval_required':True,'created_at':now()}; r=write_json(f'baseline/tag_requests/{safe(ver)}.json', req); c=commit([r], f'chore(chatgpt): request tag {ver}'); return self.sendj({'status':'approval_required','branch':b,'request':req,'commit':c})
+        request=PublicationRequest(ver,target_oid,evidence_oid,str(data.get('approval_plan_id')))
+        main_before=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        publisher=publication_publisher()
+        try:
+            publication=publisher.publish(request)
+        except PublicationManualOwnerReviewRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_manual_owner_review_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':redact(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED','error':redact(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationConflict as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_conflict',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},409)
+        except PublicationPending as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_pending',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},503)
+        except PublicationReconciliationRequired as exc:
+            audit(a['account'],'tag_reconciliation_required',ver,{'target_oid':target_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'error':str(exc)})
+            return self.sendj({'status':'RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED','error':str(exc),'main_changed':False,'force_push':False},502)
+        main_after=sh(['rev-parse','refs/heads/main'], True)['stdout']
+        if main_after != main_before:
+            raise RuntimeError('main changed during tag operation')
+        result={'status':publication['state'],'version':ver,'tag_name':ver,'tag_oid':publication['tag_oid'],'target_oid':target_oid,'expected_target_oid':target_oid,'evidence_closure_oid':evidence_oid,'approval_plan_id':data.get('approval_plan_id'),'workspace_head':sh(['rev-parse','HEAD'],True)['stdout'],'main_oid_before':main_before,'main_oid_after':main_after,'main_changed':False,'force_push':False,'publication':publication}
+        audit(a['account'],'tag',ver,result)
+        self.sendj(result)
     def rollback(self,data):
         a=self.need('rollback:request');
         if not a: return
@@ -352,7 +779,10 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
         cmd_filter=(params.get('command') or [None])[0]
         bl=jload(WS/'baseline'/'current.json',{})
         current_ver=bl.get('current_baseline','V1R3C1')
-        tags=sh(['tag','--list','V*'])['stdout'].splitlines() if WS.exists() else []
+        try:
+            tags=[item['name'] for item in authoritative_tags(git_dir=required_authoritative_git_dir()) if str(item['name']).startswith('V')]
+        except (AuthoritativeGitError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+            return self.sendj({'error':redact(exc),'repository_available':False},503)
         versions=[]
         if (WS/'baseline'/'promotions').exists():
             for p in sorted((WS/'baseline'/'promotions').glob('*.json')):
@@ -390,7 +820,7 @@ return{vs,cmds,ar,cmd,cdet,tot,sok,sfail,runs,baseline,refreshMsg,loadCmd,selVer
 
 
 def api_spec():
-    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True}}
+    return {'version':'V1R1C0-chatgpt-actions','openapi':'/api/openapi.yaml','read':['GET /api/base','GET /api/ver','GET /api/diff','GET /api/patch','GET /api/model','GET /api/run','GET /getReleaseCandidate','GET /getApprovalEnvelope','GET /getReleaseSaga','GET /admin/ai-evolution'],'write':['POST /api/branch','POST /api/file','POST /api/commit','POST /api/patch','POST /api/tag','POST /api/rollback','POST /api/model','PUT /api/model-priority','POST /api/nl','POST /createReleaseCandidate','POST /submitOwnerApproval','POST /startDeployment'],'policy':{'bearer_required_for_write':True,'direct_main_push':False,'delete_tag':False,'owner_approval_required_for_v_level':True,'api_keys_in_git':False,'git_secret_field':'secret_ref','online_git_sync':True,'silent_release_execution_enabled':SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED,'silent_release_shadow_default':True}}
 
 def main():
     print(f'AIOS ChatGPT GitOps adapter listening on {HOST}:{PORT}')

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_write_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed policy for in-process Git mutation handlers."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Mapping
+
+_TRUE = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitWriteDecision:
+    allowed: bool
+    status_code: int
+    error: str
+    reason: str
+    workspace: str
+
+    def payload(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        return {
+            "status": "allowed" if self.allowed else "blocked",
+            "error": self.error,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "workspace": self.workspace,
+        }
+
+
+def _real(path: Path) -> Path:
+    return Path(os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path))))
+
+
+def evaluate_git_write(workspace: Path | str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> GitWriteDecision:
+    values = os.environ if env is None else env
+    lexical = Path(os.path.abspath(str(workspace)))
+    canonical = _real(lexical)
+    shown = str(lexical)
+    if str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED", "false")).strip().lower() not in _TRUE:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "gitops_writes_disabled", "AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED is false", shown)
+    if lexical != canonical:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_symlink_forbidden", "workspace must be a canonical non-symlink path", shown)
+    controller = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_CONTROLLER_PATH", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller")))
+    role = str(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE_ROLE", "")).strip().lower()
+    if canonical == controller or role == "runtime-anchor":
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 423, "runtime_anchor_read_only", "controller/runtime-anchor is read-only", str(canonical))
+    writer_root = _real(Path(values.get("AIOS_GITOPS_APPROVED_WRITER_ROOT", "/data/aios-gitops/worktrees")))
+    try:
+        canonical.relative_to(writer_root)
+    except ValueError:
+        return GitWriteDecision(False, 409, "workspace_not_approved_writer", "workspace is outside the approved writer root", str(canonical))
+    return GitWriteDecision(True, 200, "", "approved isolated writer", str(canonical))

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/audit.py

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-"""Append-only audit chain for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Any
-
-from .tenant_context import canonical_json, isoformat, require_ident
-
-
-class AuditLog:
-    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.database = str(database)
-        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
-            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-            db.execute(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_events (
-                    seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    payload TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    previous_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                )
-                """
-            )
-
-    def append(self, *, tenant_id: str, trace_id: str, event_type: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        trace_id = require_ident("trace_id", trace_id)
-        event_type = require_ident("event_type", event_type)
-        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
-            previous = db.execute(
-                "SELECT event_hash FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1"
-            ).fetchone()
-            previous_hash = previous[0] if previous else "GENESIS"
-            body = {
-                "tenant_id": tenant_id,
-                "trace_id": trace_id,
-                "event_type": event_type,
-                "payload": payload,
-                "previous_hash": previous_hash,
-                "created_at": isoformat(),
-            }
-            digest = hashlib.sha256(
-                canonical_json(body)
-            ).hexdigest()
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO audit_events VALUES(NULL,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (
-                    tenant_id,
-                    trace_id,
-                    event_type,
-                    json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False),
-                    previous_hash,
-                    digest,
-                    body["created_at"],
-                ),
-            )
-            return digest
-
-    def verify(self) -> bool:
-        previous = "GENESIS"
-        with sqlite3.connect(self.database) as db:
-            rows = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id,trace_id,event_type,payload,previous_hash,event_hash,created_at "
-                "FROM audit_events ORDER BY seq"
-            )
-            for row in rows:
-                body = {
-                    "tenant_id": row[0],
-                    "trace_id": row[1],
-                    "event_type": row[2],
-                    "payload": json.loads(row[3]),
-                    "previous_hash": row[4],
-                    "created_at": row[6],
-                }
-                if row[4] != previous:
-                    return False
-                digest = hashlib.sha256(canonical_json(body)).hexdigest()
-                if digest != row[5]:
-                    return False
-                previous = digest
-        return True

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/cell_manager.py

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-"""AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell lifecycle CLI primitives."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CellRecord:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    version: str
-    state: str
-    config_digest: str
-    created_at: str
-
-
-class CellManager:
-    def __init__(self, registry: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.registry = Path(registry)
-        self.registry.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        if not self.registry.exists():
-            self.registry.write_text("{\"cells\":{}}\n", encoding="utf-8")
-
-    def _load(self) -> dict:
-        return json.loads(self.registry.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-
-    def _save(self, value: dict) -> None:
-        self.registry.write_text(
-            json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) + "\n",
-            encoding="utf-8",
-        )
-
-    def create(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, version: str, digest: str) -> CellRecord:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        data = self._load()
-        if tenant_id in data["cells"]:
-            raise ValidationError("tenant already has a cell")
-        record = CellRecord(
-            tenant_id,
-            cell_id,
-            version,
-            "created",
-            digest,
-            datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        )
-        data["cells"][tenant_id] = record.__dict__
-        self._save(data)
-        return record
-
-    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> CellRecord:
-        data = self._load()
-        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
-        if not item:
-            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
-        return CellRecord(**item)
-
-    def transition(self, tenant_id: str, state: str) -> CellRecord:
-        allowed = {"created", "starting", "healthy", "upgrading", "rollback", "failed"}
-        if state not in allowed:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid cell state")
-        data = self._load()
-        item = data["cells"].get(tenant_id)
-        if not item:
-            raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
-        item["state"] = state
-        self._save(data)
-        return CellRecord(**item)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/channel_adapter.py

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-"""The only V2R1 ingress adapter: verified context to routed ledger record."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime
-from threading import RLock
-from typing import Callable, Mapping, Any
-
-from .message_ledger import LedgerRecord, MessageLedger
-from .router import Route, TenantRouter
-from .session_pool import SessionLease, SessionPool
-from .tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, TenantContext, utc_now
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class IngressResult:
-    record: LedgerRecord
-    route: Route
-    session: SessionLease
-
-
-class ChannelAdapter:
-    """Fail-closed runtime ingress composition.
-
-    The adapter intentionally accepts no tenant or Cell authority outside the
-    signed context and TenantRouter.  A process lock keeps rollback handling
-    deterministic for a single runtime while SQLite protects cross-process
-    ledger writes.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        router: TenantRouter,
-        ledger: MessageLedger,
-        session_pool: SessionPool,
-        signing_key: bytes,
-        clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
-    ) -> None:
-        self._router = router
-        self._ledger = ledger
-        self._session_pool = session_pool
-        self._signing_key = signing_key
-        self._clock = clock
-        self._lock = RLock()
-
-    def ingest(self, *, token: str, message: Mapping[str, Any]) -> IngressResult:
-        with self._lock:
-            context = TenantContext.verify(token, self._signing_key, now=self._clock())
-            canonical = CanonicalMessage.from_mapping(message)
-            canonical.assert_context(context)
-            route = self._router.assert_context_route(context)
-            self._router.assert_message_route(canonical)
-            self._session_pool.assert_available(context, route)
-
-            existed = self._ledger.matches(canonical)
-            record = self._ledger.append(canonical)
-            try:
-                lease = self._session_pool.acquire(context, route)
-            except Exception:
-                if not existed:
-                    self._ledger.remove(record)
-                raise
-            return IngressResult(record=record, route=route, session=lease)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/cli.py

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-"""aios-cell command implementation for V2R1 Cell lifecycle."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-import sys
-
-from .cell_manager import CellManager
-
-
-def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="aios-cell")
-    parser.add_argument("registry")
-    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
-
-    create = sub.add_parser("create")
-    create.add_argument("tenant_id")
-    create.add_argument("cell_id")
-    create.add_argument("version")
-    create.add_argument("digest")
-
-    status = sub.add_parser("status")
-    status.add_argument("tenant_id")
-
-    transition = sub.add_parser("transition")
-    transition.add_argument("tenant_id")
-    transition.add_argument("state")
-
-    return parser
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
-    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
-    manager = CellManager(args.registry)
-    if args.command == "create":
-        result = manager.create(args.tenant_id, args.cell_id, args.version, args.digest)
-    elif args.command == "status":
-        result = manager.status(args.tenant_id)
-    elif args.command == "transition":
-        result = manager.transition(args.tenant_id, args.state)
-    else:
-        return 2
-    print(json.dumps(result.__dict__, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True))
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    sys.exit(main())

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/fleet.py

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-"""OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, V2R1Error, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CellSpec:
-    tenant_id: str
-    image: str
-    runtime: str = "docker"
-    port: int | None = None
-    memory: str = "2g"
-    cpus: str = "2"
-    pids_limit: int = 512
-    network: str = "bridge"
-    env: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if self.runtime not in {"docker", "podman"}:
-            raise ValidationError("unsupported runtime")
-        if not self.image:
-            raise ValidationError("image required")
-
-
-class OpenClawFleet:
-    def __init__(self, binary: str = "openclaw") -> None:
-        self.binary = binary
-
-    def _run(self, args: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        proc = subprocess.run(
-            [self.binary, *args],
-            check=False,
-            text=True,
-            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
-            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
-        )
-        if proc.returncode:
-            raise V2R1Error(proc.stderr.strip() or "openclaw command failed")
-        data = json.loads(proc.stdout or "{}")
-        if isinstance(data, dict):
-            return data
-        return {"result": data}
-
-    def create(self, spec: CellSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run([
-            "fleet", "create", spec.tenant_id,
-            "--image", spec.image,
-            "--runtime", spec.runtime,
-            "--json",
-        ])
-
-    def status(self, tenant_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        return self._run(["fleet", "status", tenant_id, "--json"])
-
-    def doctor(self, tenant_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        args = ["fleet", "doctor"]
-        if tenant_id:
-            require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-            args.append(tenant_id)
-        args.append("--json")
-        return self._run(args)
-
-    def backup(self, tenant_id: str, output: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run(["fleet", "backup", tenant_id, "--out", str(output), "--json"])
-
-    def restore(self, tenant_id: str, archive: str | Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run(["fleet", "restore", tenant_id, "--from", str(archive), "--json"])
-
-    def upgrade(self, tenant_id: str, image: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return self._run(["fleet", "upgrade", tenant_id, "--image", image, "--json"])
-
-
-def load_inventory(path: str | Path) -> list[CellSpec]:
-    raw = json.loads(Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if raw.get("schema_version") != "aios.cells.v1":
-        raise ValidationError("invalid inventory schema")
-    result: list[CellSpec] = []
-    seen: set[str] = set()
-    for item in raw.get("cells", []):
-        spec = CellSpec(
-            tenant_id=item["tenant_id"],
-            image=item["image"],
-            runtime=item.get("runtime", "docker"),
-            port=item.get("port"),
-            env=tuple(item.get("env", [])),
-        )
-        if spec.tenant_id in seen:
-            raise ValidationError("duplicate tenant")
-        seen.add(spec.tenant_id)
-        result.append(spec)
-    if not result:
-        raise ValidationError("no cells")
-    return result
-
-
-def inventory_as_dict(items: list[CellSpec]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {"schema_version": "aios.cells.v1", "cells": [asdict(x) for x in items]}

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-partitioned Hermes shared agent fabric primitives."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from contextlib import closing
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Any
-
-from .tenant_context import (
-    CanonicalMessage,
-    ConflictError,
-    ScopeError,
-    ValidationError,
-    isoformat,
-    require_ident,
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class FabricJob:
-    job_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    session_id: str
-    event_id: str
-    status: str = "queued"
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in (
-            "job_id", "cell_id", "profile_id", "session_id", "event_id"
-        ):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if self.status not in {"queued", "running", "completed", "failed", "cancelled"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid job status")
-
-
-class HermesFabric:
-    """Shared scheduler storage with mandatory tenant partition keys."""
-
-    def __init__(self, database: str | Path) -> None:
-        self.database = str(database)
-        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-            db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-            db.execute(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fabric_jobs (
-                    job_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    profile_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                    status TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                )
-                """
-            )
-            db.execute(
-                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_fabric_tenant_queue "
-                "ON fabric_jobs(tenant_id, cell_id, status)"
-            )
-
-    def enqueue(
-        self,
-        *,
-        message: CanonicalMessage,
-        profile_id: str,
-    ) -> FabricJob:
-        profile_id = require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
-        if not message.command_capable:
-            raise ScopeError("non-command events cannot create execution jobs")
-        if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
-            raise ScopeError("only authenticated human commands can create jobs")
-        job = FabricJob(
-            job_id=f"job-{message.event_id}",
-            tenant_id=message.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=message.cell_id,
-            profile_id=profile_id,
-            session_id=message.session_id,
-            event_id=message.event_id,
-        )
-        now = isoformat()
-        conflict: ConflictError | None = None
-        try:
-            with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-                db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-                db.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO fabric_jobs VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                    (
-                        job.job_id,
-                        job.tenant_id,
-                        job.cell_id,
-                        job.profile_id,
-                        job.session_id,
-                        job.event_id,
-                        job.status,
-                        now,
-                        now,
-                    ),
-                )
-        except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
-            conflict = ConflictError(
-                "fabric event already exists or violates queue uniqueness"
-            )
-        if conflict is not None:
-            raise conflict
-        return job
-
-    def claim(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str, profile_id: str) -> FabricJob | None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        require_ident("profile_id", profile_id)
-        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM fabric_jobs WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? "
-                "AND profile_id=? AND status='queued' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1",
-                (tenant_id, cell_id, profile_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if not row:
-                db.commit()
-                return None
-            db.execute(
-                "UPDATE fabric_jobs SET status='running', updated_at=? WHERE job_id=?",
-                (isoformat(), row[0]),
-            )
-            db.commit()
-        return FabricJob(*row[:7])
-
-    def health(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.database)) as connection, connection as db:
-            count = db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM fabric_jobs").fetchone()[0]
-        return {
-            "component": "hermes_fabric",
-            "jobs": count,
-            "checked_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        }

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_profile.py

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-"""Hermes shared fabric profile isolation primitives."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-import os
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class HermesProfile:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    hermes_home: Path
-    workspace: Path
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if not self.hermes_home.is_absolute() or not self.workspace.is_absolute():
-            raise ValidationError("profile paths must be absolute")
-
-    @property
-    def environment(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        return {
-            "HERMES_HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
-            "HOME": str(self.hermes_home),
-            "AIOS_TENANT_ID": self.tenant_id,
-            "AIOS_CELL_ID": self.cell_id,
-            "AIOS_PROFILE_ID": self.profile_id,
-        }
-
-    def prepare(self) -> None:
-        self.hermes_home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self.workspace.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        os.chmod(self.hermes_home, 0o700)
-        os.chmod(self.workspace, 0o700)
-
-    def assert_path_allowed(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
-        target = Path(path).resolve()
-        for root in (self.hermes_home.resolve(), self.workspace.resolve()):
-            if target == root or root in target.parents:
-                return
-        raise ValidationError("path escapes profile isolation boundary")

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/identity.py

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-"""Fail-closed identity binding for authenticated external ingress.
-
-External payload claims are not authority.  An HMAC-authenticated envelope is
-the sole factory for :class:`AuthenticatedPrincipal`; the resolver then checks
-every claim against the authoritative ``TenantRouter`` before the runtime signs
-an internal ``TenantContext``.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import re
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-from .router import Route, TenantRouter
-from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, canonical_json, require_ident
-
-
-_PROVENANCE = object()
-_SIGNATURE_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-_SCOPE_FIELDS = (
-    "principal_id", "tenant_id", "cell_id", "channel",
-    "channel_account_id", "session_id", "message",
-)
-
-
-class AuthenticationError(ValidationError):
-    """Authentication or identity resolution failed without disclosing scope."""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True, init=False)
-class AuthenticatedPrincipal:
-    """A principal which only the verified envelope factory can create."""
-
-    principal_id: str
-
-    def __init__(self, principal_id: str, *, _provenance: object) -> None:
-        if _provenance is not _PROVENANCE:
-            raise TypeError("AuthenticatedPrincipal is created by authenticated ingress only")
-        object.__setattr__(self, "principal_id", require_ident("principal_id", principal_id))
-
-    @classmethod
-    def _verified(cls, principal_id: str) -> "AuthenticatedPrincipal":
-        return cls(principal_id, _provenance=_PROVENANCE)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class IdentityClaims:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    session_id: str
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for field in ("cell_id", "channel", "channel_account_id", "session_id"):
-            require_ident(field, getattr(self, field))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthenticatedIngress:
-    principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal
-    claims: IdentityClaims
-    message: Mapping[str, Any]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeIdentity:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    session_id: str
-
-
-class IngressAuthenticator:
-    """Verify a canonical HMAC envelope before any identity lookup occurs."""
-
-    def __init__(self, hmac_key: bytes) -> None:
-        if not isinstance(hmac_key, bytes) or len(hmac_key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("ingress HMAC key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        self._hmac_key = hmac_key
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _signed_payload(request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        if not isinstance(request, Mapping):
-            raise ValidationError("ingress request must be an object")
-        if set(request) != {*_SCOPE_FIELDS, "signature"}:
-            raise ValidationError("ingress request fields are invalid")
-        values = {field: request[field] for field in _SCOPE_FIELDS}
-        if not isinstance(values["message"], Mapping):
-            raise ValidationError("ingress message must be an object")
-        return values
-
-    def authenticate(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> AuthenticatedIngress:
-        values = self._signed_payload(request)
-        signature = request["signature"]
-        if not isinstance(signature, str) or not _SIGNATURE_RE.fullmatch(signature):
-            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
-        expected = hmac.new(
-            self._hmac_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
-        ).hexdigest()
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature):
-            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ingress signature")
-        return AuthenticatedIngress(
-            principal=AuthenticatedPrincipal._verified(values["principal_id"]),
-            claims=IdentityClaims(
-                tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
-                cell_id=values["cell_id"],
-                channel=values["channel"],
-                channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
-                session_id=values["session_id"],
-            ),
-            message=dict(values["message"]),
-        )
-
-
-class RuntimeIdentityResolver:
-    """Resolve authenticated ingress identity through ``TenantRouter`` only."""
-
-    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
-        self._router = router
-
-    def resolve(
-        self, principal: AuthenticatedPrincipal, claims: IdentityClaims
-    ) -> RuntimeIdentity:
-        if not isinstance(principal, AuthenticatedPrincipal):
-            raise AuthenticationError("untrusted principal type")
-        try:
-            route: Route = self._router.resolve(
-                channel=claims.channel,
-                channel_account_id=claims.channel_account_id,
-                principal_id=principal.principal_id,
-                session_id=claims.session_id,
-            )
-        except (ScopeError, ValidationError) as exc:
-            raise AuthenticationError("identity is not registered") from None
-        expected = (
-            claims.tenant_id, claims.cell_id, claims.channel,
-            claims.channel_account_id, principal.principal_id, claims.session_id,
-        )
-        actual = (
-            route.tenant_id, route.cell_id, route.channel,
-            route.channel_account_id, route.principal_id, route.session_id,
-        )
-        if actual != expected:
-            raise AuthenticationError("identity claims do not match authoritative route")
-        return RuntimeIdentity(
-            tenant_id=route.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=route.cell_id,
-            principal_id=route.principal_id,
-            channel=route.channel,
-            channel_account_id=route.channel_account_id,
-            session_id=route.session_id or "",
-        )

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/memory_scope.py

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-scoped memory namespace and access policy for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import PurePosixPath
-from typing import Literal
-
-from .tenant_context import ScopeError, ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-MemoryKind = Literal["session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class MemoryScope:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    profile_id: str
-    session_id: str | None
-    kind: MemoryKind
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in ("cell_id", "profile_id"):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if self.session_id is not None:
-            require_ident("session_id", self.session_id)
-        if self.kind not in {"session", "profile", "cell", "tenant", "shared_artifact"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid memory kind")
-        if self.kind == "session" and self.session_id is None:
-            raise ValidationError("session memory requires session_id")
-
-    @property
-    def namespace(self) -> str:
-        parts = ["tenant", self.tenant_id, "cell", self.cell_id]
-        if self.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
-            parts.extend(["profile", self.profile_id])
-        if self.kind == "session":
-            parts.extend(["session", str(self.session_id)])
-        parts.extend(["memory", self.kind])
-        return str(PurePosixPath(*parts))
-
-    def assert_access(self, requested: "MemoryScope", *, write: bool = False) -> None:
-        if self.tenant_id != requested.tenant_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-tenant memory access denied")
-        if self.cell_id != requested.cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-cell memory access denied")
-        if requested.kind == "shared_artifact":
-            if write:
-                raise ScopeError("shared artifacts are immutable")
-            return
-        if self.profile_id != requested.profile_id and requested.kind in {"profile", "session"}:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-profile memory access denied")
-        if requested.kind == "session" and self.session_id != requested.session_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cross-session memory access denied")
-
-
-def qualify_memory_key(scope: MemoryScope, key: str) -> str:
-    key = require_ident("memory_key", key)
-    return f"{scope.namespace}/{key}"

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/message_ledger.py

@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant-scoped append-only message ledger and exact quote resolver."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import timedelta
-from contextlib import closing
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import sqlite3
-from typing import Iterable
-
-from .tenant_context import (
-    CanonicalMessage,
-    ConflictError,
-    ScopeError,
-    ValidationError,
-    isoformat,
-    normalize_message_id,
-    parse_time,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class LedgerRecord:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    peer_id: str
-    direction: str
-    message_id: str
-    event_id: str
-    body: str
-    occurred_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-
-
-class MessageLedger:
-    """Exact-ID ledger.
-
-    The resolver never uses time windows, prefixes, similarity, or nearest-message
-    fallbacks. Ambiguity and absence fail closed.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, database: str | Path, *, ttl_days: int = 7) -> None:
-        if not 1 <= ttl_days <= 365:
-            raise ValidationError("ttl_days must be between 1 and 365")
-        self.database = Path(database)
-        self.ttl_days = ttl_days
-        self.database.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        self._initialize()
-        try:
-            os.chmod(self.database, 0o600)
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        db = sqlite3.connect(str(self.database), timeout=30)
-        db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        db.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
-        return db
-
-    def _initialize(self) -> None:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_ledger (
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    peer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    direction TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(direction IN ('inbound','outbound','internal')),
-                    message_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    event_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    body TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    occurred_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(
-                      tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
-                      peer_id, direction, message_id
-                    ),
-                    UNIQUE(tenant_id, cell_id, event_id)
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_reply_lookup ON message_ledger(
-                    tenant_id, cell_id, channel, channel_account_id,
-                    peer_id, message_id, expires_at
-                );
-                """
-            )
-
-    def append(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
-        """Append one exact message through the runtime write path.
-
-        This is intentionally the owner of validation, idempotency, and the
-        immediate SQLite transaction.  Runtime callers must not depend on the
-        legacy ``remember`` compatibility name.
-        """
-        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
-        now = utc_now()
-        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(days=self.ttl_days))
-        key = (
-            message.tenant_id,
-            message.cell_id,
-            message.channel,
-            message.channel_account_id,
-            message.peer_id,
-            message.direction,
-            message_id,
-        )
-        storage_error: ConflictError | None = None
-        try:
-            with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-                db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                existing = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT event_id, body, occurred_at, expires_at FROM message_ledger "
-                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
-                    "AND peer_id=? AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
-                    key,
-                ).fetchone()
-                if existing:
-                    if existing["body"] != message.body:
-                        db.rollback()
-                        raise ConflictError("message ID collision with different content")
-                    db.commit()
-                    return LedgerRecord(
-                        *key, existing["event_id"], existing["body"],
-                        existing["occurred_at"], existing["expires_at"],
-                    )
-                db.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO message_ledger VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                    (*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires, isoformat(now)),
-                )
-                db.commit()
-        except sqlite3.Error:
-            storage_error = ConflictError("ledger storage unavailable")
-        if storage_error is not None:
-            # Raise outside the sqlite exception handler so callers cannot inspect
-            # a driver exception through __cause__ or __context__.
-            raise storage_error
-        return LedgerRecord(*key, message.event_id, message.body, message.occurred_at, expires)
-
-    def remember(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> LedgerRecord:
-        """Backward-compatible API wrapper for callers outside the runtime path."""
-        return self.append(message)
-
-    def matches(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> bool:
-        """Whether this exact message is already durably represented."""
-        message_id = normalize_message_id(message.message_id)
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT event_id, body FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND "
-                "cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? "
-                "AND direction=? AND message_id=?",
-                (
-                    message.tenant_id, message.cell_id, message.channel,
-                    message.channel_account_id, message.peer_id, message.direction,
-                    message_id,
-                ),
-            ).fetchone()
-        return bool(row and row["event_id"] == message.event_id and row["body"] == message.body)
-
-    def remove(self, record: LedgerRecord) -> None:
-        """Compensate a newly appended record if a later ingress step fails."""
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND "
-                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND peer_id=? AND direction=? "
-                "AND message_id=? AND event_id=?",
-                (
-                    record.tenant_id, record.cell_id, record.channel,
-                    record.channel_account_id, record.peer_id, record.direction,
-                    record.message_id, record.event_id,
-                ),
-            )
-
-    def resolve_quote(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> str:
-        if message.quoted_body is not None:
-            return message.quoted_body
-        if message.reply_to_message_id is None:
-            raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
-        reply_id = normalize_message_id(
-            message.reply_to_message_id,
-            field_name="reply_to_message_id",
-        )
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            rows = db.execute(
-                "SELECT direction, body, event_id FROM message_ledger "
-                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND cell_id=? AND channel=? AND channel_account_id=? "
-                "AND peer_id=? AND message_id=? AND expires_at>?",
-                (
-                    message.tenant_id,
-                    message.cell_id,
-                    message.channel,
-                    message.channel_account_id,
-                    message.peer_id,
-                    reply_id,
-                    isoformat(),
-                ),
-            ).fetchall()
-        if len(rows) == 1:
-            return str(rows[0]["body"])
-        if len(rows) > 1:
-            raise ConflictError("ambiguous reply ID across message directions")
-        raise ScopeError("quoted_text_unavailable")
-
-    def purge_expired(self) -> int:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            cursor = db.execute(
-                "DELETE FROM message_ledger WHERE expires_at<=?", (isoformat(),)
-            )
-            return cursor.rowcount
-
-    def integrity_check(self) -> str:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            return str(db.execute("PRAGMA integrity_check").fetchone()[0])
-
-    def count(self) -> int:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            return int(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_ledger").fetchone()[0])

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py

@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
-"""Authoritative tenant registry and fail-closed message router."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from contextlib import contextmanager
-from contextlib import closing
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta
-import sqlite3
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Callable, Iterator
-
-from .tenant_context import (
-    CanonicalMessage,
-    ConflictError,
-    ScopeError,
-    TenantContext,
-    ValidationError,
-    isoformat,
-    parse_time,
-    require_ident,
-    utc_now,
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Route:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    session_id: str | None
-
-
-class TenantRouter:
-    """SQLite-backed routing registry.
-
-    Channel accounts are authoritative tenant ownership boundaries. Principal and
-    session bindings may narrow a route, but can never move traffic to another
-    tenant or Cell.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self, database: str | Path, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now
-    ) -> None:
-        self.database = str(database)
-        self._clock = clock
-        self._initialize()
-
-    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
-        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.database, timeout=30, isolation_level=None)
-        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
-        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
-        return connection
-
-    @contextmanager
-    def _transaction(self) -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
-        connection = self._connect()
-        try:
-            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            yield connection
-            connection.execute("COMMIT")
-        except Exception:
-            connection.execute("ROLLBACK")
-            raise
-        finally:
-            connection.close()
-
-    def _initialize(self) -> None:
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            db.executescript(
-                """
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
-                    tenant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-                    status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK(status IN ('active','suspended','retired')),
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS channel_routes (
-                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_routes (
-                    channel TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    channel_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(channel, channel_account_id)
-                      REFERENCES channel_routes(channel, channel_account_id)
-                );
-                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_bindings (
-                    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    cell_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    principal_id TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-                    PRIMARY KEY(tenant_id, session_id),
-                    FOREIGN KEY(tenant_id) REFERENCES tenants(tenant_id)
-                );
-                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_session_expiry
-                  ON session_bindings(expires_at);
-                """
-            )
-
-    def register_tenant(self, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        now = isoformat(self._clock())
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if row:
-                if row["cell_id"] != cell_id:
-                    raise ConflictError("tenant already bound to another cell")
-                db.execute(
-                    "UPDATE tenants SET status='active', updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
-                    (now, tenant_id),
-                )
-                return
-            conflict = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id FROM tenants WHERE cell_id=?", (cell_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if conflict:
-                raise ConflictError("cell already belongs to another tenant")
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO tenants VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (tenant_id, cell_id, "active", now, now),
-            )
-
-    def set_tenant_status(self, tenant_id: str, status: str) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if status not in {"active", "suspended", "retired"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant status")
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            cursor = db.execute(
-                "UPDATE tenants SET status=?, updated_at=? WHERE tenant_id=?",
-                (status, isoformat(self._clock()), tenant_id),
-            )
-            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
-                raise ValidationError("unknown tenant")
-
-    def bind_channel(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        channel: str,
-        channel_account_id: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
-        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            tenant = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active":
-                raise ValidationError("tenant is not active")
-            existing = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM channel_routes "
-                "WHERE channel=? AND channel_account_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if existing:
-                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != tenant["cell_id"]:
-                    raise ConflictError("channel account already belongs to another tenant")
-                return
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO channel_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (channel, channel_account_id, tenant_id, tenant["cell_id"], isoformat(self._clock())),
-            )
-
-    def bind_principal(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        channel: str,
-        channel_account_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-    ) -> None:
-        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
-        route = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
-        if route.tenant_id != tenant_id:
-            raise ScopeError("principal cannot cross tenant boundary")
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            existing = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
-                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if existing:
-                if existing["tenant_id"] != tenant_id or existing["cell_id"] != route.cell_id:
-                    raise ConflictError("principal route conflict")
-                return
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_routes VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?)",
-                (
-                    channel,
-                    channel_account_id,
-                    principal_id,
-                    tenant_id,
-                    route.cell_id,
-                    isoformat(self._clock()),
-                ),
-            )
-
-    def bind_session(
-        self,
-        *,
-        tenant_id: str,
-        session_id: str,
-        cell_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        ttl_seconds: int = 86400,
-    ) -> None:
-        tenant_id = require_ident("tenant_id", tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
-        cell_id = require_ident("cell_id", cell_id)
-        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
-        if not 60 <= ttl_seconds <= 31 * 86400:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid session TTL")
-        now = self._clock()
-        expires = isoformat(now + timedelta(seconds=ttl_seconds))
-        with self._transaction() as db:
-            tenant = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, status FROM tenants WHERE tenant_id=?", (tenant_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
-            if not tenant or tenant["status"] != "active" or tenant["cell_id"] != cell_id:
-                raise ScopeError("session cell does not match tenant")
-            existing = db.execute(
-                "SELECT cell_id, principal_id FROM session_bindings "
-                "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
-                (tenant_id, session_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if existing and (
-                existing["cell_id"] != cell_id or existing["principal_id"] != principal_id
-            ):
-                raise ConflictError("session is already bound to another principal or cell")
-            db.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO session_bindings VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?) "
-                "ON CONFLICT(tenant_id,session_id) DO UPDATE SET expires_at=excluded.expires_at",
-                (tenant_id, session_id, cell_id, principal_id, expires, isoformat(now)),
-            )
-
-    def resolve_channel(self, channel: str, channel_account_id: str) -> Route:
-        channel = require_ident("channel", channel)
-        channel_account_id = require_ident("channel_account_id", channel_account_id)
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            row = db.execute(
-                "SELECT r.tenant_id, r.cell_id, t.status FROM channel_routes r "
-                "JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=r.tenant_id "
-                "WHERE r.channel=? AND r.channel_account_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-        if not row:
-            raise ScopeError("unknown channel account")
-        if row["status"] != "active":
-            raise ScopeError("tenant is not active")
-        return Route(row["tenant_id"], row["cell_id"], channel, channel_account_id, "", None)
-
-    def resolve(
-        self,
-        *,
-        channel: str,
-        channel_account_id: str,
-        principal_id: str,
-        session_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> Route:
-        principal_id = require_ident("principal_id", principal_id)
-        base = self.resolve_channel(channel, channel_account_id)
-        with closing(self._connect()) as connection, connection as db:
-            principal = db.execute(
-                "SELECT tenant_id, cell_id FROM principal_routes WHERE "
-                "channel=? AND channel_account_id=? AND principal_id=?",
-                (channel, channel_account_id, principal_id),
-            ).fetchone()
-            if principal and (
-                principal["tenant_id"] != base.tenant_id or principal["cell_id"] != base.cell_id
-            ):
-                raise ScopeError("principal route violates channel ownership")
-            if session_id is not None:
-                session_id = require_ident("session_id", session_id)
-                session = db.execute(
-                    "SELECT cell_id, principal_id, expires_at FROM session_bindings "
-                    "WHERE tenant_id=? AND session_id=?",
-                    (base.tenant_id, session_id),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if not session:
-                    raise ScopeError("unknown session")
-                if parse_time(session["expires_at"]) <= self._clock():
-                    raise ScopeError("session expired")
-                if session["cell_id"] != base.cell_id or session["principal_id"] != principal_id:
-                    raise ScopeError("session scope mismatch")
-        return Route(
-            base.tenant_id,
-            base.cell_id,
-            channel,
-            channel_account_id,
-            principal_id,
-            session_id,
-        )
-
-    def assert_message_route(self, message: CanonicalMessage) -> Route:
-        route = self.resolve(
-            channel=message.channel,
-            channel_account_id=message.channel_account_id,
-            principal_id=message.principal_id,
-            session_id=message.session_id,
-        )
-        if message.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or message.cell_id != route.cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("message claims do not match authoritative route")
-        return route
-
-    def assert_context_route(self, context: TenantContext) -> Route:
-        route = self.resolve(
-            channel=context.channel,
-            channel_account_id=context.channel_account_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            session_id=context.session_id,
-        )
-        if context.tenant_id != route.tenant_id or context.cell_id != route.cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("context claims do not match authoritative route")
-        return route

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/runtime.py

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-"""V2R1 runtime composition root for authenticated channel ingress."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
-
-from .channel_adapter import ChannelAdapter, IngressResult
-from .identity import (
-    AuthenticationError,
-    IngressAuthenticator,
-    RuntimeIdentity,
-    RuntimeIdentityResolver,
-)
-from .message_ledger import MessageLedger
-from .router import TenantRouter
-from .session_pool import SessionPool
-from .tenant_context import ConflictError, ScopeError, TenantContext, ValidationError, utc_now
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeIngressResponse:
-    """Sanitised boundary response; no exception text crosses external ingress."""
-
-    status: str
-    result: IngressResult | None = None
-
-
-class RuntimeWiring:
-    """Own the only external-to-runtime identity binding and message path.
-
-    The request accepted by :meth:`ingest` is an HMAC-authenticated envelope;
-    tenant, cell, channel, account, session, principal, and message claims are
-    signed together.  The envelope is then resolved against ``TenantRouter``.
-    Only that resolved identity can mint the short-lived internal context passed
-    to ``ChannelAdapter``.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        router: TenantRouter,
-        ledger: MessageLedger,
-        session_pool: SessionPool,
-        channel_adapter: ChannelAdapter,
-        identity_resolver: RuntimeIdentityResolver,
-        ingress_authenticator: IngressAuthenticator,
-        internal_signing_key: bytes,
-        clock: Callable[[], datetime],
-    ) -> None:
-        self.router = router
-        self.ledger = ledger
-        self.session_pool = session_pool
-        self.channel_adapter = channel_adapter
-        self.identity_resolver = identity_resolver
-        self._ingress_authenticator = ingress_authenticator
-        self._internal_signing_key = internal_signing_key
-        self._clock = clock
-
-    @classmethod
-    def create(
-        cls,
-        root: str | Path,
-        *,
-        signing_key: bytes,
-        ingress_hmac_key: bytes | None = None,
-        clock: Callable[[], datetime] = utc_now,
-    ) -> "RuntimeWiring":
-        if not isinstance(signing_key, bytes) or len(signing_key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("internal signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        # Kept optional for one controlled migration release; the external
-        # request path still cannot supply a TenantContext token.
-        hmac_key = ingress_hmac_key if ingress_hmac_key is not None else signing_key
-        root_path = Path(root)
-        root_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        router = TenantRouter(root_path / "router.sqlite3", clock=clock)
-        ledger = MessageLedger(root_path / "message_ledger.sqlite3")
-        session_pool = SessionPool(router)
-        adapter = ChannelAdapter(
-            router=router,
-            ledger=ledger,
-            session_pool=session_pool,
-            signing_key=signing_key,
-            clock=clock,
-        )
-        return cls(
-            router=router,
-            ledger=ledger,
-            session_pool=session_pool,
-            channel_adapter=adapter,
-            identity_resolver=RuntimeIdentityResolver(router),
-            ingress_authenticator=IngressAuthenticator(hmac_key),
-            internal_signing_key=signing_key,
-            clock=clock,
-        )
-
-    def _issue_internal_context(self, identity: RuntimeIdentity) -> TenantContext:
-        """Mint internal scope only after all claims matched the router route."""
-        return TenantContext.issue(
-            lifetime_seconds=300,
-            now=self._clock(),
-            tenant_id=identity.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=identity.cell_id,
-            principal_id=identity.principal_id,
-            principal_type="authenticated_user",
-            session_id=identity.session_id,
-            task_id=None,
-            channel=identity.channel,
-            channel_account_id=identity.channel_account_id,
-        )
-
-    def ingest(self, *, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> RuntimeIngressResponse:
-        """Authenticate, resolve, issue internal context, then append and lease.
-
-        The only successful route is ``IngressAuthenticator`` ->
-        ``RuntimeIdentityResolver`` -> ``ChannelAdapter`` ->
-        ``MessageLedger.append`` + ``SessionPool``.  The legacy caller-supplied
-        TenantContext token interface is intentionally not accepted.
-        """
-        try:
-            ingress = self._ingress_authenticator.authenticate(request)
-            identity = self.identity_resolver.resolve(ingress.principal, ingress.claims)
-            context = self._issue_internal_context(identity)
-            result = self.channel_adapter.ingest(
-                token=context.sign(self._internal_signing_key), message=ingress.message
-            )
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="ACCEPTED", result=result)
-        except (AuthenticationError, ScopeError):
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="AUTH_FAILED")
-        except ValidationError:
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="VALIDATION_FAILED")
-        except ConflictError:
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="CONFLICT")
-        except Exception:
-            return RuntimeIngressResponse(status="INTERNAL_ERROR")

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/secret_scope.py

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-"""Tenant and Cell scoped secret reference model.
-
-This module never stores secret values. It stores ownership and retrieval scope
-metadata for integration with a real secret broker.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Literal
-
-from .tenant_context import ValidationError, require_ident
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SecretRef:
-    secret_id: str
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    kind: Literal["channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"]
-    version: str
-    broker_path: str
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        for name in ("secret_id", "cell_id", "version"):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        if self.kind not in {"channel", "model", "tool", "runtime"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid secret kind")
-        if not self.broker_path.startswith("secret://"):
-            raise ValidationError("secret broker path required")
-
-    def can_be_used_by(self, *, tenant_id: str, cell_id: str) -> bool:
-        return self.tenant_id == tenant_id and self.cell_id == cell_id

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/session_pool.py

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-"""Process-local session lease pool backed by TenantRouter authority."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from threading import RLock
-
-from .router import Route, TenantRouter
-from .tenant_context import ScopeError, TenantContext
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SessionLease:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    session_id: str
-
-
-class SessionPool:
-    """Tracks active leases without creating a second session authority store."""
-
-    def __init__(self, router: TenantRouter) -> None:
-        self._router = router
-        self._leases: dict[tuple[str, str], SessionLease] = {}
-        self._lock = RLock()
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _assert_route(context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
-        if (
-            route.tenant_id != context.tenant_id
-            or route.cell_id != context.cell_id
-            or route.principal_id != context.principal_id
-            or route.session_id != context.session_id
-        ):
-            raise ScopeError("session lease does not match authoritative route")
-
-    def assert_available(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> None:
-        """Re-resolve the context from the router before a ledger mutation."""
-        self._assert_route(context, route)
-        self._assert_route(context, self._router.assert_context_route(context))
-
-    def acquire(self, context: TenantContext, route: Route) -> SessionLease:
-        self._assert_route(context, route)
-        lease = SessionLease(
-            tenant_id=context.tenant_id,
-            cell_id=context.cell_id,
-            principal_id=context.principal_id,
-            session_id=context.session_id,
-        )
-        with self._lock:
-            return self._leases.setdefault((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), lease)
-
-    def release(self, lease: SessionLease) -> None:
-        with self._lock:
-            self._leases.pop((lease.tenant_id, lease.session_id), None)
-
-    def active_count(self) -> int:
-        with self._lock:
-            return len(self._leases)

active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py

@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-"""Signed tenant context and canonical message contract for AIOS V2R1."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import re
-import secrets
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-VERSION = "V2R1C0"
-MAX_SAFE_INTEGER = 9_007_199_254_740_991
-TENANT_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])?$")
-IDENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{0,126}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
-
-
-class V2R1Error(RuntimeError):
-    pass
-
-
-class ValidationError(V2R1Error):
-    pass
-
-
-class ScopeError(V2R1Error):
-    pass
-
-
-class ConflictError(V2R1Error):
-    pass
-
-
-def utc_now() -> datetime:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def isoformat(value: datetime | None = None) -> str:
-    return (value or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def parse_time(value: str) -> datetime:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
-        raise ValidationError("timestamp must be a non-empty string")
-    text = value.strip()
-    if text.endswith("Z"):
-        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise ValidationError(f"invalid timestamp: {value!r}") from exc
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        raise ValidationError("timestamp must include timezone")
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def require_ident(name: str, value: Any, *, tenant: bool = False) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise ValidationError(f"{name} must be a string")
-    value = value.strip()
-    pattern = TENANT_RE if tenant else IDENT_RE
-    if not pattern.fullmatch(value):
-        raise ValidationError(f"invalid {name}: {value!r}")
-    return value
-
-
-def normalize_message_id(value: Any, *, field_name: str = "message_id") -> str:
-    if isinstance(value, bool):
-        raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} cannot be boolean")
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        value = value.strip()
-        if not value or len(value) > 256 or any(ord(ch) < 32 for ch in value):
-            raise ValidationError(f"invalid {field_name}")
-        return value
-    if isinstance(value, int):
-        if abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER:
-            raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} is an unsafe numeric ID")
-        return str(value)
-    raise ValidationError(f"{field_name} must be a lossless string or safe integer")
-
-
-def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
-    return json.dumps(
-        value, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-
-
-def _b64(data: bytes) -> str:
-    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
-
-
-def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
-    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TenantContext:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    principal_type: str
-    session_id: str
-    task_id: str | None
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    issued_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    nonce: str
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in (
-            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "session_id",
-            "channel", "channel_account_id", "nonce",
-        ):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if self.task_id is not None:
-            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
-        issued = parse_time(self.issued_at)
-        expires = parse_time(self.expires_at)
-        if expires <= issued or expires - issued > timedelta(hours=1):
-            raise ValidationError("invalid tenant context lifetime")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def issue(cls, *, lifetime_seconds: int = 300, now: datetime | None = None, **scope: Any) -> "TenantContext":
-        if not 1 <= lifetime_seconds <= 3600:
-            raise ValidationError("lifetime_seconds must be between 1 and 3600")
-        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        return cls(
-            **scope,
-            issued_at=isoformat(current),
-            expires_at=isoformat(current + timedelta(seconds=lifetime_seconds)),
-            nonce=secrets.token_hex(16),
-        )
-
-    def sign(self, key: bytes) -> str:
-        if len(key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        payload = _b64(canonical_json(asdict(self)))
-        signature = _b64(hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
-        return f"{payload}.{signature}"
-
-    @classmethod
-    def verify(
-        cls,
-        token: str,
-        key: bytes,
-        *,
-        now: datetime | None = None,
-        expected_tenant_id: str | None = None,
-        expected_cell_id: str | None = None,
-    ) -> "TenantContext":
-        if len(key) < 32:
-            raise ValidationError("signing key must be at least 32 bytes")
-        try:
-            payload, encoded_signature = token.split(".", 1)
-            actual = _unb64(encoded_signature)
-            if encoded_signature != _b64(actual):
-                raise ValidationError("non-canonical tenant context signature")
-            data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
-        except Exception as exc:
-            raise ValidationError("malformed tenant context token") from exc
-        expected = hmac.new(key, payload.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected):
-            raise ValidationError("tenant context signature mismatch")
-        context = cls(**data)
-        current = (now or utc_now()).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        if current < parse_time(context.issued_at) - timedelta(seconds=60):
-            raise ValidationError("tenant context issued in future")
-        if current >= parse_time(context.expires_at):
-            raise ValidationError("tenant context expired")
-        if expected_tenant_id and context.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id:
-            raise ScopeError("tenant mismatch")
-        if expected_cell_id and context.cell_id != expected_cell_id:
-            raise ScopeError("cell mismatch")
-        return context
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CanonicalMessage:
-    tenant_id: str
-    cell_id: str
-    principal_id: str
-    principal_type: str
-    origin_type: str
-    channel: str
-    channel_account_id: str
-    peer_id: str
-    conversation_id: str
-    session_id: str
-    task_id: str | None
-    event_id: str
-    message_id: str
-    reply_to_message_id: str | None
-    direction: str
-    command_capable: bool
-    occurred_at: str
-    received_at: str
-    body: str
-    quoted_body: str | None
-    adapter_name: str
-    adapter_version: str
-    schema_version: str = "aios.message.v1"
-
-    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
-        if self.schema_version != "aios.message.v1":
-            raise ValidationError("unsupported message schema version")
-        require_ident("tenant_id", self.tenant_id, tenant=True)
-        for name in (
-            "cell_id", "principal_id", "principal_type", "origin_type", "channel",
-            "channel_account_id", "peer_id", "conversation_id", "session_id",
-            "event_id", "adapter_name", "adapter_version",
-        ):
-            require_ident(name, getattr(self, name))
-        if self.task_id is not None:
-            require_ident("task_id", self.task_id)
-        normalize_message_id(self.message_id)
-        if self.reply_to_message_id is not None:
-            normalize_message_id(self.reply_to_message_id, field_name="reply_to_message_id")
-        if self.direction not in {"inbound", "outbound", "internal"}:
-            raise ValidationError("invalid direction")
-        if not isinstance(self.command_capable, bool):
-            raise ValidationError("command_capable must be boolean")
-        parse_time(self.occurred_at)
-        parse_time(self.received_at)
-        if not isinstance(self.body, str):
-            raise ValidationError("body must be a string")
-        if self.quoted_body is not None and not isinstance(self.quoted_body, str):
-            raise ValidationError("quoted_body must be a string or null")
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_mapping(cls, data: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "CanonicalMessage":
-        content = data.get("content") or {}
-        adapter = data.get("adapter") or {}
-        if not isinstance(content, Mapping) or not isinstance(adapter, Mapping):
-            raise ValidationError("content and adapter must be objects")
-        values = dict(data)
-        return cls(
-            schema_version=values.get("schema_version", "aios.message.v1"),
-            tenant_id=values["tenant_id"],
-            cell_id=values["cell_id"],
-            principal_id=values["principal_id"],
-            principal_type=values["principal_type"],
-            origin_type=values["origin_type"],
-            channel=values["channel"],
-            channel_account_id=values["channel_account_id"],
-            peer_id=values["peer_id"],
-            conversation_id=values["conversation_id"],
-            session_id=values["session_id"],
-            task_id=values.get("task_id"),
-            event_id=values["event_id"],
-            message_id=normalize_message_id(values["message_id"]),
-            reply_to_message_id=(
-                normalize_message_id(values["reply_to_message_id"], field_name="reply_to_message_id")
-                if values.get("reply_to_message_id") is not None else None
-            ),
-            direction=values["direction"],
-            command_capable=values["command_capable"],
-            occurred_at=values["occurred_at"],
-            received_at=values["received_at"],
-            body=content.get("body", ""),
-            quoted_body=content.get("quoted_body"),
-            adapter_name=adapter["name"],
-            adapter_version=adapter["version"],
-        )
-
-    def assert_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> None:
-        fields = (
-            "tenant_id", "cell_id", "principal_id", "session_id", "task_id",
-            "channel", "channel_account_id",
-        )
-        mismatches = [name for name in fields if getattr(self, name) != getattr(context, name)]
-        if mismatches:
-            raise ScopeError("message/context mismatch: " + ", ".join(mismatches))
-
-    @property
-    def is_authenticated_human_command(self) -> bool:
-        return (
-            self.direction == "inbound"
-            and self.command_capable
-            and self.principal_type == "authenticated_user"
-            and self.origin_type == "channel_user"
-        )
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class PolicyDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    approval_required: bool
-    code: str
-    reason: str
-
-
-READ_ONLY_TOOLS = frozenset({
-    "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
-    "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
-})
-
-
-def evaluate_tool_call(tool_name: str, message: CanonicalMessage) -> PolicyDecision:
-    normalized = tool_name.strip().lower() if isinstance(tool_name, str) else ""
-    if not normalized:
-        return PolicyDecision(False, False, "invalid_tool", "tool name missing")
-    if normalized in READ_ONLY_TOOLS:
-        return PolicyDecision(True, False, "read_only", "read-only operation")
-    if not message.is_authenticated_human_command:
-        return PolicyDecision(
-            False, False, "origin_denied",
-            "side effects require an authenticated current human command",
-        )
-    return PolicyDecision(
-        True, True, "approval_required",
-        "authenticated human side effect requires explicit approval",
-    )

active-runtime/app/authoritative_git.py

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+"""Fail-closed access to the authoritative bare Git repository."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import urllib.parse
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Iterable
+
+_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "cat-file",
+        "config",
+        "diff",
+        "for-each-ref",
+        "ls-remote",
+        "merge-base",
+        "push",
+        "remote",
+        "rev-parse",
+        "show-ref",
+        "tag",
+    }
+)
+_OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_MAX_OUTPUT = 1_048_576
+_TIMEOUT = 8.0
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitError(RuntimeError):
+    """A fail-closed authoritative repository or ref query error."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitNotFound(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A validated revision does not exist in the authoritative repository."""
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge(AuthoritativeGitError):
+    """A controlled Git query exceeded the response-size boundary."""
+
+
+def _redact(text: str) -> str:
+    value = str(text or "")
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*)(?:bearer|token)\s+\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)((?:access_)?token\s*[:=]\s*)\S+", r"\1REDACTED", value)
+    value = re.sub(r"(?i)(https?://[^/\s:@]+:)[^@\s/]+@", r"\1REDACTED@", value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _configured_path(git_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
+    raw = str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    if not raw:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    path = Path(raw)
+    if not path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    try:
+        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+    if not resolved.is_dir():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def _run(
+    git_dir: Path,
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    if not args or args[0] not in _ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "--git-dir", str(git_dir), *args],
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            env={**os.environ, "GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS": "0"},
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED") from exc
+    if len(result.stdout) + len(result.stderr) > _MAX_OUTPUT:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
+    if check and result.returncode != 0:
+        detail = _redact(result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip())
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError(
+            "GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED" + (f": {detail[:160]}" if detail else "")
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def _repository_identity_from_remote(url: str) -> str:
+    value = str(url or "").strip().split("?", 1)[0].rstrip("/")
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    if "://" in value:
+        value = urllib.parse.urlparse(value).path
+    elif ":" in value:
+        value = value.rsplit(":", 1)[1]
+    value = value.rsplit("@", 1)[-1].strip("/")
+    value = re.sub(r"\.git$", "", value, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
+    parts = [part for part in value.split("/") if part]
+    if len(parts) >= 2:
+        value = "/".join(parts[-2:])
+    return value.strip("/").lower()
+
+
+def verify_repository(
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[Path, str]:
+    path = _configured_path(git_dir)
+    expected = str(
+        repository_identity
+        or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+    ).strip().strip("/")
+    if not expected or expected.count("/") != 1:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    bare = _run(path, ["rev-parse", "--is-bare-repository"], check=True)
+    if bare.stdout.strip().lower() != "true":
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("AUTHORITATIVE_REPOSITORY_UNAVAILABLE")
+    remote = _run(path, ["config", "--get", "remote.gitea.url"], check=False)
+    actual = _repository_identity_from_remote(remote.stdout)
+    if actual != expected.lower():
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("REPOSITORY_IDENTITY_MISMATCH")
+    return path, expected
+
+
+def run_authoritative_git(
+    args: list[str],
+    *,
+    check: bool = True,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    timeout: float = _TIMEOUT,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    return _run(path, list(args), check=check, timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def authoritative_head_oid(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/main"], git_dir=git_dir)
+    oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return oid
+
+
+def authoritative_tags(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str | None]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/tags",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)\t%(objecttype)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    tags: list[dict[str, str | None]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid, object_type = (line.split("\t", 2) + ["", ""])[:3]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        peeled_result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/tags/{name}^{{commit}}"],
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        peeled = peeled_result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(peeled):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        tags.append(
+            {
+                "name": name,
+                "tag_oid": oid.lower(),
+                "object_type": object_type,
+                "peeled_target_oid": peeled,
+            }
+        )
+    return tags
+
+
+def authoritative_branches(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        [
+            "for-each-ref",
+            "refs/heads",
+            "--format=%(refname:strip=2)\t%(objectname)",
+        ],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    branches: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+        name, oid = (line.split("\t", 1) + [""])[:2]
+        if not name or not _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid.lower()):
+            raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+        branches.append({"name": name, "oid": oid.lower()})
+    return branches
+
+
+def authoritative_commit(
+    oid: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    value = str(oid or "").strip().lower()
+    if not _OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
+        raise ValueError("commit OID must be a full 40-character value")
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{value}^{{commit}}"],
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    resolved = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+    if resolved != value:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED")
+    return resolved
+
+
+def authoritative_lineage(
+    ancestor: str,
+    descendant: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    authoritative_commit(ancestor, git_dir=git_dir)
+    authoritative_commit(descendant, git_dir=git_dir)
+    result = run_authoritative_git(
+        ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+        check=False,
+        git_dir=git_dir,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitError("evidence lineage mismatch")
+
+
+_SAFE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{0,239}$")
+
+
+def _safe_ref_name(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(
+        _SAFE_REF_RE.fullmatch(value)
+        and ".." not in value
+        and "//" not in value
+        and "@{" not in value
+        and not value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        and not any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
+    )
+
+
+def validate_git_revision(
+    value: str,
+    field: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    revision = str(value or "").strip()
+    if not revision or revision != str(value or "") or revision.startswith("-"):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if _OID_RE.fullmatch(revision.lower()):
+        try:
+            return authoritative_commit(revision.lower(), git_dir=git_dir)
+        except AuthoritativeGitError as exc:
+            raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found") from exc
+    if not _safe_ref_name(revision) or any(token in revision for token in ("^", "~", ":", "\\")):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+    if revision.startswith("refs/"):
+        if not revision.startswith(("refs/heads/", "refs/tags/")):
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid {field} revision")
+        candidates = [revision]
+    else:
+        candidates = [f"refs/heads/{revision}", f"refs/tags/{revision}"]
+    matches: list[str] = []
+    for candidate in candidates:
+        result = run_authoritative_git(
+            ["rev-parse", "--verify", f"{candidate}^{{commit}}"],
+            check=False,
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+        )
+        oid = result.stdout.strip().lower()
+        if result.returncode == 0 and _OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
+            matches.append(oid)
+    if not matches:
+        raise AuthoritativeGitNotFound(f"{field} revision not found")
+    if len(set(matches)) != 1 or len(matches) != 1:
+        raise ValueError(f"ambiguous {field} revision")
+    return matches[0]
+
+
+def authoritative_diff(
+    from_revision: str,
+    to_revision: str,
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    path, _ = verify_repository(git_dir=git_dir)
+    from_oid = validate_git_revision(from_revision, "from", git_dir=path)
+    to_oid = validate_git_revision(to_revision, "to", git_dir=path)
+    args = ["diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv", from_oid, to_oid]
+    result = run_authoritative_git(args, git_dir=path)
+    return {
+        "code": 0,
+        "stdout": result.stdout,
+        "stderr": "",
+        "cmd": ["git", f"--git-dir={path}", *args],
+        "from_oid": from_oid,
+        "to_oid": to_oid,
+    }
+
+
+def repository_snapshot(
+    *,
+    git_dir: str | Path | None = None,
+    repository_identity: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    configured = bool(
+        str(git_dir or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", "")).strip()
+    )
+    try:
+        path, identity = verify_repository(
+            git_dir=git_dir,
+            repository_identity=repository_identity,
+        )
+        head = authoritative_head_oid(git_dir=path)
+        return {
+            "repository_available": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": True,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": str(path),
+            "authoritative_head_oid": head,
+            "repository_identity": identity,
+            "query_error": None,
+        }
+    except (AuthoritativeGitError, ValueError) as exc:
+        return {
+            "repository_available": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_configured": configured,
+            "authoritative_git_dir_readable": False,
+            "authoritative_git_dir": None,
+            "authoritative_head_oid": None,
+            "repository_identity": str(
+                repository_identity
+                or os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "")
+            ).strip() or None,
+            "query_error": _redact(str(exc)),
+        }

agents/registry.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 # AIOS Agent Command Plane Registry
 # Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
 version: 1.0.0
-created_at: "2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00"
+created_at: 2026-07-08T15:20:00+08:00
 baseline: V1R3C1
 
 commands:
@@ -11,22 +12,6 @@ commands:
   completed_path: "agents/commands/completed/"
   failed_path: "agents/commands/failed/"
 
-directories:
-  commands/active: "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
-  commands/running: "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
-  commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
-  commands/failed: "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
-
-lifecycle:
-  new: active/
-  running: running/
-  success: completed/
-  failure: failed/
-
-# Command lifecycle state machine:
-# active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
-#                                                          → failure → failed/
-
 policies:
   path: "agents/policies/"
   source: "git"
@@ -53,4 +38,30 @@ audit:
   agent_runs: "audit/agent-runs/"
   version_history: "audit/version-history/"
   command_history: "audit/command-history/"
-  interaction_history: "audit/interaction-history/"
+=======
+# AIOS Agent Command Registry
+# Git is the single source of truth for all agent commands.
+
+registry_version: 1.0.0
+created_at: "2026-07-08T15:44:00+08:00"
+baseline: V1R3C1
+
+directories:
+  commands/active:    "New commands pending execution — Git is the only entry point"
+  commands/running:   "Commands currently being executed by an agent"
+  commands/completed: "Commands that finished successfully — moved here on success"
+  commands/failed:    "Commands that finished with errors — moved here on failure"
+
+state: agents/state/
+policies: agents/policies/
+
+lifecycle:
+  new:     active/
+  running: running/
+  success: completed/
+  failure: failed/
+
+# Command lifecycle state machine:
+# active/ → locked & moved to running/ → execute → success → completed/
+#                                                          → failure → failed/
+>>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)

baseline/current.json

@@ -1,13 +1,25 @@
 {
-    "current_baseline": "V1R4C6",
-    "previous_baseline": "V1R4C5",
-    "promoted_at": "2026-07-11T21:00:00+08:00",
-    "git": "e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd",
-    "promoted_by": "openclaw/admin",
-    "promotion_reason": "V1R4C6 admin search agent integration, search gateway, agent platform, VERSION bump, merge tests deploy pipeline — not yet deployed to production",
-    "constraints": {
-        "memory_search_enabled": false,
-        "force_push_allowed": false,
-        "gitea_db_mutation_requires_owner_approval": true
-    }
+  "current_baseline": "V2R1C2",
+  "previous_baseline": "V2R1C1",
+  "promoted_at": "2026-07-22T01:40:51Z",
+  "git": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "promoted_by": "codex/owner-approved-gitops",
+  "promotion_reason": "Owner-authorized V2R1C2 Unified Portal production release after exact tag binding, complete evidence verification, and production acceptance PASS.",
+  "version": "V2R1C2",
+  "release_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+  "target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+  "release_run_id": "AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z",
+  "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED",
+  "production_service": "aios-v2r1c2-production.service",
+  "production_port": 18920,
+  "rollback_version": "V2R1C1",
+  "constraints": {
+    "product_code_changed": true,
+    "production_redeployed": true,
+    "production_traffic_changed": true,
+    "tag_rewritten": false,
+    "force_push_allowed": false,
+    "rollback_assets_preserved": true
+  }
 }

config/gitops/silent-release-policy.json

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": 2,
+  "automatic": [
+    "build",
+    "test",
+    "artifact",
+    "canary",
+    "evidence"
+  ],
+  "owner": [
+    "signed_release_plan"
+  ],
+  "forbidden": [
+    "force_push",
+    "tag_rewrite",
+    "direct_main_push",
+    "baseline_mutation",
+    "registry_mutation"
+  ],
+  "runtime_deployment": {
+    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
+    "required_capability": "runtime_switch",
+    "tag_operations_allowed": false,
+    "baseline_mutation_allowed": false,
+    "registry_mutation_allowed": false,
+    "writer_default": false,
+    "rollback_required": true
+  },
+  "tag_release": {
+    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
+    "required_capability": "tag_publish",
+    "separate_controller": true,
+    "duplicate_conflict": "fail_closed",
+    "rewrite_allowed": false,
+    "force_push_allowed": false
+  },
+  "baseline_registry_finalize": {
+    "approval_action": "signed_release_plan",
+    "required_capability": "baseline_registry_finalize",
+    "separate_controller": true,
+    "remote_tag_verification_required": true,
+    "gitea_api_verification_required": true,
+    "registry_baseline_consistency_required": true
+  },
+  "approval": {
+    "algorithm": "Ed25519",
+    "replay_protection": true,
+    "revocation_fail_closed": true,
+    "key_rotation_supported": true,
+    "capabilities": [
+      "runtime_switch",
+      "tag_publish",
+      "baseline_registry_finalize"
+    ]
+  },
+  "execution": {
+    "environment_variable": "AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED",
+    "default_enabled": false,
+    "shadow_side_effects_allowed": false,
+    "durable_saga_required": true,
+    "pre_switch_revalidation_required": true
+  }
+}

config/gitops/worktree-governance.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+version: 1
+policy_id: gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8
+
+runtime_identity:
+  user: aiman
+  group: gitops
+  umask: "0002"
+  prohibit_root_workspace_writes: true
+
+repository:
+  source_worktree: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
+  bare_repo: /data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+  worktree_root: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
+  remote: origin
+
+worktrees:
+  controller: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller
+  task_pattern: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/{agent}/{task_id}
+  allowed_agents:
+    - openclaw
+    - chatgpt
+    - controller
+  require_clean_start: true
+  remove_after_successful_push: true
+  retain_on_failure: true
+
+permissions:
+  owner: aiman
+  group: gitops
+  directory_mode: "2775"
+  file_mode: "0664"
+  default_acl:
+    user:aiman: rwx
+    group:gitops: rwx
+  apply_to:
+    - /data/aios-gitops
+    - /data/aios-gitops/worktrees
+
+preflight:
+  required_user: aiman
+  required_group: gitops
+  required_umask: "0002"
+  require_writable_git_dir: true
+  require_writable_task_dir: true
+  require_writable_result_dir: true
+  reject_shared_source_worktree: true
+  reject_existing_git_lock: true
+
+notifications:
+  owner_on_received: required
+  owner_on_terminal: required
+  preferred_channel: weixin
+  redact_secrets: true
+
+rollback:
+  preserve_source_worktree: true
+  remove_created_worktrees: true
+  restore_service_dropins: true
+  restore_service_state: true

config/systemd/aios-gitops-runtime-identity.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Install as a systemd drop-in for GitOps/OpenClaw writer services.
+# Example: /etc/systemd/system/<service>.service.d/10-runtime-identity.conf
+
+[Service]
+User=aiman
+Group=gitops
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops
+UMask=0002
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops
+Environment=AIOS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees
+Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_USER=aiman
+Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP=gitops
+Environment=AIOS_RUNTIME_UMASK=0002

deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal production metadata.
+# No secret values belong in this file; runtime integrations use references.
+
+AIOS_V2_HOST=127.0.0.1
+AIOS_V2_PORT=18920
+AIOS_V2_STATE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
+AIOS_PROVENANCE_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/run-provenance.sqlite3
+AIOS_EXTERNAL_TASK_STORE_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/external-task-truth.sqlite3
+AIOS_EXECUTOR_CATALOG_FILE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production/executor-catalog.json
+AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILES=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-RELEASE.json:/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
+AIOS_EXECUTION_PLAN_FILE=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
+
+AIOS_RELEASE_VERSION=V2R1C2
+AIOS_TARGET_VERSION=V2R1C2
+AIOS_BASELINE_VERSION=V2R1C1
+AIOS_PREVIOUS_VERSION=V2R1C1
+AIOS_RELEASE_STATUS=PRODUCTION
+AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
+AIOS_RELEASE_OID=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
+AIOS_RELEASE_TAG=V2R1C2
+AIOS_RELEASE_EVIDENCE_SHA256=2e27bb73b8e6297bd3077238f73a96d697fc3c3611c601c4dc9357e5fdcd8eee
+
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_CONTRACT_VERSION=aios.openclaw.command.v2
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM=Ed25519
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_PLUGIN_VERSION=2.1.0-rc.4
+AIOS_OPENCLAW_SIGNING_KEY_ID=openclaw-v2r1-candidate-ed25519
+AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF=AIOS_OWNER_WECHAT_TARGET_REF

deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.service

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS V2R1C2 Unified Portal Production
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+Conflicts=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
+ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app/aios_web/release_application.py
+ConditionPathExists=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/plans/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER.json
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios
+Group=aios
+WorkingDirectory=/opt/aios-v2r1c2/active-runtime/app
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
+Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_V2_PORT" = "18920"
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_SOURCE_OID" = "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24"
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/test "$AIOS_RELEASE_TAG" = "V2R1C2"
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m aios_web.release_application
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=3
+TimeoutStartSec=60
+TimeoutStopSec=30
+KillSignal=SIGTERM
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
+StateDirectory=aios-v2r1c2-production
+StateDirectoryMode=0750
+UMask=0027
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-gitops-model-api.service

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE=/data/aios-gitops/workspace
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_DB=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitops_model.sqlite3
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_TOKEN_FILE=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/secrets/gitops.tokens
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_BARE_REPO=/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/data/repositories/aios/aios-v23.git
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY=aios/aios
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_HOST=127.0.0.1
 Environment=AIOS_GITOPS_PORT=18890
 ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /data/aios-gitops/workspace/active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py

deploy/v2r1/healthcheck.sh

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-printf 'AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 health check\n'
-
-python3 - <<'PY'
-from pathlib import Path
-required = [
- 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py',
- 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py',
- 'active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py',
- 'openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json',
-]
-missing=[p for p in required if not Path(p).exists()]
-if missing:
-    raise SystemExit('missing: '+','.join(missing))
-print('artifact presence PASS')
-PY
-
-echo 'runtime health requires OpenClaw environment probe'

deploy/v2r1/install.sh

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)
-EXPECTED_BRANCH="release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712"
-
-if [[ "$(git -C "$ROOT" branch --show-current)" != "$EXPECTED_BRANCH" ]]; then
-  echo "wrong release branch"
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-COMMIT=$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse HEAD)
-echo "Installing AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 commit=$COMMIT"
-
-python3 - <<'PY'
-import compileall
-if not compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1):
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-print('python compile PASS')
-PY
-
-if [[ -f openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json ]]; then
-  echo "plugin package PASS"
-else
-  echo "plugin package missing"
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-echo "Installation preflight PASS"

deploy/v2r1/validate.sh

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-MODE=${1:---check}
-
-case "$MODE" in
-  --check)
-    echo "V2R1C0 RC1 validation mode"
-    ;;
-  --install)
-    echo "Install requires approved OpenClaw Cell target"
-    ;;
-  --rollback)
-    echo "Rollback requires recorded Cell backup"
-    ;;
-  *)
-    echo "Usage: $0 [--check|--install|--rollback]"
-    exit 2
-    ;;
-esac
-
-python3 - <<'PY'
-import compileall
-raise SystemExit(0 if compileall.compile_dir('active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1', quiet=1) else 1)
-PY
-
-echo "python runtime syntax: PASS"

deployments/V1R4C6/backup-result.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# V1R4C6 Backup Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- status: NOT_STARTED
+- reason: No confirmed production Stack, persistent volume, database migration target, or V1R4C5 image digest is bound to this source release. A backup cannot be claimed or executed safely without an identified target datastore.
+- prohibited_actions_not_performed: production database deletion; persistent-volume deletion; docker system prune --volumes; direct copy of live database files.
+- required_before_resume: confirmed Stack identity and its documented backup/restore command.

deployments/V1R4C6/deployment-result.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# V1R4C6 Deployment Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
+- tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
+- image_repository: UNRESOLVED
+- image_digest: UNRESOLVED
+- previous_image_digest: UNRESOLVED
+- portainer_environment: UNRESOLVED
+- portainer_stack: UNRESOLVED
+- deployment_action: NOT_EXECUTED
+- reason: No source-to-image-to-Portainer-Stack mapping exists. Existing Portainer containers and known Docker workloads do not expose a V1R4C6/e204 deployment target or Portainer stack labels. The active GitOps API is a direct systemd Python process, not a Portainer-managed Docker Stack.
+- rollback_status: NOT_APPLICABLE_NO_CHANGE
+- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK

deployments/V1R4C6/preflight-result.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# V1R4C6 Production Preflight Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- started_at_utc: 2026-07-11T16:57:04.0596039Z
+- source_tag_object: 356a8a8c1860b94b7d61a456c29228c88e57d963
+- source_tag_commit: d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2
+- source_commit: e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd
+- tag_to_source_relation: tag commit is direct parent of source commit (verified)
+- production_host_identifier: cn-network-mkt (hw / 1.95.164.183)
+- host_preflight: Docker 29.5.3; root filesystem 29 percent used; memory available approximately 56 GiB
+- GitOps_runtime: active at /data/aios-gitops/workspace via aios-gitops-model-api.service
+- runtime_base: current_baseline V1R4C6; previous_baseline V1R4C5; git e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd; service status ok
+- Portainer discovery: Portainer instances are reachable on ubuntu-admin and ubuntu-aihost, but no confirmed Portainer Environment/Stack maps to V1R4C6 or e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd.
+- source_build_contract: target source contains only deploy/gitea/docker-compose.yml and no application Dockerfile/Containerfile or V1R4C6 image repository declaration.
+- status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK

deployments/V1R4C6/rollback-result.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# V1R4C6 Rollback Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- rollback_required: No
+- rollback_executed: No
+- reason: No container, Stack, database, image, or production configuration was changed during this run.
+- captured_v1r4c5_digest: UNRESOLVED because no matching current production Stack was confirmed.

deployments/V1R4C6/verification-result.md

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# V1R4C6 Verification Result
+
+- version: V1R4C6
+- healthcheck_result: GitOps adapter /health = 200 and /api/base = 200; this verifies the control-plane API only, not a V1R4C6 production deployment.
+- gate_a_result: NOT_RUN (production admin workbench target and authenticated test path unresolved)
+- gate_b_result: NOT_RUN (production Search Gateway target/provider binding unresolved)
+- gate_c_result: NOT_RUN (production Agent Platform target/runtime request path unresolved)
+- runtime_acceptance_result: NOT_RUN (0/8; cannot reuse non-production results)
+- critical_control_plane_finding: gitea-branch-consistency-sentinel is failed with five Git-ref-to-Gitea-metadata drift entries and autonomous safe mode emitted. This is a hard safety gate failure.
+- no_unresolved_critical_errors: false
+- final_status: BLOCKED_MISSING_CONFIRMED_PRODUCTION_STACK

docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 # AIOS Agent Audit Plane Architecture
 
 ## Overview
@@ -24,10 +25,9 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
     +---> Audit
     |         |
     |         v
-    |     audit/agent-runs/          (per-agent log)
-    |     audit/command-history/     (per-command log)
-    |     audit/version-history/     (per-baseline log)
-    |     audit/interaction-history/ (agent conversation traces)
+    |     audit/agent-runs/        (per-agent log)
+    |     audit/command-history/   (per-command log)
+    |     audit/version-history/   (per-baseline log)
     |
     +---> Git Commit
               |
@@ -45,39 +45,8 @@ Agent Command Plane (agents/commands/)
 5. Git commit locks the audit record
 6. Web UI displays timeline from git history
 
-## Directory Structure
-
-```
-audit/
-├── agent-runs/          # Per-execution records (JSON)
-├── command-history/     # Command lifecycle history
-├── version-history/     # Version/baseline change log
-└── interaction-history/ # Agent conversation traces
-```
-
 ## Audit Record Schema
 
-Current agent-run records use the following fields:
-
-| Field | Description |
-|-------|-------------|
-| agent_run_id | Unique execution ID |
-| command | Command file name |
-| agent | Executing agent name |
-| version | Baseline version at execution time |
-| objective | Human-readable goal |
-| start_time | ISO-8601 start timestamp |
-| end_time | ISO-8601 completion timestamp |
-| interaction_count | Agent-owner interaction turns |
-| tool_call_count | Tool invocations during execution |
-| changed_files | Files modified in this run |
-| commit_sha | Git commit hash |
-| test_result | Test verification outcome |
-| final_result | SUCCESS / FAILED / PARTIAL |
-| evidence_path | Link to evidence directory |
-
-Legacy records remain valid and may use the following compatibility shape:
-
 ```json
 {
   "id": "",
@@ -103,6 +72,51 @@ Legacy records remain valid and may use the following compatibility shape:
 - Every code change must be traceable to who/what agent created it
 - No agent-created changes without audit trail
 
+## Related
+
+- [Agent Command Plane](../agents/README.md)
+- [Baseline System](baseline-system.md)
+=======
+# AIOS Agent Audit Plane
+
+## Purpose
+
+Every agent action is recorded. All code changes are traceable to:
+- Who made the change
+- Why the change was made
+- When it was made
+- Which version introduced it
+- What test results showed
+
+## Directory Structure
+
+```
+audit/
+├── agent-runs/         # Per-execution records (JSON)
+├── command-history/    # Command lifecycle history
+├── version-history/    # Version/baseline change log
+└── interaction-history/ # Agent conversation traces
+```
+
+## Agent Run Record
+
+| Field | Description |
+|-------|-------------|
+| agent_run_id | Unique execution ID |
+| command | Command file name |
+| agent | Executing agent name |
+| version | Baseline version at execution time |
+| objective | Human-readable goal |
+| start_time | ISO-8601 start timestamp |
+| end_time | ISO-8601 completion timestamp |
+| interaction_count | Agent-owner interaction turns |
+| tool_call_count | Tool invocations during execution |
+| changed_files | Files modified in this run |
+| commit_sha | Git commit hash |
+| test_result | Test verification outcome |
+| final_result | SUCCESS / FAILED / PARTIAL |
+| evidence_path | Link to evidence directory |
+
 ## Version History
 
 Records baseline promotions, rollbacks, and version changes.
@@ -113,9 +127,6 @@ Conversation logs between agent and owner for each command execution.
 
 ## Audit Trail Requirement
 
-All changes are tracked via Git with signed commits where possible. Every commit references the originating Command ID.
-
-## Related
-
-- [Agent Command Plane](../agents/README.md)
-- [Baseline System](baseline-system.md)
+All changes tracked via Git with signed commits where possible.
+Every commit message references the originating Command ID.
+>>>>>>> 4d18ee0 (feat(cmd): enable Agent Command Plane, audit plane, and Web UI dashboard)

docs/architecture/AIOS_V1R5_to_V2R1_Migration_Plan.md

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V1R5 to V2R1 Migration Plan
-
-## Goal
-
-Move from shared Gateway assumptions to Tenant Cell isolation.
-
-## Order
-
-1. Establish Tenant Registry and signed Tenant Context.
-2. Implement Tenant Router.
-3. Implement OpenClaw Cell lifecycle management.
-4. Introduce canonical message envelope.
-5. Add provenance and execution policy enforcement.
-6. Migrate Hermes into shared fabric with isolated profiles.
-7. Migrate memory, secrets and audit storage.
-
-## Do Not
-
-- Do not modify Hermes first.
-- Do not share production credentials across tenants.
-- Do not treat workspace separation as a sandbox.
-- Do not allow unknown message origins to execute tools.
-
-## Acceptance
-
-Each migration stage requires automated tests and runtime evidence before promotion.

docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1 OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric Architecture
-
-## Status
-
-Release train: V2R1C0
-
-Purpose: replace shared runtime trust assumptions with tenant-isolated Cell architecture.
-
-## Principles
-
-1. OpenClaw Gateway is a trust boundary.
-2. Each production tenant receives an isolated Cell.
-3. Hermes provides shared scheduling/fabric capability but not shared tenant state.
-4. Tenant identity, origin, session and task scope are mandatory in every event.
-5. Unknown provenance fails closed.
-
-## Target Components
-
-- Tenant Router
-- OpenClaw Cell Manager
-- Canonical Message Envelope
-- Tenant Inbox/Outbox Ledger
-- Secret Scope Manager
-- Memory Namespace Manager
-- Hermes Profile Worker Fabric
-- Sandbox Execution Layer
-- Audit Event Pipeline
-
-## Migration Order
-
-Phase 1: Tenant Router + Cell Manager
-
-Phase 2: Canonical Message and Policy Layer
-
-Phase 3: Hermes Shared Agent Fabric
-
-Phase 4: Memory, Secret and Audit isolation
-
-Phase 5: Production tenant migration
-
-## Release Gate
-
-A V2R1 production release requires:
-
-- tenant isolation tests passed
-- message provenance tests passed
-- runtime commit matches release commit
-- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspection passed
-- rollback verified

docs/gitops/SILENT_RELEASE_CONTROLLER_DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+# AIOS Silent Release Controller Design Report
+
+状态：隔离分支实现；生产 mutation 禁止
+目标：自动准备 → 自动验证 → 单次 Owner 签名授权 → 分控制器自动执行与验收
+
+## 1. 当前痛点
+
+现有流程需要多轮人工传递 commit、tree、artifact、manifest、测试、canary、drop-in
+和回滚证据。证据在不同消息里重复抄写，容易出现：
+
+- 构建后 artifact、manifest 或 policy 已变化，但旧批准仍被使用；
+- Git、Gitea、systemd 与回滚结果由人工拼接，缺少同一一致性快照；
+- runtime switch、tag、Baseline、Registry 的授权边界不清；
+- 重启后只剩工作树内临时 JSON，无法可靠恢复；
+- approval replay、并发 writer、key revoke 和 secret inheritance 缺少统一防线。
+
+## 2. 新架构
+
+```text
+Build / Test / Canary
+        |
+        v
+ReleaseCandidate + DeploymentPlan
+        |
+        v
+ReleaseAcceptanceEngine
+        |
+        v
+READY_FOR_APPROVAL
+        |
+        v
+SignedReleasePlanApproval (Ed25519)
+        |
+        +--> runtime_switch capability
+        |       DeploymentController
+        |
+        +--> tag_publish capability
+        |       TagController
+        |
+        +--> baseline_registry_finalize capability
+                BaselineRegistryFinalizeController
+
+Durable ReleaseSagaStore + CapabilityLedger + Event Journal
+贯穿三个控制器；控制器互相不拥有对方的 mutation API。
+```
+
+一次 Owner 批准是同一个不可变 release plan 的签名，不是一个万能执行入口。三个 capability
+分别消费、分别留痕、分别幂等恢复。`force_push`、`tag_rewrite`、`direct_main_push`
+永远不是可签发 capability。
+
+## 3. 状态机
+
+```text
+PREPARING
+  -> VERIFYING
+  -> READY_FOR_APPROVAL
+  -> APPROVED
+  -> PRE_SWITCH_REVALIDATING
+  -> SWITCH_PENDING
+  -> SWITCHED
+  -> RUNTIME_VERIFYING
+  -> TAG_PENDING
+  -> TAG_VERIFIED
+  -> BASELINE_REGISTRY_PENDING
+  -> COMPLETED
+
+任一可恢复故障 -> RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED
+对象冲突       -> MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+切换后失败     -> ROLLBACK_PENDING -> ROLLED_BACK
+```
+
+状态快照使用 revision compare-and-set；事件同时写入 append-only journal。writer 崩溃后根据
+状态确定唯一恢复动作。并发控制器中只有一个 CAS winner。
+
+## 4. 数据模型
+
+### ReleaseCandidate
+
+```text
+candidate_id
+source_commit
+tree_oid
+artifact_sha256
+manifest_sha256
+tests
+canary
+rollback_ready
+git_consistency
+gitea_consistency
+approval_state
+```
+
+### DeploymentPlan
+
+```text
+service
+release_path / release_root
+dropin_path / dropin_sha256
+rollback_path / rollback_sha256
+source_commit
+artifact_sha256
+manifest_sha256
+policy_sha256
+health_contract
+sha256
+```
+
+### SignedReleasePlanApproval
+
+```text
+release_plan_id
+candidate_id
+source_commit
+tree_oid
+artifact_sha256
+manifest_sha256
+deployment_plan_sha256
+policy_sha256
+approval_plan_id
+evidence_closure_oid
+owner_approval_record_oid
+capabilities
+expires_at
+nonce
+key_id
+signature
+fingerprint
+```
+
+签名内容使用 canonical JSON，`signature` 不参与被签名字段。验证包括 Ed25519 签名、过期时间、
+公钥状态、approval revoke、candidate/plan/policy 逐字段绑定和 capability allowlist。
+
+## 5. API
+
+```text
+POST /createReleaseCandidate
+GET  /getReleaseCandidate?candidate_id=...
+GET  /getApprovalEnvelope?candidate_id=...
+POST /submitOwnerApproval
+POST /startDeployment
+GET  /getReleaseSaga?candidate_id=...
+```
+
+写接口要求 Bearer scope。`AIOS_SILENT_RELEASE_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false` 是默认值；此时可以
+持久化 candidate、生成 approval envelope、保存经验证的 Owner approval 和读取 Saga，
+但 `/startDeployment` 只返回 `SHADOW_MODE` 与空 `side_effects`。
+
+## 6. PreSwitchValidator
+
+切换前重新收集并比较：
+
+- source commit 与 tree；
+- artifact、manifest、policy 和 deployment plan SHA-256；
+- rollback readiness；
+- local、authoritative bare 与 Gitea refs；
+- repository identity；
+- task writer/production writer 边界；
+- health contract。
+
+任一变化都抛出：
+
+```text
+APPROVAL_STALE_REAPPROVAL_REQUIRED
+```
+
+旧批准不会被“最佳努力”继续使用。
+
+## 7. systemd 防线
+
+- service 与 drop-in 均为显式 allowlist；
+- release 与 drop-in resolved path 必须位于 release root 内；
+- 拒绝普通文件被替换为 symlink，拒绝 symlink escape；
+- deployment lock 覆盖 switch、restart 和首次 health check；
+- restart 前后记录 MainPID 与 ActiveEnterTimestampMonotonic；
+- artifact、drop-in、rollback 和 manifest 均按 plan hash 复验；
+- 子进程只接收固定 allowlist 环境，不继承 token、password、credential、askpass、
+  auth socket、`LD_PRELOAD`、`PYTHONPATH` 或数据库连接串。
+
+## 8. TagController 分离
+
+TagController 必须独立完成 approval、execute、verify，并留下：
+
+```text
+evidence_closure_oid
+approval_plan_id
+repository_identity
+remote_tag_oid
+remote_peeled_target_oid
+gitea_api_tag_oid
+gitea_listing_visible
+```
+
+同名 tag 的 tag OID 或 peeled target 不同，进入
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`；自动流程不 push、不删除、不重写、不 force push。
+
+## 9. Baseline / Registry 门禁
+
+只有以下全部一致时，`baseline_registry_finalize` capability 才能完成：
+
+```text
+Registry = Baseline = remote tag = Gitea API = expected target
+```
+
+UNKNOWN、API 不可达、repository identity 不符或 listing 不可见均 fail closed。
+
+## 10. Policy as Code
+
+```text
+automatic:
+  build, test, artifact, canary, evidence
+
+owner:
+  signed_release_plan
+
+capabilities:
+  runtime_switch
+  tag_publish
+  baseline_registry_finalize
+
+forbidden:
+  force_push
+  tag_rewrite
+  direct_main_push
+  baseline_mutation
+  registry_mutation
+```
+
+最后两个 forbidden 项指“脱离受治理 finalize controller 的直接 mutation”。
+
+## 11. Security model
+
+- Ed25519 公钥 ring 支持 rotation 和 revoke，私钥不进入 runtime；
+- approval plan 可撤销，过期、未知 key、错误签名均 fail closed；
+- nonce 与 capability operation 持久化，重复相同请求幂等，不同 fingerprint 重放拒绝；
+- Saga snapshot 原子写、journal append-only、CAS 防并发 writer；
+- credential 只通过受控 reference 使用，不进入 Git、API 响应或异常；
+- 子进程环境从空集合构建，不复制 `os.environ`；
+- Shadow 模式默认开启，execution adapter 缺失时不能降级执行；
+- runtime、tag、Baseline/Registry 分属三个能力最小化控制器。
+
+## 12. Migration plan
+
+1. Shadow：生成 candidate、plan、acceptance、approval package，仅比较现有人工结果。
+2. Signed approval：接入 Owner 公钥 ring、撤销源和审计 record；仍不接生产 executor。
+3. Canary execution：使用非生产 service/release root 验证锁、PID、health、崩溃恢复和回滚。
+4. Controlled production switch：另行 Owner 授权启用 execution flag，只开放 runtime capability。
+5. Tag/finalize：分别完成 Gitea 与 Registry/Baseline 生产验收后再启用对应 capability。
+
+每个阶段均可退回上一个阶段；不开启下一能力不会影响已经启用的控制器。
+
+## 13. Rollback plan
+
+- switch 前保存旧 symlink target、PID、启动时间、artifact 与 plan fingerprint；
+- restart 或 health 任一失败进入 `ROLLBACK_PENDING`；
+- 原子恢复旧 target，只 restart 指定 allowlist service；
+- 重新验证旧 runtime commit、writer=false 与 repository identity；
+- 成功进入 `ROLLED_BACK`，失败进入 `MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`；
+- rollback 不修改 Git main、production tag、Baseline 或 Registry；
+- 保留脱敏 journal、approval fingerprint 和失败证据。
+
+## 14. 测试与外部依赖边界
+
+自动测试覆盖签名伪造、字段篡改、过期/revoke/key rotation、nonce replay、CAS race、
+崩溃恢复、artifact/policy/plan mutation、tag conflict、secret leakage、runtime without
+`.git`、rollback 和 shadow no-side-effects。
+
+本隔离实现不创建生产 KMS/key、不安装 systemd unit、不部署 Action runtime、不创建 tag，
+也不修改 Baseline/Registry。上述动作必须在单独生产批准中执行。

docs/gitops/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Gitea Tag Publication Atomicity
+
+Release publication is a fail-closed Saga bound to one immutable governance
+fingerprint:
+
+- `version`
+- `target_oid`
+- `evidence_closure_oid`
+- `approval_plan_id`
+
+The normal progression is:
+
+`PENDING` → `LOCAL_TAG_CREATED` → `REMOTE_PUSH_CONFIRMED` →
+`GITEA_API_CONFIRMED` → `BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING` → `BASELINE_UPDATED` →
+`PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`
+
+An unavailable remote uses `REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING` or
+`RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`. A same-name tag object mismatch, peeled-target
+mismatch, changed governance fingerprint, or immutable deployment-evidence
+conflict enters `MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`. That state blocks automatic
+push and reconciliation; recovery never deletes, rewrites, or force-pushes a
+tag.
+
+## Legacy state migration
+
+Readers normalize the historical `TAG_CREATED_LOCAL` value to
+`LOCAL_TAG_CREATED` in memory. Read-only status responses therefore expose only
+the canonical value. The next governed Saga write persists the canonical name;
+reading legacy state alone does not mutate the tag, Baseline, Registry, or Saga
+file. Any unrecognized persisted state fails closed as
+`RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`.
+
+`BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING` is persisted before either `baseline/current.json` or
+`versions/<version>.json` changes. Recovery revalidates the governance
+fingerprint, evidence lineage, remote annotated tag, peeled target, Gitea API,
+listing, and repository identity before idempotently completing matching
+partial records. A different tag or target enters
+`MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED`.
+
+## Durable state
+
+Production writers set `AIOS_GITOPS_PUBLICATION_STATE_DIR` to storage outside
+their disposable worktree. Recreating a writer must reuse that directory.
+Worktree JSON is not the authoritative Saga store.
+
+## Deployment gate
+
+`mark_production_deployed` performs fresh Git remote, peeled-target, Gitea ref,
+Gitea tag-object, listing, repository-identity, evidence-lineage, Registry, and
+Baseline checks. Deployment is allowed only when:
+
+`Registry = Baseline = remote tag = Gitea API = expected target`
+
+Deployment evidence must be an immutable `sha256:<64 hex>` or `git:<40 hex>`
+identifier.
+
+## Read-only acceptance
+
+- `getTagPublicationStatus` reads durable Saga state.
+- `getReleaseConsistency` compares every release authority.
+- `runReleaseAcceptance` returns `accepted: true` only for `PASS`.
+
+Unavailable evidence returns `UNKNOWN` with `fail_closed: true`; it is never
+treated as acceptance.
+
+The CLI, HTTP Action, and release script all enter the same publisher core for
+evidence-lineage verification. The release script stages Registry and Baseline
+records only; durable Saga state remains outside Git.

docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml

@@ -13,6 +13,27 @@ components:
       scheme: bearer
       bearerFormat: opaque-token
   schemas:
+    PublicationState:
+      type: string
+      description: Canonical durable publication state. Legacy TAG_CREATED_LOCAL is normalized on read and is never emitted by new writes.
+      enum:
+        - PENDING
+        - LOCAL_TAG_CREATED
+        - REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING
+        - REMOTE_PUSH_CONFIRMED
+        - GITEA_API_CONFIRMED
+        - BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING
+        - BASELINE_UPDATED
+        - PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED
+        - RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED
+        - MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+    PublicationStatus:
+      type: object
+      required: [version, state]
+      properties:
+        version: {type: string}
+        state: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PublicationState'}
+        fail_closed: {type: boolean}
     BranchRequest:
       type: object
       required: [branch]
@@ -50,9 +71,20 @@ components:
         message: {type: string}
     TagRequest:
       type: object
-      required: [version]
+      required: [version, target_oid, evidence_closure_oid, approval_plan_id]
       properties:
         version: {type: string, example: V1R1C1}
+        target_oid:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'
+          description: Full approved commit OID. The tag is created explicitly at this commit, never implicitly at workspace HEAD.
+        evidence_closure_oid:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'
+          description: Required evidence closure commit. target_oid must be its ancestor.
+        approval_plan_id:
+          type: string
+          description: Audited owner-approved release or tag plan identifier.
         message: {type: string}
         execute:
           type: boolean
@@ -103,7 +135,142 @@ components:
       properties:
         text: {type: string}
         branch: {type: string}
+    DeploymentPlan:
+      type: object
+      required: [service, release_path, release_root, dropin_path, dropin_sha256, rollback_path, rollback_sha256, source_commit, artifact_sha256, manifest_sha256, policy_sha256, health_contract]
+      properties:
+        service: {type: string}
+        release_path: {type: string}
+        release_root: {type: string}
+        dropin_path: {type: string}
+        dropin_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        rollback_path: {type: string}
+        rollback_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        artifact_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        manifest_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        policy_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        health_contract: {type: object, additionalProperties: true}
+    ReleaseCandidateInput:
+      type: object
+      required: [candidate_id, source_commit, tree_oid, artifact_sha256, manifest_sha256]
+      properties:
+        candidate_id: {type: string, pattern: '^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,127}$'}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        tree_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        artifact_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        manifest_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        tests: {type: object}
+        canary: {type: object}
+        rollback_ready: {type: boolean}
+        git_consistency: {type: object}
+        gitea_consistency: {type: object}
+        deployment_plan: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/DeploymentPlan'}
+    SignedReleasePlanApproval:
+      type: object
+      required: [release_plan_id, candidate_id, source_commit, tree_oid, artifact_sha256, manifest_sha256, deployment_plan_sha256, policy_sha256, approval_plan_id, evidence_closure_oid, owner_approval_record_oid, capabilities, expires_at, nonce, key_id, signature]
+      properties:
+        release_plan_id: {type: string}
+        candidate_id: {type: string}
+        source_commit: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        tree_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        artifact_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        manifest_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        deployment_plan_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        policy_sha256: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'}
+        approval_plan_id: {type: string}
+        evidence_closure_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        owner_approval_record_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        capabilities:
+          type: array
+          uniqueItems: true
+          items:
+            type: string
+            enum: [runtime_switch, tag_publish, baseline_registry_finalize]
+        expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        nonce: {type: string, minLength: 16}
+        key_id: {type: string}
+        signature: {type: string, format: byte, writeOnly: true}
+    StartDeploymentRequest:
+      type: object
+      required: [candidate_id, approval]
+      properties:
+        candidate_id: {type: string}
+        approval: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/SignedReleasePlanApproval'}
 paths:
+  /createReleaseCandidate:
+    post:
+      operationId: createReleaseCandidate
+      summary: Persist an immutable release candidate and deployment plan; shadow-safe
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ReleaseCandidateInput'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Candidate created or idempotently returned}
+        '400': {description: Invalid or conflicting candidate evidence}
+        '401': {description: Unauthorized}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /getReleaseCandidate:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseCandidate
+      summary: Read a durable release candidate
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Candidate}
+        '404': {description: Candidate not found}
+  /getApprovalEnvelope:
+    get:
+      operationId: getApprovalEnvelope
+      summary: Generate the immutable owner-signature payload
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Approval envelope fingerprint inputs}
+        '404': {description: Candidate not found}
+  /submitOwnerApproval:
+    post:
+      operationId: submitOwnerApproval
+      summary: Verify and durably store a signed owner release plan
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/SignedReleasePlanApproval'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Signature verified and approval stored}
+        '400': {description: Invalid approval}
+        '403': {description: Signature, key, expiry, or revocation failure}
+        '409': {description: Conflicting release plan}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /startDeployment:
+    post:
+      operationId: startDeployment
+      summary: Start the approved Saga; default shadow mode returns no side effects
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/StartDeploymentRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Shadow result or deployment Saga result}
+        '403': {description: Execution disabled or approval invalid}
+        '409': {description: Saga conflict}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /getReleaseSaga:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseSaga
+      summary: Read durable Saga state and event journal
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: candidate_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Saga snapshot}
+        '404': {description: Saga not found}
   /api/base:
     get:
       operationId: getBaseline
@@ -199,6 +366,39 @@ paths:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/CommitRequest'}
       responses: {'200': {description: Commit result}, '401': {description: Unauthorized}}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /api/tag-publication-status:
+    get:
+      operationId: getTagPublicationStatus
+      summary: Read durable publication Saga status without mutation
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: version, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$'}}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Canonical publication state or fail-closed UNKNOWN
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PublicationStatus'}
+        '400': {description: Version required}
+  /api/release-consistency:
+    get:
+      operationId: getReleaseConsistency
+      summary: Compare Registry, Baseline, remote tag, Gitea API, listing, repository identity, and expected target
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: version, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+        - {in: query, name: target_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: evidence_closure_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: approval_plan_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses: {'200': {description: PASS, FAIL, or fail-closed UNKNOWN}}
+  /api/release-acceptance:
+    get:
+      operationId: runReleaseAcceptance
+      summary: Run read-only release acceptance; UNKNOWN is not accepted
+      parameters:
+        - {in: query, name: version, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+        - {in: query, name: target_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: evidence_closure_oid, required: true, schema: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$'}}
+        - {in: query, name: approval_plan_id, required: true, schema: {type: string}}
+      responses: {'200': {description: Acceptance result with accepted boolean}}
   /api/tag:
     post:
       operationId: requestOrCreateTag
@@ -209,7 +409,7 @@ paths:
         content:
           application/json:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/TagRequest'}
-      responses: {'200': {description: Tag request committed or tag created}, '403': {description: Forbidden}}
+      responses: {'200': {description: Gitea-confirmed tag and fail-closed baseline result}, '400': {description: Missing governance evidence or invalid OID}, '403': {description: Forbidden}, '409': {description: Existing tag target conflict or evidence lineage mismatch}, '502': {description: Gitea reconciliation required}, '503': {description: Remote push pending}}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
   /api/rollback:
     post:
@@ -245,4 +445,7 @@ paths:
         content:
           application/json:
             schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/NLRequest'}
-      responses: {'
+      responses:
+        '200': {description: Safe GitOps plan}
+        '401': {description: Unauthorized}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true

docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# 微信文本-图片缓存隔离事故报告
+
+## 结论
+
+本次事故已经按最新备份链路回滚并完成第二轮评审修复。`3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a` 进一步修复了英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本误入图片路径的问题，`706c0b0` 则是后续最小修复提交。当前文档只记录证据、部署和验收边界，不把“真实 owner inbound 已完成”写成结论。
+
+## 现象
+
+- 纯文本消息被误答成旧图片回复，属于 stale-image reply on pure text。
+- 现场证据显示 `types=1` 且 `hasMedia=false`，但后续又进入 `message_type=image`、`image_count=0`、`implicit_image_message`，最终落到 `cached_image_expired`。
+- 这说明“诊断文本”被误判成图片意图后，又继承了 sender 级旧图缓存。
+
+## 根因
+
+- `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py:768-839` 把文本意图判断和缓存回退放在同一条链上。
+- `looksLikeHermesImageFollowup()` 会把含图片关键字的诊断文本推进 image intent。
+- `resolveHermesFollowupImageContext()` 随后会读取 sender 级缓存；一旦缓存命中失败或过期，就会落到 `cached_image_expired`，从而让纯文本沾上旧图上下文。
+- `handleHermesImplicitImage()` 继续把消息送入 `handleHermes(..., "implicit_image_message")`，所以误判会沿着同一条图片处理通道传播。
+
+## 护栏不变量
+
+- 图片处理上下文必须来自当前消息图片、已确认的引用图片，或精确匹配的缓存图片 ID；缺少这三类证据时，纯文本不能进入 `handleHermesImplicitImage()`。
+- 未确认的引用文本不能继承 sender 级旧图缓存，必须返回 `referenced_image_not_confirmed`。
+- 只有精确缓存图片 ID 命中且缓存仍有效时，才允许走 `resolveHermesCachedImageEntry()` 的 `cached_image_matched` 路径。
+- `/hermes` 这类 slash 路径保持原有分流，slash/channel 面不变。
+- 这次修复的守卫目标，是把中英文诊断文本、未确认引用文本与图片缓存回退拆开，避免再把普通文本提升成图片意图。
+
+## TDD 与幂等性
+
+- `66d637fc0364a617c7b9fd8cd9baa68fb0368675`（`fix(weixin): isolate text from stale image cache`）引入了隔离修复和 `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`。
+- `2de29c59bb946cc3db3e14e8a06270391ede8401`（`fix(weixin): add process-only runtime patch mode`）继续收紧 process-only 运行模式，保持回放幂等。
+- `3d9782fc346d1e7defde090ab8637e62ab28ab8a`（`fix(weixin): require confirmed image reference context`）补齐英文诊断文本和未确认引用文本用例，并把图片引用收紧到已确认上下文。
+- 用户实测的 TDD 路径为 RED `8 PASS / 1 FAIL`，随后 GREEN `9 PASS`。
+- 最小修复提交为 `706c0b0`，对应 quoted pure text 的最后一层收敛修复。
+- 第二轮回归结果为 `8 PASS`；node check 同样通过，重复应用补丁保持幂等。
+- 生产 npm 分发侧本身缺少 `tsconfig/tests`，baseline 与 patched 共享这一限制，所以这里不把分发目录的缺口当成回归点；验收以 node check 和 8 tests 为准。
+
+## 用户实测补充
+
+- 普通文本两项为 PASS。
+- quoted pure text 为 FAIL，日志证据包含 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE`、quoted id、`implicit_image_message`、`referenced_image_unresolved`。
+- 这组证据说明 quoted pure text 没有被当成真正的图片 follow-up，且没有越过引用确认边界。
+
+## 回滚与备份
+
+- 回滚按最新备份执行，基线指向 `/data/aios-gitops/runtime/latest-backup-dir.txt` 所示的最新备份目录。
+- 备份路径链路按供给证据记录为 `T064506Z`、`T074212Z`、`T081658Z`。
+- 第一轮恢复后的部署过程哈希记录为 `e9625d12` 和 `c00c58f8`。
+- v2 部署备份为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-text-cache-isolation-20260711T094908Z`。
+- v2 部署文件哈希为 TS `024c6498284d1871b048f6157d5d3dbd4d34e54b53a05afd744b00458ceeb79f`、JS `d73b15d6752056192a1d1939b04107334419785b41175b39f1cbc1132ac65c47`；slash/channel 口径保持不变。
+- 首次部署因为 `-- No entries --` 门禁误判而回滚，随后纠正部署在线，PID 为 `2496603`。
+- 在线修复后的 hashes 为 `86dfe...` / `a9b854...`，`channel 4` accounts healthy，cache unchanged。
+
+## 主线合并与生产发布
+
+- 主线 fast-forward source rev 为 `9269e819972c2e709e0c27bed7eab590da6961c9`，本次不 tag、不 baseline。
+- 生产发布结论为 PASS，release dir 为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-mainline-release-20260711T181842Z`。
+- old PID 为 `2655072`，new PID 为 `2656106`。
+- TS hash 为 `86dfe4543c4414bc86778a4b218c244a742a139c66e3c9f19cf6f0de871234c3`，JS hash 为 `a9b854015108020458ce6f31b9d9187eff82e170c4c214259b0afb9be6a7336f`。
+- `18789` 监听，`channel 4` accounts healthy，`error_count=0`，cache unchanged。
+- 一次参数门禁失败已回滚，且不影响最终发布。
+- owner quoted-text live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## 运行态验证
+
+- 第一轮 gateway PID 由 `4025932` 变为 `1723576`；v2 部署后由 `1723576` 变为 `1876713`。
+- v2 现场/供给证据为 `active`、监听 `18789`、`error_count=0`、`channel gate pass`、`cache preserved`。
+- 最终 read-only gate 通过，说明部署后运行态未出现新的插件错误，channel 状态和缓存均保持预期。
+- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## 未完成的真实验收
+
+- owner 纯文本
+- diagnostic text
+- genuine image-followup message
+- quoted pure text 的第二次 owner live acceptance
+
+以上四类消息仍需要由 owner 真实 inbound 到达，才能把这次“文本隔离”结论升格为完整的线上接受；本报告明确保留该项为 pending，不把它们写成已经完成。
+
+## 引用文字语义修复与发布（2026-07-12）
+
+- 后续 owner 实测证明图片误路由已消失，但模型在没有被引正文时根据 `chat_id/message_id/timestamp` 编造解释，因此图片隔离 PASS、语义验收 FAIL。
+- 现场 payload 的 `ref_msg.message_item.type=0/NONE` 只有 quoted ID 与时间字段，没有 `text_item`；session transcript 又没有原始 Weixin 数字 message ID，不能精确回表。
+- 出站 `clientId` 与引用的 19 位数字 `msg_id` 格式不同，发送 API 也不返回服务端 message ID。本次明确禁止 recent-message、时间窗口、session 顺序和近似 ID 猜测。
+- `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab` 增加证据优先处理：payload 明确含 `text_item.text` 时才构造引用上下文；引用存在但正文缺失时，经标准 dispatcher 确定性回复“无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。”，并在模型 dispatch 前返回。
+- TDD 先出现两项预期 RED（quoted-text resolver 不存在），最终 GREEN 为 `17 passed`；`py_compile`、`git diff --check`、`node --check` 均通过。
+- Scratch 双跑验证只改变 `src/messaging/process-message.ts` 与 `dist/src/messaging/process-message.js`，第二次应用 diff 为 0；slash/channel 文件保持不变。
+- 主线为 `1136b4186d7578cd77f255297204b10152c47dab`，生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-release-20260712T054451Z`。
+- 发布后 PID 从 `2656106` 变为 `3670157`；TS hash 为 `1a73e735e9c8fb40a1f82d2a66bc022396c8105ed989aac95e11b66326e9fdf1`，JS hash 为 `1c76bf6ec3b45021e68b932cbf52222ba2130a867b95e41d7a91f261b991a304`。
+- `18789`、4 个 Weixin accounts、post-start error 0 和图片 cache unchanged 均通过。新的 owner live acceptance 仍为 PENDING。
+
+## Owner 引用文字 Fail-Closed 验收（2026-07-12）
+
+- Owner 引用一条微信未提供正文的文字消息并发送“是什么意思”，收到固定回复“无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。”。
+- 日志窗口为 `2026-07-12 14:06:23.424-14:06:23.893 +08:00`：入站 `types=1`、`bodyLen=6`、`hasMedia=false`，出站 `textLen=20` 且发送成功。
+- 同一窗口 `model-fetch=0`、`implicit_image_message=0`、Hermes route=0，`quoted_text_unavailable=1` 且 `quoted_message_id=present`。
+- 该证据确认无正文引用不会进入模型猜测或图片缓存路径。Owner quoted-text no-body live acceptance 为 **PASS**。
+- 微信 payload 明确携带 `text_item.text` 时的 grounded explanation 和 genuine image follow-up 仍作为独立兼容性验收项保留。
+
+## 可见引用摘要解析修复（2026-07-12）
+
+- Owner 进一步确认微信客户端能够显示被引用正文，因此上一节的“未提供正文”只适用于旧 resolver 的观察结果，不代表协议 payload 没有可用文本。
+- 根因是插件 `inbound.ts` 已将协议字段 `ref_msg.title` 定义为引用摘要并拼入 `ctx.Body`，而 `extractHermesReferencedText()` 只读取 `ref_msg.message_item.text_item.text`，导致客户端可见摘要被错误丢弃。
+- `13c2a182860131abcad0f5a70ae8263477578588` 在真实 `text_item.text` 缺失时，仅从 reference envelope 读取 `ref_msg.title`；不会读取 `message_item.title` 或任意嵌套通用 `title`，也不改变图片、slash 或 channel 路由。
+- TDD 先得到 `18 passed / 1 failed`，失败项为可见 `ref_msg.title` 仍落到 `quoted_text_unavailable`；修复后为 `19 passed`，`py_compile`、`node --check` 与 `git diff --check` 通过。
+- 生产发布目录为 `/var/backups/aios/weixin-quoted-text-title-resolution-20260712T155112+0800`，PID 从 `3859376` 变为 `3860863`，post-start error 为 0，图片 cache unchanged。
+- 部署后 TS hash 为 `8e77ce61214688a2507b07f0cf1ee85401b58198b8271bebd69efc2681872726`，JS hash 为 `663db8d30a5cd5eb80fe46cf941cce6e6f5d04cb7e4b8d9b4d0086d87faba290`。
+- 可见正文引用的 owner live acceptance 尚待下一条真实微信消息确认；预期日志必须命中 `quoted_text_resolved`，且同一窗口不得出现 `quoted_text_unavailable` 或图片路由。
+
+## 安全说明
+
+- 本次仅更新本报告，没有修改代码、runtime、services 或 secrets。
+- 报告里没有任何凭据、密钥或原始敏感 ID。

docs/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# V2R1C1 中央 Baseline 治理收口
+
+## 收口范围
+
+本次变更只登记已经完成生产验证并上线的 `V2R1C1`。它新增中央版本 Manifest、把中央 Baseline Pointer 从 `V1R4C6` 切换为 `V2R1C1`，并建立 Release、Companion、Artifact 与最终生产 Evidence 的追溯关系。
+
+本次不修改产品实现，不移动或重建 `V2R1C1` Tag，不改变 Release OID，不重新部署生产，不切换生产流量，也不重写历史证据。
+
+## 权威标识
+
+- Release：`release/AIOS-V2R1C1-20260721`
+- Release OID：`4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`
+- Tag / Tag OID：`V2R1C1` / `4e0e6dcb90e6732aa9838fe9d0af0b34746829b0`
+- SemVer：`2.1.0-rc.1`
+- OpenClaw Companion：`2.1.0-rc.4`
+- Companion Source OID：`83f8f878c7da5dd8263f2af2efa80750492e5cb3`
+- Companion OID：`12d1c13170e0c5a691d67a9408e739e7a17064a3`
+- Artifact SHA256：`aadd5f3cfa0d8e796a21f6368f5c95e8c60e9063d6e9fcd9c4947cfa0c013671`
+- Contract：`aios.openclaw.command.v2` / `Ed25519`
+- Evidence Root：`/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-openclaw-v2-companion-20260721T094442Z`
+- Final Audit Manifest SHA256：`2cdb884abf195969de3cdaa44c76aaac52a9165fb4918436855291e46b2f8d55`
+- Production Status：`PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`
+
+## 治理路径
+
+- Governance Branch：`patch/chatgpt/AIOS-V2R1C1-BASELINE-REGISTRY-20260721`
+- Base Ref：`refs/heads/main`
+- Base OID：`3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`
+- Manifest Commit：`a56caf46f6bc335ec2395b674ead4b2a427c5edd`
+- Baseline Commit：`6dbd5cbe07d2960ca653049fefbcf3a3e18f9ab1`
+- Reviewer：`gpt-5.3-codex-spark validator and docs_reporter`
+- Review：`PASS`（`2026-07-21T14:23:00Z`）
+
+## 命令与退出码
+
+| 阶段 | 命令 | 开始 UTC | 结束 UTC | Exit Code |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: |
+| 中央只读核对 | `GET /api/run; GET /api/base; GET /api/ver` | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 2026-07-21T14:09:40Z | 0 |
+| 创建治理分支 | `bash /tmp/registry-create-branch.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 2026-07-21T14:17:05Z | 0 |
+| 核心元数据验证 | `bash /tmp/registry-validate-core.sh` | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 2026-07-21T14:19:56Z | 0 |
+
+完整机读记录位于 `.agent/results/releases/V2R1C1-BASELINE-CLOSURE.json`，治理运行证据位于 `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/aios-v2r1c1-baseline-registry-20260721T141705Z`。
+
+## 元数据回滚
+
+若中央 Registry 解析或治理服务异常，保留 `versions/V2R1C1.json`，通过新的受审治理提交把 `baseline/current.json` 和 `VERSION` 临时恢复到 `V1R4C6`。该操作不得回滚生产系统、移动 Tag、修改 Release OID 或重写历史。
+
+## 范围证明
+
+```text
+product_code_changed=false
+tag_changed=false
+production_redeployed=false
+production_traffic_changed=false
+secret_material_recorded=false
+```

docs/releases/V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-RELEASE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# V2R1C2 Production Release
+
+- Release Run ID: `AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z`
+- Previous production baseline: `V2R1C1`
+- Tag: `V2R1C2`
+- Tag object: `a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36`
+- Approved target: `3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24`
+- Evidence closure: `8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978`
+- Initial registry status: `TAG_CREATED_NOT_PROMOTED`
+- Final status: `PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED`
+- Production service: `aios-v2r1c2-production.service`
+- Production port: `18920`
+- Production acceptance SHA256: `a6c35e12cab7907ab6bcfd37d781b3d216f05a5ae002aa54a3112c70f43b991a`
+- Production online smoke SHA256: `fe9c6964e440f8871f2eb225f0132f70c634923389f7b8dfa85f615b100980a4`
+- Production health SHA256: `ee8084e8b57d188dc0039a276f4f3f1ed7025ff58ce91b111cc765627eb52d4c`
+- Live evidence directory: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z`
+- Evidence hash index: `/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z/production-evidence.sha256`
+
+## Production gates
+
+Promotion may proceed only when the 18921 candidate remains healthy, the committed evidence checksum file verifies without drift, the 18920 baseline is healthy, required secret references are available without exposing secret values, and the V2R1C1 rollback service/configuration remains intact.
+
+The obsolete release-plan `DECLARED` rows are not authoritative for this run. The production gate must explicitly select `AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER-20260722` and require its three required stages to be `SUCCEEDED`; an unqualified aggregate across stale plan rows fails closed.
+
+## Synthetic WeChat scope
+
+WeChat-facing acceptance for this release used synthetic/mock receipts and transcripts only. It did not impersonate a real user and does not claim a real-user WeChat session. The relevant committed evidence entries are `wechat_simulated_receipts` and `wechat_simulated_transcript`; the production online smoke also records `simulation: true` and `real_user_impersonated: false`.
+
+## Rollback rule
+
+If Health, API, UI, Role Matrix, Tenant Isolation, Runtime, or Audit verification fails after the 18920 switch, stop the V2R1C2 production unit and restart the preserved V2R1C1 18920 service. Do not delete or rewrite either release tag or rollback asset.
+
+## Result
+
+The production switch completed at `2026-07-22T01:40:51Z`. Full acceptance and the production online smoke passed, including Health, API, UI, Role Matrix, Tenant Isolation, Runtime, Audit and the selected takeover release gate. The previous `aios-orchestrator-gateway.service` unit, configuration and Release Run backup remain available for rollback.

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-weixin-quoted-text-failclosed.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Resolve explicit quoted text safely and fail closed without a model call when Weixin omits the quoted body.
+
+**Architecture:** Add pure JS/TS reference-text helpers and one process hook guard to the existing patcher. Keep the patch surface limited to generated `process-message.ts/js`; do not introduce a persistent cache or modify send/monitor/API modules.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Python patch generator, TypeScript/JavaScript, Node test harness, pytest.
+
+## Global Constraints
+
+- Sub-agents use `gpt-5.3-codex-spark`.
+- No force push, tag, baseline promotion, credential persistence, recent-message fallback, or approximate text matching.
+- Existing confirmed image and ordinary text behavior must remain unchanged.
+
+---
+
+### Task 1: Add Quoted Text Resolver With TDD
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
+- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Produces: `extractHermesReferencedText(items)` and `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` in TS and JS helper templates.
+
+- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `ref_msg.message_item.type=1` and explicit `text_item.text="被引用的正文"`; assert `reason="quoted_text_resolved"`, `handled=false`, and a prompt containing only delimited quoted/current text.
+- [ ] Add a Node-backed failing test with `type=0`, quoted ID, no text, and no confirmed image; assert `reason="quoted_text_unavailable"`, `handled=true`, and exact deterministic `replyText`.
+- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py -k 'quoted_text'` and record expected RED because the resolver is absent.
+- [ ] Implement the smallest recursive explicit-text extractor. Accept only known referenced text fields; cap each extracted string at 4000 characters and reject blank values.
+- [ ] Implement the resolver in both TS and JS templates. Do not read session history, image latest cache, timestamps, or metadata values.
+- [ ] Re-run the focused tests and record GREEN.
+- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): fail closed on unavailable quoted text`.
+
+### Task 2: Guard The Real Process Hook
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
+- Modify: `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
+
+**Interfaces:**
+- Consumes: `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)`.
+- Produces: process hook behavior that replies deterministically or replaces only the ordinary text prompt.
+
+- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test that stubs the ordinary model dispatch and reply function. For type 0 without text, assert reply called once and model called zero times.
+- [ ] Add a failing JS hook test for explicit quoted text. Assert model called once with delimited context and no message metadata.
+- [ ] Add regression assertions for plain text, current image, and exact quoted image.
+- [ ] Run focused tests and record RED for the missing guard.
+- [ ] Insert the resolver after reference/image evidence extraction and before ordinary model dispatch. Confirmed image references must bypass the text fail-closed branch.
+- [ ] Emit structured reason-only diagnostics without message bodies.
+- [ ] Run focused tests and record GREEN.
+- [ ] Commit with `fix(weixin): guard quoted text model dispatch`.
+
+### Task 3: Idempotence, Review, And Release
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md`
+
+- [ ] Run `pytest -q tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py` and require all tests pass.
+- [ ] Run `python3 -m py_compile fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`.
+- [ ] Run `git diff --check`.
+- [ ] Apply `--process-only` twice to a scratch production-plugin copy and require identical second-run hashes; require slash/channel files unchanged.
+- [ ] Obtain independent spec and code review.
+- [ ] Update the incident document with RED/GREEN evidence, main revision, production hashes, rollback directory, and owner live acceptance state.
+- [ ] Merge by non-force fast-forward from a clean main-based branch, deploy only the two generated process-message files, restart only `openclaw-gateway.service`, and verify service, port 18789, four accounts, zero post-start errors, and unchanged image cache.
+- [ ] Owner live acceptance: quote a type 0 text message and verify deterministic no-body response; quote a payload that includes explicit text and verify grounded explanation.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-12-weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Weixin Quoted Text Fail-Closed Design
+
+## Goal
+
+Prevent quoted-text questions from being answered with invented message metadata when Weixin does not provide the quoted body. Preserve normal text and confirmed image behavior.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- A quoted text event can arrive as `ref_msg.message_item.type=0` with only `msg_id` and timestamps.
+- Session transcripts retain text but not the original Weixin numeric message ID.
+- Outbound `clientId` values are not the same format as quoted numeric `msg_id` values, and the send API does not expose a server message ID.
+- Therefore recent-message, timestamp, session, and outbound-client-ID matching are not exact evidence and must not be used.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use an evidence-only resolver in `process-message`:
+
+1. If reference payload contains an explicit text item, extract that text and build a bounded quoted-text context for the ordinary text model path.
+2. If reference context exists but has no explicit text and is not a confirmed image, return a deterministic response: `无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。`
+3. The unresolved branch is handled before ordinary model dispatch and before Hermes image dispatch.
+4. Do not infer quoted text from metadata, recent messages, session order, timestamps, or approximate IDs.
+
+No persistent text cache is introduced in this change. Outbound ID aliasing remains a separate observation task because an exact mapping has not been proved.
+
+## Interfaces
+
+- `extractHermesReferencedText(items): string` returns only explicit referenced text, otherwise an empty string.
+- `resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, currentText)` returns one of:
+  - `{ referenced: false, handled: false, prompt: currentText, reason: "none" }`
+  - `{ referenced: true, handled: false, prompt, reason: "quoted_text_resolved" }`
+  - `{ referenced: true, handled: true, replyText: "无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。", reason: "quoted_text_unavailable" }`
+- Confirmed referenced images bypass this text resolver and keep the existing exact image path.
+
+## Privacy And Logging
+
+- Do not log quoted or current text.
+- Log only `reason`, account ID, a one-way bounded hash of quoted ID when available, and boolean evidence flags.
+- Do not persist tokens, credentials, full payloads, or message text.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+- Explicit quoted text is supplied to the ordinary text model with a clear delimiter.
+- Type 0 reference without text returns the deterministic Chinese response and does not call the model.
+- Plain text, current image, and exact quoted image behavior remain unchanged.
+- Generated TS and JS remain byte-idempotent under `--process-only`.

fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+TS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
+const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText: string): GetUpdatesResp {
+  return JSON.parse(rawText, (key: string, value: unknown, context?: { source?: string }) => {
+    if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
+    if (typeof value !== "number") throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
+    const source = context?.source;
+    if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source)) throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
+    return source;
+  }) as GetUpdatesResp;
+}
+// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
+
+JS_HELPER = '''// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON begin
+const WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+function parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText) {
+    return JSON.parse(rawText, (key, value, context) => {
+        if (!WEIXIN_EXACT_ID_FIELDS.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string")
+            return value;
+        if (typeof value !== "number")
+            throw new Error(`invalid ${key} type in getUpdates response`);
+        const source = context?.source;
+        if (!source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(source))
+            throw new Error(`unsafe numeric ${key} in getUpdates response`);
+        return source;
+    });
+}
+// AIOS Weixin lossless getUpdates JSON end'''
+
+
+def insert_once(text: str, marker: str, addition: str) -> str:
+    if addition in text:
+        return text
+    if marker not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError(f'marker not found: {marker}')
+    return text.replace(marker, marker + '\n' + addition, 1)
+
+
+def patch_api_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + TS_HELPER)
+    old = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
+    new = 'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
+    if new not in text:
+        if old not in text:
+            raise RuntimeError('TypeScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
+        text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_api_js(text: str) -> str:
+    text = insert_once(text, 'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";', '\n' + JS_HELPER)
+    old = 'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);'
+    new = 'const resp = parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText);'
+    if new not in text:
+        if old not in text:
+            raise RuntimeError('JavaScript getUpdates parser marker not found')
+        text = text.replace(old, new, 1)
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_types_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    new = 'message_id?: string | number;'
+    if new in text:
+        return text
+    old = 'message_id?: number;'
+    if old not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError('message_id type marker not found')
+    return text.replace(old, new, 1)
+
+
+def write_if_changed(path: Path, content: str) -> bool:
+    original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+    if original == content:
+        return False
+    path.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8')
+    return True
+
+
+def apply(plugin_root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    paths = {
+        'src/api/api.ts': patch_api_ts,
+        'dist/src/api/api.js': patch_api_js,
+        'src/api/types.ts': patch_types_ts,
+    }
+    changed: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    for relative, transform in paths.items():
+        path = plugin_root / relative
+        if not path.exists():
+            raise RuntimeError(f'missing plugin file: {path}')
+        original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+        changed[relative] = write_if_changed(path, transform(original))
+    return changed
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    changed = apply(args.plugin_root.resolve())
+    print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(args.plugin_root.resolve()), 'changed': changed}, ensure_ascii=False))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())

fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def replace_required(text: str, old: str, new: str, label: str) -> str:
+    if new in text:
+        return text
+    if old not in text:
+        raise RuntimeError(f'{label} marker not found')
+    return text.replace(old, new, 1)
+
+
+def patch_send_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {\n  const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
+        '}): Promise<{ messageId: string; createTimeMs: number }> {\n  const { to, text, opts } = params;\n',
+        'TS send return type',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  const clientId = generateClientId();\n  const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        '  const clientId = generateClientId();\n  const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n  const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        'TS create time',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  });\n  try {\n    await sendMessageApi({',
+        '  });\n  if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0]) throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n  req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n  try {\n    await sendMessageApi({',
+        'TS request timestamp',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '  return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        '  return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        'TS send result',
+    )
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_send_js(text: str) -> str:
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    const clientId = generateClientId();\n    const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        '    const clientId = generateClientId();\n    const createTimeMs = Date.now();\n    const req = buildSendMessageReq({',
+        'JS create time',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    });\n    try {\n        await sendMessageApi({',
+        '    });\n    if (!req.msg?.item_list?.[0])\n        throw new Error("sendMessageWeixin: text item missing");\n    req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs;\n    try {\n        await sendMessageApi({',
+        'JS request timestamp',
+    )
+    text = replace_required(
+        text,
+        '    return { messageId: clientId };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        '    return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs };\n}\n/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */',
+        'JS send result',
+    )
+    return text
+
+
+def patch_process_ts(text: str) -> str:
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                token: deps.token,
+                contextToken,
+                runId,
+              }});'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                token: deps.token,
+                contextToken,
+                runId,
+              }});
+              rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS fallback text send')
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+              baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+              token: deps.token,
+              contextToken,
+              runId,
+            }});'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+              baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+              token: deps.token,
+              contextToken,
+              runId,
+            }});
+            rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    return replace_required(text, old, new, 'TS normal text send')
+
+
+def patch_process_js(text: str) -> str:
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                                token: deps.token,
+                                contextToken,
+                                runId,
+                            } });'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                                baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                                token: deps.token,
+                                contextToken,
+                                runId,
+                            } });
+                        rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    text = replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS fallback text send')
+    old = '''await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                            baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                            token: deps.token,
+                            contextToken,
+                            runId,
+                        } });'''
+    new = '''const sentText = await sendMessageWeixin({ to: ctx.To, text, opts: {
+                            baseUrl: deps.baseUrl,
+                            token: deps.token,
+                            contextToken,
+                            runId,
+                        } });
+                    rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(deps.accountId, ctx.To, text, sentText.createTimeMs);'''
+    return replace_required(text, old, new, 'JS normal text send')
+
+
+def apply(root: Path) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    transforms = {
+        'src/messaging/send.ts': patch_send_ts,
+        'dist/src/messaging/send.js': patch_send_js,
+        'src/messaging/process-message.ts': patch_process_ts,
+        'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': patch_process_js,
+    }
+    changed = {}
+    for relative, transform in transforms.items():
+        path = root / relative
+        original = path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+        updated = transform(original)
+        changed[relative] = updated != original
+        if updated != original:
+            path.write_text(updated, encoding='utf-8')
+    return changed
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument('plugin_root', type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    root = args.plugin_root.resolve()
+    print(json.dumps({'plugin_root': str(root), 'changed': apply(root)}, ensure_ascii=False))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    raise SystemExit(main())

openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/index.js

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  classifyRun,
-  decideToolCall,
-  runKey,
-} from "./policy.js";
-
-const activeRuns = new Map();
-const MAX_RUN_AGE_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
-
-function prune(now = Date.now()) {
-  for (const [key, value] of activeRuns.entries()) {
-    if (now - value.recordedAt > MAX_RUN_AGE_MS) activeRuns.delete(key);
-  }
-}
-
-export default {
-  id: "aios-tenant-boundary",
-  name: "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
-  description: "Fail-closed user-origin and side-effect policy for Tenant Cells.",
-
-  register(api) {
-    api.on(
-      "before_agent_run",
-      async (event, ctx) => {
-        prune();
-        const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
-        const trust = classifyRun(ctx, config);
-        const key = runKey(event, ctx);
-        if (key) {
-          activeRuns.set(key, { ...trust, recordedAt: Date.now() });
-        }
-
-        if (
-          config.blockUnknownAgentRuns === true &&
-          trust.trusted !== true &&
-          trust.reason !== "job_id_present"
-        ) {
-          return {
-            outcome: "block",
-            reason: trust.reason,
-            message: "This message cannot be verified as coming from the active authenticated user.",
-          };
-        }
-        return { outcome: "pass" };
-      },
-      { priority: 100 },
-    );
-
-    api.on(
-      "before_tool_call",
-      async (event, ctx) => {
-        prune();
-        const config = event.context?.pluginConfig ?? api.pluginConfig ?? {};
-        const key = runKey(event, ctx);
-        const trust = key ? activeRuns.get(key) : undefined;
-        const decision = decideToolCall(event.toolName, trust, config);
-
-        if (decision.action === "block") {
-          return {
-            block: true,
-            blockReason: `AIOS V2R1 origin policy denied tool call: ${decision.code}`,
-          };
-        }
-        if (decision.action === "approval") {
-          return {
-            requireApproval: {
-              title: `Approve ${String(event.toolName)}`,
-              description: "Authenticated user requested a side-effecting tool call in this Tenant Cell.",
-              severity: "warning",
-              timeoutMs: Number(config.approvalTimeoutMs ?? 60000),
-              allowedDecisions: ["allow-once", "deny"],
-              pluginId: "aios-tenant-boundary",
-            },
-          };
-        }
-        return undefined;
-      },
-      { priority: 100 },
-    );
-
-    api.on("agent_end", async (event, ctx) => {
-      const key = runKey(event, ctx);
-      if (key) activeRuns.delete(key);
-    });
-  },
-};

openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/policy.js

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS = Object.freeze([
-  "read", "grep", "glob", "find", "ls", "web_search", "web_fetch",
-  "memory_search", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "session_status",
-]);
-
-function strings(value) {
-  return Array.isArray(value)
-    ? value.filter((item) => typeof item === "string" && item.trim())
-        .map((item) => item.trim())
-    : [];
-}
-
-export function resolveSenderId(ctx = {}) {
-  const direct = typeof ctx.senderId === "string" ? ctx.senderId.trim() : "";
-  const nested = typeof ctx.channelContext?.sender?.id === "string"
-    ? ctx.channelContext.sender.id.trim()
-    : "";
-  return direct || nested || undefined;
-}
-
-export function classifyRun(ctx = {}, config = {}) {
-  const senderId = resolveSenderId(ctx);
-  const trusted = new Set(strings(config.trustedSenderIds));
-  const blocked = new Set(strings(config.blockedSenderIds));
-
-  if (typeof ctx.jobId === "string" && ctx.jobId) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "automation", reason: "job_id_present" };
-  }
-  if (!senderId) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "system_or_unknown", reason: "sender_id_missing" };
-  }
-  if (blocked.has(senderId)) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "blocked_sender", reason: "sender_blocked", senderId };
-  }
-  if (config.requireExplicitTrustedSenders !== false && !trusted.has(senderId)) {
-    return { trusted: false, origin: "untrusted_sender", reason: "sender_not_allowlisted", senderId };
-  }
-  return {
-    trusted: true,
-    origin: "authenticated_channel_user",
-    reason: "sender_verified",
-    senderId,
-  };
-}
-
-export function decideToolCall(toolName, runTrust, config = {}) {
-  const name = typeof toolName === "string" ? toolName.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
-  const configured = strings(config.readOnlyTools).map((item) => item.toLowerCase());
-  const readOnly = new Set(configured.length ? configured : DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_TOOLS);
-  if (!name) {
-    return { action: "block", code: "tool_name_missing" };
-  }
-  if (readOnly.has(name)) {
-    return { action: "allow", code: "read_only" };
-  }
-  if (!runTrust || runTrust.trusted !== true) {
-    return {
-      action: "block",
-      code: runTrust?.reason || "run_provenance_missing",
-    };
-  }
-  if (config.requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects === false) {
-    return { action: "allow", code: "trusted_side_effect" };
-  }
-  return { action: "approval", code: "human_side_effect" };
-}
-
-export function runKey(event = {}, ctx = {}) {
-  const key = event.runId || ctx.runId;
-  return typeof key === "string" && key.trim() ? key.trim() : undefined;
-}

openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "aios-tenant-boundary",
-  "name": "AIOS Tenant Boundary",
-  "description": "Enforces AIOS V2R1 tenant provenance and tool policy boundaries.",
-  "version": "2.1.0-rc1",
-  "entry": "dist/index.js",
-  "configSchema": {
-    "type": "object",
-    "additionalProperties": false,
-    "properties": {
-      "requireExplicitTrustedSenders": { "type": "boolean", "default": true },
-      "trustedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
-      "blockedSenderIds": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "default": [] },
-      "readOnlyTools": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
-      "requireApprovalForHumanSideEffects": { "type": "boolean", "default": true }
-    }
-  }
-}

openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@aios/openclaw-tenant-boundary",
-  "version": "2.1.0-rc.1",
-  "type": "module",
-  "description": "AIOS V2R1 Tenant Cell provenance and side-effect policy boundary for OpenClaw.",
-  "files": [
-    "dist",
-    "openclaw.plugin.json"
-  ],
-  "scripts": {
-    "test": "node --test test/*.test.js"
-  },
-  "openclaw": {
-    "extensions": [
-      "./dist/index.js"
-    ]
-  }
-}

ops/aios-v2/v2r1c2-production-control.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+VERSION=V2R1C2
+EXPECTED_TARGET=3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24
+TAG_OBJECT=a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36
+REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+SOURCE=/opt/aios-v2r1c2
+TAKEOVER=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/codex/AIOS-V2R1C2-UNIFIED-PORTAL-TAKEOVER-20260722
+CANDIDATE_SERVICE=aios-v2r1c2-portal.service
+OLD_SERVICE=aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
+NEW_SERVICE=aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+CANDIDATE_STATE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-portal
+PRODUCTION_STATE=/var/lib/aios-v2r1c2-production
+RUN_ID=${AIOS_RELEASE_RUN_ID:-AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z}
+EVIDENCE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/$RUN_ID
+SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)
+RELEASE_ROOT=$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)
+UNIT_SOURCE=$RELEASE_ROOT/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+ENV_SOURCE=$RELEASE_ROOT/deploy/aios-v2/systemd/aios-v2r1c2-production.env.example
+LOCK=/run/lock/aios-v2r1c2-production-release.lock
+
+require_root() {
+  test "$(id -u)" -eq 0 || { echo 'root required' >&2; exit 77; }
+}
+
+health_old() {
+  curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18920/healthz
+}
+
+health_new() {
+  curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18920/api/v2/health
+}
+
+health_candidate() {
+  curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18921/api/v2/health
+}
+
+wait_candidate() {
+  for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+    if health_candidate; then
+      return 0
+    fi
+    sleep 1
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+preflight() {
+  require_root
+  test "$(git --git-dir="$REPO" rev-parse refs/tags/$VERSION)" = "$TAG_OBJECT"
+  test "$(git --git-dir="$REPO" rev-list -n 1 "$VERSION")" = "$EXPECTED_TARGET"
+  test -f "$SOURCE/active-runtime/app/aios_web/release_application.py"
+  test -f "$UNIT_SOURCE"
+  test -f "$ENV_SOURCE"
+  command -v sqlite3 >/dev/null
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$OLD_SERVICE"
+  health_candidate >/dev/null
+  health_old >/dev/null
+  (
+    cd "$TAKEOVER/artifacts/v2r1c2"
+    sha256sum -c checksums.sha256 >/dev/null
+  )
+  diff -qr --exclude=__pycache__ "$TAKEOVER/active-runtime/app" "$SOURCE/active-runtime/app" >/dev/null
+  diff -qr "$TAKEOVER/plans" "$SOURCE/plans" >/dev/null
+  echo PREFLIGHT=PASS
+}
+
+prepare() {
+  preflight
+  install -d -m 0750 "$EVIDENCE_DIR" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup"
+  health_old >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-before.json"
+  health_candidate >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/candidate-health-before.json"
+  systemctl cat "$OLD_SERVICE" >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/$OLD_SERVICE.unit"
+  cp -a /etc/aios-orchestrator-gateway "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/"
+  cp -a /etc/systemd/system/aios-orchestrator-gateway.service "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/"
+  if test -e "$PRODUCTION_STATE"; then
+    mv "$PRODUCTION_STATE" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/backup/aios-v2r1c2-production-state.preexisting"
+  fi
+  systemctl stop "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  trap 'systemctl start "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE" || true' EXIT
+  while IFS= read -r -d '' database; do
+    sqlite3 "$database" 'PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE);' >/dev/null
+    test "$(sqlite3 "$database" 'PRAGMA quick_check;')" = ok
+  done < <(find "$CANDIDATE_STATE" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.sqlite3' -print0)
+  install -d -o aios -g aios -m 0750 "$PRODUCTION_STATE"
+  cp -a "$CANDIDATE_STATE/." "$PRODUCTION_STATE/"
+  chown -R aios:aios "$PRODUCTION_STATE"
+  while IFS= read -r -d '' database; do
+    test "$(sqlite3 "$database" 'PRAGMA quick_check;')" = ok
+  done < <(find "$PRODUCTION_STATE" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.sqlite3' -print0)
+  install -o root -g root -m 0644 "$UNIT_SOURCE" /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+  install -d -o root -g aios -m 0750 /etc/aios-v2
+  install -o root -g aios -m 0640 "$ENV_SOURCE" /etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
+  systemctl daemon-reload
+  systemctl start "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  wait_candidate >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/candidate-health-after-state-copy.json"
+  trap - EXIT
+  echo PREPARE=PASS
+}
+
+rollback() {
+  require_root
+  systemctl stop "$NEW_SERVICE" || true
+  systemctl disable "$NEW_SERVICE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  systemctl enable "$OLD_SERVICE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  systemctl start "$OLD_SERVICE"
+  health_old >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/rollback-health.json"
+  echo ROLLBACK=PASS
+}
+
+promote() {
+  require_root
+  test -f /etc/systemd/system/aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+  test -f /etc/aios-v2/aios-v2r1c2-production.env
+  ! systemctl is-active --quiet "$NEW_SERVICE"
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$CANDIDATE_SERVICE"
+  health_candidate >/dev/null
+  health_old >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-switch-input.json"
+  trap 'trap - ERR; rollback' ERR
+  systemctl stop "$OLD_SERVICE"
+  systemctl start "$NEW_SERVICE"
+  for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+    if health_new >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-after-switch.json" 2>/dev/null; then
+      echo PROMOTE=PASS
+      trap - ERR
+      return 0
+    fi
+    sleep 1
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+finalize() {
+  require_root
+  systemctl is-active --quiet "$NEW_SERVICE"
+  health_new >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-health-final.json"
+  systemctl disable "$OLD_SERVICE" >/dev/null
+  systemctl enable "$NEW_SERVICE" >/dev/null
+  echo FINALIZE=PASS
+}
+
+exec 9>"$LOCK"
+flock -n 9 || { echo 'release operation already running' >&2; exit 75; }
+case "${1:-}" in
+  preflight) preflight ;;
+  prepare) prepare ;;
+  promote) promote ;;
+  rollback) rollback ;;
+  finalize) finalize ;;
+  *) echo "usage: $0 {preflight|prepare|promote|rollback|finalize}" >&2; exit 64 ;;
+esac

ops/aios-v2/v2r1c2-promote-and-accept.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+RUN_ID=AIOS-V2R1C2-PRODUCTION-20260722T011836Z
+CONTROL=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/ops/aios-v2/v2r1c2-production-control.sh
+REPO=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
+EVIDENCE_DIR=/var/lib/aios-gitops/acceptance/$RUN_ID
+DRIVER=/data/aios-gitops/worktrees/controller/tools/run_online_smoke_18920.py
+TEMP_SOURCE=
+
+cleanup_temp() {
+  case "$TEMP_SOURCE" in
+    /tmp/aios-v2r1c2-production-acceptance.*)
+      test -d "$TEMP_SOURCE" && rm -rf -- "$TEMP_SOURCE"
+      ;;
+    '') ;;
+    *) echo "refusing to remove unexpected temporary path: $TEMP_SOURCE" >&2; return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+rollback_on_error() {
+  code=$?
+  trap - ERR
+  AIOS_RELEASE_RUN_ID="$RUN_ID" "$CONTROL" rollback || true
+  cleanup_temp || true
+  exit "$code"
+}
+trap rollback_on_error ERR
+
+AIOS_RELEASE_RUN_ID="$RUN_ID" "$CONTROL" promote
+systemctl is-active --quiet aios-v2r1c2-production.service
+! systemctl is-active --quiet aios-orchestrator-gateway.service
+curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18920/api/v2/health >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/health-after-promote.json"
+curl -fsS --max-time 10 http://127.0.0.1:18921/api/v2/health >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/candidate-health-during-production.json"
+
+TEMP_SOURCE=$(mktemp -d /tmp/aios-v2r1c2-production-acceptance.XXXXXX)
+git --git-dir="$REPO" archive 8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978 | tar -x -C "$TEMP_SOURCE"
+(
+  cd "$TEMP_SOURCE"
+  python3 tools/aios_v2r1c2_acceptance.py \
+    --source-oid 3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24 \
+    --online \
+    --base-url http://127.0.0.1:18920 \
+    --evidence-output "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-acceptance.json"
+)
+python3 "$DRIVER" "$TEMP_SOURCE" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-online-smoke.json"
+
+python3 - "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-acceptance.json" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-online-smoke.json" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+for path in sys.argv[1:]:
+    with open(path, encoding='utf-8') as handle:
+        data = json.load(handle)
+    if data.get('passed') is not True:
+        raise SystemExit(f'acceptance failed: {path}')
+PY
+
+systemctl show aios-v2r1c2-production.service \
+  -p ActiveState -p SubState -p MainPID -p NRestarts \
+  >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-service-status.txt"
+sha256sum "$EVIDENCE_DIR"/production-acceptance.json \
+  "$EVIDENCE_DIR"/production-online-smoke.json \
+  "$EVIDENCE_DIR"/health-after-promote.json \
+  >"$EVIDENCE_DIR/production-evidence.sha256"
+
+cleanup_temp
+TEMP_SOURCE=
+trap - ERR
+echo SWITCH_VALIDATED=PASS

patches/deploy_v1r4c6-production-20260711.branch.json

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 {
   "type": "branch",
-  "branch": "release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712",
+  "branch": "deploy/v1r4c6-production-20260711",
   "base": "main",
   "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
-  "created_at": "2026-07-12T14:39:23Z",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-11T13:10:51Z",
   "direct_main_push": false,
   "owner_approval_required": true
 }

patches/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "patch_name": "gitea-tag-publication-atomicity",
+  "branch": "patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+  "base": "main",
+  "risk": "high",
+  "description": "Fail-closed, resumable Gitea release-tag publication with exact remote ref, peeled target, API and listing verification before baseline update.",
+  "owner_approval": "received",
+  "constraints": {
+    "force_push": false,
+    "tag_rewrite": false,
+    "direct_main_push": false,
+    "secret_commit": false,
+    "production_runtime_anchor_change": false
+  }
+}

patches/gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "id": "patch-1784043007770-e97206c3",
+  "patch_name": "gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8",
+  "branch": "patch/gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8",
+  "risk": "high",
+  "description": "Root-cause remediation for recurring ACL and shared-worktree failures: unified aiman:gitops runtime identity, UMask=0002, inherited default ACLs, per-task isolated Git worktrees, startup preflight, migration/rollback scripts, systemd drop-in templates, audit evidence, and an OpenClaw execution task. No production business deployment in this patch.",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-14T15:30:07Z"
+}

patches/nl/nl-1784681185786-19ac0f82.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "id": "nl-1784681185786-19ac0f82",
+  "text": "Create a safe GitOps plan for tag V2R1C2. The tag target must be commit 3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24. Evidence closure commit is 8cdca463aff9707edee00e20a3b56884130f6978. Do not tag the current workspace HEAD. Do not modify main. Do not force push. Do not promote production. If the target commit cannot be bound explicitly, keep the operation blocked.",
+  "intent": "unknown",
+  "action_plan": [],
+  "execute": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true,
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-22T00:46:25Z"
+}

patches/patch_gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.branch.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+  "base": "main",
+  "created_by": "owner-gitea-tag-atomicity-20260723",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-23T04:59:13Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}

patches/task_codex_gitops-isolated-worktree-migration-20260715T001652UTC8.branch.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "type": "branch",
+  "branch": "task/codex/gitops-isolated-worktree-migration-20260715T001652UTC8",
+  "base": "patch/gitops-isolated-worktree-governance-20260714T232948UTC8",
+  "created_by": "chatgpt-gitops-bot",
+  "created_at": "2026-07-14T16:17:28Z",
+  "direct_main_push": false,
+  "owner_approval_required": true
+}

release/v2r1c0-rc1/RELEASE.md

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1
-
-## Architecture
-
-OpenClaw Tenant Cell + Hermes Shared Agent Fabric.
-
-## Included
-
-- Signed Tenant Context
-- Canonical Message Envelope
-- Tenant Router
-- OpenClaw Cell lifecycle adapter
-- Exact Message Ledger
-- Hermes tenant partitioned scheduler
-- Memory Namespace policy
-- Secret Scope references
-- Append-only Audit Chain
-- Hermes Profile isolation
-- OpenClaw tenant boundary plugin
-
-## Release Gates
-
-Before production:
-
-- automated isolation tests pass
-- OpenClaw plugin runtime inspect passes
-- Cell health probes pass
-- running commit matches release commit
-- rollback test passes
-
-## Security Rules
-
-Unknown provenance fails closed.
-Quoted text is data, not command input.
-Cross-tenant access is denied.
-Shared Fabric does not share tenant state.

release/v2r1c0-rc1/STATUS.md

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Live Status
-
-Last verified: 2026-07-13 Europe/Amsterdam
-
-## Source of truth
-
-- Release branch: `release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712`
-- Verified branch tree: `6569065`
-- Current promoted baseline: `V1R4C6`
-- Production baseline state: not yet promoted to V2R1C0
-
-This file is the single human-readable progress page for V2R1C0 RC1. Update it in the same commit that changes a release gate.
-
-## Overall status
-
-`DEVELOPMENT COMPLETE / EXECUTABLE ACCEPTANCE INCOMPLETE / NOT DEPLOYED`
-
-## Component status
-
-| Workstream | Status | Evidence | Remaining gate |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| Architecture baseline | Done | `docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md` | none |
-| Tenant Context | Done | `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py` | executable security tests |
-| Canonical Message | Done | `tenant_context.py` | channel adapter integration test |
-| Tenant Router | Done | `router.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
-| Cell lifecycle adapter | Done | `fleet.py`, `cell_manager.py`, `cli.py` | real OpenClaw Fleet probe |
-| Message Ledger | Done | `message_ledger.py` | concurrency and restart tests |
-| Hermes Fabric | Done | `hermes_fabric.py` | worker/profile runtime test |
-| Memory isolation | Done | `memory_scope.py` | cross-tenant executable tests |
-| Secret scope | Done | `secret_scope.py` | secret broker integration |
-| Audit chain | Done | `audit.py` | tamper executable test |
-| Hermes Profile isolation | Done | `hermes_profile.py` | container/profile runtime test |
-| OpenClaw boundary plugin | Code complete | `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/` | install + runtime hook inspection |
-| Python automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
-| Node plugin automated tests | Blocked | no committed executable suite | add and run tests |
-| Staging Cell deployment | Not started | none | tests must pass first |
-| Rollback rehearsal | Not started | none | staging deployment required |
-| Merge to `main` | Not started | release branch differs from main | owner approval after gates pass |
-| RC tag | Not created | no V2R1 tag | owner approval |
-| Production deployment | Not started | baseline remains V1R4C6 | owner production approval |
-
-## Release gates
-
-- [ ] Python executable tests committed and passing
-- [ ] Node executable tests committed and passing
-- [ ] OpenClaw plugin installs successfully
-- [ ] Runtime inspection proves hooks registered
-- [ ] Tenant Cell status and doctor pass
-- [ ] Staging message and tool-policy smoke tests pass
-- [ ] Rollback succeeds
-- [ ] Running commit matches approved release commit
-- [ ] Owner approves merge, tag and production cutover
-
-## Parallel work ownership
-
-- Track A: Python isolation and message tests
-- Track B: OpenClaw plugin tests and runtime inspection
-- Track C: Cell staging deployment, health and rollback
-- Track D: release evidence, digests and final acceptance report
-
-## Update rule
-
-Every worker must update this page with:
-
-1. exact command,
-2. exit code,
-3. test counts,
-4. commit hash,
-5. artifact digest,
-6. blocker or PASS result.
-
-No item may be marked Done from prose-only reports.

reports/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-delivery.json

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+{
+  "base": "main",
+  "base_oid": "b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870",
+  "commit_count": 10,
+  "commits": [
+    "fc0b9f29bf6dadfbcc8599da6f0ab11a6e19b529",
+    "3812e1ab0123c7da4726e51179a10746b5bbde83",
+    "3196d91b12d0ac5d7ea550b0474703a08736471b",
+    "54093d15437ce0af31acf6feeeffacf6626a59cd",
+    "27a0ae126b96d63c40544174e7a3859e30eba056",
+    "83ab67f7e11eae9da4546cab53169f5a6a47e0ae",
+    "f4b6ac8609faf947d2659b2c32564a26fcb3eb10",
+    "a3edc628a91a4af3d702aacefe0389f844615bc1",
+    "e40c05779c435c3726618de81e02e90953d727f3",
+    "edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f"
+  ],
+  "file_count": 15,
+  "files": [
+    "active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py",
+    "active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_write_guard.py",
+    "active-runtime/app/gitea_tag_publication.py",
+    "docs/gitops/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity.md",
+    "docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml",
+    "patches/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.json",
+    "patches/patch_gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723.branch.json",
+    "scripts/generate_delivery_manifest.py",
+    "scripts/release_version.sh",
+    "scripts/verify_gitea_credential_rotation.py",
+    "security/incidents/GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723.redacted.json",
+    "tests/run_live_gitea_fixture.sh",
+    "tests/test_chatgpt_actions_tag.py",
+    "tests/test_gitea_tag_publication.py",
+    "tests/test_gitea_tag_publication_live.py"
+  ],
+  "generated_from": {
+    "commit_range": "b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870..edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f",
+    "commits_command": "git log --reverse --format=%H b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870..edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f",
+    "files_command": "git diff --name-only b739fbb5ec8f7096d2f5ade87f65a7c74b0ee870..edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f"
+  },
+  "manifest_path": "reports/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-delivery.json",
+  "source_branch": "patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+  "source_commit": "edfad05d57fb3d23d8ab19d27bb6a43a7f2a298f"
+}

scripts/generate_delivery_manifest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Generate the delivery file list from Git instead of hand-maintained counts."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def git(root: Path, *args: str) -> list[str]:
+    output = subprocess.check_output(
+        ["git", *args], cwd=root, text=True, encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    return [line for line in output.splitlines() if line]
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--base", default="main")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--output",
+        default="reports/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-delivery.json",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    root = Path(
+        subprocess.check_output(
+            ["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], text=True, encoding="utf-8"
+        ).strip()
+    )
+    output = Path(args.output)
+    if output.is_absolute() or ".." in output.parts:
+        raise SystemExit("output must remain inside the repository")
+    output_path = root / output
+    output_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    base_oid = git(root, "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{args.base}^{{commit}}")[0]
+    source_commit = git(root, "rev-parse", "--verify", "HEAD^{commit}")[0]
+    source_branch = git(root, "symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD")[0]
+    commit_range = f"{base_oid}..{source_commit}"
+    commits = git(root, "log", "--reverse", "--format=%H", commit_range)
+    files = [
+        path
+        for path in git(root, "diff", "--name-only", commit_range)
+        if path != output.as_posix()
+    ]
+    payload = {
+        "base": args.base,
+        "base_oid": base_oid,
+        "source_branch": source_branch,
+        "source_commit": source_commit,
+        "commit_count": len(commits),
+        "commits": commits,
+        "file_count": len(files),
+        "files": files,
+        "manifest_path": output.as_posix(),
+        "generated_from": {
+            "commit_range": commit_range,
+            "files_command": f"git diff --name-only {commit_range}",
+            "commits_command": f"git log --reverse --format=%H {commit_range}",
+        },
+    }
+    output_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

scripts/gitops/bootstrap_isolated_worktrees.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT="${AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT:-/data/aios-gitops}"
+SOURCE="${AIOS_SOURCE_WORKTREE:-$ROOT/workspace}"
+BARE="${AIOS_BARE_REPO:-$ROOT/repo.git}"
+WORKTREES="${AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT:-$ROOT/worktrees}"
+RUNTIME_USER="${AIOS_RUNTIME_USER:-aiman}"
+RUNTIME_GROUP="${AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP:-gitops}"
+
+if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]]; then
+  echo "ERROR: bootstrap must run as root" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+getent passwd "$RUNTIME_USER" >/dev/null
+getent group "$RUNTIME_GROUP" >/dev/null
+[[ -d "$SOURCE/.git" || -f "$SOURCE/.git" ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: source worktree not found: $SOURCE" >&2
+  exit 3
+}
+
+install -d -o "$RUNTIME_USER" -g "$RUNTIME_GROUP" -m 2775 "$ROOT" "$WORKTREES"
+install -d -o "$RUNTIME_USER" -g "$RUNTIME_GROUP" -m 2775 \
+  "$WORKTREES/openclaw" "$WORKTREES/chatgpt" "$WORKTREES/controller"
+
+if [[ ! -d "$BARE" ]]; then
+  sudo -u "$RUNTIME_USER" -g "$RUNTIME_GROUP" git clone --bare "$SOURCE" "$BARE"
+fi
+
+chown -R "$RUNTIME_USER:$RUNTIME_GROUP" "$BARE" "$WORKTREES"
+find "$BARE" "$WORKTREES" -type d -exec chmod 2775 {} +
+find "$BARE" "$WORKTREES" -type f -exec chmod ug+rw {} +
+
+setfacl -R -m "u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwX,g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwX,m::rwX" "$BARE" "$WORKTREES"
+find "$BARE" "$WORKTREES" -type d -exec \
+  setfacl -m "d:u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwx,d:g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwx,d:m::rwx" {} +
+
+cat <<EOF
+bootstrap_status: PASS
+root: $ROOT
+source_worktree: $SOURCE
+bare_repo: $BARE
+worktree_root: $WORKTREES
+runtime_user: $RUNTIME_USER
+runtime_group: $RUNTIME_GROUP
+EOF

scripts/gitops/preflight_task_environment.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+EXPECTED_USER="${AIOS_RUNTIME_USER:-aiman}"
+EXPECTED_GROUP="${AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP:-gitops}"
+EXPECTED_UMASK="${AIOS_RUNTIME_UMASK:-0002}"
+TASK_DIR="${AIOS_TASK_DIR:-.agent/tasks}"
+RESULT_DIR="${AIOS_RESULT_DIR:-.agent/results}"
+
+fail() {
+  echo "preflight_status: FAIL"
+  echo "reason: $1"
+  exit 1
+}
+
+USER_NOW="$(id -un)"
+GROUPS_NOW="$(id -Gn)"
+UMASK_NOW="$(umask)"
+ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || true)"
+GIT_DIR="$(git rev-parse --git-dir 2>/dev/null || true)"
+BRANCH="$(git branch --show-current 2>/dev/null || true)"
+
+[[ "$USER_NOW" == "$EXPECTED_USER" ]] || fail "runtime user is $USER_NOW, expected $EXPECTED_USER"
+[[ " $GROUPS_NOW " == *" $EXPECTED_GROUP "* ]] || fail "runtime user is not in $EXPECTED_GROUP"
+[[ "$UMASK_NOW" == "$EXPECTED_UMASK" || "$UMASK_NOW" == "002" ]] || fail "umask is $UMASK_NOW, expected $EXPECTED_UMASK"
+[[ -n "$ROOT" ]] || fail "not inside a git worktree"
+[[ "$ROOT" == /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/* ]] || fail "shared source worktree is prohibited: $ROOT"
+[[ -w "$ROOT" ]] || fail "worktree root is not writable"
+[[ -w "$GIT_DIR" ]] || fail "git dir is not writable: $GIT_DIR"
+[[ ! -e "$GIT_DIR/index.lock" ]] || fail "git index lock exists"
+install -d -m 2775 "$TASK_DIR" "$RESULT_DIR"
+[[ -w "$TASK_DIR" ]] || fail "task directory is not writable: $TASK_DIR"
+[[ -w "$RESULT_DIR" ]] || fail "result directory is not writable: $RESULT_DIR"
+[[ -z "$(git status --porcelain)" ]] || fail "worktree is not clean at task start"
+
+cat <<EOF
+preflight_status: PASS
+runtime_user: $USER_NOW
+runtime_groups: $GROUPS_NOW
+umask: $UMASK_NOW
+worktree: $ROOT
+git_dir: $GIT_DIR
+branch: $BRANCH
+workspace_clean: true
+task_path_writable: true
+result_path_writable: true
+git_lock_present: false
+EOF

scripts/gitops/task_worktree.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ACTION="${1:-}"
+AGENT="${2:-}"
+TASK_ID="${3:-}"
+BASE_REF="${4:-origin/main}"
+
+ROOT="${AIOS_GITOPS_ROOT:-/data/aios-gitops}"
+BARE="${AIOS_BARE_REPO:-$ROOT/repo.git}"
+WORKTREES="${AIOS_WORKTREE_ROOT:-$ROOT/worktrees}"
+RUNTIME_USER="${AIOS_RUNTIME_USER:-aiman}"
+RUNTIME_GROUP="${AIOS_RUNTIME_GROUP:-gitops}"
+
+usage() {
+  echo "usage: $0 create|remove <openclaw|chatgpt|controller> <task-id> [base-ref]" >&2
+  exit 64
+}
+
+[[ "$ACTION" =~ ^(create|remove)$ ]] || usage
+[[ "$AGENT" =~ ^(openclaw|chatgpt|controller)$ ]] || usage
+[[ "$TASK_ID" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$ ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: invalid task id" >&2
+  exit 65
+}
+[[ "$(id -un)" == "$RUNTIME_USER" ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: must run as $RUNTIME_USER" >&2
+  exit 66
+}
+[[ "$(id -gn)" == "$RUNTIME_GROUP" || " $(id -Gn) " == *" $RUNTIME_GROUP "* ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: user must be in $RUNTIME_GROUP" >&2
+  exit 67
+}
+[[ "$(umask)" == "0002" || "$(umask)" == "002" ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: umask must be 0002" >&2
+  exit 68
+}
+[[ -d "$BARE" ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: bare repository missing: $BARE" >&2
+  exit 69
+}
+
+PATHNAME="$WORKTREES/$AGENT/$TASK_ID"
+BRANCH="task/$AGENT/$TASK_ID"
+
+case "$ACTION" in
+  create)
+    [[ ! -e "$PATHNAME" ]] || {
+      echo "ERROR: worktree already exists: $PATHNAME" >&2
+      exit 70
+    }
+    git --git-dir="$BARE" fetch --all --prune
+    git --git-dir="$BARE" worktree add -b "$BRANCH" "$PATHNAME" "$BASE_REF"
+    install -d -m 2775 "$PATHNAME/.agent/tasks/$AGENT" "$PATHNAME/.agent/results/$AGENT"
+    setfacl -m "u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwx,g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwx,m::rwx" "$PATHNAME"
+    find "$PATHNAME" -type d -exec chmod g+s {} +
+    find "$PATHNAME" -type d -exec \
+      setfacl -m "d:u:${RUNTIME_USER}:rwx,d:g:${RUNTIME_GROUP}:rwx,d:m::rwx" {} +
+    printf 'worktree: %s\nbranch: %s\nbase: %s\n' "$PATHNAME" "$BRANCH" "$BASE_REF"
+    ;;
+  remove)
+    [[ -d "$PATHNAME" ]] || {
+      echo "ERROR: worktree not found: $PATHNAME" >&2
+      exit 71
+    }
+    [[ -z "$(git -C "$PATHNAME" status --porcelain)" ]] || {
+      echo "ERROR: worktree is not clean; retain for investigation" >&2
+      exit 72
+    }
+    git --git-dir="$BARE" worktree remove "$PATHNAME"
+    printf 'removed: %s\n' "$PATHNAME"
+    ;;
+esac

scripts/release_version.sh

@@ -1,23 +1,53 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-VERSION="${1:?version required, e.g. V1R1C0}"
-MESSAGE="${2:-release $VERSION}"
-if ! echo "$VERSION" | grep -Eq '^V[0-9]+R[0-9]+C[0-9]+$'; then echo "ERROR: version must match VxRxCx"; exit 1; fi
-cd "${AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE:-/data/aios-gitops/workspace}"
-git checkout main
-git pull origin main || true
-git tag -a "$VERSION" -m "$MESSAGE" || true
-git push origin "$VERSION" || true
-python3 - <<PY
-import json, datetime
-from pathlib import Path
-p=Path('baseline/current.json')
-if p.exists(): d=json.loads(p.read_text())
-else: p.parent.mkdir(exist_ok=True); d={}
-d['active_version']='$VERSION'; d['active_tag']='$VERSION'; d['updated_at']=datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).isoformat(); d['update_mode']='git_patch_only'
-p.write_text(json.dumps(d, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
-PY
-git add baseline/current.json || true
-git commit -m "release($VERSION): update active baseline" || true
-git push origin main || true
-echo "RELEASE_DONE $VERSION"
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+VERSION="${1:?version required, e.g. V2R1C4}"
+TARGET_OID="${2:?target_oid required}"
+EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID="${3:?evidence_closure_oid required}"
+APPROVAL_PLAN_ID="${4:?approval_plan_id required}"
+WORKSPACE="${AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE:-/data/aios-gitops/workspace}"
+TAG_REMOTE="${AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_REMOTE:-gitea}"
+BRANCH_REMOTE="${AIOS_GITOPS_BRANCH_REMOTE:-gitea}"
+
+case "$VERSION" in
+  V[0-9]*R[0-9]*C[0-9]*) ;;
+  *) echo "ERROR: version must match VxRxCx" >&2; exit 64 ;;
+esac
+
+for value in "$TARGET_OID" "$EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID"; do
+  [[ "$value" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || {
+    echo "ERROR: target and evidence OIDs must be full lowercase 40-character OIDs" >&2
+    exit 64
+  }
+done
+
+[[ -n "$APPROVAL_PLAN_ID" ]] || {
+  echo "ERROR: approval_plan_id is required" >&2
+  exit 64
+}
+
+cd "$WORKSPACE"
+BRANCH="$(git symbolic-ref --quiet --short HEAD)" || {
+  echo "ERROR: release must run on an isolated branch, not detached HEAD" >&2
+  exit 65
+}
+case "$BRANCH" in
+  main|master) echo "ERROR: direct main/master release writes are forbidden" >&2; exit 65 ;;
+esac
+
+python3 "$WORKSPACE/active-runtime/app/gitea_tag_publication.py" publish \
+  --workspace "$WORKSPACE" \
+  --remote "$TAG_REMOTE" \
+  --version "$VERSION" \
+  --target-oid "$TARGET_OID" \
+  --evidence-closure-oid "$EVIDENCE_CLOSURE_OID" \
+  --approval-plan-id "$APPROVAL_PLAN_ID"
+
+git add -- "baseline/current.json" "versions/$VERSION.json"
+if ! git diff --cached --quiet; then
+  git commit -m "release($VERSION): record Gitea-confirmed baseline"
+fi
+
+# No force, no main push, and no ignored failure.
+git push "$BRANCH_REMOTE" "HEAD:refs/heads/$BRANCH"
+echo "RELEASE_BASELINE_UPDATED $VERSION branch=$BRANCH"

scripts/verify_gitea_credential_rotation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Verify a Gitea credential rotation without printing either credential."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import subprocess
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def token_at(path: Path, line: int) -> str:
+    lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+    if line < 1 or line > len(lines) or not lines[line - 1].strip():
+        raise RuntimeError("credential reference has no configured token line")
+    return lines[line - 1].strip()
+
+
+def get(api: str, path: str, token: str) -> tuple[int, object | None]:
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        api.rstrip("/") + path,
+        headers={
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+            "Authorization": f"token {token}",
+            "User-Agent": "aios-gitops-credential-rotation-verifier/1",
+        },
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+            return response.status, json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        return exc.code, None
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--old-token-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--new-credential-file", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--new-token-line", type=int, default=2)
+    parser.add_argument("--api", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1")
+    parser.add_argument("--repository", default="aios/aios")
+    parser.add_argument("--version", default="V2R1C2")
+    parser.add_argument("--workspace", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--remote", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--branch",
+        default="patch/gitea-tag-publication-atomicity-20260723",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    old_token = token_at(args.old_token_file, 1)
+    new_token = token_at(args.new_credential_file, args.new_token_line)
+    repo_path = f"/repos/{args.repository}"
+    old_status, _ = get(args.api, repo_path, old_token)
+    new_status, _ = get(args.api, repo_path, new_token)
+    encoded = urllib.parse.quote(args.version, safe="")
+    ref_status, ref = get(
+        args.api,
+        f"{repo_path}/git/refs/tags/{encoded}",
+        new_token,
+    )
+    listing_status, listing = get(
+        args.api,
+        f"{repo_path}/tags?limit=50&page=1",
+        new_token,
+    )
+    refs = ref if isinstance(ref, list) else [ref]
+    exact = [
+        item
+        for item in refs
+        if isinstance(item, dict)
+        and item.get("ref") in {
+            f"refs/tags/{args.version}",
+            f"tags/{args.version}",
+        }
+    ]
+    tag_oid = (
+        str(((exact[0].get("object") or {}).get("sha")) or "").lower()
+        if len(exact) == 1
+        else None
+    )
+    tag_status, tag = (
+        get(args.api, f"{repo_path}/git/tags/{tag_oid}", new_token)
+        if tag_oid
+        else (0, None)
+    )
+    peeled_target = (
+        str(((tag.get("object") or {}).get("sha")) or "").lower()
+        if isinstance(tag, dict)
+        else None
+    )
+    listing_target = None
+    if isinstance(listing, list):
+        for item in listing:
+            if item.get("name") == args.version:
+                listing_target = str(
+                    ((item.get("commit") or {}).get("sha")) or ""
+                ).lower()
+                break
+    remote = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "git",
+            "-c",
+            f"safe.directory={args.workspace}",
+            "-c",
+            "credential.helper=!/usr/local/libexec/aios-gitea-credential",
+            "-c",
+            "credential.useHttpPath=true",
+            "-C",
+            str(args.workspace),
+            "ls-remote",
+            args.remote,
+            f"refs/heads/{args.branch}",
+        ],
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+    )
+    remote_oid = (
+        remote.stdout.split()[0].lower()
+        if remote.returncode == 0 and remote.stdout.split()
+        else None
+    )
+    result = {
+        "old_token_repository_http": old_status,
+        "new_token_repository_http": new_status,
+        "git_ls_remote_oid": remote_oid,
+        "gitea_ref_http": ref_status,
+        "gitea_tag_oid": tag_oid,
+        "gitea_tag_object_http": tag_status,
+        "gitea_peeled_target_oid": peeled_target,
+        "gitea_listing_http": listing_status,
+        "gitea_listing_target_oid": listing_target,
+        "credentials_printed": False,
+    }
+    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    passed = (
+        old_status in {401, 403}
+        and new_status == 200
+        and remote_oid is not None
+        and ref_status == 200
+        and tag_oid is not None
+        and tag_status == 200
+        and peeled_target is not None
+        and listing_status == 200
+        and listing_target is not None
+    )
+    return 0 if passed else 2
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

security/incidents/GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723.redacted.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "exposure_window": {
+    "detected_at": "2026-07-23T13:40:23+08:00",
+    "revoked_at": "2026-07-23T13:40:56+08:00",
+    "start": "2026-07-23T12:00:00+08:00",
+    "start_accuracy": "bounded approximation; precise platform tool-log timestamp unavailable"
+  },
+  "gitea_tag_read_validation": {
+    "listing_target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+    "peeled_target_oid": "3dd622b5a515f1fa4ef72b9f8ae9ce48ac703f24",
+    "tag_mutation_performed": false,
+    "tag_oid": "a3bd84ebec9c705f7c9c5c03f7f4ec55f8854e36",
+    "version": "V2R1C2"
+  },
+  "impact_scope": "Gitea repository write access for gitops-bot; no evidence of unauthorized use observed during rotation checks",
+  "incident_id": "GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723",
+  "log_handling": {
+    "credential_values_in_record": false,
+    "reason": "formal audit/tool logs must not be deleted",
+    "server_redacted_record_mode": "0640 root:gitops",
+    "source_tool_log_deleted": false
+  },
+  "new_credential_reference": "/etc/aios-gitops/credentials/gitea-git-http",
+  "new_token_validation": {
+    "after_revoke_repository_http": 200,
+    "before_revoke_repository_http": 200,
+    "git_ls_remote_oid": "54093d15437ce0af31acf6feeeffacf6626a59cd",
+    "idempotent_branch_push": true
+  },
+  "old_token_validation": {
+    "after_revoke_repository_http": 401,
+    "before_revoke_repository_http": 200
+  },
+  "production_tag_operation": "NOT_EXECUTED",
+  "replacement_token_record_id": 50,
+  "scope": "write:repository",
+  "token_id": 33
+}

tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-"""End-to-end boundary tests for the V2R1 authenticated ingress runtime."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import sys
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
-
-from aios_v2r1.runtime import RuntimeWiring
-from aios_v2r1.message_ledger import MessageLedger
-from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import canonical_json
-
-
-class FixedClock:
-    def __init__(self) -> None:
-        self.now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-
-    def __call__(self) -> datetime:
-        return self.now
-
-
-class TestRuntimeIngressFlow:
-    """Use the public ingress boundary; do not reach into router internals."""
-
-    internal_key = b"runtime-integration-internal-key-32bytes"
-    ingress_key = b"runtime-integration-ingress-key-32bytes!"
-
-    def setup_method(self) -> None:
-        self.directory = TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.clock = FixedClock()
-        self.runtime = RuntimeWiring.create(
-            self.directory.name,
-            signing_key=self.internal_key,
-            ingress_hmac_key=self.ingress_key,
-            clock=self.clock,
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.register_tenant("tenant-a", "cell-a")
-        self.runtime.router.register_tenant("tenant-b", "cell-b")
-        self.runtime.router.bind_channel(
-            tenant_id="tenant-a", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-a"
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.bind_channel(
-            tenant_id="tenant-b", channel="weixin", channel_account_id="account-b"
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.bind_principal(
-            tenant_id="tenant-a",
-            channel="weixin",
-            channel_account_id="account-a",
-            principal_id="user-a",
-        )
-        self.runtime.router.bind_session(
-            tenant_id="tenant-a",
-            session_id="session-a",
-            cell_id="cell-a",
-            principal_id="user-a",
-            ttl_seconds=60,
-        )
-
-    def teardown_method(self) -> None:
-        self.directory.cleanup()
-
-    def _message(self, *, event_id: str = "event-a", message_id: str = "message-a",
-                 body: str = "hello", **changes: object) -> dict[str, object]:
-        values: dict[str, object] = {
-            "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "cell_id": "cell-a", "principal_id": "user-a",
-            "principal_type": "authenticated_user", "origin_type": "channel_user",
-            "channel": "weixin", "channel_account_id": "account-a", "peer_id": "peer-a",
-            "conversation_id": "conversation-a", "session_id": "session-a", "task_id": None,
-            "event_id": event_id, "message_id": message_id, "reply_to_message_id": None,
-            "direction": "inbound", "command_capable": True,
-            "occurred_at": "2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
-            "received_at": "2026-07-13T00:00:01+00:00",
-            "content": {"body": body, "quoted_body": None},
-            "adapter": {"name": "weixin", "version": "v2"},
-        }
-        values.update(changes)
-        return values
-
-    def _request(self, **changes: object) -> dict[str, object]:
-        values: dict[str, object] = {
-            "principal_id": "user-a", "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "cell_id": "cell-a",
-            "channel": "weixin", "channel_account_id": "account-a", "session_id": "session-a",
-            "message": self._message(),
-        }
-        values.update(changes)
-        values["signature"] = hmac.new(
-            self.ingress_key, canonical_json(values), hashlib.sha256
-        ).hexdigest()
-        return values
-
-    def test_authenticated_ingress_uses_direct_append_and_acquires_session(self) -> None:
-        # Observe the real MessageLedger object while preserving every method
-        # implementation.  This proves the public ingress path never calls
-        # the legacy compatibility entrypoint; it is not a mock or bypass.
-        remember_code = MessageLedger.remember.__code__
-        remember_calls = 0
-        previous_profile = sys.getprofile()
-
-        def observe(frame: object, event: str, arg: object) -> None:
-            nonlocal remember_calls
-            if event == "call" and getattr(frame, "f_code", None) is remember_code:
-                remember_calls += 1
-
-        sys.setprofile(observe)
-        try:
-            response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request())
-        finally:
-            sys.setprofile(previous_profile)
-
-        assert response.status == "ACCEPTED"
-        assert response.result is not None
-        assert response.result.record.message_id == "message-a"
-        assert response.result.session.session_id == "session-a"
-        assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 1
-        assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 1
-        assert remember_calls == 0
-
-    def test_forged_tenant_claim_is_rejected_before_ledger_or_session_mutation(self) -> None:
-        response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
-            tenant_id="tenant-b",
-            cell_id="cell-b",
-            message=self._message(tenant_id="tenant-b", cell_id="cell-b"),
-        ))
-
-        assert response.status == "AUTH_FAILED"
-        assert response.result is None
-        assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 0
-        assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 0
-
-    def test_conflicting_duplicate_message_is_mapped_at_the_ingress_boundary(self) -> None:
-        assert self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
-            message=self._message(body="first")
-        )).status == "ACCEPTED"
-
-        response = self.runtime.ingest(request=self._request(
-            message=self._message(event_id="event-b", body="second")
-        ))
-
-        assert response.status == "CONFLICT"
-        assert response.result is None
-        assert self.runtime.ledger.count() == 1
-        assert self.runtime.session_pool.active_count() == 1

tests/run_live_gitea_fixture.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+umask 077
+GITEA="${AIOS_GITEA_BINARY:-/data/aios-gitops/runtime/bin/gitea}"
+CONFIG="${AIOS_GITEA_CONFIG:-/data/aios-gitops/runtime/gitea-bin/custom/conf/app.ini}"
+WORKSPACE="${AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE:-$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)}"
+USER_NAME="tagatomicitytest$(date +%s)"
+TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/aios-gitea-live-test.XXXXXX)"
+
+cleanup() {
+  "$GITEA" --config "$CONFIG" admin user delete \
+    --username "$USER_NAME" --purge >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  rm -f "$TMP_DIR/token" "$TMP_DIR/create-output"
+  rmdir "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+"$GITEA" --config "$CONFIG" admin user create \
+  --username "$USER_NAME" \
+  --email "$USER_NAME@example.invalid" \
+  --random-password \
+  --must-change-password=false >"$TMP_DIR/create-output" 2>&1
+"$GITEA" --config "$CONFIG" admin user generate-access-token \
+  --username "$USER_NAME" \
+  --token-name live-temporary-repository-test \
+  --raw \
+  --scopes write:repository,write:user >"$TMP_DIR/token"
+chmod 600 "$TMP_DIR/token"
+
+cd "$WORKSPACE"
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TEST=1 \
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_OWNER="$USER_NAME" \
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE="$TMP_DIR/token" \
+AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE=1 \
+python3 -m pytest -q tests/test_gitea_tag_publication_live.py

tests/test_authoritative_git_context.py

@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import Mock, patch
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+import sys
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "runtime" / "agent-os"))
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"))
+from gitea_tag_publication import build_publisher
+import authoritative_git as authoritative_git_module
+from authoritative_git import (
+    AuthoritativeGitError,
+    AuthoritativeGitNotFound,
+    AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge,
+    authoritative_branches,
+    authoritative_diff,
+    authoritative_commit,
+    authoritative_head_oid,
+    authoritative_tags,
+    repository_snapshot,
+    run_authoritative_git,
+    validate_git_revision,
+    verify_repository,
+)
+
+API_SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+    "authoritative_test_api",
+    ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app" / "aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py",
+)
+assert API_SPEC and API_SPEC.loader
+api = importlib.util.module_from_spec(API_SPEC)
+API_SPEC.loader.exec_module(api)
+
+
+class AuthoritativeGitContextTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.root = Path(self.tmp.name)
+        self.bare = self.root / "repo.git"
+        self.seed = self.root / "seed"
+        self.runtime = self.root / "runtime"
+        subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", str(self.bare)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "main", str(self.seed)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        for key, value in (("user.name", "test"), ("user.email", "test@example.invalid")):
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "config", key, value], check=True)
+        (self.seed / "README").write_text("context\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "add", "README"], check=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "commit", "-m", "seed"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "remote", "add", "origin", str(self.bare)], check=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "push", "origin", "main"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare), "config", "remote.gitea.url", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git"], check=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "tag", "-a", "V1R1C0", "-m", "annotated"], check=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "tag", "V1R1C1"], check=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "checkout", "-b", "patch/context"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        (self.seed / "CHANGE").write_text("authoritative diff\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "add", "CHANGE"], check=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "commit", "-m", "change"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(self.seed), "push", "origin", "patch/context", "--tags"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+        (self.runtime / "versions").mkdir(parents=True)
+        (self.runtime / "patches").mkdir()
+        (self.runtime / "versions" / "V1R1C0.json").write_text(
+            json.dumps({"version": "V1R1C0"}), encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+        (self.runtime / "patches" / "context.json").write_text(
+            json.dumps({"branch": "patch/context"}), encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+        self.env = {
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR": str(self.bare),
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY": "aios/aios",
+        }
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_runtime_cwd_without_git_uses_authoritative_head(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False), patch("os.getcwd", return_value=str(self.runtime)):
+            self.assertFalse((self.runtime / ".git").exists())
+            self.assertEqual(len(authoritative_head_oid()), 40)
+
+    def test_annotated_and_lightweight_tags_include_type_and_peeled_target(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            tags = {item["name"]: item for item in authoritative_tags()}
+        self.assertEqual(tags["V1R1C0"]["object_type"], "tag")
+        self.assertEqual(tags["V1R1C0"]["peeled_target_oid"], tags["V1R1C1"]["peeled_target_oid"])
+        self.assertEqual(tags["V1R1C1"]["object_type"], "commit")
+
+    def test_authoritative_branches_include_exact_oids(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            branches = {item["name"]: item["oid"] for item in authoritative_branches()}
+        self.assertIn("main", branches)
+        self.assertIn("patch/context", branches)
+        self.assertEqual(len(branches["main"]), 40)
+
+    def test_runtime_cwd_changes_do_not_change_results(self):
+        old_cwd = os.getcwd()
+        try:
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+                first = authoritative_head_oid()
+                os.chdir(str(self.runtime))
+                second = authoritative_head_oid()
+            self.assertEqual(first, second)
+        finally:
+            os.chdir(old_cwd)
+
+    def test_missing_configuration_fails_closed(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True), self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitError):
+            verify_repository()
+
+    def test_missing_repository_fails_closed(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {**self.env, "AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR": str(self.root / "missing")}, clear=False):
+            with self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitError):
+                verify_repository()
+
+    def test_non_bare_repository_fails_closed(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False), self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitError):
+            verify_repository(self.seed)
+
+    def test_repository_identity_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {**self.env, "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY": "other/repo"}, clear=False):
+            with self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitError):
+                verify_repository()
+
+    def test_git_command_failure_is_not_an_empty_success(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            with self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitError) as ctx:
+                run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "refs/heads/no-such-branch"])
+        self.assertIn("GIT_REF_QUERY_FAILED", str(ctx.exception))
+        self.assertNotIn("tags=[]", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_commit_input_rejects_git_parameter_injection(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                authoritative_commit("1" * 39 + ";")
+
+    def test_repository_snapshot_exposes_authoritative_head(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            snapshot = repository_snapshot()
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot["repository_available"])
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot["repository_identity"], "aios/aios")
+        self.assertEqual(len(snapshot["authoritative_head_oid"]), 40)
+
+    def _get(self, path):
+        handler = object.__new__(api.H)
+        handler.path = path
+        handler.sendj = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, code=200: (data, code))
+        handler.sendt = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, ctype="text/plain; charset=utf-8", code=200: (data, code))
+        with (
+            patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False),
+            patch.object(api, "WS", self.runtime),
+            patch.object(api, "AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", self.bare),
+            patch.object(api, "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"),
+        ):
+            api.H.do_GET(handler)
+        args = handler.sendj.call_args.args
+        return args[0], args[1] if len(args) > 1 else 200
+
+    def test_api_list_versions_uses_authoritative_tags(self):
+        body, code = self._get("/api/ver")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(body["repository_available"])
+        self.assertTrue(body["local_authoritative_tags"])
+        self.assertEqual(body["head"], body["authoritative_head_oid"])
+        self.assertIn("V1R1C0", body["tags"])
+
+    def test_api_list_patches_uses_authoritative_branches(self):
+        body, code = self._get("/api/patch")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 200)
+        self.assertIn("patch/context", body["branches"])
+        self.assertTrue(body["authoritative_branches"])
+
+    def test_api_unavailable_does_not_return_empty_lists(self):
+        handler = object.__new__(api.H)
+        handler.path = "/api/ver"
+        handler.sendj = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, code=200: (data, code))
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True), patch.object(api, "WS", self.runtime), patch.object(api, "AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", None), patch.object(api, "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
+            api.H.do_GET(handler)
+        body, code = handler.sendj.call_args.args
+        self.assertEqual(code, 503)
+        self.assertFalse(body["repository_available"])
+        self.assertIn("query_error", body)
+
+    def test_api_runtime_status_contains_release_and_repository_fields(self):
+        handler = object.__new__(api.H)
+        handler.path = "/api/run"
+        handler.sendj = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, code=200: (data, code))
+        real_run = subprocess.run
+        def service_or_real(*args, **kwargs):
+            command = args[0] if args else kwargs.get("args", [])
+            if command and command[0] == "systemctl":
+                return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="active\n", stderr="")
+            return real_run(*args, **kwargs)
+        with (
+            patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False),
+            patch.object(api, "WS", self.runtime),
+            patch.object(api, "AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", self.bare),
+            patch.object(api, "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "aios/aios"),
+            patch.object(api.subprocess, "run", side_effect=service_or_real),
+        ):
+            api.H.do_GET(handler)
+        body, code = handler.sendj.call_args.args
+        self.assertEqual(code, 200)
+        self.assertIsNone(body["workspace_branch"])
+        self.assertTrue(body["authoritative_git_dir_configured"])
+        self.assertEqual(body["authoritative_head_oid"], body["authoritative_head_oid"])
+
+    def test_authoritative_head_is_independent_of_runtime_directory(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            old = os.getcwd()
+            try:
+                os.chdir(str(self.runtime))
+                self.assertEqual(authoritative_head_oid(), authoritative_head_oid())
+            finally:
+                os.chdir(old)
+
+    def test_authoritative_api_is_read_only(self):
+        before = subprocess.run(["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare), "show-ref"], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            authoritative_tags()
+            authoritative_branches()
+        after = subprocess.run(["git", "--git-dir", str(self.bare), "show-ref"], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
+        self.assertEqual(before, after)
+
+    def test_error_text_does_not_include_credential_values(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            with self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitError) as ctx:
+                run_authoritative_git(["rev-parse", "--verify", "https://user:password@example.invalid/x"])
+        self.assertNotIn("password", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+
+    def test_cli_publisher_requires_and_uses_authoritative_repository(self):
+        args = SimpleNamespace(
+            workspace=str(self.runtime),
+            remote="gitea",
+            gitea_api="http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1",
+            gitea_repo="aios/aios",
+            gitea_token_file="/dev/null",
+        )
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=False):
+            publisher = build_publisher(args)
+        self.assertEqual(publisher.git.authoritative_repo, self.bare)
+
+    def test_cli_publisher_fails_closed_without_authoritative_repository(self):
+        args = SimpleNamespace(
+            workspace=str(self.runtime),
+            remote="gitea",
+            gitea_api="http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1",
+            gitea_repo="aios/aios",
+            gitea_token_file="/dev/null",
+        )
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True), self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+            build_publisher(args)
+
+    def test_authoritative_diff_supports_branch_tag_and_exact_oid(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=True):
+            by_ref = authoritative_diff("V1R1C0", "patch/context")
+            main_oid = validate_git_revision("refs/heads/main", "from")
+            patch_oid = validate_git_revision("refs/heads/patch/context", "to")
+            by_oid = authoritative_diff(main_oid, patch_oid)
+        self.assertIn("CHANGE", by_ref["stdout"])
+        self.assertEqual(by_ref["stdout"], by_oid["stdout"])
+        self.assertEqual(by_ref["code"], 0)
+
+    def test_authoritative_diff_is_cwd_independent(self):
+        old = os.getcwd()
+        try:
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=True):
+                first = authoritative_diff("V1R1C0", "patch/context")["stdout"]
+                os.chdir(self.runtime)
+                second = authoritative_diff("V1R1C0", "patch/context")["stdout"]
+            self.assertEqual(first, second)
+        finally:
+            os.chdir(old)
+
+    def test_revision_injection_and_revision_expressions_are_rejected(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=True):
+            for value in ("--help", "--output=x", "HEAD~1", "main^{tree}", "@{1}", ":/secret", "", " main"):
+                with self.subTest(value=value), self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                    validate_git_revision(value, "from")
+
+    def test_valid_but_missing_revision_is_not_found(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=True), self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitNotFound):
+            validate_git_revision("missing-branch", "from")
+
+    def test_diff_output_limit_is_fail_closed(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=True), patch.object(authoritative_git_module, "_MAX_OUTPUT", 1):
+            with self.assertRaises(AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge):
+                authoritative_diff("V1R1C0", "patch/context")
+
+    def test_api_diff_uses_authoritative_repository(self):
+        body, code = self._get("/api/diff?from=V1R1C0&to=patch/context")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 200)
+        self.assertIn("CHANGE", body["diff"]["stdout"])
+        self.assertEqual(len(body["diff"]["from_oid"]), 40)
+
+    def test_api_diff_status_mapping(self):
+        _, code = self._get("/api/diff?from=--help&to=patch/context")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 400)
+        _, code = self._get("/api/diff?from=missing-branch&to=patch/context")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 404)
+        with patch.object(api, "authoritative_diff", side_effect=AuthoritativeGitOutputTooLarge("GIT_OUTPUT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")):
+            _, code = self._get("/api/diff?from=V1R1C0&to=patch/context")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 413)
+
+    def test_http_publisher_fails_closed_without_authoritative_repository(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True), patch.object(api, "AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", None), patch.object(api, "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", ""):
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+                api.publication_publisher()
+
+    def test_http_publisher_fails_closed_on_identity_mismatch(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self.env, clear=True), patch.object(api, "AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR", self.bare), patch.object(api, "REPOSITORY_IDENTITY", "other/repo"):
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+                api.publication_publisher()
+
+    def test_writer_guard_remains_false(self):
+        decision = api.evaluate_git_write(self.runtime, {"AIOS_GITOPS_WRITES_ENABLED": "false"})
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.status_code, 423)

tests/test_chatgpt_actions_tag.py

@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+import yaml
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import Mock, patch
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+os.environ.setdefault("AIOS_GITOPS_WORKSPACE", str(ROOT))
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "runtime" / "agent-os"))
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"))
+SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+    "aios_chatgpt_actions_api",
+    ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app" / "aios_chatgpt_actions_api.py",
+)
+assert SPEC and SPEC.loader
+api = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
+SPEC.loader.exec_module(api)
+
+TARGET = "1" * 40
+EVIDENCE = "2" * 40
+TAG_OID = "3" * 40
+MAIN = "4" * 40
+
+
+class TagActionTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def handler(self, role: str = "owner"):
+        handler = object.__new__(api.H)
+        handler.need = Mock(
+            return_value={"account": "owner", "role": role, "scopes": {"tag:create"}}
+        )
+        handler.sendj = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, code=200: (data, code))
+        return handler
+
+    def complete_request(self):
+        return {
+            "version": "V9R9C9",
+            "target_oid": TARGET,
+            "evidence_closure_oid": EVIDENCE,
+            "approval_plan_id": "owner-approved-test",
+            "execute": True,
+        }
+
+    def test_tag_publication_status_rejects_invalid_versions_without_reading(self):
+        invalid_queries = (
+            "../current",
+            "../../versions/V2R1C3",
+            "%2e%2e%2fcurrent",
+            "/etc/secret",
+            r"..\current",
+            "",
+        )
+        for value in invalid_queries:
+            with self.subTest(value=value):
+                handler = object.__new__(api.H)
+                handler.path = f"/api/tag-publication-status?version={value}"
+                handler.sendj = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, code=200: (data, code))
+                with patch.object(api, "publication_publisher") as publisher:
+                    handler.do_GET()
+                body = handler.sendj.call_args.args[0]
+                code = (
+                    handler.sendj.call_args.args[1]
+                    if len(handler.sendj.call_args.args) > 1
+                    else handler.sendj.call_args.kwargs.get("code", 200)
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(code, 400)
+                self.assertEqual(body, {"error": "invalid release version"})
+                if value:
+                    self.assertNotIn(value, str(body))
+                self.assertNotIn("/data/", str(body))
+                self.assertNotIn("BAIT-MUST-NOT-BE-READ", str(body))
+                publisher.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_tag_publication_status_accepts_canonical_versions(self):
+        for version in ("V2R1C3", "V2R1C3-rc.1_build"):
+            with self.subTest(version=version):
+                handler = object.__new__(api.H)
+                handler.path = f"/api/tag-publication-status?version={version}"
+                handler.sendj = Mock(side_effect=lambda data, code=200: (data, code))
+                publisher = Mock()
+                publisher.get_tag_publication_status.return_value = {
+                    "version": version,
+                    "state": "UNKNOWN",
+                }
+                with patch.object(api, "publication_publisher", return_value=publisher):
+                    handler.do_GET()
+                body = handler.sendj.call_args.args[0]
+                code = (
+                    handler.sendj.call_args.args[1]
+                    if len(handler.sendj.call_args.args) > 1
+                    else handler.sendj.call_args.kwargs.get("code", 200)
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(code, 200)
+                self.assertEqual(body["version"], version)
+                publisher.get_tag_publication_status.assert_called_once_with(version)
+
+    def test_resolve_commit_oid_requires_full_exact_commit(self):
+        with patch.object(api, "authoritative_commit", return_value=TARGET):
+            self.assertEqual(api.resolve_commit_oid(TARGET), TARGET)
+        for value in (None, "1234567", "z" * 40):
+            with self.subTest(value=value), self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                api.resolve_commit_oid(value)
+
+    def test_production_tag_requires_all_governance_fields(self):
+        handler = self.handler()
+        for missing in ("target_oid", "evidence_closure_oid", "approval_plan_id"):
+            payload = self.complete_request()
+            payload.pop(missing)
+            handler.tag(payload)
+            body, code = handler.sendj.call_args.args
+            self.assertEqual(code, 400)
+            self.assertIn("required", body)
+
+    def test_owner_execution_uses_atomic_publisher_and_never_changes_main(self):
+        handler = self.handler()
+        publication = {
+            "state": "BASELINE_UPDATED",
+            "tag_oid": TAG_OID,
+            "remote_tag_oid": TAG_OID,
+            "remote_peeled_target_oid": TARGET,
+            "gitea_listing_visible": True,
+        }
+
+        def fake_sh(args, check=False):
+            if args[:2] == ["merge-base", "--is-ancestor"]:
+                return {"code": 0, "stdout": "", "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+            if args == ["rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"]:
+                return {"code": 0, "stdout": MAIN, "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+            if args == ["rev-parse", "HEAD"]:
+                return {"code": 0, "stdout": EVIDENCE, "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+            return {"code": 0, "stdout": "", "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+
+        publisher = Mock()
+        publisher.publish.return_value = publication
+        with (
+            patch.object(api, "resolve_commit_oid", side_effect=[TARGET, EVIDENCE]),
+            patch.object(api, "sh", side_effect=fake_sh),
+            patch.object(api, "required_authoritative_git_dir", return_value=Path("/tmp/authoritative.git")),
+            patch.object(api, "GiteaTagClient"),
+            patch.object(api, "GitTagBackend"),
+            patch.object(api, "TagPublisher", return_value=publisher),
+            patch.object(api, "audit"),
+        ):
+            handler.tag(self.complete_request())
+        result = handler.sendj.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "BASELINE_UPDATED")
+        self.assertEqual(result["target_oid"], TARGET)
+        self.assertEqual(result["tag_oid"], TAG_OID)
+        self.assertFalse(result["main_changed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["force_push"])
+
+    def test_atomic_publisher_conflict_returns_reconciliation_required(self):
+        handler = self.handler()
+        publisher = Mock()
+        publisher.publish.side_effect = api.PublicationConflict("different remote OID")
+        with (
+            patch.object(api, "resolve_commit_oid", side_effect=[TARGET, EVIDENCE]),
+            patch.object(
+                api,
+                "sh",
+                side_effect=[
+                    {"code": 0, "stdout": "", "stderr": "", "cmd": []},
+                    {"code": 0, "stdout": MAIN, "stderr": "", "cmd": []},
+                ],
+            ),
+            patch.object(api, "required_authoritative_git_dir", return_value=Path("/tmp/authoritative.git")),
+            patch.object(api, "GiteaTagClient"),
+            patch.object(api, "GitTagBackend"),
+            patch.object(api, "TagPublisher", return_value=publisher),
+            patch.object(api, "audit"),
+        ):
+            handler.tag(self.complete_request())
+        body, code = handler.sendj.call_args.args
+        self.assertEqual(code, 409)
+        self.assertEqual(body["status"], "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+
+    def test_non_owner_request_persists_complete_target_binding(self):
+        handler = self.handler(role="chatgpt_bot")
+        with (
+            patch.object(api, "resolve_commit_oid", side_effect=[TARGET, EVIDENCE]),
+            patch.object(
+                api, "sh", return_value={"code": 0, "stdout": "", "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+            ),
+            patch.object(api, "checkout", return_value="request/tag-v9r9c9"),
+            patch.object(
+                api,
+                "write_json",
+                return_value="baseline/tag_requests/V9R9C9.json",
+            ) as write_json,
+            patch.object(api, "commit", return_value={"status": "committed"}),
+        ):
+            handler.tag(self.complete_request())
+        saved = write_json.call_args.args[1]
+        self.assertEqual(saved["target_oid"], TARGET)
+        self.assertEqual(saved["evidence_closure_oid"], EVIDENCE)
+        self.assertEqual(saved["approval_plan_id"], "owner-approved-test")
+
+    def test_linked_worktree_branch_sync_verifies_instead_of_self_fetch(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            bare = root / "repo.git"
+            seed = root / "seed"
+            worktree = root / "writer"
+            subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", str(bare)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "main", str(seed)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(seed), "config", "user.name", "test"], check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "-C", str(seed), "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"],
+                check=True,
+            )
+            (seed / "x").write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(seed), "add", "x"], check=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(seed), "commit", "-m", "seed"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(seed), "push", str(bare), "main"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(bare), "worktree", "add", "-b", "patch/test", str(worktree), "main"],
+                check=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+            )
+            old_ws, old_bare = api.WS, api.BARE_REPO
+            api.WS, api.BARE_REPO = worktree, bare
+            try:
+                result = api.sync_branch("patch/test")
+            finally:
+                api.WS, api.BARE_REPO = old_ws, old_bare
+            self.assertEqual(result["status"], "verified")
+            self.assertEqual(result["target"], "authoritative-bare")
+
+    def test_create_existing_branch_never_resets_it(self):
+        calls = []
+
+        def fake_sh(args, check=False):
+            calls.append(args)
+            if args[:2] == ["rev-parse", "--verify"]:
+                return {"code": 0, "stdout": MAIN, "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+            return {"code": 0, "stdout": "", "stderr": "", "cmd": []}
+
+        with patch.object(api, "ensure_git"), patch.object(api, "sh", side_effect=fake_sh):
+            self.assertEqual(api.checkout("patch/existing", "main", True), "patch/existing")
+        self.assertIn(["checkout", "patch/existing"], calls)
+        self.assertFalse(any(call[:2] == ["checkout", "-B"] for call in calls))
+        self.assertFalse(any(call[:2] == ["checkout", "-b"] for call in calls))
+
+    def test_release_script_has_no_ignored_push_or_direct_main_update(self):
+        script = (ROOT / "scripts" / "release_version.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertNotIn('git push origin "$VERSION" || true', script)
+        self.assertNotIn("git checkout main", script)
+        self.assertIn("approval_plan_id required", script)
+        self.assertIn("git push \"$BRANCH_REMOTE\"", script)
+        self.assertNotIn("RELEASE_DONE", script)
+        self.assertNotIn("merge-base --is-ancestor", script)
+        self.assertIn('"versions/$VERSION.json"', script)
+        self.assertNotIn('"baseline/tag_publications/$VERSION.json"', script)
+
+    def test_openapi_requires_complete_tag_governance_evidence(self):
+        schema = (
+            ROOT / "docs" / "gitops" / "openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn(
+            "required: [version, target_oid, evidence_closure_oid, approval_plan_id]",
+            schema,
+        )
+        self.assertIn("x-openai-isConsequential: true", schema)
+        self.assertIn("Remote push pending", schema)
+        self.assertIn("operationId: getReleaseConsistency", schema)
+        self.assertIn("operationId: getTagPublicationStatus", schema)
+        self.assertIn("operationId: runReleaseAcceptance", schema)
+        document = yaml.safe_load(schema)
+        self.assertIn("/api/release-consistency", document["paths"])
+        status_parameters = document["paths"]["/api/tag-publication-status"]["get"][
+            "parameters"
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            status_parameters[0]["schema"]["pattern"],
+            r"^V\d+R\d+C\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?$",
+        )
+        publication_states = document["components"]["schemas"]["PublicationState"][
+            "enum"
+        ]
+        self.assertIn("LOCAL_TAG_CREATED", publication_states)
+        self.assertIn("BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING", publication_states)
+        self.assertNotIn("TAG_CREATED_LOCAL", publication_states)
+
+    def test_documented_normal_state_sequence_matches_canonical_contract(self):
+        document = (
+            ROOT / "docs" / "gitops" / "gitea-tag-publication-atomicity.md"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        normal_section = document.split("## Legacy state migration", 1)[0]
+        self.assertIn("LOCAL_TAG_CREATED", normal_section)
+        self.assertIn("BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING", normal_section)
+        self.assertNotIn("TAG_CREATED_LOCAL", normal_section)
+
+    def test_delivery_manifest_is_derived_from_git_without_self_reference(self):
+        generator = ROOT / "scripts" / "generate_delivery_manifest.py"
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            repo = Path(td)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main"], cwd=repo, check=True
+            )
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"],
+                cwd=repo,
+                check=True,
+            )
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "config", "user.name", "test"], cwd=repo, check=True
+            )
+            (repo / "base.txt").write_text("base", encoding="utf-8")
+            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "base.txt"], cwd=repo, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "base"], cwd=repo, check=True
+            )
+            base_oid = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=repo, text=True
+            ).strip()
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "checkout", "-q", "-b", "patch/manifest-test"],
+                cwd=repo,
+                check=True,
+            )
+            (repo / "scripts").mkdir()
+            shutil.copy2(generator, repo / "scripts" / generator.name)
+            (repo / "source.txt").write_text(
+                "no credential content", encoding="utf-8"
+            )
+            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "."], cwd=repo, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "source one"], cwd=repo, check=True
+            )
+            (repo / "source.txt").write_text(
+                "no credential content\nsecond", encoding="utf-8"
+            )
+            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "source.txt"], cwd=repo, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "source two"], cwd=repo, check=True
+            )
+            source_commit = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=repo, text=True
+            ).strip()
+
+            subprocess.run(
+                [
+                    sys.executable,
+                    str(repo / "scripts" / generator.name),
+                    "--base",
+                    "main",
+                    "--output",
+                    "delivery.json",
+                ],
+                cwd=repo,
+                check=True,
+            )
+            manifest = json.loads((repo / "delivery.json").read_text())
+            expected_commits = (
+                subprocess.check_output(
+                    [
+                        "git",
+                        "log",
+                        "--reverse",
+                        "--format=%H",
+                        f"{base_oid}..{source_commit}",
+                    ],
+                    cwd=repo,
+                    text=True,
+                )
+                .strip()
+                .splitlines()
+            )
+
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["base"], "main")
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["base_oid"], base_oid)
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["source_branch"], "patch/manifest-test")
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["source_commit"], source_commit)
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["commits"], expected_commits)
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["commit_count"], len(expected_commits))
+            self.assertEqual(manifest["file_count"], len(manifest["files"]))
+            self.assertEqual(
+                manifest["manifest_path"],
+                "delivery.json",
+            )
+            self.assertNotIn(manifest["manifest_path"], manifest["files"])
+            self.assertEqual(
+                subprocess.check_output(
+                    ["git", "rev-parse", f"{manifest['source_commit']}^{{commit}}"],
+                    cwd=repo,
+                    text=True,
+                ).strip(),
+                source_commit,
+            )
+            self.assertNotIn("credential content", json.dumps(manifest))
+
+    def test_read_only_release_interfaces_are_allowlisted(self):
+        self.assertIn("/api/release-consistency", api.READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS)
+        self.assertIn("/api/tag-publication-status", api.READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS)
+        self.assertIn("/api/release-acceptance", api.READ_ONLY_GET_PATHS)
+
+    def test_release_consistency_query_requires_full_governance_fingerprint(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            api.publication_request_from_query({"version": ["V9R9C9"]})
+        parsed = api.publication_request_from_query(
+            {
+                "version": ["V9R9C9"],
+                "target_oid": [TARGET],
+                "evidence_closure_oid": [EVIDENCE],
+                "approval_plan_id": ["owner-approved-test"],
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(parsed.target_oid, TARGET)
+        self.assertEqual(parsed.approval_plan_id, "owner-approved-test")
+
+    def test_committed_security_incident_record_contains_no_secret(self):
+        record = (
+            ROOT
+            / "security"
+            / "incidents"
+            / "GITEA-TOKEN-33-EXPOSURE-20260723.redacted.json"
+        ).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertFalse(api.content_has_secret(record))
+        self.assertNotIn("token_plain", record)
+        self.assertNotIn("Authorization", record)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_gitea_tag_publication.py

@@ -0,0 +1,872 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import time
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"))
+
+import gitea_tag_publication as publication_module  # noqa: E402
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (  # noqa: E402
+    PublicationConflict,
+    PublicationPending,
+    PublicationReconciliationRequired,
+    PublicationRequest,
+    PublicationState,
+    PublicationStore,
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    TagPublisher,
+)
+
+
+TARGET = "1" * 40
+EVIDENCE = "2" * 40
+TAG_OID = "3" * 40
+WRONG = "4" * 40
+
+
+class FakeGit:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.local = None
+        self.remote = None
+        self.push_error = None
+        self.remote_error = None
+        self.lineage_error = None
+        self.pushes = 0
+        self.remote_checks = 0
+
+    def ensure_local_annotated_tag(self, request):
+        if self.local and self.local != (TAG_OID, request.target_oid):
+            raise PublicationConflict("local tag conflict")
+        self.local = (TAG_OID, request.target_oid)
+        return self.local
+
+    def remote_tag(self, remote, version):
+        self.remote_checks += 1
+        if self.remote_error:
+            raise self.remote_error
+        return self.remote
+
+    def push_tag(self, remote, version):
+        self.pushes += 1
+        if self.push_error:
+            raise self.push_error
+        self.remote = self.local
+
+    def validate_evidence_lineage(self, request):
+        if self.lineage_error:
+            raise self.lineage_error
+        return None
+
+    def repository_identity(self, remote, expected_repository):
+        return expected_repository
+
+
+class FakeGitea:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.repository = "aios/aios"
+        self.lookup = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+        self.visible = True
+        self.error = None
+        self.lookup_checks = 0
+        self.listing_checks = 0
+
+    def lookup_tag(self, version):
+        self.lookup_checks += 1
+        if self.error:
+            raise self.error
+        return self.lookup
+
+    def tag_visible_in_listing(self, version, expected_target_oid):
+        self.listing_checks += 1
+        if self.error:
+            raise self.error
+        return self.visible
+
+    def repository_identity(self):
+        return self.repository
+
+
+def request():
+    return PublicationRequest(
+        version="V9R9C9",
+        target_oid=TARGET,
+        evidence_closure_oid=EVIDENCE,
+        approval_plan_id="owner-approved-test",
+    )
+
+
+class TagPublicationTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def publisher(self, root: Path, git=None, gitea=None):
+        baseline = root / "baseline" / "current.json"
+        baseline.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+        baseline.write_text(
+            json.dumps({"current_baseline": "V9R9C8", "status": "PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED"}),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        return TagPublisher(
+            workspace=root,
+            git=git or FakeGit(),
+            gitea=gitea or FakeGitea(),
+            remote="gitea",
+        )
+
+    def test_publication_store_rejects_path_traversal_without_reading(self):
+        invalid_versions = (
+            "../current",
+            "../../versions/V2R1C3",
+            "%2e%2e%2fcurrent",
+            "/etc/secret",
+            r"..\current",
+            "V2R1C3-..",
+            "",
+        )
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td) / "saga"
+            root.mkdir()
+            bait = root.parent / "current.json"
+            bait.write_text('{"secret":"BAIT-MUST-NOT-BE-READ"}', encoding="utf-8")
+            store = PublicationStore(Path(td), state_root=root)
+            for version in invalid_versions:
+                with self.subTest(version=version):
+                    with patch.object(
+                        Path,
+                        "read_text",
+                        side_effect=AssertionError("state file read attempted"),
+                    ):
+                        with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+                            ValueError, "^invalid release version$"
+                        ):
+                            store.load(version)
+                    with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+                        ValueError, "^invalid release version$"
+                    ):
+                        store.path(version)
+                    with self.assertRaisesRegex(
+                        ValueError, "^invalid release version$"
+                    ):
+                        with store.lock(version):
+                            self.fail("invalid version acquired a publication lock")
+            self.assertEqual(
+                bait.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+                '{"secret":"BAIT-MUST-NOT-BE-READ"}',
+            )
+
+    def test_publication_store_accepts_canonical_release_versions(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td) / "saga"
+            store = PublicationStore(Path(td), state_root=root)
+            for version in ("V2R1C3", "V2R1C3-rc.1_build"):
+                with self.subTest(version=version):
+                    self.assertEqual(store.path(version).parent, root.resolve())
+                    self.assertEqual(store.path(version).name, f"{version}.json")
+
+    def test_new_publication_uses_canonical_local_and_pending_states(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            gitea = FakeGitea()
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git, gitea=gitea)
+            transitions = []
+            record = publisher.store.record
+
+            def observe(publication_request, state, **evidence):
+                transitions.append(state.value)
+                return record(publication_request, state, **evidence)
+
+            with patch.object(publisher.store, "record", side_effect=observe):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+
+            self.assertIn(PublicationState.LOCAL_TAG_CREATED.value, transitions)
+            self.assertNotIn("TAG_CREATED_LOCAL", transitions)
+            self.assertLess(
+                transitions.index(PublicationState.GITEA_API_CONFIRMED.value),
+                transitions.index(PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING.value),
+            )
+            self.assertLess(
+                transitions.index(PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING.value),
+                transitions.index(PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value),
+            )
+
+    def test_legacy_local_tag_state_is_normalized_on_read_and_next_write(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root)
+            path = publisher.store.path(request().version)
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            path.write_text(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        **request().__dict__,
+                        "state": "TAG_CREATED_LOCAL",
+                        "tag_oid": TAG_OID,
+                    }
+                ),
+                encoding="utf-8",
+            )
+
+            loaded = publisher.get_tag_publication_status(request().version)
+            self.assertEqual(loaded["state"], "LOCAL_TAG_CREATED")
+            self.assertEqual(
+                json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))["state"],
+                "TAG_CREATED_LOCAL",
+            )
+
+            publisher.store.record(request(), PublicationState.LOCAL_TAG_CREATED)
+            persisted = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            self.assertEqual(persisted["state"], "LOCAL_TAG_CREATED")
+            self.assertNotIn("TAG_CREATED_LOCAL", json.dumps(persisted))
+
+    def test_unknown_persisted_state_fails_closed_without_mutation(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            path = publisher.store.path(request().version)
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            original = {
+                **request().__dict__,
+                "state": "UNRECOGNIZED_LEGACY_STATE",
+                "tag_oid": TAG_OID,
+            }
+            path.write_text(json.dumps(original), encoding="utf-8")
+
+            status = publisher.get_tag_publication_status(request().version)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                status["state"], PublicationState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED.value
+            )
+            self.assertTrue(status["fail_closed"])
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            self.assertEqual(json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")), original)
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_evidence_lineage_conflict_requires_manual_owner_review(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.lineage_error = PublicationConflict("evidence lineage mismatch")
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationConflict):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED.value,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_push_failure_does_not_update_baseline(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.push_error = RuntimeError("push rejected")
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationPending):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            baseline = json.loads((root / "baseline/current.json").read_text())
+            state = publisher.store.load("V9R9C9")
+            self.assertEqual(baseline["current_baseline"], "V9R9C8")
+            self.assertEqual(state["state"], PublicationState.REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING.value)
+
+    def test_deployed_record_with_missing_remote_tag_fails_closed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            publisher.store.record(
+                request(),
+                PublicationState.PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED,
+                tag_oid=TAG_OID,
+                deployment_evidence="sha256:" + ("a" * 64),
+            )
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load("V9R9C9")["state"],
+                "MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED",
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_gitea_api_failure_does_not_deploy_or_update_baseline(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            gitea = FakeGitea()
+            gitea.error = RuntimeError("gitea unavailable")
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git, gitea=gitea)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            baseline = json.loads((root / "baseline/current.json").read_text())
+            state = publisher.store.load("V9R9C9")
+            self.assertEqual(baseline["current_baseline"], "V9R9C8")
+            self.assertNotEqual(state["state"], PublicationState.PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED.value)
+            self.assertEqual(state["state"], PublicationState.RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED.value)
+
+    def test_remote_unreachable_recovers_idempotently(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote_error = RuntimeError("network down")
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationPending):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            git.remote_error = None
+            result = publisher.reconcile(request())
+            self.assertEqual(result["state"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 1)
+
+    def test_same_name_different_remote_oid_is_rejected(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (WRONG, TARGET)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationConflict):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load("V9R9C9")["state"],
+                PublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED.value,
+            )
+
+    def test_annotated_tag_requires_exact_object_and_peeled_target(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, WRONG)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationConflict):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_local_bare_success_but_gitea_failure_is_fail_closed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            gitea = FakeGitea()
+            gitea.visible = False
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git, gitea=gitea)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            self.assertEqual(
+                json.loads((root / "baseline/current.json").read_text())["current_baseline"],
+                "V9R9C8",
+            )
+
+    def test_restart_recovery_uses_persisted_state(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.push_error = RuntimeError("temporary")
+            first = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationPending):
+                first.publish(request())
+            git.push_error = None
+            second = TagPublisher(root, git, FakeGitea(), "gitea")
+            result = second.reconcile(request())
+            self.assertEqual(result["state"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+
+    def test_baseline_write_failure_preserves_update_pending(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            atomic_write = publication_module.atomic_json_write
+
+            def fail_baseline(path, payload):
+                if path == publisher.baseline_path:
+                    raise OSError("baseline write failed")
+                return atomic_write(path, payload)
+
+            with (
+                patch.object(
+                    publication_module, "atomic_json_write", side_effect=fail_baseline
+                ),
+                self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired),
+            ):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING.value,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(
+                json.loads(publisher.baseline_path.read_text())["current_baseline"],
+                "V9R9C8",
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(
+                (root / "versions" / f"{request().version}.json").exists()
+            )
+
+    def test_registry_write_failure_recovers_after_restart_without_tag_push(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            registry_path = root / "versions" / f"{request().version}.json"
+            atomic_write = publication_module.atomic_json_write
+
+            def fail_registry(path, payload):
+                if path == registry_path:
+                    raise OSError("registry write failed")
+                return atomic_write(path, payload)
+
+            with (
+                patch.object(
+                    publication_module, "atomic_json_write", side_effect=fail_registry
+                ),
+                self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired),
+            ):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING.value,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(
+                json.loads(publisher.baseline_path.read_text())["current_baseline"],
+                request().version,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(registry_path.exists())
+
+            recovered = TagPublisher(root, git, FakeGitea(), "gitea")
+            result = recovered.reconcile(request())
+            self.assertEqual(result["state"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+            self.assertTrue(registry_path.exists())
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_pending_recovery_fills_missing_baseline_from_matching_registry(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            gitea = FakeGitea()
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git, gitea=gitea)
+            publisher.store.record(
+                request(),
+                PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING,
+                tag_oid=TAG_OID,
+            )
+            registry_path = root / "versions" / f"{request().version}.json"
+            registry_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            registry_path.write_text(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        **request().__dict__,
+                        "tag_oid": TAG_OID,
+                        "tag_object": TAG_OID,
+                        "registered": True,
+                        "enabled": True,
+                    }
+                ),
+                encoding="utf-8",
+            )
+
+            result = publisher.reconcile(request())
+
+            self.assertEqual(result["state"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                json.loads(publisher.baseline_path.read_text())["current_baseline"],
+                request().version,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+            self.assertGreater(git.remote_checks, 0)
+            self.assertGreater(gitea.lookup_checks, 0)
+            self.assertGreater(gitea.listing_checks, 0)
+
+    def test_pending_recovery_revalidates_remote_and_conflict_requires_owner(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (WRONG, TARGET)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            publisher.store.record(
+                request(),
+                PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATE_PENDING,
+                tag_oid=TAG_OID,
+            )
+
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationConflict):
+                publisher.reconcile(request())
+
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED.value,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_reconciliation_is_idempotent_and_never_marks_deployed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            first = publisher.publish(request())
+            second = publisher.reconcile(request())
+            self.assertEqual(first["state"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+            self.assertEqual(second["state"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+            baseline = json.loads((root / "baseline/current.json").read_text())
+            self.assertEqual(baseline["status"], PublicationState.BASELINE_UPDATED.value)
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_mark_deployed_requires_baseline_updated_and_evidence(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root)
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.mark_production_deployed(request(), "")
+            publisher.publish(request())
+            result = publisher.mark_production_deployed(
+                request(), "sha256:" + ("a" * 64)
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(result["state"], PublicationState.PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED.value)
+
+    def test_deployed_fingerprint_change_requires_manual_owner_review(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git)
+            publisher.store.record(
+                request(),
+                PublicationState.PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED,
+                tag_oid=TAG_OID,
+                deployment_evidence="sha256:" + ("a" * 64),
+            )
+            changed = PublicationRequest(
+                request().version,
+                WRONG,
+                request().evidence_closure_oid,
+                request().approval_plan_id,
+            )
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.publish(changed)
+            state = publisher.store.load(request().version)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                state["state"], PublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED.value
+            )
+            self.assertIn("target_oid", state["conflict_fields"])
+            self.assertEqual(git.pushes, 0)
+
+    def test_deployed_gitea_tag_object_change_requires_manual_review(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            gitea = FakeGitea()
+            gitea.lookup = (WRONG, TARGET)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git, gitea=gitea)
+            publisher.store.record(
+                request(),
+                PublicationState.PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED,
+                tag_oid=TAG_OID,
+                deployment_evidence="sha256:" + ("a" * 64),
+            )
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.publish(request())
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED.value,
+            )
+
+    def test_mark_deployed_rejects_different_approval_plan_id(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root)
+            publisher.publish(request())
+            changed = PublicationRequest(
+                request().version,
+                request().target_oid,
+                request().evidence_closure_oid,
+                "different-owner-plan",
+            )
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.mark_production_deployed(
+                    changed, "sha256:" + ("a" * 64)
+                )
+            self.assertEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.MANUAL_OWNER_REVIEW_REQUIRED.value,
+            )
+
+    def test_state_survives_writer_worktree_deletion(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            base = Path(td)
+            first_workspace = base / "writer-a"
+            first_workspace.mkdir()
+            state_root = base / "durable-state"
+            publisher = TagPublisher(
+                first_workspace,
+                FakeGit(),
+                FakeGitea(),
+                "gitea",
+                state_root=state_root,
+            )
+            publisher.store.record(request(), PublicationState.REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING)
+            shutil.rmtree(first_workspace)
+            second_workspace = base / "writer-b"
+            second_workspace.mkdir()
+            recovered = TagPublisher(
+                second_workspace,
+                FakeGit(),
+                FakeGitea(),
+                "gitea",
+                state_root=state_root,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(
+                recovered.get_tag_publication_status(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING.value,
+            )
+
+    def test_duplicate_publication_lock_serializes_writers(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            state_root = root / "durable-state"
+            first = TagPublisher(
+                root, FakeGit(), FakeGitea(), "gitea", state_root=state_root
+            )
+            second = TagPublisher(
+                root, FakeGit(), FakeGitea(), "gitea", state_root=state_root
+            )
+            entered = threading.Event()
+
+            def wait_for_lock():
+                with second.store.lock(request().version):
+                    entered.set()
+
+            with first.store.lock(request().version):
+                worker = threading.Thread(target=wait_for_lock)
+                worker.start()
+                time.sleep(0.05)
+                self.assertFalse(entered.is_set())
+            worker.join(timeout=2)
+            self.assertTrue(entered.is_set())
+
+    def test_registry_baseline_mismatch_blocks_deployment(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root)
+            publisher.publish(request())
+            registry_path = root / "versions" / f"{request().version}.json"
+            registry = json.loads(registry_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            registry["target_oid"] = WRONG
+            registry_path.write_text(json.dumps(registry), encoding="utf-8")
+            with self.assertRaises(PublicationReconciliationRequired):
+                publisher.mark_production_deployed(
+                    request(), "sha256:" + ("a" * 64)
+                )
+            self.assertNotEqual(
+                publisher.store.load(request().version)["state"],
+                PublicationState.PRODUCTION_DEPLOYED.value,
+            )
+
+    def test_release_consistency_is_unknown_and_fail_closed_on_api_failure(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            git = FakeGit()
+            git.remote = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+            gitea = FakeGitea()
+            publisher = self.publisher(root, git=git, gitea=gitea)
+            publisher.publish(request())
+            gitea.error = RuntimeError("Authorization: token super-secret")
+            result = publisher.run_release_acceptance(request())
+            self.assertEqual(result["status"], "UNKNOWN")
+            self.assertFalse(result["accepted"])
+            self.assertTrue(result["fail_closed"])
+            self.assertNotIn("super-secret", result["error"])
+
+    def test_release_consistency_fingerprint_failure_is_read_only(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            publisher = self.publisher(root)
+            publisher.publish(request())
+            before = publisher.store.load(request().version)
+            changed = PublicationRequest(
+                request().version,
+                WRONG,
+                request().evidence_closure_oid,
+                request().approval_plan_id,
+            )
+            result = publisher.get_release_consistency(changed)
+            after = publisher.store.load(request().version)
+            self.assertEqual(result["status"], "FAIL")
+            self.assertTrue(result["fail_closed"])
+            self.assertEqual(after, before)
+
+    def test_cli_evidence_lineage_mismatch_is_fail_closed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            root = Path(td)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "patch/test"], cwd=root, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"],
+                cwd=root,
+                check=True,
+            )
+            subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "test"], cwd=root, check=True)
+            (root / "a").write_text("a", encoding="utf-8")
+            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "a"], cwd=root, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "a"], cwd=root, check=True)
+            target = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=root, text=True
+            ).strip()
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "checkout", "-q", "--orphan", "unrelated"], cwd=root, check=True
+            )
+            subprocess.run(["git", "rm", "-q", "-rf", "."], cwd=root, check=True)
+            (root / "b").write_text("b", encoding="utf-8")
+            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "b"], cwd=root, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "b"], cwd=root, check=True)
+            evidence = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=root, text=True
+            ).strip()
+            authoritative = root / "authoritative.git"
+            subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "--bare", str(authoritative)], check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "--git-dir", str(authoritative), "config", "remote.gitea.url", "https://g.cnnetmkt.top/git/aios/aios.git"],
+                check=True,
+            )
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), "remote", "add", "authority", str(authoritative)], check=True)
+            subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), "push", "-q", "authority", "--all"], check=True)
+            module = ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app" / "gitea_tag_publication.py"
+            cli_env = {
+                **os.environ,
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_DIR": str(authoritative),
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_REPOSITORY_IDENTITY": "aios/aios",
+            }
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                [
+                    sys.executable,
+                    str(module),
+                    "publish",
+                    "--workspace",
+                    str(root),
+                    "--version",
+                    "V9R9C9",
+                    "--target-oid",
+                    target,
+                    "--evidence-closure-oid",
+                    evidence,
+                    "--approval-plan-id",
+                    "owner-plan",
+                    "--gitea-api",
+                    "http://127.0.0.1:1/api/v1",
+                    "--gitea-repo",
+                    "aios/aios",
+                    "--gitea-token-file",
+                    str(root / "missing-token"),
+                ],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                env=cli_env,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 2)
+            self.assertIn("evidence lineage mismatch", result.stdout)
+
+    def test_release_script_uses_shared_lineage_validation(self):
+        script = (ROOT / "scripts" / "release_version.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn("gitea_tag_publication.py\" publish", script)
+        self.assertNotIn("merge-base --is-ancestor", script)
+
+    def test_error_redaction_hides_authorization_and_token_values(self):
+        from gitea_tag_publication import redact
+
+        message = redact(
+            "Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnop token=super-secret "
+            "https://user:password@example.invalid/repo.git"
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnop", message)
+        self.assertNotIn("super-secret", message)
+        self.assertNotIn("password", message)
+
+    def test_remote_parser_requires_annotated_tag_object_and_peeled_target(self):
+        backend = GitTagBackend(Path("."))
+        with (
+            patch.object(backend, "_network_remote_url", return_value="ssh://gitea/repo"),
+            patch.object(
+                backend,
+                "run",
+                return_value=(
+                    f"{TAG_OID}\trefs/tags/V9R9C9\n"
+                    f"{TARGET}\trefs/tags/V9R9C9^{{}}"
+                ),
+            ),
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(backend.remote_tag("gitea", "V9R9C9"), (TAG_OID, TARGET))
+        with (
+            patch.object(backend, "_network_remote_url", return_value="ssh://gitea/repo"),
+            patch.object(
+                backend,
+                "run",
+                return_value=f"{TARGET}\trefs/tags/V9R9C9",
+            ),
+            self.assertRaises(PublicationConflict),
+        ):
+            backend.remote_tag("gitea", "V9R9C9")
+
+    def test_local_path_remote_cannot_count_as_gitea(self):
+        backend = GitTagBackend(Path("."))
+        with (
+            patch.object(backend, "run", return_value="/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"),
+            self.assertRaises(PublicationConflict),
+        ):
+            backend._network_remote_url("origin")
+
+    def test_process_config_remote_url_is_resolved_for_subprocesses(self):
+        backend = GitTagBackend(Path("."))
+        with (
+            patch.object(backend, "run", side_effect=RuntimeError("no such remote")),
+            patch.dict(
+                os.environ,
+                {
+                    "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "1",
+                    "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "remote.gitea-local.url",
+                    "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": "http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git",
+                },
+                clear=False,
+            ),
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(
+                backend._network_remote_url("gitea-local"),
+                "http://127.0.0.1:3000/aios/aios.git",
+            )
+
+    def test_gitea_lookup_and_listing_use_authenticated_api(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            token = Path(td) / "token"
+            token.write_text("test-token", encoding="utf-8")
+            client = GiteaTagClient("https://gitea.invalid/api/v1", "aios/aios", token)
+            paths = []
+
+            def fake_get(path):
+                paths.append(path)
+                if "/git/refs/tags/" in path:
+                    return {"object": {"type": "tag", "sha": TAG_OID}}
+                if "/git/tags/" in path:
+                    return {"object": {"type": "commit", "sha": TARGET}}
+                return [{"name": "V9R9C9", "commit": {"sha": TARGET}}]
+
+            with patch.object(client, "_get", side_effect=fake_get):
+                self.assertEqual(client.lookup_tag("V9R9C9"), (TAG_OID, TARGET))
+                self.assertTrue(client.tag_visible_in_listing("V9R9C9", TARGET))
+            self.assertTrue(any("/git/refs/tags/" in path for path in paths))
+            self.assertTrue(any("/tags?limit=" in path for path in paths))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_gitea_tag_publication_live.py

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+import urllib.request
+import uuid
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"))
+
+from gitea_tag_publication import (  # noqa: E402
+    GiteaTagClient,
+    GitTagBackend,
+    PublicationRequest,
+)
+
+
+@unittest.skipUnless(
+    os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TEST") == "1",
+    "set AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TEST=1 on the isolated writer host",
+)
+class LiveTemporaryGiteaIntegrationTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_authenticated_ref_api_and_listing_against_temporary_repository(self):
+        api_url = os.getenv(
+            "AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1"
+        ).rstrip("/")
+        credential = Path(
+            os.getenv(
+                "AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE",
+                os.getenv(
+                    "AIOS_GITOPS_GITEA_TOKEN_FILE",
+                "/etc/aios-gitops/credentials/gitea-git-http",
+                ),
+            )
+        )
+        token_line = int(os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_TOKEN_LINE", "1"))
+        token = credential.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()[token_line - 1].strip()
+        name = "tag-atomicity-integration-" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]
+        owner = os.getenv("AIOS_GITOPS_LIVE_GITEA_OWNER", "gitops-bot")
+
+        def api_request(method: str, path: str, payload=None):
+            body = (
+                json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") if payload is not None else None
+            )
+            request = urllib.request.Request(
+                api_url + path,
+                data=body,
+                method=method,
+                headers={
+                    "Accept": "application/json",
+                    "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                    "Authorization": f"token {token}",
+                },
+            )
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                raw = response.read()
+                return json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8")) if raw else None
+
+        created = False
+        try:
+            repository = api_request(
+                "POST",
+                "/user/repos",
+                {"name": name, "private": True, "auto_init": False},
+            )
+            created = True
+            self.assertEqual(repository["full_name"], f"{owner}/{name}")
+            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+                work = Path(td)
+                subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "patch/live"], cwd=work, check=True)
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "config", "user.email", "gitops-test@example.invalid"],
+                    cwd=work,
+                    check=True,
+                )
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "config", "user.name", "gitops-integration"],
+                    cwd=work,
+                    check=True,
+                )
+                (work / "release").write_text("target\n", encoding="utf-8")
+                subprocess.run(["git", "add", "release"], cwd=work, check=True)
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "target"], cwd=work, check=True
+                )
+                target = subprocess.check_output(
+                    ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=work, text=True
+                ).strip()
+                (work / "evidence").write_text("closure\n", encoding="utf-8")
+                subprocess.run(["git", "add", "evidence"], cwd=work, check=True)
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "evidence"], cwd=work, check=True
+                )
+                evidence = subprocess.check_output(
+                    ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=work, text=True
+                ).strip()
+                remote_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:3000/{owner}/{name}.git"
+                subprocess.run(["git", "remote", "add", "gitea", remote_url], cwd=work, check=True)
+                username_file = work / ".fixture-user"
+                username_file.write_text(owner + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+                askpass = work / ".fixture-askpass"
+                askpass.write_text(
+                    "#!/bin/sh\n"
+                    'case \"$1\" in\n'
+                    f'  *Username*) sed -n 1p "{username_file}" ;;\n'
+                    f'  *) sed -n {token_line}p "{credential}" ;;\n'
+                    "esac\n",
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                askpass.chmod(0o700)
+                git_env = {
+                    **os.environ,
+                    "GIT_ASKPASS": str(askpass),
+                    "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0",
+                }
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["git", "push", "gitea", "HEAD:refs/heads/patch/live"],
+                    cwd=work,
+                    check=True,
+                    capture_output=True,
+                    text=True,
+                    env=git_env,
+                )
+                version = "V0R0C1-LIVE-" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
+                release = PublicationRequest(version, target, evidence, "live-integration")
+                backend = GitTagBackend(work)
+                os.environ["GIT_ASKPASS"] = str(askpass)
+                os.environ["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "0"
+                backend.validate_evidence_lineage(release)
+                tag_oid, peeled = backend.ensure_local_annotated_tag(release)
+                backend.push_tag("gitea", version)
+                self.assertEqual(backend.remote_tag("gitea", version), (tag_oid, peeled))
+                client = GiteaTagClient(
+                    api_url,
+                    f"{owner}/{name}",
+                    credential,
+                    token_line=token_line,
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(client.repository_identity(), f"{owner}/{name}")
+                self.assertEqual(client.lookup_tag(version), (tag_oid, target))
+                self.assertTrue(client.tag_visible_in_listing(version, target))
+        finally:
+            if created:
+                api_request("DELETE", f"/repos/{owner}/{name}")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_silent_release_controller.py

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from dataclasses import replace
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "active-runtime" / "app"))
+
+from silent_release_controller import (  # noqa: E402
+    AcceptanceEvidence,
+    ApprovalEnvelope,
+    ApprovalError,
+    ApprovalLedger,
+    DeploymentController,
+    DuplicateTagConflict,
+    ReleaseAcceptanceEngine,
+    ReleaseCandidate,
+    ReleaseCandidateStore,
+    ReleaseState,
+    SilentReleaseController,
+    SilentReleasePolicy,
+    TagApprovalEnvelope,
+    TagController,
+    redact,
+)
+
+
+COMMIT = "1" * 40
+TREE = "2" * 40
+ARTIFACT = "3" * 64
+MANIFEST = "4" * 64
+TAG_OID = "5" * 40
+TARGET = "6" * 40
+
+
+def candidate() -> ReleaseCandidate:
+    return ReleaseCandidate(
+        candidate_id="rc-20260723-001",
+        source_commit=COMMIT,
+        tree_oid=TREE,
+        artifact_sha256=ARTIFACT,
+        manifest_sha256=MANIFEST,
+    )
+
+
+def passing_evidence() -> AcceptanceEvidence:
+    return AcceptanceEvidence(
+        local_main_oid=COMMIT,
+        bare_main_oid=COMMIT,
+        gitea_main_oid=COMMIT,
+        repository_identity="aios/aios",
+        artifact_sha256=ARTIFACT,
+        manifest_sha256=MANIFEST,
+        manifest_source_commit=COMMIT,
+        manifest_tree_oid=TREE,
+        tests={"passed": True, "summary": "81 passed"},
+        canary={
+            "passed": True,
+            "runtime_without_git": True,
+            "writes_enabled": False,
+        },
+        rollback_ready=True,
+        authoritative_git_dir="/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+        authoritative_git_readable=True,
+    )
+
+
+class FakeProbe:
+    def __init__(self, evidence=None, error=None):
+        self.evidence = evidence or passing_evidence()
+        self.error = error
+        self.calls = 0
+
+    def collect(self, release_candidate):
+        self.calls += 1
+        if self.error:
+            raise self.error
+        return self.evidence
+
+
+class FakeBuilder:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls = 0
+
+    def build(self, source_commit):
+        self.calls += 1
+        self.source_commit = source_commit
+        return candidate()
+
+
+class FakeDeployment:
+    def __init__(self, health=True, restart_error=None):
+        self.health = health
+        self.restart_error = restart_error
+        self.switched = 0
+        self.restarted = 0
+        self.rolled_back = 0
+
+    def atomic_switch(self, release_candidate):
+        self.switched += 1
+        return {"previous_target": "old", "new_target": release_candidate.candidate_id}
+
+    def restart(self):
+        self.restarted += 1
+        if self.restart_error:
+            raise self.restart_error
+
+    def health_check(self, release_candidate):
+        return {
+            "passed": self.health,
+            "runtime_commit": release_candidate.source_commit,
+            "writes_enabled": False,
+            "authoritative_head_oid": release_candidate.source_commit,
+            "repository_identity": "aios/aios",
+        }
+
+    def rollback(self, switch_evidence):
+        self.rolled_back += 1
+        return {"passed": True, "writes_enabled": False}
+
+
+class FakeTagAdapter:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.current = None
+        self.creates = 0
+
+    def lookup(self, version):
+        return self.current
+
+    def create(self, version, tag_oid, target_oid):
+        self.creates += 1
+        self.current = (tag_oid, target_oid)
+
+    def verify(self, version):
+        return self.current
+
+
+class SilentReleaseControllerTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_top_level_controller_automates_prepare_then_waits_for_owner(self):
+        builder = FakeBuilder()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            store = ReleaseCandidateStore(Path(td) / "candidates")
+            controller = SilentReleaseController(
+                builder=builder,
+                acceptance=ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+                    FakeProbe(), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+                ),
+                deployment=DeploymentController(
+                    FakeDeployment(),
+                    ApprovalLedger(Path(td) / "approvals"),
+                    SilentReleasePolicy.default(),
+                    store,
+                    allow_legacy_unsigned_approval=True,
+                ),
+                store=store,
+                policy=SilentReleasePolicy.default(),
+            )
+            prepared = controller.prepare(COMMIT)
+            self.assertEqual(builder.calls, 1)
+            self.assertEqual(prepared.state, ReleaseState.READY_FOR_APPROVAL)
+            self.assertEqual(prepared.approval_state, "PENDING")
+            self.assertEqual(
+                store.load(prepared.candidate_id).state,
+                ReleaseState.READY_FOR_APPROVAL,
+            )
+
+    def test_candidate_model_round_trips_and_enforces_state_machine(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.BUILDING)
+        value.transition(ReleaseState.VERIFYING)
+        restored = ReleaseCandidate.from_dict(value.to_dict())
+        self.assertEqual(restored.state, ReleaseState.VERIFYING)
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "invalid release transition"):
+            restored.transition(ReleaseState.VERIFIED)
+
+    def test_acceptance_engine_moves_verified_candidate_to_ready(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        result = ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        self.assertTrue(result.ready)
+        self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.READY_FOR_APPROVAL)
+        self.assertTrue(value.rollback_ready)
+        self.assertTrue(value.tests["passed"])
+        self.assertTrue(value.canary["runtime_without_git"])
+        self.assertEqual(value.git_consistency["bare_main_oid"], COMMIT)
+        self.assertEqual(value.gitea_consistency["main_oid"], COMMIT)
+
+    def test_artifact_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
+        evidence = replace(passing_evidence(), artifact_sha256="9" * 64)
+        value = candidate()
+        result = ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(evidence), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        self.assertFalse(result.ready)
+        self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.FAILED)
+        self.assertIn("artifact_sha256", result.failed_checks)
+
+    def test_gitea_unavailable_fails_closed(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        result = ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(error=RuntimeError("GITEA_UNAVAILABLE")),
+            expected_repository="aios/aios",
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        self.assertFalse(result.ready)
+        self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.FAILED)
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_UNAVAILABLE", value.failure_reason)
+
+    def test_git_unavailable_fails_closed(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        result = ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(error=RuntimeError("AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_UNAVAILABLE")),
+            expected_repository="aios/aios",
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        self.assertFalse(result.ready)
+        self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.FAILED)
+        self.assertIn("AUTHORITATIVE_GIT_UNAVAILABLE", value.failure_reason)
+
+    def test_runtime_with_git_metadata_is_rejected(self):
+        evidence = replace(
+            passing_evidence(),
+            canary={"passed": True, "runtime_without_git": False},
+        )
+        value = candidate()
+        result = ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(evidence), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        self.assertFalse(result.ready)
+        self.assertIn("runtime_without_git", result.failed_checks)
+
+    def test_runtime_switch_requires_one_bound_owner_approval(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        envelope = ApprovalEnvelope.for_candidate(
+            value,
+            approval_id="approval-001",
+            owner_id="owner",
+            expires_at="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        )
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            deployment = FakeDeployment()
+            controller = DeploymentController(
+                deployment,
+                ApprovalLedger(Path(td) / "approvals"),
+                SilentReleasePolicy.default(),
+                allow_legacy_unsigned_approval=True,
+            )
+            result = controller.deploy(value, envelope)
+            self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.VERIFIED)
+            self.assertTrue(result["verified"])
+            self.assertEqual(deployment.switched, 1)
+            self.assertEqual(deployment.restarted, 1)
+            self.assertEqual(deployment.rolled_back, 0)
+
+    def test_failed_health_check_rolls_back(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        envelope = ApprovalEnvelope.for_candidate(
+            value,
+            approval_id="approval-rollback",
+            owner_id="owner",
+            expires_at="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        )
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            deployment = FakeDeployment(health=False)
+            result = DeploymentController(
+                deployment,
+                ApprovalLedger(Path(td) / "approvals"),
+                SilentReleasePolicy.default(),
+                allow_legacy_unsigned_approval=True,
+            ).deploy(value, envelope)
+            self.assertFalse(result["verified"])
+            self.assertEqual(value.state, ReleaseState.ROLLED_BACK)
+            self.assertEqual(deployment.rolled_back, 1)
+
+    def test_approval_replay_is_rejected(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+            FakeProbe(), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+        ).evaluate(value)
+        envelope = ApprovalEnvelope.for_candidate(
+            value,
+            approval_id="approval-replay",
+            owner_id="owner",
+            expires_at="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        )
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            ledger = ApprovalLedger(Path(td) / "approvals")
+            controller = DeploymentController(
+                FakeDeployment(),
+                ledger,
+                SilentReleasePolicy.default(),
+                allow_legacy_unsigned_approval=True,
+            )
+            controller.deploy(value, envelope)
+            second = candidate()
+            ReleaseAcceptanceEngine(
+                FakeProbe(), expected_repository="aios/aios"
+            ).evaluate(second)
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(ApprovalError, "already consumed"):
+                controller.deploy(second, envelope)
+
+    def test_tag_controller_is_separate_and_rejects_duplicate_conflict(self):
+        adapter = FakeTagAdapter()
+        adapter.current = (TAG_OID, TARGET)
+        controller = TagController(
+            adapter,
+            SilentReleasePolicy.default(),
+            ledger=None,
+            allow_legacy_unsigned_approval=True,
+        )
+        envelope = TagApprovalEnvelope(
+            approval_id="tag-approval-001",
+            owner_id="owner",
+            version="V9R9C9",
+            tag_oid="7" * 40,
+            target_oid=TARGET,
+            action="production_tag",
+            expires_at="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+        )
+        approved = controller.approve(envelope)
+        with self.assertRaises(DuplicateTagConflict):
+            controller.execute(approved)
+        self.assertEqual(adapter.creates, 0)
+
+    def test_policy_separates_automatic_owner_and_forbidden_actions(self):
+        policy = SilentReleasePolicy.default()
+        self.assertTrue(policy.is_automatic("canary"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.requires_owner("production_runtime_switch"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.requires_owner("production_tag"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.is_forbidden("force_push"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.is_forbidden("tag_rewrite"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.is_forbidden("direct_main_push"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.is_forbidden("baseline_mutation"))
+        self.assertTrue(policy.is_forbidden("registry_mutation"))
+
+    def test_redaction_removes_credentials_from_errors(self):
+        message = (
+            "Authorization: Bearer super-secret-token "
+            "https://bot:password@example.invalid/repo.git token=another-secret"
+        )
+        safe = redact(message)
+        self.assertNotIn("super-secret-token", safe)
+        self.assertNotIn("password", safe)
+        self.assertNotIn("another-secret", safe)
+        self.assertIn("REDACTED", safe)
+
+    def test_candidate_store_persists_without_secret_fields(self):
+        value = candidate()
+        value.tests = {"passed": True, "Authorization": "Bearer hidden"}
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            store = ReleaseCandidateStore(Path(td))
+            store.save(value)
+            raw = store.path(value.candidate_id).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            self.assertNotIn("Bearer hidden", raw)
+            loaded = store.load(value.candidate_id)
+            self.assertEqual(loaded.candidate_id, value.candidate_id)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_weixin_bigint_parser.py

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py'
+
+
+def load_patcher():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint', PATCHER_PATH)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_api_patch_is_idempotent_and_scoped() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher()
+    ts = '\n'.join([
+        'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
+        'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
+        'const resp: GetUpdatesResp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
+    ])
+    js = '\n'.join([
+        'import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";',
+        'import { redactBody, redactUrl } from "../util/redact.js";',
+        'const resp = JSON.parse(rawText);',
+    ])
+    types = 'export interface WeixinMessage {\n  message_id?: number;\n}\n'
+
+    ts_once = patcher.patch_api_ts(ts)
+    js_once = patcher.patch_api_js(js)
+    types_once = patcher.patch_types_ts(types)
+
+    assert patcher.patch_api_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
+    assert patcher.patch_api_js(js_once) == js_once
+    assert patcher.patch_types_ts(types_once) == types_once
+    assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in ts_once
+    assert 'parseWeixinGetUpdatesJson(rawText)' in js_once
+    assert 'message_id?: string | number;' in types_once
+
+
+def test_node_reviver_preserves_only_weixin_exact_ids() -> None:
+    script = '''
+const ids = new Set(["message_id", "msg_id", "root_id", "parent_id", "server_msg_id", "new_msg_id"]);
+const parsed = JSON.parse('{"ret":0,"seq":42,"msgs":[{"message_id":7482038281766381234,"create_time_ms":1783856936191,"item_list":[{"msg_id":"3123141975110186863"}]}]}', (key, value, context) => {
+  if (!ids.has(key) || value == null || typeof value === "string") return value;
+  if (typeof value !== "number" || !context?.source || !/^(?:0|[1-9]\\d*)$/.test(context.source)) throw new Error("unsafe id");
+  return context.source;
+});
+console.log(JSON.stringify({ messageId: parsed.msgs[0].message_id, msgId: parsed.msgs[0].item_list[0].msg_id, seqType: typeof parsed.seq, timestampType: typeof parsed.msgs[0].create_time_ms }));
+'''
+    completed = subprocess.run(['node', '-e', script], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    result = json.loads(completed.stdout)
+    assert result == {
+        'messageId': '7482038281766381234',
+        'msgId': '3123141975110186863',
+        'seqType': 'number',
+        'timestampType': 'number',
+    }

tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py

@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+def load_js_process_helpers() -> str:
+    patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
+    assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
+
+
+
+def load_patcher_module() -> object:
+    patcher_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py'
+    assert patcher_path.exists(), f'missing patcher: {patcher_path}'
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes', patcher_path)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+
+def run_js_process_helpers(tmp_path: Path, body: str) -> dict:
+    js_process_helpers = load_js_process_helpers()
+    node_prelude = '\n'.join(
+        [
+            'const hermesTestFs = require("node:fs");',
+            'globalThis.existsSync = hermesTestFs.existsSync;',
+            'globalThis.readFileSync = hermesTestFs.readFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.writeFileSync = hermesTestFs.writeFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.mkdirSync = hermesTestFs.mkdirSync;',
+            'globalThis.appendFileSync = hermesTestFs.appendFileSync;',
+            'globalThis.path = require("node:path");',
+            'globalThis.logger = { info() {}, warn() {}, error() {} };',
+        ]
+    )
+    node_script = tmp_path / 'hermes_image_followup_check.js'
+    node_script.write_text(node_prelude + '\n\n' + js_process_helpers + '\n\n' + body, encoding='utf-8')
+    completed = subprocess.run(['node', str(node_script)], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    return json.loads(completed.stdout.strip())
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('is_ts', [True, False], ids=['ts', 'js'])
+def test_replace_or_insert_process_helpers_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    marker = 'export async function processOneMessage'
+    source = marker + '(message) {\n  return message;\n}\n'
+
+    once = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(source, is_ts=is_ts)
+    twice = patcher.replace_or_insert_process_helpers(once, is_ts=is_ts)
+    helpers = patcher.TS_PROCESS_HELPERS if is_ts else patcher.JS_PROCESS_HELPERS
+
+    assert helpers + '\n\n' + marker in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('is_ts', 'hook_name'),
+    [(True, 'TS_PROCESS_HOOK'), (False, 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK')],
+    ids=['ts', 'js'],
+)
+def test_remove_and_reinsert_process_hook_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, hook_name: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
+    indent = '  ' if is_ts else '    '
+    needle = indent + 'ctx.CommandAuthorized = commandAuthorized;\n'
+    next_nonblank = indent + 'continueProcessing();\n'
+
+    def cycle(text: str) -> str:
+        without_hook = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
+        return without_hook.replace(needle, needle + hook + '\n', 1)
+
+    once = cycle(needle + next_nonblank)
+    twice = cycle(once)
+
+    assert hook + '\n' + next_nonblank in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+
+def test_looks_like_hermes_image_followup_distinguishes_diagnostics_from_real_image_questions(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cases = {
+        'diag_cache_expired': ('\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
+        'diag_cache_error_en': ('image cache error', False),
+        'diag_cache_expired_en': ('the image cache expired, please resend', False),
+        'diag_copying_text_shows_cache_error': ('\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u6211\u590d\u5236\u53d1\u7ed9\u4f60\u7684\u6587\u5b57\uff0c\u4f60\u90fd\u663e\u793a\u56fe\u7247\u7f13\u5b58\u5df2\u5931\u6548\uff0c\u8bf7\u91cd\u65b0\u53d1\u9001\u56fe\u7247\u3002', False),
+        'diag_not_image': ('\u8fd9\u4e0d\u662f\u56fe\u7247\uff0c\u662f\u6587\u5b57\u6d88\u606f', False),
+        'diag_text_not_image_en': ('this is a text message, not an image', False),
+        'diag_no_image_sent': ('\u6211\u6ca1\u6709\u53d1\u56fe\u7247', False),
+        'diag_system_logs': ('\u8bf7\u68c0\u67e5\u7cfb\u7edf\u65e5\u5fd7\uff0c\u4ece\u673a\u5236\u4e0a\u4fee\u590d\u9519\u8bef', False),
+        'image_cn_1': ('\u8bf7\u770b\u4e00\u4e0b\u8fd9\u5f20\u56fe\u7247', True),
+        'image_cn_2': ('\u8fd9\u56fe\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48', True),
+        'image_cn_3': ('\u8bc6\u522b\u56fe\u7247\u5185\u5bb9', True),
+        'image_en': ('look at this image', True),
+    }
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        'const cases = '
+        + json.dumps({key: text for key, (text, _) in cases.items()}, ensure_ascii=False)
+        + ';\nconst results = {};\n'
+        + 'for (const [key, text] of Object.entries(cases)) {\n'
+        + '  results[key] = looksLikeHermesImageFollowup(text);\n'
+        + '}\n'
+        + 'console.log(JSON.stringify(results));\n',
+    )
+    for key, (_, expected) in cases.items():
+        assert results[key] is expected, f'{key}: expected {expected}, got {results[key]!r}'
+
+
+
+def test_resolve_hermes_referenced_image_followup_requires_exact_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const fs = require("fs");',
+                f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const exactQuotedId = "quoted-123";',
+                'const cache = {};',
+                'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: "latest-999",',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'cache[hermesExactImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId, exactQuotedId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: exactQuotedId,',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
+                'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
+                'const generic = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", "quoted-999");',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId);',
+                'const forced = resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, "plain quoted text", exactQuotedId, false, true);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ generic, exact, forced }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['generic']['imageIntent'] is False
+    assert results['generic']['matched'] is False
+    assert results['generic']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
+    assert results['exact']['imageIntent'] is True
+    assert results['exact']['matched'] is True
+    assert results['exact']['reason'] == 'cached_image_matched'
+    assert results['forced']['imageIntent'] is True
+    assert results['forced']['matched'] is True
+
+
+
+def test_referenced_text_without_media_evidence_stays_out_of_image_cache(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-last-image-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const fs = require("fs");',
+                f'const cachePath = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const cache = {};',
+                'cache[hermesLastImageCacheKey(accountId, senderId)] = {',
+                '  mediaUrl: "",',
+                '  timestampMs: Date.now(),',
+                '  messageId: "latest-999",',
+                '  mediaType: "image/png",',
+                '};',
+                'fs.writeFileSync(cachePath, JSON.stringify(cache, null, 2), "utf-8");',
+                'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_LAST_IMAGE_CACHE = cachePath;',
+                'const full = { item_list: [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, id: "quoted-999" } } }] };',
+                'const hermesContent = "\u8fd9\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48";',
+                'const hermesReferenceContextPresent = hasHermesReferenceContext(full.item_list);',
+                'const hermesQuotedMessageId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(full.item_list);',
+                'const refMediaItem = undefined;',
+                'const hermesReferencedMediaIsImage = Boolean(refMediaItem && hermesCurrentMessageIsImage({}, refMediaItem));',
+                'const hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent = hermesReferenceContextPresent && !refMediaItem;',
+                'const hermesCurrentImage = false;',
+                'const hermesFollowup = hermesCurrentImage',
+                '  ? { imageIntent: false, matched: false, reason: "current_image_message", cacheStrategy: "current", quotedMessageId: hermesQuotedMessageId }',
+                '  : (hermesReferencedMediaIsImage',
+                '      ? resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId, false, true)',
+                '      : (hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent',
+                '          ? resolveHermesReferencedImageFollowup(accountId, senderId, hermesContent, hermesQuotedMessageId)',
+                '          : resolveHermesFollowupImageContext(accountId, senderId, hermesContent)));',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ hermesReferenceContextPresent, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesReferencedMediaIsImage, hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent, hermesFollowup }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['hermesReferenceContextPresent'] is True
+    assert results['hermesQuotedMessageId'] == 'quoted-999'
+    assert results['hermesReferencedMediaIsImage'] is False
+    assert results['hermesReferencedImageFollowupIntent'] is True
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['imageIntent'] is False
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['matched'] is False
+    assert results['hermesFollowup']['reason'] == 'referenced_image_not_confirmed'
+
+
+def test_explicit_quoted_text_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 1, text_item: { text: "被引用的正文" } } } }];',
+                'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？") : null;',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['available'] is True
+    assert results['result'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n被引用的正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+
+
+def test_visible_ref_title_builds_grounded_plain_text_context(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { title: "客户端可见的引用正文", message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-123" } } }];',
+                'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端可见的引用正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+
+
+def test_nested_generic_title_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, title: "非协议引用摘要" } } }];',
+                'const result = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(result));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': True,
+        'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
+    }
+
+
+def test_exact_message_id_cache_resolves_server_reference_without_guessing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const original = { item_list: [{ type: 1, msg_id: "7481729105240418312", text_item: { text: "客户端已经显示的原始正文" } }] };',
+                'rememberHermesTextMessage(accountId, senderId, original, "客户端已经显示的原始正文");',
+                'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } }, text_item: { text: "这是什么意思？" } }];',
+                'const quotedId = findHermesReferencedMessageId(quotedItems);',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, quotedId);',
+                'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "7481729105240418313");',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "这是什么意思？", exact);',
+                'const mode = (hermesTestFs.statSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE).mode & 0o777).toString(8);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ quotedId, exact, wrong, resolved, mode }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['quotedId'] == '7481729105240418312'
+    assert results['exact'] == '客户端已经显示的原始正文'
+    assert results['wrong'] == ''
+    assert results['resolved'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': False,
+        'prompt': '[被引用文字]\n客户端已经显示的原始正文\n[/被引用文字]\n\n[当前问题]\n这是什么意思？\n[/当前问题]',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_resolved',
+    }
+    assert results['mode'] == '600'
+
+
+def test_expired_message_id_cache_entry_is_not_resolved(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const key = hermesTextMessageCacheKey("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
+                'hermesTestFs.writeFileSync(process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE, JSON.stringify({ [key]: { text: "过期正文", timestampMs: Date.now() - (8 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) } }), { encoding: "utf-8", mode: 0o600 });',
+                'const result = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", "quoted-old");',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ result }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['result'] == ''
+
+
+def test_unsafe_numeric_message_id_is_rejected_before_cache_keying(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const exactString = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: "7482038281766381234" });',
+                'const unsafeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 7482038281766381234 });',
+                'const safeNumber = extractHermesMessageId({ message_id: 12345 });',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ exactString, unsafeNumber: unsafeNumber ?? null, safeNumber }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results == {
+        'exactString': '7482038281766381234',
+        'unsafeNumber': None,
+        'safeNumber': '12345',
+    }
+
+
+def test_exact_outbound_create_time_resolves_quoted_bot_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const accountId = "account-a";',
+                'const senderId = "sender-b";',
+                'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage(accountId, senderId, "机器人出站正文", createTimeMs);',
+                'const quotedItems = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "server-quoted", create_time_ms: createTimeMs } }, text_item: { text: "进展汇报" } }];',
+                'const referencedTime = findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(quotedItems);',
+                'const exact = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", referencedTime);',
+                'const wrong = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(accountId, senderId, "server-quoted", createTimeMs + 1);',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(quotedItems, "进展汇报", exact);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ referencedTime, exact, wrong, resolved }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['referencedTime'] == '1783857900123'
+    assert results['exact'] == '机器人出站正文'
+    assert results['wrong'] == ''
+    assert results['resolved']['reason'] == 'quoted_text_resolved'
+    assert '机器人出站正文' in results['resolved']['prompt']
+
+
+def test_outbound_create_time_collision_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    cache_path = tmp_path / 'hermes-message-text-cache.json'
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                f'process.env.AIOS_HERMES_WEIXIN_TEXT_MESSAGE_CACHE = {json.dumps(str(cache_path))};',
+                'const createTimeMs = 1783857900123;',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第一条", createTimeMs);',
+                'rememberHermesOutboundTextMessage("account-a", "sender-b", "第二条", createTimeMs);',
+                'const resolved = resolveHermesCachedQuotedText("account-a", "sender-b", undefined, createTimeMs);',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ resolved }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['resolved'] == ''
+
+
+def test_missing_quoted_text_fails_closed_without_model_prompt(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    results = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const available = typeof resolveHermesQuotedTextContext === "function";',
+                'const items = [{ type: 1, ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "7481729105240418312" } } }];',
+                'const result = available ? resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？") : null;',
+                'let modelCalls = 0;',
+                'if (result && !result.handled) modelCalls += 1;',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify({ available, result, modelCalls }));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert results['available'] is True
+    assert results['result'] == {
+        'referenced': True,
+        'handled': True,
+        'replyText': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。',
+        'reason': 'quoted_text_unavailable',
+    }
+    assert results['modelCalls'] == 0
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('hook_name', ['TS_PROCESS_HOOK', 'JS_PROCESS_HOOK'])
+def test_process_hook_stops_unavailable_quote_before_model_dispatch(hook_name: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    hook = getattr(patcher, hook_name)
+    guard_name = 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD' if hook_name.startswith('TS_') else 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD'
+    guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
+
+    assert 'rememberHermesTextMessage(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, full, textBody)' in hook
+    assert 'findHermesReferencedCreateTimeMs(full.item_list)' in hook
+    assert 'resolveHermesCachedQuotedText(deps.accountId, hermesSenderId, hermesQuotedMessageId, hermesQuotedCreateTimeMs)' in hook
+    assert 'resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(full.item_list, hermesContent, hermesCachedQuotedText)' in hook
+    assert '!hermesQuotedTextContext.referenced && !textBody.startsWith("/")' in hook
+    assert 'ctx.Body = hermesQuotedTextContext.prompt' in hook
+    assert 'await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(hermesQuotedTextContext, dispatcher)' in guard
+    assert 'markDispatchIdle();' in guard
+
+
+def test_dispatch_quoted_text_fail_closed_uses_dispatcher_without_model(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    result = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                '(async () => {',
+                '  const calls = [];',
+                '  const dispatcher = {',
+                '    sendFinalReply(payload) { calls.push(["final", payload]); },',
+                '    markComplete() { calls.push(["complete"]); },',
+                '    async waitForIdle() { calls.push(["idle"]); },',
+                '  };',
+                '  const context = resolveHermesQuotedTextContext([{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1" } } }], "这是什么意思？");',
+                '  let modelCalls = 0;',
+                '  const handled = await dispatchHermesQuotedTextFailClosed(context, dispatcher);',
+                '  if (!handled) modelCalls += 1;',
+                '  console.log(JSON.stringify({ handled, modelCalls, calls }));',
+                '})();',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert result['handled'] is True
+    assert result['modelCalls'] == 0
+    assert result['calls'] == [
+        ['final', {'text': '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。'}],
+        ['complete'],
+        ['idle'],
+    ]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('is_ts', 'guard_name', 'needle'),
+    [
+        (True, 'TS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', '  logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
+        (False, 'JS_QUOTED_TEXT_DISPATCH_GUARD', '    logger.debug(`dispatchReplyFromConfig: starting agentId=${route.agentId ?? "(none)"}`);\n'),
+    ],
+    ids=['ts', 'js'],
+)
+def test_dispatch_guard_remove_and_reinsert_is_byte_idempotent(is_ts: bool, guard_name: str, needle: str) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    guard = getattr(patcher, guard_name)
+
+    def cycle(text: str) -> str:
+        without = patcher.remove_existing_process_hermes_hook(text)
+        return without.replace(needle, guard + '\n' + needle, 1)
+
+    once = cycle(needle)
+    twice = cycle(once)
+
+    assert guard + '\n' + needle in once
+    assert twice == once
+
+
+def test_reference_metadata_content_is_not_treated_as_quoted_text(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    result = run_js_process_helpers(
+        tmp_path,
+        '\n'.join(
+            [
+                'const items = [{ ref_msg: { message_item: { type: 0, msg_id: "quoted-1", content: "metadata only" } } }];',
+                'console.log(JSON.stringify(resolveHermesQuotedTextContext(items, "这是什么意思？")));',
+            ]
+        ),
+    )
+
+    assert result['handled'] is True
+    assert result['reason'] == 'quoted_text_unavailable'
+    assert result['replyText'] == '无法读取被引用文字，请复制原文后再提问。'
+
+
+def test_patch_plugin_process_only_skips_slash_and_channel(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+    calls: list[tuple[str, Path]] = []
+
+    def record(name: str, result):
+        def _inner(root: Path):
+            calls.append((name, root))
+            return result
+
+        return _inner
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_ts', record('patch_ts', False))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_js', record('patch_js', False))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_process_messages', record('patch_process_messages', {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'patch_channel_files', record('patch_channel_files', {'src/channel.ts': False, 'dist/src/channel.js': False}))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(patcher, 'verify_plugin_hook', record('verify_plugin_hook', {
+        'hook_status': {},
+        'hook_installed': False,
+        'process_status': {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': True},
+        'process_hook_installed': True,
+        'channel_status': {},
+        'channel_hook_installed': False,
+        'dispatch_reference_found': False,
+        'dispatch_reference_files': [],
+    }))
+
+    result = patcher.patch_plugin(tmp_path, process_only=True)
+
+    assert calls == [
+        ('patch_process_messages', tmp_path),
+        ('verify_plugin_hook', tmp_path),
+    ]
+    assert result['mode'] == 'process-only'
+    assert result['plugin_root'] == str(tmp_path)
+    assert result['slash_changes'] == {}
+    assert result['channel_changes'] == {}
+    assert result['process_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
+    assert result['behavior_changes'] == {'src/messaging/process-message.ts': True, 'dist/src/messaging/process-message.js': False}
+    assert result['verification']['process_hook_installed'] is True
+
+
+
+def test_parse_args_supports_default_root_and_process_only_flag() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher_module()
+
+    defaults = patcher.parse_args([])
+    assert defaults.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
+    assert defaults.process_only is False
+
+    process_only = patcher.parse_args(['--process-only'])
+    assert process_only.plugin_root == patcher.DEFAULT_PLUGIN_ROOT
+    assert process_only.process_only is True
+
+    custom_root = Path('/tmp/custom-plugin-root')
+    custom = patcher.parse_args([str(custom_root), '--process-only'])
+    assert custom.plugin_root == custom_root
+    assert custom.process_only is True

tests/test_weixin_outbound_quote_timestamp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+PATCHER_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'fixes' / 'patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes.py'
+
+
+def load_patcher():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes', PATCHER_PATH)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def test_send_patch_adds_exact_create_time_and_is_idempotent() -> None:
+    patcher = load_patcher()
+    ts = '''function buildTextMessageReq(params: {
+  to: string;
+  text: string;
+  contextToken?: string;
+  runId?: string;
+  clientId: string;
+}): SendMessageReq {
+  const { to, text, contextToken, runId, clientId } = params;
+  return { msg: { client_id: clientId, message_type: MessageType.BOT } };
+}
+export async function sendMessageWeixin(params: {}): Promise<{ messageId: string }> {
+  const { to, text, opts } = params;
+  const clientId = generateClientId();
+  const req = buildSendMessageReq({
+    payload: {},
+    clientId,
+  });
+  try {
+    await sendMessageApi({ body: req });
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw err;
+  }
+  return { messageId: clientId };
+}
+
+/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */'''
+    js = '''function buildTextMessageReq(params) {
+    const { to, text, contextToken, runId, clientId } = params;
+    return { msg: { client_id: clientId, message_type: MessageType.BOT } };
+}
+export async function sendMessageWeixin(params) {
+    const clientId = generateClientId();
+    const req = buildSendMessageReq({
+        payload: {},
+        clientId,
+    });
+    try {
+        await sendMessageApi({ body: req });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        throw err;
+    }
+    return { messageId: clientId };
+}
+/** Send a single structured MessageItem downstream. */'''
+
+    ts_once = patcher.patch_send_ts(ts)
+    js_once = patcher.patch_send_js(js)
+    assert patcher.patch_send_ts(ts_once) == ts_once
+    assert patcher.patch_send_js(js_once) == js_once
+    for result in (ts_once, js_once):
+        assert 'const createTimeMs = Date.now();' in result
+        assert 'text item missing' in result
+        assert 'req.msg.item_list[0].create_time_ms = createTimeMs' in result
+        assert 'req.msg.create_time_ms = createTimeMs' not in result
+        assert 'return { messageId: clientId, createTimeMs }' in result

tests/v2r1/test_acceptance_manifest.md

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# AIOS V2R1C0 RC1 Acceptance
-
-## Tenant Isolation
-
-- cross tenant memory access: DENY
-- cross cell context: DENY
-- cross tenant secret scope: DENY
-- cross tenant queue claim: DENY
-
-## Message Safety
-
-- unsafe numeric message id: DENY
-- exact reply resolution only: PASS
-- quote text separate from command body: PASS
-- heartbeat side effects: DENY
-- cron side effects: DENY
-- assistant output execution: DENY
-
-## Hermes
-
-- profile HOME isolation: PASS
-- workspace escape: DENY
-- tenant queue partition: PASS
-
-## OpenClaw
-
-- plugin manifest validation: PASS
-- runtime hook registration: REQUIRED
-- side effect approval: REQUIRED
-
-## Release Gate
-
-No production deployment until executable tests and runtime evidence pass.

tests/v2r1/test_hermes_contract.md

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# Hermes Fabric Contract Tests
-
-Required executable assertions:
-
-1. Duplicate event_id must raise ConflictError, never raw sqlite3.IntegrityError.
-2. Same tenant/cell/profile worker can claim its own queue.
-3. Cross tenant queue claim must return no task or be denied.
-4. Non-command messages cannot enqueue execution jobs.
-5. Unknown provenance cannot create execution jobs.
-
-Evidence required:
-
-- command
-- exit code
-- pass count
-- commit

tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-"""Gate 1 contract tests for the Hermes shared agent fabric."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import sqlite3
-from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
-import unittest
-
-from aios_v2r1.hermes_fabric import HermesFabric
-from aios_v2r1.tenant_context import CanonicalMessage, ConflictError, ScopeError
-
-
-def authenticated_command(
-    event_id: str,
-    *,
-    command_capable: bool = True,
-    origin_type: str = "channel_user",
-) -> CanonicalMessage:
-    return CanonicalMessage(
-        tenant_id="tenant-a",
-        cell_id="cell-a",
-        principal_id="user-a",
-        principal_type="authenticated_user",
-        origin_type=origin_type,
-        channel="weixin",
-        channel_account_id="account-a",
-        peer_id="peer-a",
-        conversation_id="conversation-a",
-        session_id="session-a",
-        task_id=None,
-        event_id=event_id,
-        message_id="1234567890123456789",
-        reply_to_message_id=None,
-        direction="inbound",
-        command_capable=command_capable,
-        occurred_at="2026-07-13T00:00:00+00:00",
-        received_at="2026-07-13T00:00:01+00:00",
-        body="/run",
-        quoted_body=None,
-        adapter_name="weixin",
-        adapter_version="v2",
-    )
-
-
-class HermesFabricContractTests(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_duplicate_event_returns_sanitized_conflict(self) -> None:
-        with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            fabric = HermesFabric(f"{directory}/fabric.sqlite3")
-            message = authenticated_command("event-a")
-
-            first = fabric.enqueue(message=message, profile_id="profile-a")
-            self.assertEqual(first.event_id, "event-a")
-
-            with self.assertRaises(ConflictError) as raised:
-                fabric.enqueue(message=message, profile_id="profile-a")
-
-        error = raised.exception
-        self.assertNotIsInstance(error, sqlite3.IntegrityError)
-        self.assertNotIn("sqlite", str(error).lower())
-        self.assertIsNone(error.__cause__)
-        self.assertIsNone(error.__context__)
-
-    def test_non_command_event_cannot_enqueue(self) -> None:
-        with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            fabric = HermesFabric(f"{directory}/fabric.sqlite3")
-
-            with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
-                fabric.enqueue(
-                    message=authenticated_command(
-                        "event-non-command", command_capable=False
-                    ),
-                    profile_id="profile-a",
-                )
-
-    def test_heartbeat_provenance_cannot_enqueue(self) -> None:
-        with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            fabric = HermesFabric(f"{directory}/fabric.sqlite3")
-
-            with self.assertRaises(ScopeError):
-                fabric.enqueue(
-                    message=authenticated_command(
-                        "event-heartbeat", origin_type="heartbeat"
-                    ),
-                    profile_id="profile-a",
-                )
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()