feat(task-plane): add durable multi-agent fleet scheduler

active-runtime/app/agent_event_bus.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from hashlib import sha256
 from pathlib import Path
 import json
 from typing import Any
+from message_handoff import stable_event_id
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -55,13 +56,19 @@ class AgentEventBus:
         payload: dict[str, Any],
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        event_id = "evt_" + sha256(
-            json.dumps(
-                {"kind": kind, "source": source, "summary": summary, "payload": payload},
-                sort_keys=True,
-                ensure_ascii=False,
-            ).encode("utf-8")
-        ).hexdigest()[:16]
+        event_id = stable_event_id(
+            source=source, target=target, message_type=kind, payload=payload,
+            tenant_id=(payload.get('tenant_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            user_id=(payload.get('user_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            project_id=(payload.get('project_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            conversation_id=(payload.get('conversation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            task_id=(payload.get('task_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            run_id=(payload.get('run_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            correlation_id=(payload.get('correlation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            causation_id=(payload.get('causation_id') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            sequence=(payload.get('sequence') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+            idempotency_key=(payload.get('idempotency_key') if isinstance(payload, dict) else None),
+        )
         event = AgentEvent(event_id, kind, source, target, summary, payload, correlation_id=correlation_id)
         self._write("pending", event.to_dict())
         self._audit("created", event.to_dict())

active-runtime/app/agent_event_observability_bridge.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
     def __init__(self, hooks: AgentObservabilityHooks | None = None):
         self.hooks = hooks or AgentObservabilityHooks()
 
-    def consume(self, event: dict):
+    def consume(self, event: dict, *, actor=None, trace=None):
         kind = event.get("kind")
         payload = event.get("payload", {})
         if kind == "agent_started":
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ class AgentEventObservabilityBridge:
                 visible_scope=payload.get("scope", "self"),
                 entry_agent=payload.get("agent", "unknown"),
                 execution_id=event.get("id"),
+                actor=actor,
+                trace=trace,
             )
         if kind == "agent_delegated":
             return self.hooks.delegate(event["execution_id"], payload.get("agent", "unknown"))

active-runtime/app/agent_observability.py

@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ class AgentExecutionRecord:
     status: str = "completed"
     started_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
     ended_at: str = field(default_factory=utc_now)
+    trace_id: str | None = None
+    span_id: str | None = None
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
 
     def to_dict(self):
         return asdict(self)

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py

@@ -9,25 +9,49 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
+from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
 from .agent_observability_dashboard import AgentObservabilityDashboard
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext, authorize_scope
 
 store = AgentObservabilityStore()
 dashboard = AgentObservabilityDashboard(store.load())
 
 
-def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any]):
-    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**payload)
+def record_agent_execution(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None):
+    scoped = any(payload.get(name) is not None for name in (
+        "trace_id", "span_id", "tenant_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id"
+    ))
+    values = dict(payload)
+    if scoped:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+        trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(trusted, trace.scope)
+        bound = {
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": trace.parent_span_id, "correlation_id": trace.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": trace.causation_id, "tenant_id": trace.scope.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": trace.scope.user_id, "project_id": trace.scope.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": trace.scope.conversation_id, "task_id": trace.task_id,
+            "claim_id": trace.claim_id, "run_id": trace.scope.run_id, "message_id": trace.message_id,
+        }
+        for name, authoritative in bound.items():
+            if values.get(name) not in (None, authoritative):
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:" + name)
+            values[name] = authoritative
+    record = AgentExecutionRecord(**values)
     return {"status": "ok", "record": store.append(record)}
 
 
-def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user"):
-    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role)
+def get_agent_observability(user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None):
+    records = store.query(user_id, group_id, role, actor=actor)
+    visible = AgentObservability()
+    visible.records = [AgentExecutionRecord(**record) for record in records]
     return {
         "status": "ok",
         "records": records,
-        "summary": store.load().summary(user_id if role != "owner" else None),
+        "summary": visible.summary(None),
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_hooks.py

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord
 from .agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    TraceContext,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -36,6 +41,7 @@ class AgentRunContext:
     input_tokens: int = 0
     output_tokens: int = 0
     status: str = "running"
+    trace: TraceContext | None = None
 
     def delegate(self, agent_name: str) -> None:
         if agent_name not in self.path:
@@ -59,7 +65,19 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
         visible_scope: str,
         entry_agent: str,
         execution_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if execution_id is not None and execution_id in self.active:
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
+        if trace is not None:
+            if actor is None:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_ACTOR_CONTEXT_REQUIRED")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            authorize_scope(trusted_actor, trace.scope)
+            if trace.scope.user_id is not None and trace.scope.user_id != user_id:
+                raise RuntimeError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY:user_id")
         run = AgentRunContext(
             execution_id=execution_id or f"exec_{uuid4().hex[:12]}",
             user_id=user_id,
@@ -67,6 +85,7 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             entry_agent=entry_agent,
             path=[entry_agent],
             used_hermes=entry_agent.lower() == "hermes",
+            trace=trace,
         )
         self.active[run.execution_id] = run
         return {"status": "started", "execution_id": run.execution_id, "run": run.__dict__}
@@ -106,6 +125,18 @@ class AgentObservabilityHooks:
             status=status,
             started_at=run.started_at,
             ended_at=ended_at,
+            trace_id=run.trace.trace_id if run.trace else None,
+            span_id=run.trace.span_id if run.trace else None,
+            parent_span_id=run.trace.parent_span_id if run.trace else None,
+            correlation_id=run.trace.correlation_id if run.trace else None,
+            causation_id=run.trace.causation_id if run.trace else None,
+            tenant_id=run.trace.scope.tenant_id if run.trace else None,
+            project_id=run.trace.scope.project_id if run.trace else None,
+            conversation_id=run.trace.scope.conversation_id if run.trace else None,
+            task_id=run.trace.task_id if run.trace else None,
+            claim_id=run.trace.claim_id if run.trace else None,
+            run_id=run.trace.scope.run_id if run.trace else None,
+            message_id=run.trace.message_id if run.trace else None,
         )
         return {"status": "stored", "record": self.store.append(record)}
 

active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
 from .agent_observability import AgentExecutionRecord, AgentObservability
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    authorize_scope,
+)
 
 
 class AgentObservabilityStore:
@@ -23,6 +29,11 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
     def append(self, record: AgentExecutionRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
         path = self.records_dir / f"{record.execution_id}.json"
         data = record.to_dict()
+        if path.exists():
+            existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if existing == data:
+                return existing
+            raise RuntimeError("OBSERVABILITY_EXECUTION_CONFLICT")
         path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
         return data
 
@@ -33,8 +44,36 @@ class AgentObservabilityStore:
             observability.records.append(AgentExecutionRecord(**raw))
         return observability
 
-    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user") -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    def query(self, user_id: str | None = None, group_id: str | None = None, role: str = "user", *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         records = [record.to_dict() for record in self.load().records]
+        scoped = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is not None]
+        legacy = [record for record in records if record.get("tenant_id") is None]
+        if actor is not None:
+            trusted = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            visible: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+            for record in scoped:
+                try:
+                    authorize_scope(
+                        trusted,
+                        GovernanceScope(
+                            "tenant",
+                            tenant_id=record.get("tenant_id"),
+                            user_id=record.get("user_id"),
+                            project_id=record.get("project_id"),
+                            conversation_id=record.get("conversation_id"),
+                            run_id=record.get("run_id"),
+                        ),
+                    )
+                except GovernanceError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(record)
+            if trusted.privileged:
+                visible.extend(legacy)
+            else:
+                visible.extend(record for record in legacy if record.get("user_id") == trusted.scope.user_id)
+            return visible
+        # Caller-supplied role remains a legacy compatibility path only.
+        records = legacy
         if role == "owner":
             return records
         if role == "group_admin" and group_id:

active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+"""Owner-controlled, CAS-bound retry extension for exhausted Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+MAX_BODY = 64 * 1024
+AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV = "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID"
+
+
+class RetryExtensionError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, status: int = 409) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+        self.status = status
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _required_authorization_id() -> str:
+    value = os.environ.get(AUTHORIZE_EXTENSION_ID_ENV, "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISSING")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _require_string(value: object, code: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    value = value.strip()
+    if pattern is not None and pattern.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        raise RetryExtensionError(code, 400)
+    return value
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RetryExtensionRequest:
+    expected_status: str
+    expected_revision: int
+    expected_attempt: int
+    expected_max_attempts: int
+    next_max_attempts: int
+    previous_verification_sha256: str
+    authorization_id: str
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RetryExtensionRequest":
+        allowed = {
+            "expected_status", "expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts",
+            "next_max_attempts", "previous_verification_sha256", "authorization_id", "idempotency_key",
+        }
+        if set(value) != allowed:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_FIELDS_INVALID", 400)
+        status = _require_string(value["expected_status"], "EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID")
+        if status != "FAILED":
+            raise RetryExtensionError("EXPECTED_STATUS_INVALID", 400)
+        ints: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for field in ("expected_revision", "expected_attempt", "expected_max_attempts", "next_max_attempts"):
+            item = value[field]
+            if not isinstance(item, int) or isinstance(item, bool) or item < 0:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_INTEGER_INVALID", 400)
+            ints[field] = item
+        if ints["expected_attempt"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"]:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_NOT_EXHAUSTED", 409)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] != ints["expected_max_attempts"] + 1:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP", 400)
+        if ints["next_max_attempts"] > 50:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_LIMIT_EXCEEDED", 400)
+        verification = _require_string(value["previous_verification_sha256"], "VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID")
+        if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", verification) is None:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("VERIFICATION_SHA256_INVALID", 400)
+        authorization = _require_string(value["authorization_id"], "AUTHORIZATION_ID_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        key = _require_string(value["idempotency_key"], "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID", KEY_RE)
+        return cls(
+            status,
+            ints["expected_revision"],
+            ints["expected_attempt"],
+            ints["expected_max_attempts"],
+            ints["next_max_attempts"],
+            verification,
+            authorization,
+            key,
+        )
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "expected_status": self.expected_status,
+            "expected_revision": self.expected_revision,
+            "expected_attempt": self.expected_attempt,
+            "expected_max_attempts": self.expected_max_attempts,
+            "next_max_attempts": self.next_max_attempts,
+            "previous_verification_sha256": self.previous_verification_sha256,
+            "authorization_id": self.authorization_id,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+        }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionStore:
+    """Owns the official mutation. Direct/manual DB edits remain forbidden."""
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.db_path = Path(db_path)
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _columns(connection: sqlite3.Connection, table: str) -> dict[str, sqlite3.Row]:
+        return {str(row["name"]): row for row in connection.execute(f'PRAGMA table_info("{table}")')}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _event_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> tuple[str, dict[str, sqlite3.Row]]:
+        tables = {
+            row["name"]
+            for row in connection.execute("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'")
+        }
+        for name in ("task_events", "events"):
+            if name not in tables:
+                continue
+            columns = RetryExtensionStore._columns(connection, name)
+            if "task_id" in columns and ("event_type" in columns or "type" in columns):
+                return name, columns
+        raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_TABLE_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _verification_hash(raw: object) -> str:
+        if raw in (None, ""):
+            value: object = {}
+        elif isinstance(raw, str):
+            try:
+                value = json.loads(raw)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_VERIFICATION_INVALID", 409) from exc
+        else:
+            value = raw
+        return _sha(value)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _ensure_extension_table(connection: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
+        connection.execute(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_retry_extensions (
+              task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              authorization_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_verification_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+              previous_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              next_max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              expected_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              applied_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+              created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+              PRIMARY KEY(task_id, idempotency_key)
+            )
+            """
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _insert_event(
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        task_id: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> None:
+        table, columns = RetryExtensionStore._event_table(connection)
+        values: dict[str, Any] = {"task_id": task_id}
+        if "event_type" in columns:
+            values["event_type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        else:
+            values["type"] = "TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+        payload_text = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+        if "payload_json" in columns:
+            values["payload_json"] = payload_text
+        elif "payload" in columns:
+            values["payload"] = payload_text
+        else:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_EVENT_PAYLOAD_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+        if "created_at" in columns:
+            values["created_at"] = _now()
+        if "agent_id" in columns:
+            values["agent_id"] = "owner-control"
+        if "actor_id" in columns:
+            values["actor_id"] = "owner-control"
+        names = list(values)
+        sql = f'INSERT INTO "{table}" ({",".join(f"""\"{name}\"""" for name in names)}) VALUES ({",".join("?" for _ in names)})'
+        connection.execute(sql, tuple(values[name] for name in names))
+
+    def extend(self, task_id: str, request: RetryExtensionRequest) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        task_id = _require_string(task_id, "TASK_ID_INVALID", TASK_RE)
+        required_authorization_id = _required_authorization_id()
+        if request.authorization_id != required_authorization_id:
+            raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH", 403)
+        request_payload = request.public()
+        request_sha = _sha(request_payload)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            self._ensure_extension_table(connection)
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM task_retry_extensions WHERE task_id=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (task_id, request.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT", 409)
+                connection.commit()
+                return {
+                    "task_id": task_id,
+                    "status": "QUEUED",
+                    "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                    "max_attempts": int(replay["next_max_attempts"]),
+                    "revision": int(replay["applied_revision"]),
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                    "authorization_id": replay["authorization_id"],
+                    "previous_verification_sha256": replay["previous_verification_sha256"],
+                }
+
+            columns = self._columns(connection, "tasks")
+            required = {
+                "task_id", "status", "attempt", "max_attempts", "revision", "claimed_by",
+                "lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at", "verification_json",
+            }
+            if not required.issubset(columns):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_SCHEMA_RETRY_EXTENSION_UNSUPPORTED", 503)
+            task = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)).fetchone()
+            if task is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("TASK_NOT_FOUND", 404)
+            actual_verification_sha = self._verification_hash(task["verification_json"])
+            if actual_verification_sha != request.previous_verification_sha256:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT", 409)
+            if (
+                task["status"] != request.expected_status
+                or int(task["revision"]) != request.expected_revision
+                or int(task["attempt"]) != request.expected_attempt
+                or int(task["max_attempts"]) != request.expected_max_attempts
+            ):
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+            for lease_field in ("lease_token_hash", "lease_expires_at"):
+                if lease_field in columns and task[lease_field] not in (None, ""):
+                    raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_ACTIVE_LEASE_DENY", 409)
+
+            previous_claimed_by = task["claimed_by"]
+            applied_revision = request.expected_revision + 1
+            cursor = connection.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE tasks
+                   SET status='QUEUED', max_attempts=?, revision=?, claimed_by=NULL,
+                       lease_token_hash=NULL, lease_expires_at=NULL
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND status=? AND revision=? AND attempt=? AND max_attempts=?
+                   AND claimed_by IS ?
+                   AND lease_token_hash IS NULL AND lease_expires_at IS NULL
+                """,
+                (
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    task_id,
+                    request.expected_status,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    request.expected_attempt,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    previous_claimed_by,
+                ),
+            )
+            if cursor.rowcount != 1:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RETRY_EXTENSION_CAS_MISMATCH", 409)
+
+            event_payload = {
+                "schema": "aios.task-retry-extension.event.v1",
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "idempotency_key": request.idempotency_key,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                "previous_max_attempts": request.expected_max_attempts,
+                "next_max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "previous_revision": request.expected_revision,
+                "applied_revision": applied_revision,
+                "request_sha256": request_sha,
+                "previous_claimed_by": previous_claimed_by,
+                "stale_terminal_claim_normalized": previous_claimed_by not in (None, ""),
+            }
+            self._insert_event(connection, task_id, event_payload)
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO task_retry_extensions(
+                  task_id,idempotency_key,request_sha256,authorization_id,previous_verification_sha256,
+                  previous_max_attempts,next_max_attempts,expected_revision,applied_revision,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id,
+                    request.idempotency_key,
+                    request_sha,
+                    request.authorization_id,
+                    request.previous_verification_sha256,
+                    request.expected_max_attempts,
+                    request.next_max_attempts,
+                    request.expected_revision,
+                    applied_revision,
+                    _now(),
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            return {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "status": "QUEUED",
+                "attempt": request.expected_attempt,
+                "max_attempts": request.next_max_attempts,
+                "revision": applied_revision,
+                "idempotent": False,
+                "authorization_id": request.authorization_id,
+                "previous_verification_sha256": request.previous_verification_sha256,
+            }
+
+
+class RetryExtensionHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    store: RetryExtensionStore | None = None
+    control_token: str = ""
+
+    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def _json(self, value: Mapping[str, Any], status: int) -> None:
+        data = json.dumps(dict(value), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _authorized(self) -> bool:
+        header = self.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+        return (
+            header.startswith("Bearer ")
+            and bool(self.control_token)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(header[7:], self.control_token)
+        )
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        if self.path == "/health":
+            self._json({"status": "ok", "service": "aios-agent-task-retry-extension"}, 200)
+        else:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        match = re.fullmatch(r"/v1/tasks/([^/]+)/retry-extension", self.path)
+        if match is None:
+            self._json({"error": "NOT_FOUND"}, 404)
+            return
+        if not self._authorized():
+            self._json({"error": "UNAUTHORIZED"}, 401)
+            return
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        except ValueError:
+            self._json({"error": "CONTENT_LENGTH_INVALID"}, 400)
+            return
+        if length < 1 or length > MAX_BODY:
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_SIZE_INVALID"}, 413)
+            return
+        try:
+            value = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode("utf-8"))
+            if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+                raise ValueError
+            request = RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(value)
+            if self.store is None:
+                raise RetryExtensionError("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", 503)
+            result = self.store.extend(match.group(1), request)
+            self._json(result, 200 if result["idempotent"] else 201)
+        except RetryExtensionError as exc:
+            self._json({"error": exc.code}, exc.status)
+        except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+            self._json({"error": "REQUEST_INVALID"}, 400)
+
+
+def load_control_token(path: Path) -> str:
+    if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
+    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    if len(value) < 32:
+        raise RuntimeError("TASK_RETRY_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def serve() -> None:
+    db = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB", "/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3"))
+    _required_authorization_id()
+    token_path = Path(
+        os.environ.get(
+            "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE",
+            str(Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials")) / "agent_task_control_token"),
+        )
+    )
+    host = os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+    port = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT", "18941"))
+    RetryExtensionHandler.store = RetryExtensionStore(db)
+    RetryExtensionHandler.control_token = load_control_token(token_path)
+    ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), RetryExtensionHandler).serve_forever()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    serve()

active-runtime/app/aios_authority_git_executor.py

@@ -94,6 +94,91 @@ class AuthorityGitExecutor:
         self._git(["worktree", "add", "--detach", str(path), base_oid])
         return path
 
+    def recover_failed_detached_worktree_exact(
+        self,
+        *,
+        path: Path,
+        expected_oid: str,
+        stale_oid: str,
+        target_ref: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        """Recreate one exact clean, detached, single-attempt worktree at its durable head."""
+        _oid(expected_oid, "expected_oid")
+        _oid(stale_oid, "stale_oid")
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(target_ref):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        if self.read_ref(target_ref) is not None:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        if (
+            not path.is_absolute()
+            or path.parent != self.worktree_root
+            or path.name in {"", ".", ".."}
+            or path.is_symlink()
+            or not path.is_dir()
+        ):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_PATH_INVALID")
+        head = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if head.returncode != 0 or head.stdout.strip() != stale_oid or stale_oid == expected_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_HEAD_INVALID")
+        symbolic = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if symbolic.returncode != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_NOT_DETACHED")
+        status = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(path), "status", "--porcelain=v1", "--untracked-files=all"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if status.returncode != 0 or status.stdout:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_NOT_CLEAN")
+        parents = self._git(["rev-list", "--parents", "-n", "1", stale_oid]).split()
+        if parents != [stale_oid, expected_oid]:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_LINEAGE_INVALID")
+        registered = [
+            line.removeprefix("worktree ")
+            for line in self._git(["worktree", "list", "--porcelain"]).splitlines()
+            if line.startswith("worktree ")
+        ]
+        if registered.count(str(path)) != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_REGISTRATION_INVALID")
+        self._git(["worktree", "remove", "--force", str(path)])
+        if path.exists() or path.is_symlink():
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_REMOVE_FAILED")
+        recreated = self.create_detached_worktree(expected_oid, path.name, path.parent)
+        readback = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(recreated), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        detached = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(recreated), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if readback.returncode != 0 or readback.stdout.strip() != expected_oid or detached.returncode != 1:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("WORKTREE_RECOVERY_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return stale_oid
+
+    def create_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_base_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
+        if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")
+        _oid(expected_base_oid, "expected_base_oid")
+        _oid(new_oid, "new_oid")
+        current = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if current is not None:
+            if current == new_oid:
+                return new_oid
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        if not self.ancestry_check(expected_base_oid, new_oid):
+            raise AuthorityGitError("NEW_OID_NOT_DESCENDANT")
+        self._git(["update-ref", branch, new_oid, "0" * 40])
+        readback = self.read_ref(branch)
+        if readback != new_oid:
+            raise AuthorityGitError("AUTHORITY_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+        return readback
+
     def advance_task_branch_CAS(self, branch: str, expected_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> str:
         if not TASK_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(branch):
             raise AuthorityGitError("TASK_BRANCH_SCOPE_DENIED")

active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2.py

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
     "getGovernedWriteCapabilities",
     "createGovernedTask",
     "acquireWriterLease",
+    "bootstrapWriterLease",
+    "renewWriterLease",
     "commitFileGoverned",
     "commitFilesGoverned",
     "getGitOpsJob",
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ BRIDGE_OPERATIONS = (
 OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
     "createGovernedTask": ("task_id", "repository", "base_oid", "target_branch", "risk", "description", "idempotency_key"),
     "acquireWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
+    "bootstrapWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
+    "renewWriterLease": ("schema", "task_id", "repository", "branch_mode", "base_oid", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "lease_seconds"),
     "commitFileGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "path", "content_base64", "message"),
     "commitFilesGoverned": ("task_id", "repository", "expected_branch_oid", "target_branch", "generation", "idempotency_key", "files", "message"),
     "getGitOpsJob": ("job_id",),
@@ -46,6 +50,49 @@ OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = {
     "getControlPlaneSnapshot": (),
 }
 
+BRIDGE_OPERATION_CONTRACTS = {
+    "acquireWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["acquireWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required",
+        ),
+    },
+    "bootstrapWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["bootstrapWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "create_target_branch", "worktree_mode", "cas_ref_update_required",
+            "recovered", "bootstrapped", "runtime_rehydrated",
+            "durable_branch_lease_present", "idempotent",
+        ),
+    },
+    "renewWriterLease": {
+        "method": "POST",
+        "path": "/v2/writer-lease/renew",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["renewWriterLease"],
+        "response_fields": (
+            "task_id", "job_id", "generation", "lease_seconds", "lease_expires_at",
+            "recovered", "bootstrapped", "runtime_rehydrated",
+            "durable_branch_lease_present", "idempotent",
+        ),
+    },
+    "commitFileGoverned": {
+        "method": "POST", "path": "/v2/commit-file",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFileGoverned"],
+        "response_fields": ("job_id", "commit_oid", "commit_visible", "branch_mode", "target_branch", "generation"),
+    },
+    "commitFilesGoverned": {
+        "method": "POST", "path": "/v2/commit-files",
+        "required_fields": OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["commitFilesGoverned"],
+        "response_fields": ("job_id", "commit_oid", "commit_visible", "branch_mode", "target_branch", "generation"),
+    },
+}
+
 
 class RuntimeDriftError(RuntimeError):
     pass
@@ -122,6 +169,14 @@ class BridgeV2Adapter:
             "legacy_writes_enabled": False,
             "governed_writes_enabled": True,
             "operations": list(BRIDGE_OPERATIONS),
+            "operation_contracts": {
+                operation: {
+                    **contract,
+                    "required_fields": list(contract["required_fields"]),
+                    "response_fields": list(contract["response_fields"]),
+                }
+                for operation, contract in BRIDGE_OPERATION_CONTRACTS.items()
+            },
             "force_push": False,
             "main_write": False,
             "tag_write": False,
@@ -151,6 +206,8 @@ class BridgeV2Adapter:
 
     def createGovernedTask(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("createGovernedTask", request)
     def acquireWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("acquireWriterLease", request)
+    def bootstrapWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("bootstrapWriterLease", request)
+    def renewWriterLease(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("renewWriterLease", request)
     def commitFileGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFileGoverned", request)
     def commitFilesGoverned(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("commitFilesGoverned", request)
     def getGitOpsJob(self, request: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any: return self._call("getGitOpsJob", request)

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_executor.py

@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ class AuthorityPort(Protocol):
     def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool: ...
     def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str: ...
     def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool: ...
+    def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, expected_base: str, new: str) -> str: ...
     def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str: ...
 
 
 class RemotePort(Protocol):
     def repository_identity(self) -> str: ...
+    def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None: ...
     def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None: ...
     def read_git_ref(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
     def read_api_branch(self, branch: str) -> str | None: ...
@@ -103,6 +105,9 @@ class AuthorityGitAdapter:
     def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
         return self.executor.ancestry_check(older, newer)
 
+    def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, expected_base: str, new: str) -> str:
+        return self.executor.create_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected_base, new)
+
     def compare_and_swap_branch(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> str:
         return self.executor.advance_task_branch_CAS(self._ref(branch), expected, new)
 
@@ -258,6 +263,15 @@ class GiteaContinuationRemote:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_GIT_READBACK_INVALID")
         return oid
 
+    def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None:
+        self._require_projected()
+        self.repository_identity()
+        if self.read_git_ref(branch) is not None:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_TARGET_BRANCH_ALREADY_EXISTS")
+        _run(["git", "push", self.remote_name, f"{new}:refs/heads/{branch}"], cwd=self.workspace)
+        if self.read_git_ref(branch) != new:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("GITEA_CREATE_READBACK_MISMATCH")
+
     def push_exact(self, branch: str, expected: str, new: str) -> None:
         self._require_projected()
         self.repository_identity()
@@ -329,6 +343,7 @@ class ContinuationPermissions:
 @dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
 class ContinuationRuntimeBinding:
     request: WriterLeaseRequestV2
+    job_id: str
     workspace_path: Path
     lease_not_before: datetime
     lease_expires_at: datetime
@@ -389,13 +404,20 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
     def observe_generation(self, branch: str, generation: int) -> None:
         self._observed_generations[branch] = max(generation, self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0))
 
-    def _max_generation(self, branch: str) -> int:
+    def _max_generation(self, branch: str, *, exclude_job_id: str | None = None) -> int:
         observed = self._observed_generations.get(branch, 0)
         with self.controller.store._connect() as connection:
-            row = connection.execute(
-                "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
-                (branch,),
-            ).fetchone()
+            if exclude_job_id is None:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases WHERE branch=?",
+                    (branch,),
+                ).fetchone()
+            else:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT MAX(generation) AS generation FROM branch_leases "
+                    "WHERE branch=? AND job_id!=?",
+                    (branch, exclude_job_id),
+                ).fetchone()
         durable = int(row["generation"] or 0)
         return max(observed, durable)
 
@@ -404,6 +426,7 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
         return {
             "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
             "task_id": request.task_id,
+            "job_id": request.job_id,
             "repository": request.repository,
             "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
             "base_oid": request.base_oid,
@@ -413,10 +436,21 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "lease_seconds": request.lease_seconds,
         }
 
-    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding) -> None:
+    def _validate_preflight(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, *, job_id: str | None = None) -> None:
         request = binding.request
-        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(self._request_mapping(request), self.authority)
-        if normalized != {**self._request_mapping(request), "create_target_branch": False, "worktree_mode": "detached_at_expected_head", "cas_ref_update_required": True}:
+        request_mapping = self._request_mapping(request)
+        normalized = validate_writer_lease_request_v2(request_mapping, self.authority)
+        expected_normalized = {
+            **request_mapping,
+            "create_target_branch": request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW",
+            "worktree_mode": (
+                "detached_at_base_oid"
+                if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW"
+                else "detached_at_expected_head"
+            ),
+            "cas_ref_update_required": True,
+        }
+        if normalized != expected_normalized:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("CONTINUATION_NORMALIZATION_INVALID")
         if not binding.original_receipt_valid or not binding.original_grant_consumed:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("ORIGINAL_GRANT_LINEAGE_INVALID")
@@ -426,7 +460,7 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
         if now >= binding.lease_expires_at:
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("LEASE_EXPIRED")
-        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch):
+        if request.generation <= self._max_generation(request.target_branch, exclude_job_id=job_id):
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("GENERATION_NOT_MONOTONIC")
         if not self.workspace.is_detached():
             raise ContinuationExecutionError("WORKTREE_NOT_DETACHED")
@@ -452,57 +486,102 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "generation": request.generation,
         }
 
-    def execute(self, binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding, commit: ContinuationCommit) -> dict[str, object]:
-        payload = commit.payload()
-        submitted = self.controller.submit(self._job_request(binding, commit, payload), payload=payload)
-        current = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-        if JobState(current["state"]) == JobState.COMPLETED:
+    def execute(
+        self,
+        binding: ContinuationRuntimeBinding,
+        commit: ContinuationCommit,
+        *,
+        before_complete: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        commit.payload()
+        if not binding.job_id or binding.request.job_id != binding.job_id:
+            raise ContinuationExecutionError("RUNTIME_LINEAGE_MISSING_JOB_ID")
+        current = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+        current_state = JobState(current["state"])
+        if current_state == JobState.COMPLETED:
             return self.controller.store._receipt(current, duplicate=True).as_dict()
-        self._validate_preflight(binding)
+        if current_state == JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED:
+            receipt = json.loads(str(current["receipt_json"] or "{}"))
+            commit_oid = str(receipt.get("authority_oid") or "")
+            if not OID_RE.fullmatch(commit_oid):
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("GOVERNED_COMMIT_OID_INVALID")
+            if before_complete is not None:
+                before_complete(commit_oid)
+            return self.controller.advance(
+                binding.job_id,
+                JobState.COMPLETED,
+                side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+                receipt=receipt,
+            ).as_dict()
+        self._validate_preflight(binding, job_id=binding.job_id)
         request = binding.request
         projected = False
         try:
             self.credential.project()
             projected = True
-            row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.REQUESTED:
+            row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+            state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.REQUESTED:
                 self.controller.advance(
-                    submitted.job_id,
+                    binding.job_id,
                     JobState.AUTHORIZED,
                     side_effect_state="AUTHORIZED",
                     receipt={"task_id": request.task_id, "original_grant_consumed": True},
+                    expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
                 )
-                row = self.controller.store.read(submitted.job_id)
-            if JobState(row["state"]) == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.AUTHORIZED:
                 self.controller.lease_job(
-                    submitted.job_id,
-                    lease_id=f"lease-{submitted.job_id}",
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    lease_id=f"lease-{binding.job_id}",
                     lineage_anchor_oid=request.base_oid,
                     current_head_oid=request.expected_branch_oid,
                     generation=request.generation,
                     lease_expires_at=binding.lease_expires_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
                     expected_revision=int(row["revision"]),
                 )
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY, side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY")
-            self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.LEASED:
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.WORKTREE_READY,
+                                        side_effect_state="WORKTREE_READY", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+                row = self.controller.store.read(binding.job_id)
+                state = JobState(row["state"])
+            if state == JobState.WORKTREE_READY:
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.EXECUTING,
+                                        side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS", expected_revision=int(row["revision"]))
+            elif state != JobState.EXECUTING:
+                raise ContinuationExecutionError("JOB_EXECUTION_STATE_INVALID")
             new_oid = self.workspace.commit_files(commit.files, commit.message)
             if not OID_RE.fullmatch(new_oid) or not self.authority.is_ancestor(request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid):
                 raise ContinuationExecutionError("NON_FAST_FORWARD_COMMIT")
-            authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
+            if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+                authority_oid = self.authority.create_task_branch_cas(request.target_branch, request.base_oid, new_oid)
+            else:
+                authority_oid = self.authority.compare_and_swap_branch(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
             if authority_oid != new_oid:
                 raise ContinuationExecutionError("AUTHORITY_CAS_READBACK_MISMATCH")
             self.controller.advance(
-                submitted.job_id,
+                binding.job_id,
                 JobState.LOCAL_VERIFIED,
                 side_effect_state="LOCAL_VERIFIED",
                 receipt={"authority_oid": authority_oid, "force_push": False},
             )
             try:
-                self.controller.advance(submitted.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
-                self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
+                self.controller.advance(binding.job_id, JobState.REMOTE_SYNCING, side_effect_state="IN_PROGRESS")
+                if request.branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW":
+                    self.remote.push_new_exact(request.target_branch, new_oid)
+                else:
+                    self.remote.push_exact(request.target_branch, request.expected_branch_oid, new_oid)
             except Exception:
-                return self._remote_pending(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
-            return self._finish_remote_verification(submitted.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+                return self._remote_pending(binding.job_id, authority_oid, new_oid)
+            return self._finish_remote_verification(
+                binding.job_id,
+                authority_oid,
+                new_oid,
+                before_complete=before_complete,
+            )
         finally:
             if projected:
                 self.credential.revoke()
@@ -525,7 +604,14 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
         )
         return result.as_dict()
 
-    def _finish_remote_verification(self, job_id: str, authority_oid: str, new_oid: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    def _finish_remote_verification(
+        self,
+        job_id: str,
+        authority_oid: str,
+        new_oid: str,
+        *,
+        before_complete: Callable[[str], None] | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
         row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)
         branch = row["branch"]
         request = json.loads(row["request_json"])["binding"]
@@ -542,8 +628,20 @@ class ContinuationExecutor:
             "reconciliation_decision": decision.action.value,
             "force_push": False,
         }
-        self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt)
-        return self.controller.advance(job_id, JobState.COMPLETED, side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED", receipt=receipt).as_dict()
+        self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        )
+        if before_complete is not None:
+            before_complete(new_oid)
+        return self.controller.advance(
+            job_id,
+            JobState.COMPLETED,
+            side_effect_state="REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            receipt=receipt,
+        ).as_dict()
 
     def reconcile(self, job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
         row = self.controller.store.read(job_id)

active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_lease.py

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
     target_branch: str
     generation: int
     lease_seconds: int = 900
+    job_id: str = ""
 
     schema = "aios.task-writer-lease.v2"
     accepted_schemas = frozenset({"aios.task-writer-lease.v2", "aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2"})
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ class WriterLeaseRequestV2:
     def validate(self, probe: BranchProbe) -> None:
         if not self.task_id or self.repository != "aios/aios":
             raise ContinuationError("request_identity_invalid")
+        if not self.job_id or not self.job_id.startswith("job-"):
+            raise ContinuationError("job_id_invalid")
         if self.branch_mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
             raise ContinuationError("branch_mode_invalid")
         _oid(self.base_oid, "base_oid")

active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 import os
 from pathlib import Path
 import secrets
+import re
 from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 
@@ -21,9 +22,14 @@ class CredentialLease:
     scopes: tuple[str, ...]
     provider: str
     state: str = "ACTIVE"
+    scope_type: str = "system"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
 
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state}
+        return {"lease_id": self.lease_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "repository": self.repository, "target_branch": self.target_branch, "generation": self.generation, "issued_at": self.issued_at, "expires_at": self.expires_at, "scopes": list(self.scopes), "provider": self.provider, "state": self.state, "scope_type": self.scope_type, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id, "project_id": self.project_id, "run_id": self.run_id}
 
 
 class FileCredentialProvider:
@@ -43,11 +49,19 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         self.now = now or (lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))
         self._leases: dict[str, CredentialLease] = {}
 
-    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def issue(self, *, task_id: str, repository: str, target_branch: str, generation: int, scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ("git:push", "gitea:read"), lease_seconds: int = 900, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if repository != "aios/aios" or not target_branch.startswith("agent/") or generation < 1 or not 1 <= lease_seconds <= 86400:
             raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        if scope_type == "tenant":
+            if not tenant_id:
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        elif scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any((tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)):
+                raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
         now = self.now().astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__)
+        lease = CredentialLease("lease-" + secrets.token_hex(16), task_id, repository, target_branch, generation, now.isoformat(), (now + timedelta(seconds=lease_seconds)).isoformat(), tuple(scopes), type(self.provider).__name__, "ACTIVE", scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
         self._leases[lease.lease_id] = lease
         return lease.as_dict()
 
@@ -64,7 +78,39 @@ class CredentialBroker:
         lease = self._get(lease_id)
         if lease.state != "ACTIVE":
             raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_LEASE_NOT_ACTIVE")
-        return self.provider.environment(lease)
+        environment = self.provider.environment(lease)
+        for key, value in environment.items():
+            upper = str(key).upper()
+            if not isinstance(value, str):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            sensitive = any(marker in upper for marker in ("CREDENTIAL", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "PRIVATE_KEY", "API_KEY"))
+            if re.search(r"(?i)bearer\s+\S+|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]", value):
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            if sensitive and upper.endswith("_FILE"):
+                candidate = Path(value)
+                credential_root = Path("/run/credentials")
+                try:
+                    resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=False)
+                except OSError as exc:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY") from exc
+                if not candidate.is_absolute() or not (resolved == credential_root or credential_root in resolved.parents):
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive and upper.endswith("_REFERENCE"):
+                if re.fullmatch(r"(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}", value) is None:
+                    raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+            elif sensitive:
+                raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        return environment
+
+    def authorize(self, lease_id: str, *, task_id: str, operation: str, scope_type: str = "system", tenant_id: str | None = None, user_id: str | None = None, project_id: str | None = None, run_id: str | None = None) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        lease = self._get(lease_id)
+        if lease.state != "ACTIVE" or lease.task_id != task_id or operation not in lease.scopes:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        requested = (scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, run_id)
+        actual = (lease.scope_type, lease.tenant_id, lease.user_id, lease.project_id, lease.run_id)
+        if requested != actual:
+            raise RuntimeError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        return self.environment(lease_id)
 
     def status(self, lease_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return self._get(lease_id).as_dict()

active-runtime/app/aios_gitops_job_controller.py

@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ class ServiceUnavailable(JobError):
     pass
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class LeaseRenewalResult:
+    """Durable outcome of one writer-lease recovery attempt."""
+
+    renewed: bool
+    idempotent: bool
+    durable: bool
+    lease_expires_at: str | None
+
+    def __bool__(self) -> bool:
+        return self.renewed or self.idempotent
+
+
 class BindingConflict(JobError):
     pass
 
@@ -66,6 +79,14 @@ def utc_now() -> str:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
 
 
+def parse_utc(value: str) -> datetime:
+    normalized = value[:-1] + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value
+    parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        raise ValueError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
 def canonical_json(value: Any) -> bytes:
     return (
         json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + "\n"
@@ -404,13 +425,16 @@ class GitOpsJobController:
         self.store._mirror(result)
         return self.store._receipt(result, duplicate=True)
 
-    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE") -> None:
+    def update_lease(self, lease_id: str, *, expected_revision: int, current_head_oid: str, generation: int, state: str = "ACTIVE", lease_expires_at: str | None = None) -> None:
         if len(current_head_oid) != 40 or generation < 1:
             raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
         try:
             with self.store._connect() as connection:
                 connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-                updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
+                if lease_expires_at is None:
+                    updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
+                else:
+                    updated = connection.execute("UPDATE branch_leases SET current_head_oid=?,generation=?,lease_expires_at=?,state=?,revision=revision+1 WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=?", (current_head_oid, generation, lease_expires_at, state, lease_id, expected_revision))
                 if updated.rowcount != 1:
                     raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
                 connection.commit()
@@ -419,6 +443,94 @@ class GitOpsJobController:
         except sqlite3.Error as exc:
             raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
 
+    def renew_lease(
+        self,
+        *,
+        branch: str,
+        lineage_anchor_oid: str,
+        current_head_oid: str,
+        generation: int,
+        lease_expires_at: str,
+    ) -> LeaseRenewalResult:
+        if (
+            not branch
+            or len(lineage_anchor_oid) != 40
+            or len(current_head_oid) != 40
+            or generation < 1
+            or not lease_expires_at.strip()
+        ):
+            raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        try:
+            with self.store._connect() as connection:
+                connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+                rows = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT lease_id, revision, generation, state, lease_expires_at "
+                    "FROM branch_leases "
+                    "WHERE branch=? AND lineage_anchor_oid=? AND current_head_oid=? "
+                    "AND generation=? AND state='ACTIVE' ORDER BY revision DESC",
+                    (branch, lineage_anchor_oid, current_head_oid, generation),
+                ).fetchall()
+                if not rows:
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return LeaseRenewalResult(False, False, False, None)
+                if len(rows) != 1:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+                row = rows[0]
+                try:
+                    current_expires_at = parse_utc(str(row["lease_expires_at"]))
+                    requested_expires_at = parse_utc(lease_expires_at)
+                except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID") from exc
+                now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+                if requested_expires_at <= now:
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+                if current_expires_at > now:
+                    connection.commit()
+                    return LeaseRenewalResult(
+                        False,
+                        True,
+                        True,
+                        str(row["lease_expires_at"]),
+                    )
+                updated = connection.execute(
+                    "UPDATE branch_leases SET lease_expires_at=?,revision=revision+1 "
+                    "WHERE lease_id=? AND revision=? AND generation=? "
+                    "AND state='ACTIVE' AND lease_expires_at=?",
+                    (
+                        lease_expires_at,
+                        row["lease_id"],
+                        int(row["revision"]),
+                        generation,
+                        row["lease_expires_at"],
+                    ),
+                )
+                if updated.rowcount != 1:
+                    current = connection.execute(
+                        "SELECT lease_expires_at, generation, state FROM branch_leases "
+                        "WHERE lease_id=?",
+                        (row["lease_id"],),
+                    ).fetchone()
+                    if (
+                        current is not None
+                        and int(current["generation"]) == generation
+                        and current["state"] == "ACTIVE"
+                        and parse_utc(str(current["lease_expires_at"])) > now
+                    ):
+                        connection.commit()
+                        return LeaseRenewalResult(
+                            False,
+                            True,
+                            True,
+                            str(current["lease_expires_at"]),
+                        )
+                    raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+                connection.commit()
+                return LeaseRenewalResult(True, False, True, lease_expires_at)
+        except JobError:
+            raise
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            raise ServiceUnavailable("JOB_DB_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+
     def advance(self, job_id: str, state: JobState, *, side_effect_state: str, receipt: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, expected_revision: int | None = None) -> JobReceipt:
         return self._advance(
             job_id,

active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""Uncredentialed deterministic executor for governed Online Agent changes.
+
+This process never receives Agent/Owner/Bridge credentials and never writes Git refs.
+It operates only on an exchange bundle and returns hash-bound changed files + test evidence.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import errno
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import tarfile
+import tempfile
+import time
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+ALLOWED_PROGRAMS = {"/usr/bin/python3", "/usr/bin/git", "/bin/true", "/usr/bin/true"}
+MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
+SECRET_ENV_TOKENS = ("TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "CREDENTIAL", "AUTHORIZATION", "PRIVATE_KEY")
+REQUEST_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{15,254}$")
+SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*[:=]\s*bearer\s+\S+|authorization\s+bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
+)
+
+
+class IsolatedExecutorError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def safe_relative(value: object) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or value.startswith("/"):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    path = Path(value)
+    if ".." in path.parts or "." in path.parts or any(part in {"", ".git"} for part in path.parts):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_INVALID")
+    return path.as_posix()
+
+
+def resolve_under(root: Path, relative: str) -> Path:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    path = (root / safe_relative(relative)).resolve(strict=False)
+    if path == root or root not in path.parents:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("PATH_ESCAPE")
+    return path
+
+
+def _credential_exposure(directory: Path) -> str | None:
+    """Return an exposure code; EACCES is the intended credential isolation proof."""
+    try:
+        if not directory.exists():
+            return None
+        if directory.is_symlink():
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_SYMLINK"
+        if os.access(directory, os.R_OK):
+            return "CREDENTIAL_MOUNT_ACCESSIBLE"
+        if directory.is_dir():
+            for child in directory.iterdir():
+                if child.is_file() and os.access(child, os.R_OK):
+                    return "CREDENTIAL_FILE_ACCESSIBLE"
+    except PermissionError:
+        return None
+    return None
+
+
+def assert_uncredentialed() -> None:
+    credentials = Path("/run/credentials")
+    candidates = {credentials}
+    credentials_directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "/run/credentials"))
+    candidates.add(credentials_directory)
+    leaked = sorted(
+        key for key, value in os.environ.items()
+        if value
+        and (any(token in key.upper() for token in SECRET_ENV_TOKENS) or SENSITIVE_VALUE_RE.search(str(value)))
+    )
+    if leaked:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CREDENTIAL_ENV_EXPOSED:" + ",".join(leaked))
+    for directory in candidates:
+        exposure = _credential_exposure(directory)
+        if exposure is not None:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError(exposure)
+    # In the intended PrivateNetwork namespace host loopback services are unreachable.
+    try:
+        probe = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno in {errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM, errno.EAFNOSUPPORT}:
+            return
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("NETWORK_ISOLATION_PROBE_FAILED") from exc
+    probe.settimeout(0.15)
+    try:
+        if probe.connect_ex(("127.0.0.1", 18892)) == 0:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("GOVERNED_BRIDGE_REACHABLE")
+    finally:
+        probe.close()
+
+
+def extract_source(archive: Path, root: Path) -> None:
+    if archive.is_symlink() or not archive.is_file() or archive.stat().st_size > MAX_ARCHIVE_BYTES:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_INVALID")
+    with tarfile.open(archive, "r:gz") as tf:
+        for member in tf.getmembers():
+            path = Path(member.name)
+            if path.is_absolute() or ".." in path.parts or ".git" in path.parts:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+            if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_LINK_DENY")
+        tf.extractall(root, filter="data")
+
+
+def run_command(item: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    argv = item.get("argv")
+    if not isinstance(argv, Sequence) or isinstance(argv, (str, bytes)) or not argv:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_INVALID")
+    argv = [str(part) for part in argv]
+    if argv[0] not in ALLOWED_PROGRAMS:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_PROGRAM_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/python3" and "-m" in argv:
+        index = argv.index("-m")
+        if index + 1 >= len(argv) or argv[index + 1] not in {"pytest", "py_compile"}:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("PYTHON_MODULE_DENY")
+    if argv[0] == "/usr/bin/git" and any(
+        token in {"push", "update-ref", "commit", "merge", "rebase", "reset", "clean", "branch"}
+        for token in argv[1:]
+    ):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("GIT_MUTATION_DENY")
+    timeout = int(item.get("timeout_seconds") or 300)
+    if not 1 <= timeout <= 1800:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("COMMAND_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
+    cwd = root if item.get("cwd", ".") == "." else resolve_under(root, str(item.get("cwd")))
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        cwd=cwd,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=False,
+        timeout=timeout,
+        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
+    )
+    result = {
+        "label": str(item.get("label") or "command"),
+        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
+        "stdout_sha256": sha256(completed.stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "stderr_sha256": sha256(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
+        "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
+    }
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError(
+            "COMMAND_FAILED:" + result["label"] + ":" + str(completed.returncode)
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def apply_changes(request: Mapping[str, Any], root: Path) -> list[str]:
+    changes = request.get("change_set")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not changes:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    changed: list[str] = []
+    for change in changes:
+        if not isinstance(change, Mapping):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_INVALID")
+        relative = safe_relative(change.get("path"))
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        current = path.read_bytes() if path.is_file() else None
+        expected = change.get("expected_sha256")
+        if expected is not None and (current is None or sha256(current) != expected):
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_DRIFT:" + relative)
+        operation = change.get("operation")
+        if operation == "write_file":
+            content = change.get("content")
+            if not isinstance(content, str):
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("WRITE_CONTENT_INVALID")
+            path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "replace_text":
+            if current is None:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_SOURCE_MISSING")
+            old = str(change.get("old"))
+            new = str(change.get("new"))
+            count = int(change.get("count", 1))
+            text = current.decode("utf-8")
+            if text.count(old) != count:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("REPLACE_COUNT_INVALID:" + relative)
+            path.write_text(text.replace(old, new), encoding="utf-8")
+        elif operation == "delete_file":
+            if path.exists():
+                path.unlink()
+        else:
+            raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGE_OPERATION_INVALID")
+        changed.append(relative)
+    return sorted(set(changed))
+
+
+def changed_bundle(root: Path, changed: list[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    files = []
+    for relative in changed:
+        path = resolve_under(root, relative)
+        if path.exists():
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                raise IsolatedExecutorError("CHANGED_FILE_TOO_LARGE:" + relative)
+            files.append({
+                "path": relative,
+                "deleted": False,
+                "sha256": sha256(data),
+                "content_b64": base64.b64encode(data).decode("ascii"),
+            })
+        else:
+            files.append({"path": relative, "deleted": True, "sha256": None, "content_b64": None})
+    return files
+
+
+def execute_request(request_path: Path, result_path: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    request = json.loads(request_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if request.get("schema") != "aios.isolated-execution.request.v1":
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+    request_id = request.get("request_id")
+    if not isinstance(request_id, str) or not REQUEST_ID_RE.fullmatch(request_id):
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("REQUEST_ID_INVALID")
+    source_archive = Path(str(request.get("source_archive") or ""))
+    if not source_archive.is_absolute():
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_PATH_INVALID")
+    expected_archive_sha = str(request.get("source_archive_sha256") or "")
+    if sha256(source_archive.read_bytes()) != expected_archive_sha:
+        raise IsolatedExecutorError("SOURCE_ARCHIVE_SHA_MISMATCH")
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="aios-isolated-executor-") as temporary:
+        root = Path(temporary) / "workspace"
+        root.mkdir()
+        extract_source(source_archive, root)
+        changed = apply_changes(request, root)
+        commands = [
+            run_command(item, root)
+            for item in request.get("verification", [])
+            if isinstance(item, Mapping)
+        ]
+        result = {
+            "schema": "aios.isolated-execution.result.v1",
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "request_sha256": sha256(canonical(request)),
+            "changed_files": changed_bundle(root, changed),
+            "verification": commands,
+            "credential_isolation": {
+                "credential_env_absent": True,
+                "credential_mount_inaccessible": True,
+                "governed_bridge_unreachable": True,
+            },
+        }
+        result["result_sha256"] = sha256(canonical(result))
+        temporary_result = result_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary_result.write_text(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")), encoding="utf-8")
+        os.replace(temporary_result, result_path)
+
+
+def serve(root: Path) -> None:
+    assert_uncredentialed()
+    requests = root / "requests"
+    results = root / "results"
+    failed = root / "failed"
+    for path in (requests, results, failed):
+        path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    while True:
+        for request in sorted(requests.glob("*.json")):
+            if request.is_symlink():
+                continue
+            result = results / request.name
+            try:
+                execute_request(request, result)
+                request.unlink()
+            except Exception as exc:
+                (failed / request.name).write_text(
+                    json.dumps({"error": str(exc) or type(exc).__name__}, sort_keys=True),
+                    encoding="utf-8",
+                )
+                request.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    import argparse
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--root", default="/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor")
+    parser.add_argument("--request")
+    parser.add_argument("--result")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.request and args.result:
+        execute_request(Path(args.request), Path(args.result))
+    else:
+        serve(Path(args.root))

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+"""Durable checkpoint journal for the generic Online Agent worker.
+
+The JSON task state remains a fast cache.  This SQLite journal is the durable,
+append-only evidence used for restart/resume/replay decisions.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+PHASE_ORDER = {
+    "claimed": 10,
+    "workspace_prepared": 20,
+    "verification_passed": 30,
+    "source_capture_done": 40,
+    "commit_done": 40,
+    "reconciliation_required": 45,
+    "result_pending": 50,
+    "result_submitted": 60,
+}
+
+
+class CheckpointError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sha256_json(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CheckpointBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    attempt: int
+    execution_digest: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    generation: int
+
+    def material(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "attempt": self.attempt,
+            "execution_digest": self.execution_digest,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "base_oid": self.base_oid,
+            "expected_branch_oid": self.expected_branch_oid,
+            "target_branch": self.target_branch,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+        }
+
+    @property
+    def binding_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return sha256_json(self.material())
+
+
+class CheckpointStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoints(
+                  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  job_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  repository TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  base_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  expected_branch_oid TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  target_branch TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  PRIMARY KEY(task_id, attempt, sequence)
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_task_latest
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt DESC, sequence DESC);
+                CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_checkpoints_exact_replay
+                  ON checkpoints(task_id, attempt, phase, payload_sha256);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                  attempt INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  phase TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  phase_order INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                  execution_digest TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  binding_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _phase_order(phase: str) -> int:
+        try:
+            return PHASE_ORDER[phase]
+        except KeyError as exc:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_INVALID") from exc
+
+    def append(
+        self,
+        binding: CheckpointBinding,
+        phase: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        order = self._phase_order(phase)
+        payload_value = dict(payload)
+        payload_sha = sha256_json(payload_value)
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            connection.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND phase=? AND payload_sha256=?
+                """,
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, phase, payload_sha),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                connection.commit()
+                return dict(replay)
+
+            head = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoint_heads WHERE task_id=?",
+                (binding.task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if head is not None:
+                head_attempt = int(head["attempt"])
+                head_order = int(head["phase_order"])
+                if binding.attempt < head_attempt:
+                    raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_ATTEMPT_REGRESSION")
+                if binding.attempt == head_attempt:
+                    if head["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_EXECUTION_DIGEST_CONFLICT")
+                    if head["binding_sha256"] != binding.binding_sha256:
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+                    if order < head_order and phase != "reconciliation_required":
+                        raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_PHASE_REGRESSION")
+                    sequence = int(head["sequence"]) + 1
+                else:
+                    sequence = 1
+            else:
+                sequence = 1
+
+            created_at = now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoints(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,job_id,
+                  repository,base_oid,expected_branch_oid,target_branch,generation,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_json,payload_sha256,created_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.job_id,
+                    binding.repository,
+                    binding.base_oid,
+                    binding.expected_branch_oid,
+                    binding.target_branch,
+                    binding.generation,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    canonical(payload_value).decode("utf-8"),
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO checkpoint_heads(
+                  task_id,attempt,sequence,phase,phase_order,execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256,payload_sha256,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                  attempt=excluded.attempt,
+                  sequence=excluded.sequence,
+                  phase=excluded.phase,
+                  phase_order=excluded.phase_order,
+                  execution_digest=excluded.execution_digest,
+                  binding_sha256=excluded.binding_sha256,
+                  payload_sha256=excluded.payload_sha256,
+                  updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    binding.task_id,
+                    binding.attempt,
+                    sequence,
+                    phase,
+                    order,
+                    binding.execution_digest,
+                    binding.binding_sha256,
+                    payload_sha,
+                    created_at,
+                ),
+            )
+            connection.commit()
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM checkpoints WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=? AND sequence=?",
+                (binding.task_id, binding.attempt, sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            return dict(row)
+
+    def latest(self, task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=?
+                 ORDER BY attempt DESC, sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def latest_for_attempt(self, task_id: str, attempt: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        with self._connect() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT * FROM checkpoints
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND attempt=?
+                 ORDER BY sequence DESC
+                 LIMIT 1
+                """,
+                (task_id, attempt),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                return None
+            value = dict(row)
+            value["payload"] = json.loads(value.pop("payload_json"))
+            return value
+
+    def verify_latest_binding(self, binding: CheckpointBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        value = self.latest(binding.task_id)
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        if int(value["attempt"]) > binding.attempt:
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_FUTURE_ATTEMPT")
+        # A previous attempt may be reused only when the immutable execution/scope binding matches.
+        if value["execution_digest"] != binding.execution_digest:
+            return None
+        expected = CheckpointBinding(
+            task_id=value["task_id"],
+            attempt=int(value["attempt"]),
+            execution_digest=value["execution_digest"],
+            job_id=value["job_id"],
+            repository=value["repository"],
+            base_oid=value["base_oid"],
+            expected_branch_oid=value["expected_branch_oid"],
+            target_branch=value["target_branch"],
+            generation=int(value["generation"]),
+        )
+        current_scope = binding.material()
+        historical_scope = expected.material()
+        current_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        historical_scope.pop("attempt", None)
+        if sha256_json(current_scope) != sha256_json(historical_scope):
+            raise CheckpointError("CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return value

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_compact_map.py

@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+"""Bounded read-only repository interface map for governed Online Agent analysis.
+
+The compact map intentionally returns symbols and short source excerpts rather than a
+source archive. It is designed for control-plane consumers that cannot safely ingest a
+multi-megabyte repository snapshot.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ast
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+
+SCHEMA = "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1"
+MAX_RESULT_BYTES = 120 * 1024
+TARGET_RESULT_BYTES = 108 * 1024
+MAX_MODULES = 40
+MAX_SYMBOLS = 80
+MAX_TESTS = 40
+MAX_EXCERPTS = 25
+MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS = 1200
+MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
+
+ROOTS = (
+    "active-runtime/app",
+    "runtime/agent-os",
+    "tests",
+    "db/migrations",
+    "migrations",
+    "deploy/systemd",
+    "docs/task-plane",
+    "docs/superpowers/specs",
+)
+SUFFIXES = {".py", ".sql", ".service", ".md", ".json", ".yaml", ".yml"}
+
+DEFAULT_TERMS = {
+    "agent", "worker", "fleet", "scheduler", "scheduling", "task", "claim", "lease",
+    "heartbeat", "capacity", "concurrency", "priority", "fairness", "queue", "retry",
+    "backoff", "circuit", "health", "liveness", "scope", "tenant", "project", "trace",
+    "message", "checkpoint", "recovery", "idempotency", "dispatch", "assignment",
+}
+CONTRACT_TERMS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION": ("agent", "register", "worker", "capability", "version"),
+    "FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING": ("capacity", "slot", "concurrency", "scheduler", "queue"),
+    "FLEET_FAIRNESS": ("fair", "priority", "queue", "tenant", "project", "starvation"),
+    "FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION": ("failure", "health", "liveness", "timeout", "circuit", "poison"),
+    "FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT": ("reassign", "assignment", "claim", "lease", "retry", "worker"),
+    "FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION": ("tenant", "project", "scope", "conversation", "task", "run"),
+    "FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH": ("idempot", "dispatch", "claim", "lease", "result", "attempt"),
+    "FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY": ("checkpoint", "resume", "recover", "retry", "cleanup", "receipt"),
+}
+SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|"
+    r"(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^'\"\s,;]+)"
+)
+SQL_TABLE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?is)\bcreate\s+table\s+(?:if\s+not\s+exists\s+)?[\"`[]?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*)"
+)
+
+
+class CompactInterfaceMapError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _sha(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _bounded_excerpt(text: str, start_line: int, end_line: int) -> str:
+    lines = text.splitlines()
+    start = max(0, start_line - 2)
+    end = min(len(lines), max(end_line + 1, start + 1))
+    excerpt = "\n".join(lines[start:end])
+    excerpt = SENSITIVE_RE.sub("<redacted-sensitive-source-pattern>", excerpt)
+    if len(excerpt) > MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS:
+        excerpt = excerpt[: MAX_EXCERPT_CHARS - 1] + "…"
+    return excerpt
+
+
+def _signal_terms(signals: Sequence[str]) -> set[str]:
+    terms = set(DEFAULT_TERMS)
+    for signal in signals:
+        if not isinstance(signal, str):
+            continue
+        terms.update(
+            token.lower()
+            for token in re.findall(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{2,63}", signal)
+        )
+    return set(sorted(terms)[:96])
+
+
+def _candidate_files(root: Path, terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    root = root.resolve()
+    candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for relative_root in ROOTS:
+        directory = (root / relative_root).resolve(strict=False)
+        if directory == root or root not in directory.parents:
+            raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if not directory.is_dir() or directory.is_symlink():
+            continue
+        for path in sorted(directory.rglob("*")):
+            if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.suffix.lower() not in SUFFIXES:
+                continue
+            resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
+            if root not in resolved.parents:
+                raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_PATH_ESCAPE")
+            data = path.read_bytes()
+            if len(data) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
+                continue
+            relative = path.relative_to(root).as_posix()
+            text = data.decode("utf-8", "ignore")
+            searchable = (relative + "\n" + text[:384000]).lower()
+            matched = sorted(term for term in terms if term in searchable)
+            if not matched:
+                continue
+            path_bonus = sum(3 for term in terms if term in relative.lower())
+            test_bonus = 3 if relative.startswith("tests/") else 0
+            score = min(250, len(matched) + path_bonus + test_bonus)
+            candidates.append(
+                {
+                    "path": relative,
+                    "sha256": _sha(data),
+                    "bytes": len(data),
+                    "score": score,
+                    "text": text,
+                    "suffix": path.suffix.lower(),
+                }
+            )
+    candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (-item["score"], item["path"]))
+    return candidates
+
+
+def _python_symbols(item: Mapping[str, Any], terms: set[str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    try:
+        tree = ast.parse(str(item["text"]), filename=str(item["path"]))
+    except SyntaxError:
+        return []
+    result: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    class Visitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.stack: list[str] = []
+
+        def _record(self, node: ast.AST, kind: str, name: str) -> None:
+            qualified = ".".join([*self.stack, name]) if self.stack else name
+            haystack = f"{item['path']} {qualified}".lower()
+            score = sum(3 if term in haystack else 0 for term in terms)
+            if name.startswith("test_"):
+                score += 12
+            result.append(
+                {
+                    "path": item["path"],
+                    "symbol": qualified,
+                    "kind": kind,
+                    "line": int(getattr(node, "lineno", 1)),
+                    "end_line": int(getattr(node, "end_lineno", getattr(node, "lineno", 1))),
+                    "score": score + int(item["score"]),
+                }
+            )
+
+        def visit_ClassDef(self, node: ast.ClassDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "class", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+        def visit_AsyncFunctionDef(self, node: ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> Any:
+            self._record(node, "async_function", node.name)
+            self.stack.append(node.name)
+            self.generic_visit(node)
+            self.stack.pop()
+
+    Visitor().visit(tree)
+    return result
+
+
+def _surface_ref(symbol: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    return f"{symbol['path']}::{symbol['symbol']}"
+
+
+def _contract_map(
+    symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+    modules: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    module_paths = [str(item["path"]) for item in modules]
+    for contract, terms in CONTRACT_TERMS.items():
+        scored: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+        for symbol in symbols:
+            haystack = _surface_ref(symbol).lower()
+            score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in haystack)
+            if score:
+                scored.append((score, _surface_ref(symbol)))
+        scored.sort(key=lambda item: (-item[0], item[1]))
+        surfaces = [value for _, value in scored[:6]]
+        if not surfaces:
+            for path in module_paths:
+                score = sum(1 for term in terms if term in path.lower())
+                if score:
+                    surfaces.append(path)
+                if len(surfaces) == 6:
+                    break
+        result[contract] = {
+            "status": "PARTIAL" if surfaces else "GAP",
+            "surfaces": surfaces,
+        }
+    return result
+
+
+def _gap_evidence(symbols: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]]) -> tuple[list[str], list[str], list[str]]:
+    haystack = "\n".join(_surface_ref(item).lower() for item in symbols)
+
+    invariants = [
+        "Online Task claim/heartbeat remains the authoritative worker ownership boundary.",
+        "Governed mutation remains separated from read-only analysis and requires WriterLease.",
+        "P1 attempt-aware result idempotency and durable checkpoint recovery are reusable fleet primitives.",
+        "Scope/trace/message lineage must remain attached when work is scheduled or reassigned.",
+    ]
+    failure_windows: list[str] = []
+    if "scheduler" not in haystack:
+        failure_windows.append("No first-class durable fleet scheduler symbol detected; worker-local polling may still be the scheduling mechanism.")
+    if "capacity" not in haystack and "slot" not in haystack:
+        failure_windows.append("No explicit durable worker-capacity/slot primitive detected.")
+    if "fair" not in haystack and "starvation" not in haystack:
+        failure_windows.append("No explicit fairness/starvation policy symbol detected.")
+    if "circuit" not in haystack:
+        failure_windows.append("No explicit circuit-breaker primitive detected for repeated worker/task failures.")
+    if "reassign" not in haystack:
+        failure_windows.append("No explicit worker-reassignment primitive detected beyond lease expiry/retry semantics.")
+
+    reuse_points: list[str] = []
+    desired = (
+        ("checkpoint", "P1 durable checkpoint/resume"),
+        ("message", "P0-B MessageEnvelope/handoff"),
+        ("trace", "P0-C trace correlation"),
+        ("scope", "P0-A scope isolation"),
+        ("lease", "claim/WriterLease ownership"),
+        ("heartbeat", "worker liveness"),
+        ("idempot", "retry-safe dispatch/result"),
+    )
+    for token, label in desired:
+        match = next((item for item in symbols if token in _surface_ref(item).lower()), None)
+        if match is not None:
+            reuse_points.append(f"{label}: {_surface_ref(match)}")
+    return invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points
+
+
+def _trim_to_budget(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def size() -> int:
+        return len(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and value["bounded_excerpts"]:
+        value["bounded_excerpts"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["functions"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["functions"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["classes"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["classes"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["tests"]) > 15:
+        value["implementation_map"]["tests"].pop()
+    while size() > TARGET_RESULT_BYTES and len(value["implementation_map"]["modules"]) > 20:
+        value["implementation_map"]["modules"].pop()
+    final_size = size()
+    if final_size > MAX_RESULT_BYTES:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_RESULT_TOO_LARGE")
+    value["result_bytes"] = final_size
+    return value
+
+
+def build_compact_interface_map(
+    worktree: Path,
+    source_signals: Sequence[str],
+    *,
+    source_commit: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    root = Path(worktree)
+    if not root.is_dir() or root.is_symlink():
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_WORKTREE_INVALID")
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", source_commit) is None:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_SOURCE_COMMIT_INVALID")
+
+    terms = _signal_terms(source_signals)
+    candidates = _candidate_files(root, terms)
+    if not candidates:
+        raise CompactInterfaceMapError("INTERFACE_MAP_EMPTY")
+
+    module_candidates = candidates[:MAX_MODULES]
+    modules = [
+        {
+            "path": item["path"],
+            "sha256": item["sha256"],
+            "bytes": item["bytes"],
+            "score": item["score"],
+        }
+        for item in module_candidates
+    ]
+
+    symbols: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    tables: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    systemd_units: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for item in candidates:
+        if item["suffix"] == ".py":
+            symbols.extend(_python_symbols(item, terms))
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".sql":
+            for table in SQL_TABLE_RE.findall(str(item["text"])):
+                tables.append({"path": item["path"], "table": table, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+        elif item["suffix"] == ".service":
+            systemd_units.append({"path": item["path"], "unit": Path(str(item["path"])).name, "sha256": item["sha256"]})
+
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    all_symbols = list(symbols)
+    test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][: min(MAX_TESTS, 24)]
+    non_test_symbols = [
+        item for item in all_symbols
+        if item not in test_symbols
+    ][: max(0, MAX_SYMBOLS - len(test_symbols))]
+    symbols = [*test_symbols, *non_test_symbols]
+    symbols.sort(key=lambda item: (-int(item["score"]), str(item["path"]), str(item["symbol"])))
+    classes = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] == "class"
+    ]
+    functions = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if item["kind"] in {"function", "async_function"} and not str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ]
+    tests = [
+        {k: item[k] for k in ("path", "symbol", "line", "end_line")}
+        for item in symbols
+        if str(item["path"]).startswith("tests/") or str(item["symbol"]).split(".")[-1].startswith("test_")
+    ][:MAX_TESTS]
+
+    excerpts: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    by_path = {str(item["path"]): item for item in candidates}
+    for symbol in symbols:
+        if len(excerpts) == MAX_EXCERPTS:
+            break
+        item = by_path.get(str(symbol["path"]))
+        if item is None:
+            continue
+        excerpt = _bounded_excerpt(str(item["text"]), int(symbol["line"]), int(symbol["end_line"]))
+        if not excerpt.strip():
+            continue
+        excerpts.append(
+            {
+                "path": symbol["path"],
+                "symbol": symbol["symbol"],
+                "sha256": item["sha256"],
+                "excerpt": excerpt,
+            }
+        )
+
+    invariants, failure_windows, reuse_points = _gap_evidence(all_symbols)
+    result = {
+        "schema": SCHEMA,
+        "source_commit": source_commit,
+        "implementation_map": {
+            "modules": modules,
+            "classes": classes[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "functions": functions[:MAX_SYMBOLS],
+            "tables": tables[:40],
+            "systemd_units": systemd_units[:20],
+            "tests": tests,
+            "current_invariants": invariants,
+            "failure_windows": failure_windows,
+            "reuse_points": reuse_points,
+        },
+        "bounded_excerpts": excerpts,
+        "contracts": _contract_map(all_symbols, modules),
+    }
+    return _trim_to_budget(result)

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_execution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+"""Canonical governed execution projection for Online Agent Tasks.
+
+The durable governed binding is authoritative.  Natural-language task fields and
+worker configuration are never allowed to invent repository, ref, generation, or
+idempotency coordinates.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+
+EXECUTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.execution.v2"
+PROJECTION_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.task-projection.v1"
+OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+TASK_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
+BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$")
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}$")
+PROTECTED_PREFIXES = ("main", "master", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "baseline/", "production/")
+MUTATION_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic"})
+SUPPORTED_ACTIONS = frozenset({"deterministic", "source_capture"})
+
+
+class ExecutionProjectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """A canonical fail-closed projection or validation error."""
+
+
+class OnlineTaskProjectionClient:
+    """Official HTTP projection client using only a control credential reference."""
+
+    def __init__(self, api_base: str, control_token_path: Path) -> None:
+        self.api_base = api_base.rstrip("/")
+        self.control_token_path = Path(control_token_path)
+
+    def _token(self) -> str:
+        path = self.control_token_path
+        if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file():
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_UNAVAILABLE")
+        value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+        if len(value) < 32:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_CONTROL_INVALID")
+        return value
+
+    def create(
+        self,
+        projected_task: Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        binding: "GovernedExecutionBinding",
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        body = dict(projected_task)
+        payload = _canonical(body).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            self.api_base + "/v1/tasks",
+            method="POST",
+            data=payload,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer " + self._token(),
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Accept": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
+                result = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+                status = response.status
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+            try:
+                error = json.loads(raw).get("error")
+            except (AttributeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                error = "HTTP_ERROR"
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError(f"ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_FAILED:{exc.code}:{error}") from exc
+        except (OSError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
+            raise ExecutionProjectionError("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
+        if status not in {200, 201} or not isinstance(result, dict):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        if result.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or result.get("status") not in {"QUEUED", "VERIFYING", "SUCCEEDED"}:
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        metadata = result.get("metadata")
+        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID")
+        returned_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        submitted_metadata = _object(body.get("metadata"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID")
+        submitted_execution = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(submitted_metadata.get("execution"), "ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_REQUEST_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+        )
+        if _canonical(returned_execution) != _canonical(submitted_execution):
+            _error("ONLINE_TASK_PROJECTION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID")
+        return result
+
+
+def _error(code: str) -> None:
+    raise ExecutionProjectionError(code)
+
+
+def _object(value: object, code: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        _error(code)
+    return dict(value)
+
+
+def _string(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+        _error(code)
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+def _task_id(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    if TASK_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error("TASK_ID_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _oid(value: object, code: str) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, code)
+    if OID_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+        _error(code)
+    return value
+
+
+def _branch(value: object) -> str:
+    value = _string(value, "TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    if BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value) is None or value.startswith(PROTECTED_PREFIXES):
+        _error("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _generation(value: object) -> int:
+    if not isinstance(value, int) or isinstance(value, bool) or value < 1:
+        _error("GENERATION_INVALID")
+    return value
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _source_signals(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Normalize untrusted natural-language hints before they enter a signed envelope."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    result: list[str] = []
+    for item in value:
+        if not isinstance(item, str):
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+        text = " ".join(item.split()).strip()
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        # Projection may accept long task prose, but execution envelopes stay bounded.
+        text = text[:512].rstrip()
+        if text not in result:
+            result.append(text)
+        if len(result) == 16:
+            break
+    return tuple(result)
+
+
+def _capabilities(value: object) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    result = tuple(sorted({_string(item, "CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID") for item in value}))
+    if any(len(item) > 120 for item in result):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+    return result
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    repository: str
+    base_oid: str
+    expected_branch_oid: str
+    target_branch: str
+    branch_mode: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_mapping(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "GovernedExecutionBinding":
+        data = dict(value)
+        task_id = _task_id(data.get("task_id"))
+        job_id = _string(data.get("job_id"), "JOB_ID_REQUIRED")
+        if TASK_RE.fullmatch(job_id) is None:
+            _error("JOB_ID_INVALID")
+        repository = _string(data.get("repository"), "REPOSITORY_INVALID")
+        if repository != "aios/aios":
+            _error("WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY")
+        base_oid = _oid(data.get("base_oid"), "BASE_OID_INVALID")
+        expected = _oid(data.get("expected_branch_oid"), "EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_INVALID")
+        target = _branch(data.get("target_branch"))
+        mode = _string(data.get("branch_mode"), "BRANCH_MODE_MISSING")
+        if mode not in {"CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"}:
+            _error("BRANCH_MODE_INVALID")
+        generation = _generation(data.get("generation"))
+        if mode == "CREATE_NEW" and expected != base_oid:
+            _error("EXPECTED_BASE_CONFLICT")
+        key = _string(data.get("idempotency_key"), "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        if KEY_RE.fullmatch(key) is None:
+            _error("IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+        return cls(task_id, job_id, repository, base_oid, expected, target, mode, generation, key)
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+def binding_from_bootstrap(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(value)
+
+
+def validate_execution_envelope(
+    value: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding | None = None,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    envelope = dict(value)
+    if envelope.get("schema") != EXECUTION_SCHEMA:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA_VALIDATION")
+    candidate = GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(envelope)
+    if binding is not None and candidate != binding:
+        comparisons = (
+            (candidate.task_id, binding.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.job_id, binding.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.repository, binding.repository, "WRONG_REPOSITORY_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.base_oid, binding.base_oid, "WRONG_BASE_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.expected_branch_oid, binding.expected_branch_oid, "WRONG_EXPECTED_HEAD_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.target_branch, binding.target_branch, "WRONG_BRANCH_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.generation, binding.generation, "WRONG_GENERATION_ENVELOPE_DENY"),
+            (candidate.branch_mode, binding.branch_mode, "BRANCH_MODE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+            (candidate.idempotency_key, binding.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        )
+        for actual, expected, code in comparisons:
+            if actual != expected:
+                _error(code)
+    action = _string(envelope.get("action"), "EXECUTION_ACTION_MISSING")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capability_scope = _capabilities(envelope.get("capability_scope"))
+    if worker_capabilities is not None and not set(capability_scope).issubset(set(worker_capabilities)):
+        _error("CAPABILITY_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    workspace = _object(envelope.get("workspace"), "WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    if workspace.get("authority_git_dir") != "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git" or workspace.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
+        _error("WORKSPACE_POLICY_DENY")
+    governance = _object(envelope.get("governance"), "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED")
+    governed_coordinates = (
+        (governance.get("task_id"), candidate.task_id, "TASK_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("job_id"), candidate.job_id, "JOB_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        (governance.get("idempotency_key"), candidate.idempotency_key, "IDEMPOTENCY_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    )
+    for actual_coordinate, expected_coordinate, code in governed_coordinates:
+        if actual_coordinate != expected_coordinate:
+            _error(code)
+    commit_key = _string(governance.get("commit_idempotency_key"), "COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if KEY_RE.fullmatch(commit_key) is None:
+        _error("COMMIT_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID")
+    if governance.get("writer_lease") is not (action in MUTATION_ACTIONS):
+        _error("WRITER_LEASE_POLICY_DENY")
+    for field in ("main_write", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "force_push", "protected_ref_bypass"):
+        if governance.get(field, False) is not False:
+            _error("POLICY_DENY")
+    changes = envelope.get("change_set")
+    verification = envelope.get("verification")
+    if not isinstance(changes, list) or not isinstance(verification, list):
+        _error("EXECUTION_OPERATIONS_INVALID")
+    if action == "source_capture":
+        if changes or verification:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY")
+        signals = list(_source_signals(envelope.get("source_signals") or []))
+        if envelope.get("source_signals") != signals:
+            _error("SOURCE_CAPTURE_SIGNALS_INVALID")
+    elif not changes:
+        _error("CHANGE_SET_INVALID")
+    declared = str(envelope.get("execution_digest") or "")
+    material = {key: item for key, item in envelope.items() if key != "execution_digest"}
+    actual = _digest(material)
+    if declared != actual:
+        _error("EXECUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
+    return {**material, "execution_digest": actual}
+
+
+def project_execution_envelope(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    *,
+    required_capabilities: Sequence[str] = (),
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(execution_request or {})
+    action = str(request.get("action") or "source_capture")
+    if action not in SUPPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        _error("EXECUTION_ACTION_UNSUPPORTED")
+    capabilities = _capabilities(request.get("capability_scope", required_capabilities))
+    governance = {
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "idempotency_key": binding.idempotency_key,
+        "commit_idempotency_key": str(request.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{binding.task_id}-commit-g{binding.generation}"),
+        "writer_lease": action in MUTATION_ACTIONS,
+        "main_write": False,
+        "production_write": False,
+        "tag_write": False,
+        "baseline_write": False,
+        "force_push": False,
+        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
+    }
+    supplied_governance = request.get("governance")
+    if supplied_governance is not None:
+        governance.update(_object(supplied_governance, "GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED"))
+    material: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema": EXECUTION_SCHEMA,
+        **binding.public(),
+        "action": action,
+        "adapter": str(request.get("adapter") or ("deterministic" if action == "deterministic" else "source_capture")),
+        "capability_scope": list(capabilities),
+        "change_set": list(request.get("change_set") or []),
+        "verification": list(request.get("verification") or []),
+        "source_signals": list(_source_signals(request.get("source_signals") or [])) if action == "source_capture" else [],
+        "governance": governance,
+        "workspace": {
+            "authority_git_dir": "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git",
+            "read_only_repository": True,
+            "cleanup_policy": "always",
+        },
+    }
+    envelope = {**material, "execution_digest": _digest(material)}
+    return validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding)
+
+
+def project_online_task(
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    task_request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    execution_request: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    request = dict(task_request)
+    required = _capabilities(request.get("required_capabilities"))
+    execution = project_execution_envelope(binding, execution_request, required_capabilities=required)
+    metadata = dict(request.get("metadata") or {})
+    if "execution" in metadata:
+        validate_execution_envelope(_object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"), binding=binding)
+        if metadata["execution"] != execution:
+            _error("EXECUTION_PROJECTION_CONFLICT")
+    metadata["execution"] = execution
+    metadata["execution_projection"] = {
+        "schema": PROJECTION_SCHEMA,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "job_id": binding.job_id,
+        "execution_digest": execution["execution_digest"],
+    }
+    return {
+        **request,
+        "task_id": binding.task_id,
+        "metadata": metadata,
+        "required_capabilities": list(required),
+        "idempotency_key": str(request.get("idempotency_key") or f"online-task:{binding.idempotency_key}"),
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_task_execution(
+    task: Mapping[str, Any],
+    binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    *,
+    worker_capabilities: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], str]:
+    metadata = task.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and "execution" in metadata:
+        value = validate_execution_envelope(
+            _object(metadata["execution"], "EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_INVALID"),
+            binding=binding,
+            worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities,
+        )
+        return value, "persisted"
+    projected = project_execution_envelope(
+        binding,
+        {"action": "source_capture", "capability_scope": task.get("required_capabilities") or []},
+        required_capabilities=task.get("required_capabilities") or [],
+    )
+    validate_execution_envelope(projected, binding=binding, worker_capabilities=worker_capabilities)
+    return projected, "recovered_projection"

active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_plan_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Durable, authority-bound deterministic execution plans for Online Agent Tasks."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import fcntl
+import hashlib
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+)
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _digest(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _task_key(task_id: str) -> str:
+    readable = "".join(ch if ch.isalnum() or ch in "._-" else "-" for ch in task_id).strip("-")[:72] or "task"
+    return readable + "-" + hashlib.sha256(task_id.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:24]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecutionPlanRecord:
+    task_id: str
+    job_id: str
+    source_head_oid: str
+    generation: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    plan_digest: str
+    execution: dict[str, Any]
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "schema": "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1",
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "job_id": self.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": self.source_head_oid,
+            "generation": self.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "plan_digest": self.plan_digest,
+            "execution": dict(self.execution),
+        }
+
+
+class ExecutionPlanStore:
+    def __init__(self, root: Path) -> None:
+        self.root = Path(root)
+        self.root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    def _path(self, task_id: str) -> Path:
+        return self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".json")
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _lock(self, task_id: str):
+        path = self.root / (_task_key(task_id) + ".lock")
+        with path.open("a+b") as handle:
+            fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            try:
+                yield
+            finally:
+                fcntl.flock(handle.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _source_head(binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> str:
+        return binding.expected_branch_oid if binding.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING" else binding.base_oid
+
+    def _read(self, task_id: str) -> ExecutionPlanRecord | None:
+        path = self._path(task_id)
+        if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
+            return None
+        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan-record.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        execution = value.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_RECORD_INVALID")
+        return ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=str(value.get("task_id") or ""),
+            job_id=str(value.get("job_id") or ""),
+            source_head_oid=str(value.get("source_head_oid") or ""),
+            generation=int(value.get("generation") or 0),
+            idempotency_key=str(value.get("idempotency_key") or ""),
+            plan_digest=str(value.get("plan_digest") or ""),
+            execution=dict(execution),
+        )
+
+    def register(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self._lock(binding.task_id):
+            return self._register_locked(binding, request)
+
+    def _register_locked(
+        self,
+        binding: GovernedExecutionBinding,
+        request: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if request.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.plan.v1":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SCHEMA_INVALID")
+        if request.get("task_id") != binding.task_id or request.get("job_id") != binding.job_id:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if int(request.get("generation") or 0) != binding.generation:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_GENERATION_CONFLICT")
+        source_head = str(request.get("source_head_oid") or "")
+        if source_head != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_CONFLICT")
+        key = str(request.get("idempotency_key") or "")
+        if len(key) < 8:
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_INVALID")
+        execution_request = request.get("execution")
+        if not isinstance(execution_request, Mapping) or execution_request.get("action") != "deterministic":
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_DETERMINISTIC_REQUIRED")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, execution_request)
+        material = {
+            "task_id": binding.task_id,
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "source_head_oid": source_head,
+            "generation": binding.generation,
+            "idempotency_key": key,
+            "execution": dict(execution_request),
+        }
+        plan_digest = _digest(material)
+        existing = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        expected_previous = request.get("expected_previous_plan_digest")
+        if existing is not None:
+            if existing.idempotency_key == key:
+                if existing.plan_digest != plan_digest:
+                    raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                return {**existing.public(), "idempotent": True, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+            if expected_previous != existing.plan_digest:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            if existing.source_head_oid != source_head:
+                raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_STALE_REPLACEMENT_DENY")
+        elif expected_previous not in (None, ""):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH")
+
+        record = ExecutionPlanRecord(
+            task_id=binding.task_id,
+            job_id=binding.job_id,
+            source_head_oid=source_head,
+            generation=binding.generation,
+            idempotency_key=key,
+            plan_digest=plan_digest,
+            execution=dict(execution_request),
+        )
+        path = self._path(binding.task_id)
+        temporary = path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        temporary.write_text(
+            json.dumps(record.public(), sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        temporary.replace(path)
+        return {**record.public(), "idempotent": False, "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"]}
+
+    def resolve(self, binding: GovernedExecutionBinding) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        record = self._read(binding.task_id)
+        if record is None:
+            return None
+        if (
+            record.task_id != binding.task_id
+            or record.job_id != binding.job_id
+            or record.generation != binding.generation
+        ):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_BINDING_CONFLICT")
+        if record.source_head_oid != self._source_head(binding):
+            raise ExecutionPlanError("EXECUTION_PLAN_SOURCE_HEAD_DRIFT")
+        envelope = project_execution_envelope(binding, record.execution)
+        return {
+            "execution": dict(record.execution),
+            "plan_digest": record.plan_digest,
+            "execution_digest": envelope["execution_digest"],
+        }

active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py

@@ -964,6 +964,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
     required = {
         "schema",
         "task_id",
+        "job_id",
         "repository",
         "branch_mode",
         "base_oid",
@@ -976,6 +977,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
         raise ProvisioningError("LEASE_REQUEST_V2_FIELDS_REJECTED", 409)
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
         task_id=str(raw["task_id"]),
+        job_id=str(raw["job_id"]),
         repository=str(raw["repository"]),
         branch_mode=str(raw["branch_mode"]),
         base_oid=str(raw["base_oid"]),
@@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ def validate_writer_lease_request_v2(raw: Mapping[str, Any], probe: Any) -> dict
     return {
         "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
         "task_id": request.task_id,
+        "job_id": request.job_id,
         "repository": request.repository,
         "branch_mode": request.branch_mode,
         "base_oid": request.base_oid,

active-runtime/app/message_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+import datetime as dt
+import hashlib
+import json
+import sqlite3
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+UTC = dt.timezone.utc
+_ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY = frozenset({"public", "tenant", "project", "private", "run"})
+_PRIVILEGED = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "message.admin", "task.admin"})
+
+
+class HandoffError(RuntimeError):
+    code = "HANDOFF_ERROR"
+
+
+class MessageScopeMismatch(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"
+
+
+class ConfidentialityScopeDenied(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"
+
+
+class MessageExpired(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_EXPIRED"
+
+
+class SequenceGap(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT"
+
+
+class SequenceConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_CONFLICT"
+
+
+class IdempotencyConflict(HandoffError):
+    code = "MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"
+
+
+def _utcnow() -> dt.datetime:
+    return dt.datetime.now(UTC)
+
+
+def _iso(value: dt.datetime | str | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    parsed = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00")) if isinstance(value, str) else value
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=UTC)
+    return parsed.astimezone(UTC).isoformat()
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _tuple_scope(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({str(item).strip() for item in value if str(item).strip()}))
+
+
+_SECRET_KEY = re.compile(r"(?i)(?:token|secret|password|private[_-]?key|api[_-]?key)")
+_SECRET_VALUE = re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{8,}|(?:token|secret|password|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+")
+_SAFE_REFERENCE = re.compile(r"^(?:systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+
+
+def assert_payload_secret_safe(value: Any, *, key: str = "") -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        for child_key, child in value.items():
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=str(child_key))
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        for child in value:
+            assert_payload_secret_safe(child, key=key)
+        return
+    if isinstance(value, (bytes, bytearray)):
+        raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if _SECRET_VALUE.search(value):
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        if _SECRET_KEY.search(key) and value and _SAFE_REFERENCE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+            raise ValueError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DeliveryContext:
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_actor(cls, actor: Any) -> "DeliveryContext":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            if isinstance(actor, Mapping):
+                return actor.get(name)
+            return getattr(actor, name, None)
+        return cls(
+            tenant_id=_clean(get("tenant_id")),
+            user_id=_clean(get("user_id")),
+            project_id=_clean(get("project_id")),
+            conversation_id=_clean(get("conversation_id")),
+            run_id=_clean(get("run_id")),
+            capabilities=_tuple_scope(get("capabilities") or get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & _PRIVILEGED)
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MessageEnvelope:
+    source: str
+    target: str
+    message_type: str
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any]
+    sequence: int
+    idempotency_key: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    capability_scope: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    confidentiality_scope: str = "private"
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+    created_at: str = dataclasses.field(default_factory=lambda: _iso(_utcnow()) or "")
+    envelope_id: str = ""
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        assert_payload_secret_safe(self.payload)
+        for field in ("source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key", "tenant_id", "user_id",
+                      "project_id", "conversation_id", "task_id", "run_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id"):
+            object.__setattr__(self, field, _clean(getattr(self, field)) if field not in {
+                "source", "target", "message_type", "idempotency_key"
+            } else (_clean(getattr(self, field)) or ""))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capability_scope", _tuple_scope(self.capability_scope))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "confidentiality_scope", (_clean(self.confidentiality_scope) or "private").lower())
+        object.__setattr__(self, "expires_at", _iso(self.expires_at))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "created_at", _iso(self.created_at) or "")
+        if not self.source or not self.target or not self.message_type or not self.idempotency_key:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_IDENTITY_REQUIRED")
+        if not isinstance(self.sequence, int) or self.sequence < 1:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_MUST_BE_POSITIVE")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope not in _ALLOWED_CONFIDENTIALITY:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope != "public" and self.tenant_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TENANT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and self.project_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PROJECT_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and self.user_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_USER_REQUIRED")
+        if self.confidentiality_scope == "run" and self.run_id is None:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_RUN_REQUIRED")
+        expected = stable_event_id(
+            source=self.source, target=self.target, message_type=self.message_type, payload=self.payload,
+            tenant_id=self.tenant_id, user_id=self.user_id, project_id=self.project_id,
+            conversation_id=self.conversation_id, task_id=self.task_id, run_id=self.run_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id, causation_id=self.causation_id,
+            sequence=self.sequence, idempotency_key=self.idempotency_key,
+        )
+        if self.envelope_id and self.envelope_id != expected:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_ENVELOPE_ID_MISMATCH")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "envelope_id", expected)
+
+    @property
+    def payload_sha256(self) -> str:
+        return _sha(self.payload)
+
+    @property
+    def stream_key(self) -> str:
+        return _sha({
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "source": self.source, "target": self.target,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id, "run_id": self.run_id,
+        })
+
+    def is_expired(self, *, now: dt.datetime | None = None) -> bool:
+        if self.expires_at is None:
+            return False
+        return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at) <= (now or _utcnow()).astimezone(UTC)
+
+    def as_record(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "envelope_id": self.envelope_id, "stream_key": self.stream_key, "source": self.source,
+            "target": self.target, "message_type": self.message_type, "payload_json": _canonical(self.payload),
+            "payload_sha256": self.payload_sha256, "tenant_id": self.tenant_id, "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id, "conversation_id": self.conversation_id, "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id, "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id, "sequence": self.sequence,
+            "capability_scope_json": _canonical(self.capability_scope),
+            "confidentiality_scope": self.confidentiality_scope, "idempotency_key": self.idempotency_key,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at, "created_at": self.created_at,
+        }
+
+
+def stable_event_id(*, source: Any, target: Any, message_type: Any, payload: Any,
+                    tenant_id: Any = None, user_id: Any = None, project_id: Any = None,
+                    conversation_id: Any = None, task_id: Any = None, run_id: Any = None,
+                    correlation_id: Any = None, causation_id: Any = None,
+                    sequence: Any = None, idempotency_key: Any = None) -> str:
+    assert_payload_secret_safe(payload)
+    material = {
+        "source": _clean(source), "target": _clean(target), "message_type": _clean(message_type),
+        "payload_sha256": _sha(payload), "tenant_id": _clean(tenant_id), "user_id": _clean(user_id),
+        "project_id": _clean(project_id), "conversation_id": _clean(conversation_id),
+        "task_id": _clean(task_id), "run_id": _clean(run_id), "causation_id": _clean(causation_id),
+        "sequence": sequence, "idempotency_key": _clean(idempotency_key),
+    }
+    # Preserve historical envelope IDs for legacy rows that predate correlation_id.
+    if _clean(correlation_id) is not None:
+        material["correlation_id"] = _clean(correlation_id)
+    return _sha(material)
+
+
+def bind_envelope_scope(envelope: MessageEnvelope, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return envelope
+    if ctx.tenant_id is None:
+        if envelope.tenant_id is not None:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(MessageScopeMismatch.code)
+        return envelope
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        trusted = getattr(ctx, field)
+        requested = getattr(envelope, field)
+        if requested is not None and requested != trusted:
+            raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:{field}")
+        if requested is None and trusted is not None:
+            updates[field] = trusted
+    if not updates:
+        return envelope
+    data = dataclasses.asdict(envelope)
+    data.update(updates)
+    data["envelope_id"] = ""
+    return MessageEnvelope(**data)
+
+
+def authorize_delivery(actor: Any, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> None:
+    ctx = DeliveryContext.from_actor(actor)
+    if ctx.privileged:
+        return
+    if not set(envelope.capability_scope).issubset(set(ctx.capabilities)):
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:capability")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "public":
+        return
+    if ctx.tenant_id != envelope.tenant_id:
+        raise MessageScopeMismatch(f"{MessageScopeMismatch.code}:tenant_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"project", "private", "run"} and ctx.project_id != envelope.project_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:project_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope in {"private", "run"} and ctx.user_id != envelope.user_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:user_id")
+    if envelope.confidentiality_scope == "run" and ctx.run_id != envelope.run_id:
+        raise ConfidentialityScopeDenied(f"{ConfidentialityScopeDenied.code}:run_id")
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  correlation_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);
+"""
+
+
+class DurableHandoffStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            columns = {str(row[1]) for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(message_handoff)")}
+            if "correlation_id" not in columns:
+                conn.execute("ALTER TABLE message_handoff ADD COLUMN correlation_id TEXT")
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_lineage "
+                "ON message_handoff(correlation_id, causation_id)"
+            )
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return conn
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _from_row(row: sqlite3.Row) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        return MessageEnvelope(
+            source=row["source"], target=row["target"], message_type=row["message_type"],
+            payload=json.loads(row["payload_json"]), tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], user_id=row["user_id"],
+            project_id=row["project_id"], conversation_id=row["conversation_id"], task_id=row["task_id"],
+            run_id=row["run_id"], correlation_id=row["correlation_id"],
+            causation_id=row["causation_id"], sequence=int(row["sequence"]),
+            capability_scope=tuple(json.loads(row["capability_scope_json"])),
+            confidentiality_scope=row["confidentiality_scope"], idempotency_key=row["idempotency_key"],
+            expires_at=row["expires_at"], created_at=row["created_at"], envelope_id=row["envelope_id"],
+        )
+
+    def put(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        if envelope.is_expired():
+            raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+        record = envelope.as_record()
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            replay = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND idempotency_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.idempotency_key),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(replay)
+                if existing.envelope_id != envelope.envelope_id or existing.payload_sha256 != envelope.payload_sha256:
+                    raise IdempotencyConflict(IdempotencyConflict.code)
+                conn.commit()
+                return "REPLAY", existing
+            seq = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=? AND sequence=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key, envelope.sequence),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if seq is not None:
+                existing = self._from_row(seq)
+                if existing.envelope_id == envelope.envelope_id:
+                    conn.commit()
+                    return "REPLAY", existing
+                raise SequenceConflict(SequenceConflict.code)
+            maximum = int(conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(sequence),0) FROM message_handoff WHERE stream_key=?",
+                (envelope.stream_key,),
+            ).fetchone()[0])
+            expected = maximum + 1
+            if envelope.sequence != expected:
+                raise SequenceGap(f"{SequenceGap.code}:expected={expected}:actual={envelope.sequence}")
+            columns = tuple(record)
+            placeholders = ",".join("?" for _ in columns)
+            conn.execute(
+                f"INSERT INTO message_handoff ({','.join(columns)}) VALUES ({placeholders})",
+                tuple(record[column] for column in columns),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            return "CREATED", envelope
+
+    def get(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise KeyError(envelope_id)
+            envelope = self._from_row(row)
+            if envelope.is_expired():
+                conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope_id,))
+                conn.commit()
+                raise MessageExpired(MessageExpired.code)
+            authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+            return envelope
+
+    def pending(self, *, target: str, actor: Any, limit: int = 100) -> list[MessageEnvelope]:
+        if not 1 <= limit <= 1000:
+            raise ValueError("MESSAGE_PENDING_LIMIT_INVALID")
+        visible: list[MessageEnvelope] = []
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM message_handoff WHERE target=? AND status='PENDING' ORDER BY created_at, sequence LIMIT ?",
+                (target, limit),
+            ).fetchall()
+            for row in rows:
+                envelope = self._from_row(row)
+                if envelope.is_expired():
+                    conn.execute("UPDATE message_handoff SET status='EXPIRED' WHERE envelope_id=?", (envelope.envelope_id,))
+                    continue
+                try:
+                    authorize_delivery(actor, envelope)
+                except HandoffError:
+                    continue
+                visible.append(envelope)
+            conn.commit()
+        return visible
+
+    def mark_delivered(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='DELIVERED', delivered_at=? "
+                "WHERE envelope_id=? AND status='PENDING'",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+    def acknowledge(self, envelope_id: str, *, actor: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+        envelope = self.get(envelope_id, actor=actor)
+        with self._connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE message_handoff SET status='ACKED', acked_at=? WHERE envelope_id=?",
+                (_iso(_utcnow()), envelope_id),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        return envelope
+
+
+class HandoffFabric:
+    def __init__(self, store: DurableHandoffStore) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+
+    def publish(self, envelope: MessageEnvelope, *, actor: Any | None = None) -> tuple[str, MessageEnvelope]:
+        return self.store.put(bind_envelope_scope(envelope, actor) if actor is not None else envelope)

active-runtime/app/message_handoff_adapters.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from message_handoff import MessageEnvelope
+
+
+def _get(value: Any, *names: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    for name in names:
+        if isinstance(value, Mapping) and name in value:
+            return value[name]
+        if hasattr(value, name):
+            return getattr(value, name)
+    return default
+
+
+def agent_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                            idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(event, "payload", "data", default={}) or {}
+    target = target or _get(event, "target", "recipient")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", "producer", "agent_id", default="agent-event")),
+        target=str(target),
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "event_type", "type", "message_type", default="agent.event")),
+        payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default="")) or f"agent-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=_get(event, "causation_id"),
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def taskplane_event_to_envelope(event: Any, *, target: str, sequence: int = 1,
+                                idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    data = _get(event, "data", "payload", default={}) or {}
+    event_id = str(_get(event, "id", "event_id", default=""))
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(_get(event, "source", default="task-plane")),
+        target=target,
+        message_type=str(_get(event, "type", "event_type", default="task.event")),
+        payload=dict(data),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or event_id or f"task-event:{sequence}",
+        causation_id=event_id or None,
+        **scope,
+    )
+
+
+def legacy_message_to_envelope(message: Any, *, target: str | None = None, sequence: int = 1,
+                               idempotency_key: str | None = None, **scope: Any) -> MessageEnvelope:
+    payload = _get(message, "payload", "data", "body", "content", default={})
+    if not isinstance(payload, Mapping):
+        payload = {"value": payload}
+    target = target or _get(message, "target", "recipient", "receiver")
+    if not target:
+        raise ValueError("MESSAGE_TARGET_REQUIRED")
+    source = _get(message, "source", "sender", "agent_id", default="legacy-message-bus")
+    kind = _get(message, "message_type", "type", "kind", default="legacy.message")
+    identifier = _get(message, "id", "message_id", "event_id")
+    return MessageEnvelope(
+        source=str(source), target=str(target), message_type=str(kind), payload=dict(payload),
+        sequence=sequence,
+        idempotency_key=idempotency_key or (str(identifier) if identifier else f"legacy:{sequence}"),
+        causation_id=str(identifier) if identifier else None,
+        **scope,
+    )

active-runtime/app/search_agent_adapter.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from typing import Any
 
 from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
         domain_profiles: list[str] | None = None,
         user_scope: str = "public",
         correlation_id: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        trace: TraceContext | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         payload = {
             "query": query,
@@ -59,7 +63,11 @@ class SearchGatewayAgentAdapter:
             "session_profile": context.session_profile,
             "correlation_id": correlation_id,
         }
-        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        if actor is None and trace is None:
+            # Preserve adapter compatibility; the governed orchestrator itself
+            # still fails closed when trusted context is absent.
+            return self.orchestrator.execute(payload)
+        return self.orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 class OpenClawSearchClient(SearchGatewayAgentAdapter):

active-runtime/app/search_gateway.py

@@ -13,10 +13,18 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+import hashlib
+import json
 from typing import Any, Protocol
 from uuid import uuid4
 
 from .search_profile_resolver import DomainQueryProfileRegistry, SearchProfile, SearchProfileResolver
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 def utc_now() -> str:
@@ -156,13 +164,25 @@ class SearchPolicyGuard:
 
 
 class SearchGateway:
-    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None):
+    def __init__(self, providers: list[SearchProvider] | None = None, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.providers = providers or []
+        self.governance_store = governance_store
         self.profile_resolver = SearchProfileResolver()
         self.planner = QueryPlanner()
         self.guard = SearchPolicyGuard()
 
-    def search(self, request: SearchRequest) -> SearchResponse:
+    def search(self, request: SearchRequest, *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> SearchResponse:
+        trusted_actor: GovernanceActor | None = None
+        if self.governance_store is not None:
+            if actor is None or trace is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            trusted_actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+            if request.requester != trusted_actor.identity:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="requester")
+            if request.correlation_id is not None and request.correlation_id not in {
+                trace.trace_id, trace.correlation_id
+            }:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION", field="correlation_id")
         request_id = request.correlation_id or f"search_{uuid4().hex[:12]}"
         profile = self.profile_resolver.resolve(request.group_profile, request.user_profile, request.session_profile)
         expanded_queries = self.planner.expand(request, profile)
@@ -184,14 +204,60 @@ class SearchGateway:
         attempts: list[SearchProviderAttempt] = []
         providers = self._ordered_providers(profile)
         for provider in providers:
+            if request.authorized_sources and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_DENY"))
+                continue
+            if request.user_scope != "public" and provider.name not in request.authorized_sources:
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=provider.name, status="denied", reason="SOURCE_AUTHZ_REQUIRED"))
+                continue
             try:
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    assert trusted_actor is not None and trace is not None
+                    input_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {"query": request.query, "intent": request.intent, "provider": provider.name},
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    invocation_key = hashlib.sha256(
+                        f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}:{provider.name}:{input_digest}".encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    authorization = self.governance_store.authorize_tool(
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        tool_name=f"search.{provider.name}",
+                        trace=trace,
+                        requested_scope=trace.scope,
+                        input_digest=input_digest,
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                    )
+                    if authorization.get("idempotent"):
+                        raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_REPLAY")
                 provider_evidence, attempt = provider.search(request, expanded_queries)
+                if self.governance_store is not None:
+                    result_digest = hashlib.sha256(
+                        json.dumps(
+                            {
+                                "evidence": [item.to_dict() for item in provider_evidence],
+                                "attempt": attempt.to_dict(),
+                            },
+                            sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False,
+                        ).encode("utf-8")
+                    ).hexdigest()
+                    self.governance_store.record_tool_receipt(
+                        invocation_key=invocation_key,
+                        result_digest=result_digest,
+                        actor=trusted_actor,
+                        trace=trace,
+                    )
                 evidence.extend(provider_evidence)
                 attempts.append(attempt)
                 if provider_evidence:
                     break
-            except Exception as exc:
-                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason=str(exc)))
+            except GovernanceError:
+                raise
+            except Exception:
+                # Provider exceptions may contain URLs, tokens, or local paths.
+                attempts.append(SearchProviderAttempt(provider=getattr(provider, "name", "unknown"), status="failed", reason="PROVIDER_FAILURE"))
 
         if evidence:
             return SearchResponse(

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_api.py

@@ -7,27 +7,29 @@ try:
 except Exception:
     APIRouter = None
 
-from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway import SearchRequest
+from .search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceActor, TraceContext
 from .search_gateway_dashboard import SearchGatewayDashboard
 
 
-gateway = SearchGateway()
+orchestrator = SearchGatewayOrchestrator()
 dashboard = SearchGatewayDashboard()
 
 
-def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request = SearchRequest(**payload)
-    return gateway.search(request).to_dict()
+def search_gateway_request(payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return orchestrator.execute(payload, actor=actor, trace=trace)
 
 
 def get_search_gateway_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
     return {
         "module": "search-gateway",
         "status": "ready",
-        "providers_configured": len(gateway.providers),
+        "providers_configured": len(orchestrator.gateway.providers),
         "policy_guard": "enabled",
         "profile_customization": "enabled",
         "fallback_required_when_provider_unavailable": True,
+        "governance": "required",
     }
 
 

active-runtime/app/search_gateway_orchestrator.py

@@ -3,24 +3,49 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
+import os
 
 from .search_audit_store import SearchAuditStore
 from .search_event_bridge import SearchEventBridge
 from .search_gateway import SearchGateway, SearchRequest
 from .search_provider_registry import SearchProviderRegistry
+from .trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    ToolDescriptor,
+    TraceContext,
+)
 
 
 class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
-    def __init__(self):
+    def __init__(self, *, governance_store: GovernanceStore | None = None):
         self.registry = SearchProviderRegistry()
         self.audit = SearchAuditStore()
         self.events = SearchEventBridge()
-        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered())
+        self.governance = governance_store or GovernanceStore(
+            os.environ.get("AIOS_SEARCH_GOVERNANCE_DB", "runtime/search-governance.sqlite3")
+        )
+        registrar = GovernanceActor(
+            "search-runtime-bootstrap", GovernanceScope("system"), ("system.admin",)
+        )
+        for provider in self.registry.ordered():
+            self.governance.register_tool(
+                ToolDescriptor(
+                    f"search.{provider.name}", "tool", GovernanceScope("global"), ("tool.search",)
+                ),
+                registrar,
+            )
+        self.gateway = SearchGateway(self.registry.ordered(), governance_store=self.governance)
 
-    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def execute(self, payload: dict[str, Any], *, actor: GovernanceActor | dict[str, Any] | None = None, trace: TraceContext | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if actor is None or trace is None:
+            from .trace_tool_credential_governance import GovernanceError
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        self.governance.record_trace(trace, actor)
         request = SearchRequest(**payload)
         self.events.search_started(request.to_dict())
-        response = self.gateway.search(request)
+        response = self.gateway.search(request, actor=actor, trace=trace)
         result = response.to_dict()
         for attempt in result.get("attempts", []):
             self.events.provider_attempted(result["request_id"], attempt)
@@ -35,6 +60,7 @@ class SearchGatewayOrchestrator:
             "registry": self.registry.status(),
             "audit": "enabled",
             "events": "enabled",
+            "governance": "required",
         }
 
 

active-runtime/app/task_plane/api.py

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ from .models import (
 )
 from .policy import PolicyEngine
 from .store import TaskPlaneStore
+from .scope import bind_task_scope
 from .worker_registry import WorkerRegistry
 
 
@@ -68,28 +69,54 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         self.delegation = DelegationEngine(store)
         self.store.probe_attestation_verifier = self.policy.probe_attestation_verifier
 
-    def create_task(self, body: dict[str, Any], idempotency_key: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    def _authorized_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str, action: str) -> TaskRecord:
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id, self.policy.actor_context(actor))
+        self.policy.assert_allowed(action, actor, task=task)
+        return task
+
+    def create_task(
+        self,
+        body: dict[str, Any],
+        idempotency_key: str | None = None,
+        *,
+        actor_identity: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if body.get("parent_task_id"):
             raise ForbiddenError("child tasks must use the delegate endpoint")
         issuer = body.get("issuer", {})
-        actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        declared_actor = issuer.get("id", "anon") if isinstance(issuer, dict) else "anon"
+        actor = actor_identity or declared_actor
         self.policy.assert_allowed("create", actor)
         try:
             plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body)
         except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
             raise ValidationError("invalid task plan") from exc
+        if actor_identity is not None:
+            plan = bind_task_scope(
+                plan, self.policy.actor_context(actor_identity), public_create=True
+            )
         task = self.store.create_task_with_event(plan, idempotency_key=idempotency_key)
         return task.to_dict()
 
     def list_tasks(self, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        context = None
         if actor is not None:
             self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
-        return [task.to_dict(include_task=False) for task in self.store.list_tasks()]
+            context = self.policy.actor_context(actor)
+        return [
+            task.to_dict(include_task=False)
+            for task in self.store.list_tasks(context)
+        ]
 
     def get_task(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        context = None
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        return self.store.get_task(task_id).to_dict()
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor)
+            context = self.policy.actor_context(actor)
+        task = self.store.get_task(task_id, context)
+        if actor is not None:
+            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=task)
+        return task.to_dict()
 
     def get_worker(self, worker_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         if actor is not None:
@@ -163,9 +190,8 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not worker_id:
             raise ValidationError("worker_id required")
 
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "claim")
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, str(worker_id))
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("claim", actor, task=task)
         lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
             body.get("lease_seconds", 30), "lease_seconds", 1, 3600
         )
@@ -184,10 +210,9 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not claim_id:
             raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "heartbeat")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("heartbeat", actor, task=task)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
         lease_seconds = _bounded_int(
@@ -206,10 +231,9 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         message = body.get("message")
         if progress is None:
             raise ValidationError("progress required")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "progress")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("progress", actor, task=task)
         if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
             if message not in {None, ""} or contains_secret_text(stage):
                 raise ValidationError(
@@ -234,7 +258,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         if not claim_id:
             raise ValidationError("claim_id required")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "result")
 
         status = body.get("status", "COMPLETED")
         outputs = body.get("outputs", [])
@@ -247,7 +271,6 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
             raise ValidationError("evidence items must be objects")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         self.policy.assert_readonly_worker_binding(actor, claim.worker_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("result", actor, task=task)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
         if task.task_plan.data_classification == "credential-secret":
@@ -326,8 +349,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         reason = body.get("reason", "failed")
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "worker"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor)
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("fail", actor, task=task)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "fail")
         claim = self.store.get_claim(claim_id)
         if claim.worker_identity != actor:
             raise ForbiddenError("claim identity mismatch")
@@ -339,8 +361,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or body.get("worker_identity") or "owner"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor)
         reason = body.get("reason", "cancelled")
-        task = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("cancel", actor, task=task)
+        task = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "cancel")
         updated = self.store.cancel_task_with_event(
             task_id, task.revision, reason=reason
         )
@@ -349,8 +370,7 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
     def delegate(self, task_id: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         actor = body.get("actor_identity") or "owner"
         self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor)
-        parent = self.store.get_task(task_id)
-        self.policy.assert_allowed("delegate", actor, task=parent)
+        parent = self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "delegate")
         if "task" in body:
             try:
                 child_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(body["task"])
@@ -364,25 +384,31 @@ class TaskPlaneService:
             except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
                 raise ValidationError("invalid child task plan") from exc
         child_plan.parent_task_id = task_id
+        child_plan = bind_task_scope(
+            child_plan, self.policy.actor_context(actor), public_create=False
+        )
         child = self.delegation.delegate(task_id, child_plan, caller=actor)
         return child.to_dict()
 
     def get_events(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "audit")
+        else:
+            self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.store.list_events(task_id)
 
     def get_evidence(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("audit", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "audit")
+        else:
+            self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.evidence.list(task_id)
 
     def get_children(self, task_id: str, actor: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
         if actor is not None:
-            self.policy.assert_allowed("read", actor, task=self.store.get_task(task_id))
-        self.store.get_task(task_id)
+            self._authorized_task(task_id, actor, "read")
+        else:
+            self.store.get_task(task_id)
         return self.store.list_children(task_id)
 
 
@@ -506,7 +532,11 @@ class TaskPlaneRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                 ):
                     raise ForbiddenError("issuer identity mismatch")
                 body["issuer"] = {"type": "authenticated", "id": identity}
-                return 201, self.service.create_task(body or {}, headers.get("idempotency-key"))
+                return 201, self.service.create_task(
+                    body or {},
+                    headers.get("idempotency-key"),
+                    actor_identity=identity,
+                )
             if body.get("actor_identity") not in {None, identity}:
                 raise ForbiddenError("actor identity mismatch")
             body["actor_identity"] = identity

active-runtime/app/task_plane/events.py

@@ -106,3 +106,8 @@ class DurableOutboxDispatcher:
             receipt=str(receipt) if receipt else None,
             error=None if receipt else f"{adapter.name} receipt unavailable",
         )
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(event, *, target, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import taskplane_event_to_envelope
+    return taskplane_event_to_envelope(event, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,828 @@
+"""Durable multi-agent fleet scheduling for TaskPlane.
+
+The fleet layer decides *which* eligible worker should receive *which* queued task.
+It never replaces TaskPlane claim/lease ownership: callers must still perform the
+authoritative TaskPlane claim CAS after a reservation is returned.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import json
+import math
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
+
+DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS = 30
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD = 3
+DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS = 15 * 60
+MAX_SLOTS = 128
+
+
+class FleetError(RuntimeError):
+    pass
+
+
+class FleetConflict(FleetError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _sha(value: object) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _text(value: object, default: str = "") -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    return str(value).strip() or default
+
+
+def _int(value: object, default: int, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID")
+    try:
+        result = int(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_INVALID") from exc
+    if result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_INTEGER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _float(value: object, default: float, minimum: float, maximum: float) -> float:
+    if value is None:
+        return default
+    try:
+        result = float(value)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_INVALID") from exc
+    if not math.isfinite(result) or result < minimum or result > maximum:
+        raise FleetError("FLEET_NUMBER_OUT_OF_RANGE")
+    return result
+
+
+def _mapping(value: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value
+    if hasattr(value, "to_dict"):
+        data = value.to_dict()
+        if isinstance(data, Mapping):
+            return data
+    if hasattr(value, "__dict__"):
+        return vars(value)
+    return {}
+
+
+def _attr(value: object, name: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(name, default)
+    return getattr(value, name, default)
+
+
+def _task_plan(task: object) -> object:
+    return _attr(task, "task_plan", _attr(task, "plan", task))
+
+
+def _task_id(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "task_id", _attr(_task_plan(task), "task_id", "")))
+
+
+def _task_status(task: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(task, "status", "")).upper()
+
+
+def _task_revision(task: object) -> int:
+    return _int(_attr(task, "revision", 0), 0, 0, 2**31 - 1)
+
+
+def _task_created_at(task: object) -> float:
+    value = _attr(task, "created_at", _attr(task, "updated_at", 0.0))
+    try:
+        return float(value or 0.0)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return 0.0
+
+
+def _task_required_capabilities(task: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "required_capabilities", ())
+    if not isinstance(value, Sequence) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+def _task_metadata(task: object) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    value = _attr(plan, "metadata", {})
+    return value if isinstance(value, Mapping) else {}
+
+
+def _task_scope_key(task: object) -> str:
+    plan = _task_plan(task)
+    scope_type = _text(_attr(plan, "scope_type", "legacy"), "legacy")
+    tenant = _text(_attr(plan, "tenant_id", ""))
+    project = _text(_attr(plan, "project_id", ""))
+    user = _text(_attr(plan, "user_id", ""))
+    if scope_type == "tenant":
+        return "tenant:" + tenant + "|project:" + (project or "*")
+    if scope_type == "system":
+        return "system"
+    return "legacy:" + (user or "*")
+
+
+def _worker_id(worker: object) -> str:
+    return _text(_attr(worker, "worker_id", ""))
+
+
+def _worker_capabilities(worker: object) -> frozenset[str]:
+    value = _attr(worker, "capabilities", ())
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        value = value.keys()
+    if not isinstance(value, Iterable) or isinstance(value, (str, bytes)):
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(_text(item) for item in value if _text(item))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetWorkerPolicy:
+    worker_id: str
+    max_slots: int = 1
+    failure_domain: str = "default"
+    weight: float = 1.0
+    labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None
+    revision: int = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FleetDispatchDecision:
+    reservation_id: str
+    task_id: str
+    worker_id: str
+    task_revision: int
+    scope_key: str
+    failure_domain: str
+    reserved_until: float
+    score: tuple[float, float, float, str]
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "reservation_id": self.reservation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "worker_id": self.worker_id,
+            "task_revision": self.task_revision,
+            "scope_key": self.scope_key,
+            "failure_domain": self.failure_domain,
+            "reserved_until": self.reserved_until,
+            "score": list(self.score),
+        }
+
+
+class FleetStateStore:
+    """Small durable fleet journal colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database."""
+
+    def __init__(self, connection: sqlite3.Connection, lock: threading.RLock | None = None) -> None:
+        self.conn = connection
+        self.lock = lock or threading.RLock()
+        self._savepoint_counter = 0
+        self._ensure_schema()
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _transaction(self):
+        with self.lock:
+            self._savepoint_counter += 1
+            name = f"fleet_{threading.get_ident()}_{self._savepoint_counter}"
+            self.conn.execute(f"SAVEPOINT {name}")
+            try:
+                yield
+            except Exception:
+                self.conn.execute(f"ROLLBACK TO {name}")
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+                raise
+            else:
+                self.conn.execute(f"RELEASE {name}")
+
+    def _ensure_schema(self) -> None:
+        with self.lock:
+            self.conn.executescript(
+                """
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_capacity (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    max_slots INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    weight REAL NOT NULL,
+                    labels_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_scope_state (
+                    scope_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    virtual_finish REAL NOT NULL,
+                    dispatch_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    last_dispatched_at REAL,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_dispatches (
+                    reservation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    task_revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    scope_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_domain TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    state TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    reserved_until REAL NOT NULL,
+                    claim_id TEXT,
+                    created_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_fleet_dispatch_worker_state
+                    ON fleet_dispatches(worker_id, state, reserved_until);
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_worker_failures (
+                    worker_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                    consecutive_failures INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    circuit_open_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL
+                );
+                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS fleet_task_worker_failures (
+                    task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    worker_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    failure_count INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    blocked_until REAL,
+                    last_failure_class TEXT,
+                    revision INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                    updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
+                    PRIMARY KEY(task_id, worker_id)
+                );
+                """
+            )
+
+    def configure_worker(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        *,
+        max_slots: int = 1,
+        failure_domain: str = "default",
+        weight: float = 1.0,
+        labels: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+        expected_revision: int | None = None,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        if not worker_id:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_ID_REQUIRED")
+        max_slots = _int(max_slots, 1, 1, MAX_SLOTS)
+        weight = _float(weight, 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+        failure_domain = _text(failure_domain, "default")
+        normalized_labels = {
+            _text(k): _text(v)
+            for k, v in dict(labels or {}).items()
+            if _text(k) and _text(v)
+        }
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT revision FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current = int(row[0]) if row else 0
+            if expected_revision is not None and current != int(expected_revision):
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_WORKER_POLICY_CAS_MISMATCH")
+            revision = current + 1
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_capacity(
+                    worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    max_slots=excluded.max_slots,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    weight=excluded.weight,
+                    labels_json=excluded.labels_json,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    worker_id,
+                    max_slots,
+                    failure_domain,
+                    weight,
+                    json.dumps(normalized_labels, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")),
+                    revision,
+                    now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id, max_slots, failure_domain, weight, normalized_labels, revision
+        )
+
+    def worker_policy(self, worker_id: str) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        worker_id = _text(worker_id)
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT worker_id,max_slots,failure_domain,weight,labels_json,revision
+                FROM fleet_worker_capacity WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return FleetWorkerPolicy(worker_id=worker_id)
+        return FleetWorkerPolicy(
+            worker_id=str(row[0]),
+            max_slots=int(row[1]),
+            failure_domain=str(row[2]),
+            weight=float(row[3]),
+            labels=json.loads(row[4] or "{}"),
+            revision=int(row[5]),
+        )
+
+    def _cleanup_expired(self, now: float) -> None:
+        self.conn.execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+               SET state='EXPIRED', updated_at=?
+             WHERE state='RESERVED' AND reserved_until<=?
+            """,
+            (now, now),
+        )
+
+    def reserved_slots(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        with self.lock:
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT COUNT(*) FROM fleet_dispatches
+                 WHERE worker_id=? AND state IN ('RESERVED','CLAIMED') AND reserved_until>?
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    def scope_virtual_finish(self, scope_key: str) -> float:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+
+    def reserve(
+        self,
+        *,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        task_revision: int,
+        scope_key: str,
+        failure_domain: str,
+        score: tuple[float, float, float, str],
+        reservation_seconds: int,
+        now: float,
+        scope_weight: float,
+    ) -> FleetDispatchDecision:
+        reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        reservation_id = "fleet-" + _sha(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "worker_id": worker_id,
+                "task_revision": task_revision,
+                "scope_key": scope_key,
+            }
+        )[:32]
+        reserved_until = now + reservation_seconds
+        with self._transaction():
+            self._cleanup_expired(now)
+            existing = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT reservation_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                       reserved_until,state
+                  FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE task_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing and str(existing[6]) in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"} and float(existing[5]) > now:
+                if str(existing[1]) != worker_id or int(existing[2]) != task_revision:
+                    raise FleetConflict("FLEET_TASK_ALREADY_RESERVED")
+                return FleetDispatchDecision(
+                    str(existing[0]), task_id, worker_id, task_revision, str(existing[3]),
+                    str(existing[4]), float(existing[5]), score
+                )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_dispatches(
+                    reservation_id,task_id,worker_id,task_revision,scope_key,failure_domain,
+                    state,reserved_until,claim_id,created_at,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,'RESERVED',?,NULL,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    reservation_id=excluded.reservation_id,
+                    worker_id=excluded.worker_id,
+                    task_revision=excluded.task_revision,
+                    scope_key=excluded.scope_key,
+                    failure_domain=excluded.failure_domain,
+                    state='RESERVED',
+                    reserved_until=excluded.reserved_until,
+                    claim_id=NULL,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+                    failure_domain, reserved_until, now, now,
+                ),
+            )
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT virtual_finish,dispatch_count,revision FROM fleet_scope_state WHERE scope_key=?",
+                (scope_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            current_finish = float(row[0]) if row else 0.0
+            dispatch_count = int(row[1]) if row else 0
+            revision = int(row[2]) if row else 0
+            next_finish = max(current_finish, 0.0) + 1.0 / max(scope_weight, 0.05)
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_scope_state(
+                    scope_key,virtual_finish,dispatch_count,last_dispatched_at,revision
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(scope_key) DO UPDATE SET
+                    virtual_finish=excluded.virtual_finish,
+                    dispatch_count=excluded.dispatch_count,
+                    last_dispatched_at=excluded.last_dispatched_at,
+                    revision=excluded.revision
+                """,
+                (scope_key, next_finish, dispatch_count + 1, now, revision + 1),
+            )
+        return FleetDispatchDecision(
+            reservation_id, task_id, worker_id, task_revision, scope_key,
+            failure_domain, reserved_until, score
+        )
+
+    def bind_claim(self, reservation_id: str, claim_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT state FROM fleet_dispatches WHERE reservation_id=?",
+                (reservation_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_FOUND")
+            if str(row[0]) not in {"RESERVED", "CLAIMED"}:
+                raise FleetConflict("FLEET_RESERVATION_NOT_ACTIVE")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                UPDATE fleet_dispatches
+                   SET state='CLAIMED', claim_id=?, updated_at=?
+                 WHERE reservation_id=?
+                """,
+                (claim_id, now, reservation_id),
+            )
+
+    def release(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        *,
+        state: str = "RELEASED",
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if state not in {"RELEASED", "COMPLETED", "FAILED", "EXPIRED"}:
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_RESERVATION_STATE_INVALID")
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE fleet_dispatches SET state=?,updated_at=? WHERE task_id=?",
+                (state, now, task_id),
+            )
+
+    def worker_circuit_open(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                "SELECT circuit_open_until FROM fleet_worker_failures WHERE worker_id=?",
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def task_worker_blocked(self, task_id: str, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        with self.lock:
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT blocked_until FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+        return bool(row and row[0] is not None and float(row[0]) > now)
+
+    def record_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        threshold: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD,
+        base_circuit_seconds: int = DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        threshold = _int(threshold, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD, 1, 20)
+        base_circuit_seconds = _int(base_circuit_seconds, DEFAULT_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT consecutive_failures,revision FROM fleet_worker_failures
+                 WHERE worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (worker_id,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            failures = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            open_until = None
+            if failures >= threshold:
+                exponent = min(failures - threshold, 8)
+                open_until = now + min(
+                    MAX_CIRCUIT_SECONDS, base_circuit_seconds * (2**exponent)
+                )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=excluded.consecutive_failures,
+                    circuit_open_until=excluded.circuit_open_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, failures, open_until, _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now),
+            )
+        return {
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "consecutive_failures": failures,
+            "circuit_open_until": open_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+    def record_worker_success(self, worker_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        with self._transaction():
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_worker_failures(
+                    worker_id,consecutive_failures,circuit_open_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,0,NULL,NULL,1,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    consecutive_failures=0,
+                    circuit_open_until=NULL,
+                    last_failure_class=NULL,
+                    revision=revision+1,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (worker_id, now),
+            )
+
+    def record_task_worker_failure(
+        self,
+        task_id: str,
+        worker_id: str,
+        failure_class: str,
+        *,
+        quarantine_seconds: int = 60,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        now = float(time.time() if now is None else now)
+        quarantine_seconds = _int(quarantine_seconds, 60, 1, 3600)
+        with self._transaction():
+            row = self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                SELECT failure_count,revision FROM fleet_task_worker_failures
+                 WHERE task_id=? AND worker_id=?
+                """,
+                (task_id, worker_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            count = (int(row[0]) if row else 0) + 1
+            revision = (int(row[1]) if row else 0) + 1
+            blocked_until = now + quarantine_seconds
+            self.conn.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO fleet_task_worker_failures(
+                    task_id,worker_id,failure_count,blocked_until,last_failure_class,
+                    revision,updated_at
+                ) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
+                ON CONFLICT(task_id,worker_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                    failure_count=excluded.failure_count,
+                    blocked_until=excluded.blocked_until,
+                    last_failure_class=excluded.last_failure_class,
+                    revision=excluded.revision,
+                    updated_at=excluded.updated_at
+                """,
+                (
+                    task_id, worker_id, count, blocked_until,
+                    _text(failure_class, "unknown"), revision, now,
+                ),
+            )
+        return {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "worker_id": worker_id,
+            "failure_count": count,
+            "blocked_until": blocked_until,
+            "revision": revision,
+        }
+
+
+class FleetScheduler:
+    """Deterministic capacity/fairness scheduler over existing TaskPlane records."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        store: Any,
+        workers: Any,
+        *,
+        now_fn: Any = time.time,
+        reservation_seconds: int = DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self.workers = workers
+        self.now_fn = now_fn
+        self.reservation_seconds = _int(
+            reservation_seconds, DEFAULT_RESERVATION_SECONDS, 1, 300
+        )
+        connection = getattr(store, "conn", None)
+        if not isinstance(connection, sqlite3.Connection):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASKPLANE_SQLITE_CONNECTION_REQUIRED")
+        lock = getattr(store, "_lock", None)
+        self.state = FleetStateStore(connection, lock)
+
+    def configure_worker(self, worker_id: str, **kwargs: Any) -> FleetWorkerPolicy:
+        return self.state.configure_worker(worker_id, **kwargs)
+
+    def _online(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> bool:
+        method = getattr(self.workers, "is_online", None)
+        if not callable(method):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_REGISTRY_ONLINE_CHECK_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            return bool(method(worker_id, now=now))
+        except TypeError:
+            return bool(method(worker_id))
+
+    def _worker_record(self, worker_id: str) -> object:
+        getter = getattr(self.store, "get_worker", None)
+        if not callable(getter):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_WORKER_LOOKUP_REQUIRED")
+        return getter(worker_id)
+
+    def _active_claims(self, worker_id: str, now: float) -> int:
+        columns = {
+            str(row[1])
+            for row in self.store.conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(claims)").fetchall()
+        }
+        required = {"worker_id", "status"}
+        if not required.issubset(columns):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_CLAIMS_SCHEMA_UNSUPPORTED")
+        sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM claims WHERE worker_id=? AND status='ACTIVE'"
+        params: list[Any] = [worker_id]
+        if "lease_expires_at" in columns:
+            sql += " AND lease_expires_at>?"
+            params.append(now)
+        row = self.store.conn.execute(sql, tuple(params)).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0] if row else 0)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _labels_match(policy: FleetWorkerPolicy, task: object) -> bool:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        affinity = metadata.get("fleet_affinity_labels") or {}
+        if affinity and not isinstance(affinity, Mapping):
+            return False
+        labels = dict(policy.labels or {})
+        for key, value in dict(affinity).items():
+            if labels.get(_text(key)) != _text(value):
+                return False
+        avoid = metadata.get("fleet_avoid_failure_domains") or []
+        if isinstance(avoid, Sequence) and not isinstance(avoid, (str, bytes)):
+            if policy.failure_domain in {_text(item) for item in avoid}:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+    def _eligible_worker(self, worker_id: str, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[bool, int, FleetWorkerPolicy]:
+        if not self._online(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        worker = self._worker_record(worker_id)
+        policy = self.state.worker_policy(worker_id)
+        if self.state.worker_circuit_open(worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if self.state.task_worker_blocked(_task_id(task), worker_id, now):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        if not self._labels_match(policy, task):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        required = _task_required_capabilities(task)
+        capabilities = _worker_capabilities(worker)
+        if required and not required.issubset(capabilities):
+            return False, 0, policy
+        active = self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+        reserved = self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+        load = active + reserved
+        if load >= policy.max_slots:
+            return False, load, policy
+        return True, load, policy
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _task_priority(task: object, now: float) -> float:
+        metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+        base = _int(metadata.get("fleet_priority"), 0, -100, 100)
+        created = _task_created_at(task)
+        waited = max(0.0, now - created) if created > 0 else 0.0
+        aging = min(100.0, waited / 60.0)
+        return float(base) + aging
+
+    def _task_score(self, task: object, now: float) -> tuple[float, float, float, str]:
+        scope = _task_scope_key(task)
+        virtual_finish = self.state.scope_virtual_finish(scope)
+        priority = self._task_priority(task, now)
+        return (virtual_finish, -priority, _task_created_at(task), _task_id(task))
+
+    def _tasks(self, actor_context: Any = None) -> list[object]:
+        lister = getattr(self.store, "list_tasks", None)
+        if not callable(lister):
+            raise FleetError("FLEET_TASK_LIST_REQUIRED")
+        try:
+            tasks = lister(actor_context)
+        except TypeError:
+            tasks = lister()
+        return [
+            task for task in tasks
+            if _task_status(task) in {"CREATED", "QUEUED"}
+            and _task_id(task)
+        ]
+
+    def select(
+        self,
+        worker_ids: Sequence[str],
+        *,
+        actor_context: Any = None,
+        limit: int = 1,
+        now: float | None = None,
+    ) -> list[FleetDispatchDecision]:
+        now = float(self.now_fn() if now is None else now)
+        limit = _int(limit, 1, 1, 100)
+        worker_ids = tuple(dict.fromkeys(_text(item) for item in worker_ids if _text(item)))
+        tasks = sorted(self._tasks(actor_context), key=lambda task: self._task_score(task, now))
+        decisions: list[FleetDispatchDecision] = []
+        local_load: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for task in tasks:
+            if len(decisions) >= limit:
+                break
+            candidates: list[tuple[int, float, str, FleetWorkerPolicy]] = []
+            for worker_id in worker_ids:
+                eligible, load, policy = self._eligible_worker(worker_id, task, now)
+                if not eligible:
+                    continue
+                effective_load = local_load.get(worker_id, load)
+                if effective_load >= policy.max_slots:
+                    continue
+                candidates.append(
+                    (
+                        effective_load,
+                        -policy.weight,
+                        worker_id,
+                        policy,
+                    )
+                )
+            if not candidates:
+                continue
+            candidates.sort(key=lambda item: (item[0], item[1], item[2]))
+            _, _, worker_id, policy = candidates[0]
+            score = self._task_score(task, now)
+            metadata = _task_metadata(task)
+            scope_weight = _float(metadata.get("fleet_scope_weight"), 1.0, 0.05, 100.0)
+            try:
+                decision = self.state.reserve(
+                    task_id=_task_id(task),
+                    worker_id=worker_id,
+                    task_revision=_task_revision(task),
+                    scope_key=_task_scope_key(task),
+                    failure_domain=policy.failure_domain,
+                    score=score,
+                    reservation_seconds=self.reservation_seconds,
+                    now=now,
+                    scope_weight=scope_weight,
+                )
+            except FleetConflict:
+                continue
+            local_load[worker_id] = local_load.get(
+                worker_id,
+                self._active_claims(worker_id, now)
+                + self.state.reserved_slots(worker_id, now)
+                - 1,
+            ) + 1
+            decisions.append(decision)
+        return decisions

active-runtime/app/task_plane/models.py

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
+from .scope import normalize_task_scope
+
 
 SENSITIVE_KEYS = {
     "secret",
@@ -66,6 +68,12 @@ TASK_PLAN_KEYS = {
     "allowed_input_paths",
     "allowed_output_paths",
     "output_policy",
+    "scope_type",
+    "tenant_id",
+    "user_id",
+    "project_id",
+    "conversation_id",
+    "run_id",
 }
 
 
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ class TaskPlan:
     schema_version: int = 1
     task_id: str | None = None
     task_type: str = "code.change"
+    scope_type: str = "legacy"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
     issuer: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
     intent: str | None = None
     required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
@@ -311,10 +325,17 @@ class TaskPlan:
                 raise ValueError("credential-secret requires metadata-only logging")
             if output_policy != "hash-count-status-only":
                 raise ValueError("credential-secret requires restricted output")
+        scope = normalize_task_scope(data)
         return cls(
             schema_version=schema_version,
             task_id=validate_identifier(data["task_id"], "task_id"),
             task_type=validate_type(data.get("task_type", "code.change"), "task_type"),
+            scope_type=scope.scope_type,
+            tenant_id=scope.tenant_id,
+            user_id=scope.user_id,
+            project_id=scope.project_id,
+            conversation_id=scope.conversation_id,
+            run_id=scope.run_id,
             issuer=issuer,
             intent=data.get("intent"),
             required_capabilities=_normalize_list(data.get("required_capabilities", [])),
@@ -348,6 +369,12 @@ class TaskPlan:
             "schema_version": self.schema_version,
             "task_id": self.task_id,
             "task_type": self.task_type,
+            "scope_type": self.scope_type,
+            "tenant_id": self.tenant_id,
+            "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "project_id": self.project_id,
+            "conversation_id": self.conversation_id,
+            "run_id": self.run_id,
             "issuer": self.issuer,
             "intent": self.intent,
             "required_capabilities": list(self.required_capabilities),

active-runtime/app/task_plane/policy.py

@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Callable
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
 
 from .errors import ForbiddenError, LockedError
 from .models import ProbeEvidence, ResultEnvelope, TaskRecord
+from .scope import TaskActorContext, actor_context as build_actor_context
 
 
 RISK_RANK = {"low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3}
@@ -93,6 +94,10 @@ class PolicyEngine:
         result_signature_verifier: Callable[[ResultEnvelope], bool] | None = None,
         probe_attestation_verifier: Callable[[ProbeEvidence], bool] | None = None,
         identity_capabilities: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None,
+        identity_actor_contexts: Mapping[
+            str, TaskActorContext | Mapping[str, Any]
+        ]
+        | None = None,
         admin_identities: set[str] | None = None,
         readonly_worker_execution_enabled: bool = False,
         readonly_worker_profiles: list[ReadonlyWorkerProfile] | None = None,
@@ -109,12 +114,26 @@ class PolicyEngine:
             identity: set(capabilities)
             for identity, capabilities in (identity_capabilities or {}).items()
         }
+        self.identity_actor_contexts = dict(identity_actor_contexts or {})
         self.admin_identities = set(admin_identities or ())
         self.readonly_worker_execution_enabled = readonly_worker_execution_enabled
         self.readonly_worker_profiles = {
             profile.identity: profile for profile in (readonly_worker_profiles or [])
         }
 
+    def actor_context(self, identity: str) -> TaskActorContext:
+        configured = self.identity_actor_contexts.get(
+            identity, self.identity_actor_contexts.get("*")
+        )
+        capabilities = set(
+            self.identity_capabilities.get(
+                identity, self.identity_capabilities.get("*", set())
+            )
+        )
+        if identity in self.admin_identities:
+            capabilities.add("task.admin")
+        return build_actor_context(identity, configured, capabilities)
+
     def _readonly_worker_allows(
         self, action: str, actor: str, task: TaskRecord | None
     ) -> bool:

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scheduler.py

@@ -74,3 +74,13 @@ class TaskScheduler:
             operation_digest=task.task_plan.operation_digest(),
         )
         return claim
+
+# R4.2 P2 durable multi-agent fleet scheduling public surface.
+from .fleet import (
+    FleetConflict,
+    FleetDispatchDecision,
+    FleetError,
+    FleetScheduler,
+    FleetStateStore,
+    FleetWorkerPolicy,
+)

active-runtime/app/task_plane/scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+"""Trusted TaskPlane scope model and SQL authorization helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+from .errors import ForbiddenError, ValidationError
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset(
+    {"*", "admin", "system.admin", "task.admin", "task.read.all"}
+)
+
+
+def _value(value: Any, field: str) -> Any:
+    if hasattr(value, "task_plan"):
+        value = value.task_plan
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        return value.get(field)
+    return getattr(value, field, None)
+
+
+def _text(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    result = str(value).strip()
+    return result or None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskScope:
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TaskActorContext:
+    identity: str
+    scope_type: str = "legacy"
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+    capabilities: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
+
+
+def normalize_task_scope(value: Any) -> TaskScope:
+    fields = {field: _text(_value(value, field)) for field in SCOPE_FIELDS}
+    declared = _text(_value(value, "scope_type"))
+    if declared is None:
+        declared = "tenant" if fields["tenant_id"] else "legacy"
+    if declared == "tenant":
+        if fields["tenant_id"] is None:
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "tenant scope requires tenant_id", code="TASK_SCOPE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED"
+            )
+    elif declared == "legacy":
+        if any(fields.values()):
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "legacy scope cannot contain scoped ownership",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_LEGACY_WITH_SCOPED_FIELDS",
+            )
+    elif declared == "system":
+        if any(fields[field] for field in ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id")):
+            raise ValidationError(
+                "system scope cannot contain tenant ownership",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_SYSTEM_WITH_TENANT_FIELDS",
+            )
+    else:
+        raise ValidationError("invalid task scope type", code="TASK_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+    return TaskScope(declared, **fields)
+
+
+def actor_is_privileged(actor: TaskActorContext) -> bool:
+    return bool(actor.capabilities & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def actor_context(
+    identity: str,
+    configured: TaskActorContext | Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    capabilities: set[str] | frozenset[str],
+) -> TaskActorContext:
+    if isinstance(configured, TaskActorContext):
+        context = configured
+    else:
+        data = dict(configured or {})
+        data.pop("identity", None)
+        data.pop("capabilities", None)
+        context = TaskActorContext(identity=str(identity), **data)
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(context)
+    return replace(
+        context,
+        identity=str(identity),
+        scope_type=scope.scope_type,
+        tenant_id=scope.tenant_id,
+        user_id=scope.user_id,
+        project_id=scope.project_id,
+        conversation_id=scope.conversation_id,
+        run_id=scope.run_id,
+        capabilities=frozenset(str(item) for item in capabilities),
+    )
+
+
+def bind_task_scope(plan: Any, actor: TaskActorContext, *, public_create: bool) -> Any:
+    requested = normalize_task_scope(plan)
+    if actor_is_privileged(actor):
+        trusted = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+        if requested.scope_type == "legacy" and trusted.scope_type != "legacy":
+            plan.scope_type = trusted.scope_type
+            for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+                setattr(plan, field, getattr(actor, field))
+        return plan
+    trusted = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+    if public_create and trusted.scope_type == "legacy":
+        raise ForbiddenError(
+            "authenticated identity has no tenant scope",
+            code="TASK_ACTOR_SCOPE_UNAVAILABLE",
+        )
+    if trusted.scope_type != "tenant":
+        if requested.scope_type == "legacy":
+            plan.scope_type = trusted.scope_type
+            for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+                setattr(plan, field, getattr(actor, field))
+            return plan
+        if requested.scope_type != trusted.scope_type:
+            raise ForbiddenError("task scope mismatch", code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return plan
+    if requested.scope_type not in {"legacy", "tenant"}:
+        raise ForbiddenError("task scope mismatch", code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    updates: dict[str, Any] = {"scope_type": "tenant"}
+    for field in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        declared = getattr(requested, field)
+        authoritative = getattr(actor, field)
+        if declared is not None and declared != authoritative:
+            raise ForbiddenError(
+                "task scope mismatch",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY",
+                details={"field": field},
+            )
+        updates[field] = authoritative
+    for field, item in updates.items():
+        setattr(plan, field, item)
+    return plan
+
+
+def actor_scope_sql(actor: TaskActorContext | None) -> tuple[str, tuple[Any, ...]]:
+    if actor is None or actor_is_privileged(actor):
+        return "", ()
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(actor)
+    if scope.scope_type == "legacy":
+        return "scope_type = 'legacy'", ()
+    if scope.scope_type == "system":
+        return "scope_type = 'system'", ()
+    clauses = ["scope_type = 'tenant'", "tenant_id = ?"]
+    params: list[Any] = [scope.tenant_id]
+    for field in ("user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id"):
+        value = getattr(scope, field)
+        if value is None:
+            clauses.append(f"{field} IS NULL")
+        else:
+            clauses.append(f"({field} IS NULL OR {field} = ?)")
+            params.append(value)
+    return " AND ".join(clauses), tuple(params)
+
+
+def task_scope_values(value: Any) -> tuple[str | None, ...]:
+    scope = normalize_task_scope(value)
+    return (
+        scope.scope_type,
+        scope.tenant_id,
+        scope.user_id,
+        scope.project_id,
+        scope.conversation_id,
+        scope.run_id,
+    )

active-runtime/app/task_plane/store.py

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ from .models import (
     redact_value,
     validate_identifier,
 )
+from .scope import TaskActorContext, actor_scope_sql, task_scope_values
 
 
 EventEnvelope = tuple[str, str, str, str, str, float]
@@ -134,6 +135,12 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                     status TEXT NOT NULL,
                     task_json TEXT NOT NULL,
                     task_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+                    scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'legacy',
+                    tenant_id TEXT,
+                    user_id TEXT,
+                    project_id TEXT,
+                    conversation_id TEXT,
+                    run_id TEXT,
                     root_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
                     parent_task_id TEXT,
                     correlation_id TEXT,
@@ -272,6 +279,21 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                 )
                 """
             )
+            self._ensure_columns(
+                "tasks",
+                {
+                    "scope_type": "TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'legacy'",
+                    "tenant_id": "TEXT",
+                    "user_id": "TEXT",
+                    "project_id": "TEXT",
+                    "conversation_id": "TEXT",
+                    "run_id": "TEXT",
+                },
+            )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE tasks SET scope_type='legacy' "
+                "WHERE scope_type IS NULL OR TRIM(scope_type)=''"
+            )
             self._ensure_columns(
                 "workers",
                 {
@@ -299,6 +321,14 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             )
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_status ON tasks(status)")
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_parent ON tasks(parent_task_id)")
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_scope_tenant_project "
+                "ON tasks(scope_type, tenant_id, project_id)"
+            )
+            self.conn.execute(
+                "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_tasks_scope_owner "
+                "ON tasks(scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id)"
+            )
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_workers_status ON workers(status)")
             self.conn.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_claims_task ON claims(task_id)")
             self.conn.execute(
@@ -347,6 +377,42 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             raise NotFoundError("task")
         task_json = json.loads(row["task_json"])
         task_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(task_json)
+        stored_scope = tuple(
+            row[field]
+            for field in (
+                "scope_type",
+                "tenant_id",
+                "user_id",
+                "project_id",
+                "conversation_id",
+                "run_id",
+            )
+        )
+        json_has_scope = any(
+            field in task_json
+            for field in (
+                "scope_type",
+                "tenant_id",
+                "user_id",
+                "project_id",
+                "conversation_id",
+                "run_id",
+            )
+        )
+        if json_has_scope and stored_scope != task_scope_values(task_plan):
+            raise ConflictError(
+                "task scope persistence mismatch",
+                code="TASK_SCOPE_PERSISTENCE_MISMATCH",
+            )
+        if not json_has_scope:
+            (
+                task_plan.scope_type,
+                task_plan.tenant_id,
+                task_plan.user_id,
+                task_plan.project_id,
+                task_plan.conversation_id,
+                task_plan.run_id,
+            ) = stored_scope
         task_plan.parent_task_id = row["parent_task_id"]
         task_plan.correlation_id = row["correlation_id"]
         return TaskRecord(
@@ -389,6 +455,7 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
         task_id = task_plan.task_id or f"task-{uuid.uuid4()}"
         task_plan.task_id = task_id
         task_json = redact_value(task_plan.to_dict(redact=False))
+        scope_values = task_scope_values(task_plan)
         now = _now()
         with self._transaction():
             if idempotency_key:
@@ -397,7 +464,11 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                     (idempotency_key,),
                 ).fetchone()
                 if existing:
-                    if _canonical(json.loads(existing["task_json"])) != _canonical(task_json):
+                    existing_plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+                        json.loads(existing["task_json"])
+                    )
+                    existing_json = redact_value(existing_plan.to_dict(redact=False))
+                    if _canonical(existing_json) != _canonical(task_json):
                         raise ConflictError("idempotency key payload mismatch")
                     return self.get_task(existing["task_id"])
             root_task_id = task_id
@@ -412,14 +483,18 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
             self.conn.execute(
                 """
                 INSERT INTO tasks
-                (task_id, revision, status, task_json, task_type, root_task_id, parent_task_id, correlation_id, idempotency_key, created_at, updated_at, failure_reason)
-                VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NULL)
+                (task_id, revision, status, task_json, task_type,
+                 scope_type, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, conversation_id, run_id,
+                 root_task_id, parent_task_id, correlation_id, idempotency_key,
+                 created_at, updated_at, failure_reason)
+                VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NULL)
                 """,
                 (
                     task_id,
                     "CREATED",
                     json.dumps(task_json, ensure_ascii=False),
                     task_plan.task_type,
+                    *scope_values,
                     root_task_id,
                     task_plan.parent_task_id,
                     task_plan.correlation_id,
@@ -451,21 +526,30 @@ class TaskPlaneStore:
                 )
             return self.get_task(task.task_id)
 
-    def get_task(self, task_id: str) -> TaskRecord:
+    def get_task(
+        self, task_id: str, actor_context: TaskActorContext | None = None
+    ) -> TaskRecord:
         task_id = _validated_id(task_id, "task_id")
+        predicate, scope_params = actor_scope_sql(actor_context)
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?"
+        if predicate:
+            sql += f" AND ({predicate})"
         with self._lock:
-            row = self.conn.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id=?", (task_id,)
-            ).fetchone()
+            row = self.conn.execute(sql, (task_id, *scope_params)).fetchone()
         if row is None:
             raise NotFoundError(f"task {task_id} not found")
         return self._row_to_task(row)
 
-    def list_tasks(self) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+    def list_tasks(
+        self, actor_context: TaskActorContext | None = None
+    ) -> list[TaskRecord]:
+        predicate, scope_params = actor_scope_sql(actor_context)
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks"
+        if predicate:
+            sql += f" WHERE ({predicate})"
+        sql += " ORDER BY created_at DESC"
         with self._lock:
-            rows = self.conn.execute(
-                "SELECT * FROM tasks ORDER BY created_at DESC"
-            ).fetchall()
+            rows = self.conn.execute(sql, scope_params).fetchall()
         return [self._row_to_task(row) for row in rows]
 
     def get_task_budget(self, task_id: str) -> Budget:

active-runtime/app/trace_tool_credential_governance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,759 @@
+"""Scope-bound governance for traces, Tool/MCP calls, and credentials.
+
+This module deliberately stores references and audit metadata only.  Secret
+material remains in the configured credential provider boundary.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
+
+
+SCOPE_FIELDS = ("tenant_id", "user_id", "project_id", "conversation_id", "run_id")
+PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES = frozenset({"*", "admin", "system.admin", "governance.admin"})
+REFERENCE_RE = re.compile(r"^(systemd-credential|vault|secret-manager):[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$")
+IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,179}$")
+
+
+class GovernanceError(RuntimeError):
+    def __init__(self, code: str, *, field: str | None = None) -> None:
+        super().__init__(code if field is None else f"{code}:{field}")
+        self.code = code
+        self.field = field
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text or None
+
+
+def _scope_tuple(value: Iterable[str] | str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if value is None:
+        return ()
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.split(",")
+    return tuple(sorted({_clean(item) for item in value if _clean(item)}))
+
+
+def _canonical(value: Any) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
+
+
+def _sha(value: Any) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(value).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _identifier(value: Any, code: str) -> str:
+    text = _clean(value)
+    if text is None or IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(text) is None:
+        raise GovernanceError(code)
+    return text
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceScope:
+    """Explicit resource scope; system/global resources never get fake tenants."""
+
+    scope_type: str
+    tenant_id: str | None = None
+    user_id: str | None = None
+    project_id: str | None = None
+    conversation_id: str | None = None
+    run_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "scope_type", (_clean(self.scope_type) or "").lower())
+        for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, _clean(getattr(self, name)))
+        if self.scope_type == "tenant":
+            if self.tenant_id is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED")
+        elif self.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_NON_TENANT_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        elif self.scope_type == "legacy":
+            if any(getattr(self, name) is not None for name in SCOPE_FIELDS):
+                raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_INVALID")
+        else:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_TYPE_INVALID")
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceScope":
+        def get(name: str) -> Any:
+            return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+        declared = _clean(get("scope_type"))
+        tenant_id = _clean(get("tenant_id"))
+        return cls(
+            scope_type=declared or ("tenant" if tenant_id else "legacy"),
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            user_id=get("user_id"),
+            project_id=get("project_id"),
+            conversation_id=get("conversation_id"),
+            run_id=get("run_id"),
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GovernanceActor:
+    identity: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "identity", _identifier(self.identity, "GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.capabilities))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_value(cls, value: Any) -> "GovernanceActor":
+        if isinstance(value, cls):
+            return value
+        if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_ACTOR_INVALID")
+        return cls(
+            identity=value.get("identity") or value.get("actor_id") or value.get("user_id"),
+            scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(value),
+            capabilities=_scope_tuple(value.get("capabilities") or value.get("capability_scope")),
+        )
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return bool(set(self.capabilities) & PRIVILEGED_CAPABILITIES)
+
+
+def authorize_scope(actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], resource: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    resource = resource if isinstance(resource, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(resource)
+    if actor.privileged:
+        return
+    if resource.scope_type in {"system", "global"}:
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SYSTEM_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+    if resource.scope_type == "legacy":
+        if actor.scope.scope_type != "legacy":
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_LEGACY_SCOPE_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        return
+    if actor.scope.scope_type != "tenant":
+        raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field="scope_type")
+    for name in SCOPE_FIELDS:
+        expected = getattr(resource, name)
+        actual = getattr(actor.scope, name)
+        if expected is not None and expected != actual:
+            raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY", field=name)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TraceContext:
+    trace_id: str
+    span_id: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    parent_span_id: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    causation_id: str | None = None
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    claim_id: str | None = None
+    message_id: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "trace_id", _identifier(self.trace_id, "TRACE_ID_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "span_id", _identifier(self.span_id, "TRACE_SPAN_ID_INVALID"))
+        for name in ("parent_span_id", "correlation_id", "causation_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id"):
+            value = _clean(getattr(self, name))
+            if value is not None and IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(value) is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_IDENTIFIER_INVALID", field=name)
+            object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
+
+    def child(self, *, span_id: str, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any], **lineage: Any) -> "TraceContext":
+        authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        for name in ("trace_id", "task_id", "claim_id", "message_id", "correlation_id"):
+            supplied = _clean(lineage.get(name))
+            expected = getattr(self, name)
+            if supplied is not None and expected is not None and supplied != expected:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field=name)
+        requested_scope = lineage.pop("scope", self.scope)
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != self.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+        return TraceContext(
+            trace_id=self.trace_id,
+            span_id=span_id,
+            parent_span_id=self.span_id,
+            correlation_id=self.correlation_id,
+            causation_id=_clean(lineage.get("causation_id")) or self.span_id,
+            task_id=self.task_id,
+            claim_id=self.claim_id,
+            message_id=self.message_id,
+            scope=self.scope,
+        )
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "trace_id": self.trace_id,
+            "span_id": self.span_id,
+            "parent_span_id": self.parent_span_id,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "causation_id": self.causation_id,
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "claim_id": self.claim_id,
+            "message_id": self.message_id,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+def bind_trace_lineage(
+    *,
+    actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+    task: Any,
+    message: Any,
+    trace_id: str,
+    span_id: str,
+    parent: TraceContext | None = None,
+) -> TraceContext:
+    actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+    task_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(task)
+    message_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(message)
+    if task_scope != message_scope:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+    authorize_scope(actor, task_scope)
+
+    def get(value: Any, name: str) -> Any:
+        return value.get(name) if isinstance(value, Mapping) else getattr(value, name, None)
+
+    task_id = _clean(get(task, "task_id"))
+    message_task = _clean(get(message, "task_id"))
+    if task_id and message_task and task_id != message_task:
+        raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    context = TraceContext(
+        trace_id=trace_id,
+        span_id=span_id,
+        parent_span_id=parent.span_id if parent else None,
+        correlation_id=_clean(get(task, "correlation_id")) or _clean(get(message, "correlation_id")),
+        causation_id=_clean(get(message, "causation_id")) or (parent.span_id if parent else None),
+        task_id=task_id or message_task,
+        claim_id=_clean(get(task, "claim_id")) or _clean(get(message, "claim_id")),
+        message_id=_clean(get(message, "envelope_id")) or _clean(get(message, "id")),
+        scope=task_scope,
+    )
+    if parent is not None:
+        if parent.trace_id != context.trace_id or parent.scope != context.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY")
+        if parent.task_id and context.task_id and parent.task_id != context.task_id:
+            raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="task_id")
+    return context
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ToolDescriptor:
+    name: str
+    kind: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    credential_ref: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "name", _identifier(self.name, "TOOL_NAME_INVALID"))
+        object.__setattr__(self, "kind", (_clean(self.kind) or "").lower())
+        if self.kind not in {"tool", "mcp"}:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_KIND_INVALID")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "required_capabilities", _scope_tuple(self.required_capabilities))
+        if self.credential_ref is not None and REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref) is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CredentialGrant:
+    grant_id: str
+    credential_ref: str
+    scope: GovernanceScope
+    operations: tuple[str, ...]
+    task_id: str | None = None
+    tool_name: str | None = None
+    expires_at: str | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        object.__setattr__(self, "grant_id", _identifier(self.grant_id, "CREDENTIAL_GRANT_ID_INVALID"))
+        if REFERENCE_RE.fullmatch(self.credential_ref or "") is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY")
+        object.__setattr__(self, "operations", _scope_tuple(self.operations))
+        if not self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_OPERATIONS_REQUIRED")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_EXPIRY_INVALID")
+
+    def authorize(
+        self,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        *,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None = None,
+        tool_name: str | None = None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        try:
+            authorize_scope(actor, self.scope)
+        except GovernanceError as exc:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field=exc.field) from exc
+        if operation not in self.operations:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="operation")
+        if self.task_id is not None and self.task_id != _clean(task_id):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="task_id")
+        if self.tool_name is not None and self.tool_name != _clean(tool_name):
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="tool_name")
+        if self.expires_at is not None:
+            current = (now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            expiry = datetime.fromisoformat(self.expires_at.replace("Z", "+00:00")).astimezone(timezone.utc)
+            if current >= expiry:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="expires_at")
+        return self.credential_ref
+
+    def public(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "grant_id": self.grant_id,
+            "credential_ref": self.credential_ref,
+            "operations": list(self.operations),
+            "task_id": self.task_id,
+            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            **self.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+_SCHEMA = """
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_schema_metadata (
+  singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK(singleton=1),
+  schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tools (
+  name TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+  scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  required_capabilities_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  credential_ref TEXT,
+  descriptor_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_trace_spans (
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  parent_span_id TEXT,
+  context_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  context_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY(trace_id, span_id)
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_credential_grants (
+  grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  grant_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  grant_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governed_tool_invocations (
+  invocation_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  request_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tool_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  claim_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  span_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL,
+  receipt_sha256 TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS governance_audit_evidence (
+  sequence INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  evidence_id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  action TEXT NOT NULL,
+  actor_identity TEXT NOT NULL,
+  trace_id TEXT,
+  span_id TEXT,
+  resource_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  outcome TEXT NOT NULL,
+  details_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  previous_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  evidence_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+"""
+
+
+class GovernanceStore:
+    def __init__(self, path: str | Path) -> None:
+        self.path = Path(path)
+        self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            has_metadata = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT 1 FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='governance_schema_metadata'"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if has_metadata:
+                row = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is not None and int(row[0]) != 1:
+                    raise GovernanceError("GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED")
+            connection.executescript(_SCHEMA)
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT schema_version FROM governance_schema_metadata WHERE singleton=1"
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                connection.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO governance_schema_metadata(singleton,schema_version) VALUES(1,1)"
+                )
+            connection.commit()
+
+    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        connection = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=30.0)
+        connection.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON")
+        connection.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=30000")
+        return connection
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def _connection(self):
+        connection = self._connect()
+        try:
+            yield connection
+            connection.commit()
+        except Exception:
+            connection.rollback()
+            raise
+        finally:
+            connection.close()
+
+    def _audit(
+        self,
+        connection: sqlite3.Connection,
+        *,
+        action: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor,
+        resource_id: str,
+        outcome: str,
+        trace: TraceContext | None,
+        details: Mapping[str, Any],
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        previous = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT evidence_sha256 FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence DESC LIMIT 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        previous_sha = str(previous[0]) if previous else ""
+        created_at = _now()
+        material = {
+            "action": action,
+            "actor_identity": actor.identity,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id if trace else None,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id if trace else None,
+            "resource_id": resource_id,
+            "outcome": outcome,
+            "details": dict(details),
+            "previous_sha256": previous_sha,
+            "created_at": created_at,
+        }
+        digest = _sha(material)
+        evidence_id = "gev-" + digest[:32]
+        connection.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO governance_audit_evidence
+               (evidence_id,action,actor_identity,trace_id,span_id,resource_id,outcome,
+                details_json,previous_sha256,evidence_sha256,created_at)
+               VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+            (
+                evidence_id, action, actor.identity, material["trace_id"], material["span_id"],
+                resource_id, outcome, _canonical(material["details"]), previous_sha, digest, created_at,
+            ),
+        )
+        return {"evidence_id": evidence_id, "evidence_sha256": digest, **material}
+
+    def record_trace(self, trace: TraceContext, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        context = trace.as_dict()
+        digest = _sha(context)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            if trace.parent_span_id:
+                parent = connection.execute(
+                    "SELECT context_json FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                    (trace.trace_id, trace.parent_span_id),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if parent is None:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY", field="parent_span_id")
+                parent_context = json.loads(parent[0])
+                if GovernanceScope.from_value(parent_context) != trace.scope:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_trace_spans VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, trace.parent_span_id, _canonical(context), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TRACE_RECORDED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=f"{trace.trace_id}:{trace.span_id}", outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"context_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"context": context, "context_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def register_tool(self, descriptor: ToolDescriptor, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+        public = {
+            "name": descriptor.name,
+            "kind": descriptor.kind,
+            "required_capabilities": list(descriptor.required_capabilities),
+            "credential_ref": descriptor.credential_ref,
+            **descriptor.scope.as_dict(),
+        }
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT descriptor_sha256 FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (descriptor.name,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_DESCRIPTOR_CONFLICT")
+            if existing is not None:
+                return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "idempotent": True}
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_tools VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (descriptor.name, descriptor.kind, _canonical(descriptor.scope.as_dict()),
+                 _canonical(descriptor.required_capabilities), descriptor.credential_ref, digest),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_REGISTERED", actor=actor, resource_id=descriptor.name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=None, details={"descriptor_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"descriptor": public, "descriptor_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_tool(
+        self,
+        *,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        tool_name: str,
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        requested_scope: GovernanceScope | Mapping[str, Any],
+        input_digest: str,
+        invocation_key: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", input_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INPUT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        if trace.task_id is None or trace.claim_id is None:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="active_claim")
+        requested_scope = requested_scope if isinstance(requested_scope, GovernanceScope) else GovernanceScope.from_value(requested_scope)
+        if requested_scope != trace.scope:
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION")
+        authorize_scope(actor, requested_scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            persisted_trace = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT context_sha256 FROM governed_trace_spans WHERE trace_id=? AND span_id=?",
+                (trace.trace_id, trace.span_id),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if persisted_trace is None or persisted_trace[0] != _sha(trace.as_dict()):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY", field="trace")
+            row = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governed_tools WHERE name=?", (tool_name,)).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            descriptor_scope = GovernanceScope.from_value(json.loads(row["scope_json"]))
+            if descriptor_scope.scope_type == "tenant" and descriptor_scope != requested_scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            required = set(json.loads(row["required_capabilities_json"]))
+            if not required.issubset(set(actor.capabilities)):
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY")
+            request_sha = _sha({
+                "tool_name": tool_name, "input_digest": input_digest,
+                "task_id": trace.task_id, "claim_id": trace.claim_id,
+                "trace_id": trace.trace_id, "span_id": trace.span_id,
+                "scope": requested_scope.as_dict(),
+            })
+            replay = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if replay is not None:
+                if replay["request_sha256"] != request_sha:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT")
+                if replay["status"] != "VERIFIED":
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+                return {
+                    "tool_name": tool_name, "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+                    "span_id": trace.span_id, "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+                    "status": "VERIFIED", "receipt_sha256": replay["receipt_sha256"],
+                    "idempotent": True,
+                }
+            created_at = _now()
+            connection.execute(
+                """INSERT INTO governed_tool_invocations
+                   (invocation_key,request_sha256,tool_name,task_id,claim_id,trace_id,span_id,
+                    status,receipt_sha256,created_at,updated_at)
+                   VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)""",
+                (invocation_key, request_sha, tool_name, trace.task_id, trace.claim_id,
+                 trace.trace_id, trace.span_id, "AUTHORIZED", None, created_at, created_at),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor, resource_id=tool_name,
+                outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"input_sha256": input_digest, "scope_sha256": _sha(requested_scope.as_dict()),
+                         "invocation_key": invocation_key},
+            )
+        return {
+            "tool_name": tool_name,
+            "trace_id": trace.trace_id,
+            "span_id": trace.span_id,
+            "invocation_key": invocation_key,
+            "status": "AUTHORIZED",
+            "credential_required": row["credential_ref"] is not None,
+            "evidence": evidence,
+        }
+
+    def record_tool_receipt(
+        self,
+        *,
+        invocation_key: str,
+        result_digest: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        invocation_key = _identifier(invocation_key, "TOOL_INVOCATION_KEY_INVALID")
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", result_digest):
+            raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_DIGEST_INVALID")
+        authorize_scope(actor, trace.scope)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT * FROM governed_tool_invocations WHERE invocation_key=?",
+                (invocation_key,),
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None or row["trace_id"] != trace.trace_id or row["span_id"] != trace.span_id:
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_BINDING_INVALID")
+            if row["status"] == "VERIFIED":
+                if row["receipt_sha256"] != result_digest:
+                    raise GovernanceError("TOOL_RECEIPT_CONFLICT")
+                return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "idempotent": True}
+            if row["status"] != "AUTHORIZED":
+                raise GovernanceError("TOOL_INVOCATION_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED")
+            connection.execute(
+                "UPDATE governed_tool_invocations SET status='VERIFIED',receipt_sha256=?,updated_at=? "
+                "WHERE invocation_key=? AND status='AUTHORIZED'",
+                (result_digest, _now(), invocation_key),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=row["tool_name"], outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"invocation_key": invocation_key, "result_sha256": result_digest},
+            )
+        return {"invocation_key": invocation_key, "status": "VERIFIED", "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def store_grant(self, grant: CredentialGrant, actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        if not actor.privileged:
+            raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+        public = grant.public()
+        digest = _sha(public)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            existing = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_sha256 FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant.grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if existing is not None and existing[0] != digest:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_GRANT_CONFLICT")
+            connection.execute(
+                "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO governed_credential_grants VALUES (?,?,?,?)",
+                (grant.grant_id, _canonical(public), digest, _now()),
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_GRANT_STORED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant.grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=None,
+                details={"grant_sha256": digest},
+            )
+        return {"grant": public, "grant_sha256": digest, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def authorize_credential(
+        self,
+        *,
+        grant_id: str,
+        actor: GovernanceActor | Mapping[str, Any],
+        trace: TraceContext,
+        operation: str,
+        task_id: str | None,
+        tool_name: str | None,
+        now: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        actor = GovernanceActor.from_value(actor)
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            row = connection.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_json FROM governed_credential_grants WHERE grant_id=?", (grant_id,)
+            ).fetchone()
+            if row is None:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY")
+            raw = json.loads(row[0])
+            grant = CredentialGrant(
+                grant_id=raw["grant_id"], credential_ref=raw["credential_ref"],
+                scope=GovernanceScope.from_value(raw), operations=tuple(raw["operations"]),
+                task_id=raw.get("task_id"), tool_name=raw.get("tool_name"),
+                expires_at=raw.get("expires_at"),
+            )
+            if trace.scope != grant.scope:
+                raise GovernanceError("CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY", field="trace_scope")
+            reference = grant.authorize(
+                actor, operation=operation, task_id=task_id, tool_name=tool_name, now=now
+            )
+            evidence = self._audit(
+                connection, action="CREDENTIAL_AUTHORIZED", actor=actor,
+                resource_id=grant_id, outcome="ALLOW", trace=trace,
+                details={"operation": operation, "task_id": task_id, "tool_name": tool_name,
+                         "credential_ref_sha256": _sha(reference)},
+            )
+        return {"credential_ref": reference, "evidence": evidence}
+
+    def verify_audit_chain(self, required_actions: Iterable[str] = ()) -> bool:
+        ordered_actions: list[str] = []
+        previous = ""
+        with self._connection() as connection:
+            rows = connection.execute("SELECT * FROM governance_audit_evidence ORDER BY sequence").fetchall()
+        for row in rows:
+            details = json.loads(row["details_json"])
+            material = {
+                "action": row["action"], "actor_identity": row["actor_identity"],
+                "trace_id": row["trace_id"], "span_id": row["span_id"],
+                "resource_id": row["resource_id"], "outcome": row["outcome"],
+                "details": details, "previous_sha256": row["previous_sha256"],
+                "created_at": row["created_at"],
+            }
+            if row["previous_sha256"] != previous or row["evidence_sha256"] != _sha(material):
+                return False
+            previous = row["evidence_sha256"]
+            ordered_actions.append(row["action"])
+        position = 0
+        for required in required_actions:
+            try:
+                position = ordered_actions.index(required, position) + 1
+            except ValueError:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "CredentialGrant", "GovernanceActor", "GovernanceError", "GovernanceScope",
+    "GovernanceStore", "ToolDescriptor", "TraceContext", "authorize_scope",
+    "bind_trace_lineage",
+]

db/migrations/20260817_message_handoff.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+-- R4.2 P0-B durable Message/Handoff Fabric.
+-- Forward-only. The existing 20260707 message_outbox remains a compatibility source.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_handoff (
+  envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  stream_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  message_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tenant_id TEXT,
+  user_id TEXT,
+  project_id TEXT,
+  conversation_id TEXT,
+  task_id TEXT,
+  run_id TEXT,
+  causation_id TEXT,
+  sequence INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK(sequence >= 1),
+  capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+  confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL,
+  idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+  expires_at TEXT,
+  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+  delivered_at TEXT,
+  acked_at TEXT,
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, idempotency_key),
+  UNIQUE(stream_key, sequence)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_target_status
+  ON message_handoff(target, status, created_at);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_message_handoff_scope
+  ON message_handoff(tenant_id, project_id, user_id, conversation_id, run_id);

deploy/agent-runtime-openclaw.conf.example

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# Non-secret staging configuration for the OpenClaw engineering backend.
-#
-# Discover the exact binary with `command -v openclaw`.
-# Do not point this at the chat/WeChat Gateway HTTP endpoint.
-AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_BACKEND_ARGV_JSON='["/usr/bin/python3","/usr/local/lib/aios-agent-runtime-broker/openclaw_engineering_backend.py"]'
-
-# Required: exact absolute path discovered on hw.imruyi.top.
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN=/REPLACE/WITH/ABSOLUTE/OPENCLAW/PATH
-
-# Required: provider/model verified on the installed OpenClaw build.
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL=REPLACE_WITH_VERIFIED_PROVIDER_MODEL
-
-# Non-secret map: provider environment variable -> systemd credential file name.
-# Example after separately projecting an encrypted credential:
-# AIOS_OPENCLAW_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_JSON='{"OPENAI_API_KEY":"openai_api_key"}'
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_JSON='{}'
-
-AIOS_OPENCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800

deploy/install-autonomous-intent-worker-staging.sh

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-set -eu
-
-if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
-  echo "must run as root" >&2
-  exit 20
-fi
-
-SRC_ROOT="${1:-.}"
-WORKER_SRC="$SRC_ROOT/services/aios-autonomous-agent-worker"
-BROKER_SRC="$SRC_ROOT/services/aios-agent-runtime-broker"
-UNIT_SRC="$SRC_ROOT/deploy/systemd"
-
-grep -Fq 'AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:19998' \
-  "$UNIT_SRC/aios-autonomous-agent-worker.service" || {
-    echo "staging bridge binding missing" >&2
-    exit 21
-  }
-
-getent group aios-agent-runtime >/dev/null 2>&1 || groupadd --system aios-agent-runtime
-id aios-agent-runtime >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
-  useradd --system --gid aios-agent-runtime --home-dir /nonexistent --shell /usr/sbin/nologin aios-agent-runtime
-id aios-autonomous-agent-worker >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
-  useradd --system --home-dir /nonexistent --shell /usr/sbin/nologin aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-usermod -a -G aios-agent-runtime aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-
-install -d -m 0755 /usr/local/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-install -d -m 0755 /usr/local/lib/aios-agent-runtime-broker
-install -d -m 0750 -o aios-autonomous-agent-worker -g aios-autonomous-agent-worker \
-  /var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-install -d -m 0770 -o aios-autonomous-agent-worker -g aios-agent-runtime \
-  /var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/workspaces
-
-for file in autonomous_worker.py intent_runtime.py runtime_client.py register.py runtime_selftest.py; do
-  install -m 0755 "$WORKER_SRC/$file" "/usr/local/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/$file"
-done
-install -m 0755 "$BROKER_SRC/broker.py" /usr/local/lib/aios-agent-runtime-broker/broker.py
-install -m 0755 "$BROKER_SRC/openclaw_engineering_backend.py" /usr/local/lib/aios-agent-runtime-broker/openclaw_engineering_backend.py
-install -m 0644 "$BROKER_SRC/RUNTIME_CONTRACT.md" /usr/local/lib/aios-agent-runtime-broker/RUNTIME_CONTRACT.md
-
-install -m 0644 "$UNIT_SRC/aios-autonomous-agent-worker.service" /etc/systemd/system/
-install -m 0644 "$UNIT_SRC/aios-autonomous-agent-register.service" /etc/systemd/system/
-install -m 0644 "$UNIT_SRC/aios-agent-runtime-broker@.service" /etc/systemd/system/
-
-systemctl daemon-reload
-
-cat <<'EOF'
-Files installed. Services were NOT started or enabled.
-
-Required before activation:
-1. Discover `openclaw` with `command -v openclaw`.
-2. Verify `openclaw agent exec --help` exposes the required headless coding
-   options on the installed version.
-3. Create /etc/aios/agent-runtime-openclaw.conf from the non-secret example.
-4. Project provider/model credentials into the OpenClaw broker service with a
-   separate systemd encrypted credential. Never reuse the Online Agent Task
-   token or writer lease.
-5. Start only `aios-agent-runtime-broker@openclaw.service`.
-6. Run runtime_selftest.py and require a real worktree mutation with unchanged
-   Git HEAD.
-7. Only after self-test PASS register the autonomous identity and enable
-   continuous polling.
-
-The autonomous worker is staging-only and rejects any Governed Bridge other
-than http://127.0.0.1:19998.
-EOF

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-runtime-broker@.service

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS isolated %i engineering runtime broker
-After=network-online.target
-Wants=network-online.target
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=aios-agent-runtime
-Group=aios-agent-runtime
-Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER=%i
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_SOCKET=/run/aios-agent-runtime/%i.sock
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/workspaces
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_ALLOWED_PEER_USER=aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=15
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=3600
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios/agent-runtime-%i.conf
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /usr/local/lib/aios-agent-runtime-broker/broker.py
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=5
-RuntimeDirectory=aios-agent-runtime
-RuntimeDirectoryMode=0770
-UMask=0007
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-LockPersonality=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-RestrictNamespaces=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/workspaces /run/aios-agent-runtime
-InaccessiblePaths=-/data/aios-gitops/repo.git -/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-CapabilityBoundingSet=
-AmbientCapabilities=
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-runtime-broker@openclaw.service.d/10-provider-credential.conf.example

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Example only. Choose the credential name/provider used by the verified model.
-# The encrypted credential file contains secret material and must never be committed.
-[Service]
-# Example:
-# LoadCredentialEncrypted=openai_api_key:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-agent-runtime-openclaw/openai_api_key

deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS owner-controlled Task retry-extension API
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-agent-task
+Group=aios-agent-task
+LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-control.token
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_DB=/var/lib/aios-agent-task/state.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_CONTROL_TOKEN_FILE=%d/agent_task_control_token
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_HOST=127.0.0.1
+Environment=AIOS_TASK_RETRY_PORT=18941
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_agent_task_retry_extension.py
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-agent-task
+UMask=0077
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-autonomous-agent-register.service

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS Autonomous Intent Agent register/recover
-After=network-online.target aios-agent-task-api.service aios-agent-runtime-broker@openclaw.service
-Wants=network-online.target
-Requires=aios-agent-runtime-broker@openclaw.service
-Before=aios-autonomous-agent-worker.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-RemainAfterExit=yes
-User=root
-Group=root
-LoadCredential=bridge_control_token:/run/credentials/aios-gitops-model-api.service/agent_task_control_token
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-autonomous-20260815
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-15.4-autonomous-intent
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_REGISTRATION_STATE=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/registration
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL=/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/agent_token
-Environment=AIOS_HERMES_BROKER_SOCKET=/run/aios-agent-runtime/hermes.sock
-Environment=AIOS_OPENCLAW_BROKER_SOCKET=/run/aios-agent-runtime/openclaw.sock
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /usr/local/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/register.py
-TimeoutStartSec=120
-UMask=0077
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-LockPersonality=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
-ReadWritePaths=/etc/credstore.encrypted /var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-autonomous-agent-worker.service

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS Autonomous Intent Engineering Worker (staging)
-After=network-online.target aios-agent-task-api.service aios-agent-runtime-broker@openclaw.service aios-autonomous-agent-register.service
-Wants=network-online.target aios-agent-runtime-broker@openclaw.service
-Requires=aios-autonomous-agent-register.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-Group=aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-SupplementaryGroups=aios-agent-runtime gitops
-LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/agent_token
-Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
-Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:19998
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-autonomous-20260815
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-15.4-autonomous-intent
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_REPOSITORY=aios/aios
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_BASE_REF=refs/heads/main
-Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/workspaces
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_POLL_SECONDS=5
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS=10
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_LEASE_SECONDS=300
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_RUNTIME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=3600
-Environment=AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_DEFAULT_ADAPTER=openclaw
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_SHARED_GROUP=aios-agent-runtime
-Environment=AIOS_HERMES_BROKER_SOCKET=/run/aios-agent-runtime/hermes.sock
-Environment=AIOS_OPENCLAW_BROKER_SOCKET=/run/aios-agent-runtime/openclaw.sock
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /usr/local/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/autonomous_worker.py
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=5
-TimeoutStopSec=30
-UMask=0027
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-LockPersonality=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-RestrictNamespaces=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
-ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker
-InaccessiblePaths=-/etc/credstore.encrypted
-CapabilityBoundingSet=
-AmbientCapabilities=
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-isolated-executor.service

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=AIOS uncredentialed deterministic Planner/Executor
+After=local-fs.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=aios-engineering-executor
+Group=aios-executor-exchange
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_isolated_executor.py --root /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=2
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+PrivateNetwork=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+LockPersonality=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+RestrictNamespaces=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
+IPAddressDeny=any
+IPAddressAllow=localhost
+InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+UMask=0027
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-worker-register-20260815.service

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=AIOS generic Online Agent register-or-recover (2026-08-15)
-After=network-online.target aios-gitops-model-api.service aios-agent-task-api.service
-Wants=network-online.target
-Before=aios-online-agent-worker-20260815.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-RemainAfterExit=yes
-User=root
-Group=root
-LoadCredential=bridge_control_token:/run/credentials/aios-gitops-model-api.service/agent_task_control_token
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-generic-20260815
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=trusted-online-engineering-worker
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-15.3-generic
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL=/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_REGISTRATION_STATE=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/registration
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /usr/local/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/register.py
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=true
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-LockPersonality=true
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
-ReadWritePaths=/etc/credstore.encrypted /var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815
-UMask=0077
-TimeoutStartSec=120
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target

deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-worker.service

@@ -1,30 +1,30 @@
 [Unit]
-Description=AIOS generic governed Online Agent Worker (2026-08-15)
-After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-online-agent-worker-register-20260815.service
-Wants=aios-online-agent-worker-register-20260815.service
+Description=AIOS governed Online Agent Worker
+After=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
+Wants=aios-agent-task-api.service aios-chatgpt-bridge-v2-staging.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=simple
 User=aios-engineering-worker
 Group=aios-engineering-worker
-SupplementaryGroups=gitops
+SupplementaryGroups=gitops aios-executor-exchange
 LoadCredentialEncrypted=agent_token:/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token
 Environment=PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
 Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18940
 Environment=AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18892
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-generic-20260815
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_ID=online-engineering-worker
 Environment=AIOS_AGENT_TYPE=trusted-online-engineering-worker
-Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-15.3-generic
+Environment=AIOS_AGENT_VERSION=2026-08-17.2-durable
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CAPABILITIES=git.read,git.test,governed.write.branch,governed.write.file
 Environment=AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/workspaces
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_POLL_SECONDS=5
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS=10
-Environment=AIOS_WORKER_LEASE_SECONDS=300
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /usr/local/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/online_agent_worker.py
+Environment=AIOS_ISOLATED_EXECUTOR_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_CHECKPOINT_DB=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/checkpoints.sqlite3
+Environment=AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker/workspaces
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -B /opt/aios/current/active-runtime/app/aios_online_agent_worker.py
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=5
-TimeoutStopSec=15
+TimeoutStopSec=20
 NoNewPrivileges=true
 PrivateTmp=true
 ProtectSystem=strict
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ RestrictNamespaces=true
 MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
 ReadOnlyPaths=/data/aios-gitops/repo.git
-ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker
 UMask=0027
 
 [Install]

deploy/sysusers.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+g aios-executor-exchange -
+u aios-engineering-executor - "AIOS isolated engineering executor" /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor /usr/sbin/nologin
+m aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange
+m aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange

deploy/tmpfiles.d/aios-online-agent-executor.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/requests 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/results 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/failed 2770 aios-engineering-executor aios-executor-exchange -
+d /var/lib/aios-online-agent-executor/sources 2770 aios-engineering-worker aios-executor-exchange -

docs/autonomous-intent-worker-v2.md

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-# Autonomous Intent Worker v2
-
-## Goal
-
-A Custom GPT or other trusted producer creates a prose engineering task with:
-
-- `goal`
-- `instructions`
-- `success_criteria`
-- `required_capabilities`
-
-A long-running autonomous worker claims only tasks explicitly marked with:
-
-- `intent.task`
-- `engineering.execute`
-
-and only when the requested engineering runtime capability is actually
-available, e.g. `agent.runtime.hermes`.
-
-The runtime edits a disposable worktree. The worker independently inspects the
-diff, scans for secrets, reruns verification, and persists through staging
-Governed GitOps.
-
-## Security domains
-
-The Online Agent worker owns task/lease/governed-write credentials.
-
-The runtime broker is a separate service identity. It authorizes the worker
-over Unix `SO_PEERCRED`, opens the worktree using `O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW`, and
-passes a pinned `/proc/self/fd/<fd>` path to the engineering backend. The
-backend never receives the Agent Task token or writer lease.
-
-The worker rejects:
-- a runtime-created Git commit (`HEAD != base_oid`);
-- direct authoritative ref mutation/push;
-- sensitive credential/key paths;
-- obvious secret material;
-- non-staging Governed Bridge endpoints.
-
-## Staging boundary
-
-`autonomous_worker.py` intentionally rejects any Governed Write API base other
-than:
-
-`http://127.0.0.1:19998`
-
-Production/main/tag/baseline/force-push writes remain outside this worker.
-
-## Migration protection
-
-The worker does not infer intent from prose. Historical tasks without
-`intent.task` are skipped before claim, so they do not lose an attempt.
-
-The bootstrap task
-`implement-autonomous-intent-worker-v2-20260815` currently lacks the intent
-marker and is therefore intentionally not claimable by this worker. That is a
-control-plane/bootstrap concern, not a reason to weaken the runtime rule.
-
-## Runtime requirement
-
-A chat/WeChat Hermes endpoint is not enough. A compliant engineering backend
-must:
-1. accept `aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1`;
-2. inspect and mutate the supplied disposable worktree;
-3. leave Git HEAD unchanged;
-4. return `aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1`.
-
-The exact installed Hermes/Codex interface is host-specific and must be
-discovered before configuring the broker. No CLI flags are invented here.
-
-## Activation gate
-
-Do not register or enable the autonomous consumer until:
-1. a real engineering backend is found;
-2. broker is configured with that backend;
-3. `runtime_selftest.py` reports PASS;
-4. backend has no Agent Task token or writer lease.
-
-After activation, complete D/E/F/G:
-- D: native intent task, no `metadata.execution`;
-- E: goal-only engineering task, runtime finds files/root cause;
-- F: unavailable runtime capability remains unclaimed;
-- G: restart during real runtime execution, no duplicate commit/branch.
-
-
-## OpenClaw backend candidate
-
-A current OpenClaw installation can be used as an autonomous engineering
-runtime without making OpenClaw itself an AIOS Task API client.
-
-The bundled wrapper uses the official headless coding entry point:
-
-```text
-openclaw agent exec
-  --message-file -
-  --cwd <pinned-disposable-worktree>
-  --model <verified-provider/model>
-  --auth-env-only
-  --timeout <seconds>
-  --json
-```
-
-Reference used for implementation:
-`https://docs.openclaw.ai/cli/agent`
-
-The wrapper maps the stable OpenClaw JSON envelope into
-`aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1`. The AIOS worker remains responsible for
-claim/heartbeat, independent diff verification and Governed GitOps.
-
-OpenClaw is advertised as `agent.runtime.openclaw`, not as Hermes or Codex.

docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml

@@ -240,6 +240,114 @@ components:
       additionalProperties: false
       properties:
         candidate_id: {type: string}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds]
+      properties:
+        schema:
+          type: string
+          enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2, aios.task-writer-lease-request.v2]
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, job_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds, create_target_branch, worktree_mode, cas_ref_update_required]
+      properties:
+        schema: {type: string, enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2]}
+        task_id: {type: string}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+        create_target_branch: {type: boolean}
+        worktree_mode: {type: string, enum: [detached_at_base_oid, detached_at_expected_head]}
+        cas_ref_update_required: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        lease_expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+    BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [schema, task_id, job_id, repository, branch_mode, base_oid, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, lease_seconds, lease_expires_at, create_target_branch, worktree_mode, cas_ref_update_required, recovered, bootstrapped, idempotent, runtime_rehydrated, durable_branch_lease_present]
+      properties:
+        schema: {type: string, enum: [aios.task-writer-lease.v2]}
+        task_id: {type: string}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CREATE_NEW, CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        base_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        lease_seconds: {type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 86400}
+        lease_expires_at: {type: string, format: date-time}
+        create_target_branch: {type: boolean, const: false}
+        worktree_mode: {type: string, enum: [detached_at_base_oid, detached_at_expected_head]}
+        cas_ref_update_required: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        recovered: {type: boolean}
+        bootstrapped: {type: boolean}
+        idempotent: {type: boolean}
+        runtime_rehydrated: {type: boolean}
+        durable_branch_lease_present: {type: boolean}
+    BridgeCommitFileRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [task_id, repository, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, idempotency_key, path, content_base64, message]
+      properties:
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        idempotency_key: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        path: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 512}
+        content_base64: {type: string, format: byte}
+        message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}
+    BridgeCommitFilesRequest:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: false
+      required: [task_id, repository, expected_branch_oid, target_branch, generation, idempotency_key, files, message]
+      properties:
+        task_id: {type: string, minLength: 1}
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        repository: {type: string, const: aios/aios}
+        expected_branch_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+        idempotency_key: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 256}
+        files: {type: object, additionalProperties: {type: string, format: byte}, minProperties: 1}
+        message: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 200}
+    BridgeCommitResponse:
+      type: object
+      additionalProperties: true
+      required: [job_id, commit_oid, commit_visible, branch_mode, target_branch, generation]
+      properties:
+        job_id: {type: string, pattern: '^job-[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{7,255}$'}
+        commit_oid: {type: string, pattern: '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'}
+        commit_visible: {type: boolean}
+        branch_mode: {type: string, enum: [CONTINUE_EXISTING]}
+        target_branch: {type: string, pattern: '^agent/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,179}$'}
+        generation: {type: integer, minimum: 1}
+    BridgeGovernedCapabilities:
+      type: object
+      required: [bridge_schema_version, governed_writes_enabled, operations, operation_contracts]
+      properties:
+        bridge_schema_version: {type: string, const: aios.chatgpt-gitops-bridge.v2}
+        governed_writes_enabled: {type: boolean, const: true}
+        operations: {type: array, items: {type: string}}
+        operation_contracts: {type: object, additionalProperties: true}
 paths:
   /createReleaseIntent:
     post:
@@ -567,3 +675,118 @@ paths:
         '200': {description: Safe GitOps plan}
         '401': {description: Unauthorized}
       x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/capabilities:
+    get:
+      operationId: getGovernedWriteCapabilities
+      summary: Read the governed Bridge v2 capability contract
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Governed operations and their request/response contracts
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeGovernedCapabilities'}
+  /v2/writer-lease:
+    post:
+      operationId: acquireWriterLease
+      summary: Acquire the exact governed writer lease for a task generation
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Exact detached worktree lease binding
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid lease binding}
+        '409': {description: Branch, base, or generation conflict}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/writer-lease/bootstrap:
+    post:
+      operationId: bootstrapWriterLease
+      summary: Bootstrap a governed writer runtime without creating a durable lease
+      description: >
+        Staging-only runtime recovery. It validates the exact task, repository,
+        base OID, expected branch OID, target branch, and generation. It must
+        not create a branch, insert a branch lease, or consume a generation.
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Runtime binding bootstrapped or returned idempotently
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid lease binding}
+        '409': {description: A matching durable lease already exists or binding conflicts}
+        '503': {description: Runtime or durable state unavailable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/writer-lease/renew:
+    post:
+      operationId: renewWriterLease
+      summary: Recover an expired governed writer lease without changing its binding
+      description: >
+        Renews only the current task generation and exact repository, base OID,
+        expected branch OID, and target branch. Durable renewal is revision-CAS
+        protected; runtime rehydration is reported separately.
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Lease recovered or idempotently observed as already active
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse'}
+        '400': {description: Invalid schema, generation, or lease duration}
+        '409': {description: Task, base, repository, branch, generation, or durable lease conflict}
+        '503': {description: Durable job store or runtime unavailable}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/commit-file:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFileGoverned
+      summary: Commit one file through the governed writer lease
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitFileRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Authority and remote visibility receipt
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitResponse'}
+        '409': {description: Lease, expected-head, idempotency, or repository conflict}
+        '503': {description: Reconciliation required}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true
+  /v2/commit-files:
+    post:
+      operationId: commitFilesGoverned
+      summary: Atomically commit a bounded set of files through the governed writer lease
+      security: [{bearerAuth: []}]
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitFilesRequest'}
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Authority and remote visibility receipt
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/BridgeCommitResponse'}
+        '409': {description: Lease, expected-head, idempotency, or repository conflict}
+        '503': {description: Reconciliation required}
+      x-openai-isConsequential: true

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-16-r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# R4.2 P0-A TaskPlane Scope Isolation Design
+
+Status: approved candidate design. This document is not evidence of a protected-main merge or production deployment.
+
+## Boundary
+
+- Task: `r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-20260816`
+- Governed Job: `job-3fd743b51971c6007923699c1233f84c`
+- Repository: `aios/aios`
+- Base: `0eb6e1a864edfdaeef37b438991707a110e21558`
+- Target branch: `agent/r42-p0a-taskplane-scope-isolation-20260816`
+- Generation: `1`
+
+The implementation reuses this exact boundary. It does not create a replacement Task, Job, branch, generation, or idempotency key.
+
+## Model and invariants
+
+`TaskPlan` gains first-class `scope_type`, `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `project_id`, `conversation_id`, and `run_id` fields. The fields participate in accepted-key validation, parsing, serialization, persistence, and authorization.
+
+Historical rows without scope data normalize to `scope_type=legacy`; no tenant is inferred. Tenant-scoped tasks require a non-empty `tenant_id`. System/global resources use an explicit `scope_type=system` invariant and do not receive a fabricated tenant. A task may add user, project, conversation, and run ownership within its tenant.
+
+## Trusted ActorContext
+
+TaskPlane defines a small immutable `TaskActorContext` used only for authorization. The HTTP authenticator returns an identity. `PolicyEngine` resolves that identity through server-owned policy configuration into the effective context and capabilities. Request fields such as `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `group_id`, and `role` are declarations only and never expand authority.
+
+Public create, list, and get paths always use the resolved context. Internal compatibility calls may omit a context and retain explicit legacy behavior, but the HTTP adapter never uses that path.
+
+## Persistence
+
+SQLite remains the current runtime. `_create_schema()` performs an idempotent forward migration that adds the six scope columns and indexes, then backfills only missing `scope_type` values to `legacy`.
+
+New writes persist scope in both the canonical `task_json` representation and first-class columns. Reads accept historical JSON without scope, using legacy columns, but reject a new-row mismatch between JSON and columns. SQL list/get predicates are parameterized and applied before row hydration.
+
+PostgreSQL remains a separate migration target and is not claimed by this change.
+
+## Authorization flow
+
+1. HTTP bearer authentication yields an identity.
+2. `PolicyEngine` verifies capability and resolves the identity to `TaskActorContext`.
+3. Create binds the requested scope to the trusted context and rejects mismatches.
+4. List/get pass the trusted context to `TaskPlaneStore`.
+5. Store applies tenant and ownership predicates in SQL; privileged capabilities may explicitly cross scope.
+
+Tenant actors cannot read legacy tasks, another tenant, or mismatched owned resources. Legacy actors can only read legacy tasks. System actors require explicit privileged capability for cross-scope access.
+
+## Failure behavior
+
+Missing tenant scope, forged scope, unknown scope types, JSON/column divergence, and unauthorized list/get operations fail closed with canonical TaskPlane errors. Public get does not reveal whether an out-of-scope task exists.
+
+## Verification
+
+Tests exercise real model round trips, SQLite migration/restart, Service/Policy/Store wiring, tenant A versus tenant B list/get denial, ownership filtering, forged create payload rejection, legacy isolation, privileged access, and SQL parameterization. Existing TaskPlane API, RBAC, recovery/security, and security-contract suites remain mandatory.
+
+The candidate is complete only after real `TASK_CLAIMED`, `TASK_HEARTBEAT`, exact WriterLease, governed commit, OID convergence, result submission, and `TASK_VERIFIED`. Protected main and production remain unchanged.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p0c-trace-tool-credential-governance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# R4.2 P0-C Trace / Tool-MCP / Credential Governance
+
+## Status boundary
+
+This change is a candidate implementation on the governed P0-C branch. It does
+not promote protected `main`, deploy Production, or assert that all R4.2 target
+architecture is complete.
+
+## Scope model
+
+Governance resources use an explicit `scope_type`:
+
+- `tenant` requires `tenant_id` and may narrow to user, project,
+  conversation, and run;
+- `system` and `global` prohibit tenant ownership fields;
+- `legacy` preserves unscoped historical records without inventing ownership.
+
+System and global tools therefore never receive a synthetic tenant merely to
+satisfy a tenant-oriented schema.
+
+## Trace lineage
+
+`TaskPlan` and `MessageEnvelope` scope is bound to a `TraceContext`. The trace
+records `trace_id`, `span_id`, parent span, correlation, causation, task,
+message, and the canonical P0-A scope. Child spans must keep the parent's trace,
+task, and scope. Privileged visibility does not permit cross-scope trace
+splicing.
+
+`MessageEnvelope.correlation_id` is persisted and identity-bound. Existing
+handoff databases are upgraded in place with an idempotent column migration;
+legacy rows retain their prior event IDs because a null correlation field is
+not added to the historical identity material.
+
+Observability keeps its legacy presentation fields, but new governed records
+also carry immutable trace and scope fields. Scoped records require a trusted
+server actor for queries. A repeated execution ID is an idempotent replay only
+when the complete record matches; conflicting overwrites are denied.
+
+## Tool and MCP governance
+
+`ToolDescriptor` binds a tool or MCP server to:
+
+- an explicit resource scope;
+- required actor capabilities;
+- an optional credential reference.
+
+Invocation authorization requires exact propagation of the trace scope and a
+capability superset. Unknown tools, cross-tenant calls, scope substitution, and
+non-privileged access to system/global resources fail closed. Every successful
+registration and invocation appends hash-chained audit evidence.
+
+## Credential governance
+
+Credentials are represented only by references whose schemes are
+`systemd-credential`, `vault`, or `secret-manager`. Raw bearer tokens, passwords,
+and arbitrary values are rejected. Grants are bound to scope, operation, task,
+tool, and expiry. Public/audit records contain a reference hash where disclosure
+is unnecessary; secret material is never persisted by this module.
+
+The existing runtime credential broker remains backward compatible for system
+leases, adds explicit tenant/system/global invariants, and rejects providers
+that attempt to return raw token/secret/password environment values instead of
+file/reference indirection.
+
+## Durable evidence
+
+The SQLite governance store is restart-safe and idempotently initializes four
+tables: governed tools, trace spans, credential grants, and audit evidence.
+Audit entries form a SHA-256 chain. Acceptance requires the chain to verify and
+contain the required actions; missing evidence is not treated as success.
+
+## Acceptance tests
+
+The candidate must pass:
+
+- `TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY`;
+- `TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY`;
+- `TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY`;
+- `CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY`;
+- `AUDIT_EVIDENCE_COMPLETENESS`;
+- P0-A scope and P0-B handoff regression suites;
+- Python compilation, `git diff --check`, and a diff-scoped secret scan.
+
+The repository-wide baseline currently has seven unrelated failures in the
+isolated host environment (five stale continuation-contract fixtures and two
+host-permission fixtures). The same seven failures reproduce at the untouched
+`a642b045775b9154a00ae78543037fbef4fb447b` base; they are not suppressed or
+modified by P0-C.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p1-durable-execution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# R4.2 P1 — Durable Online Agent Execution
+
+Status: candidate implementation. This document does not imply protected-main promotion or Production deployment.
+
+## State model
+
+The generic worker uses two local durable layers:
+
+1. `tasks/<task_id>.json`: atomic fast-state cache for compatibility and quick restart.
+2. `checkpoints.sqlite3`: append-only attempt/phase journal with `synchronous=FULL`.
+
+Checkpoint identity is bound to:
+
+- task_id
+- attempt
+- execution_digest
+- job_id
+- repository
+- base_oid
+- expected_branch_oid
+- target_branch
+- generation
+
+A checkpoint from another repository/branch/generation is never reused.
+
+Phases are monotonic within an attempt:
+
+`claimed → workspace_prepared → verification_passed → source_capture_done|commit_done → result_pending → result_submitted`
+
+`reconciliation_required` is an explicit recovery phase.
+
+## Attempt-aware result idempotency
+
+Result submission idempotency keys include the official Task attempt and the execution digest. The same
+attempt reuses the same key after a timeout/restart; a later official attempt cannot collide with an
+earlier result.
+
+Before submitting a result the worker durably writes `result_pending`, including the result hash and
+idempotency key. After a successful or exact-idempotency-reconciled API response it writes
+`result_submitted`.
+
+A 409 is accepted only if the Task API already contains the exact same result body and the Task is
+VERIFYING/SUCCEEDED. A conflicting result remains a hard failure.
+
+## Resume rules
+
+- `source_capture_done` and `result_pending` may be reused across later official attempts only when the
+  execution/scope binding is identical. This avoids repeating read-only source capture.
+- A deterministic task that crashed before governed commit replays from a new clean detached worktree.
+  This is safe because there is no external side effect yet.
+- `commit_done` is never recommitted. Recovery requires exact Job receipt OID convergence plus exactly
+  one ACTIVE WriterLease whose `current_head_oid` equals the governed commit.
+- delayed Git visibility remains `RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED`, preserving an explicit recovery entry.
+
+## Crash cleanup
+
+On worker startup, stale `task-*` workspaces under the configured workspace root are removed before
+polling begins. The path boundary is verified before deletion.
+
+## Contracts
+
+P1 gates include:
+
+- CHECKPOINT_DURABLE_WRITE
+- RESUME_FROM_CHECKPOINT
+- RETRY_IDEMPOTENT_NO_DUPLICATE_SIDE_EFFECT
+- CRASH_RECOVERY_CONVERGENCE
+- WORKER_RESTART_RESUME
+- CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_ISOLATION
+- RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE
+- WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_RECOVERY
+- LEASE_RENEWAL_RECOVERY
+
+WriterLease and governed Job authority remain in the existing Bridge/GitOps durable stores; the worker
+checkpoint DB is not a competing authority for Git state.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-agent-fleet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Agent Fleet / Multi-Agent Scheduling / Fault Isolation
+
+P2 adds a durable fleet decision layer inside TaskPlane without replacing TaskPlane claim/lease
+ownership. Worker registration/heartbeat remains authoritative for liveness. TaskPlane claim CAS
+remains authoritative for ownership. Probe-before-reassignment remains mandatory after an expired
+lease. P1 checkpoint/result replay remains authoritative after worker restart.
+
+`FleetScheduler` adds durable worker capacity slots, weighted scope fairness, starvation aging,
+affinity/anti-affinity labels, worker circuit breakers, per-task/worker quarantine and idempotent
+dispatch reservations. Fleet state is colocated in the existing TaskPlane SQLite database and is
+created idempotently; no new daemon or database is introduced.
+
+A fleet reservation is only a scheduling decision. It does not claim a Task. Callers must perform
+the normal TaskPlane claim and may then bind the returned claim ID to the reservation. This preserves
+the existing ownership and recovery invariants.
+
+Failure recovery never bypasses probe evidence. When TaskPlane recovery places work back in a
+claimable state, P2 may quarantine the failed worker and prefer another worker/failure domain.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-17-r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# R4.2 P2 Compact Interface Map Runtime
+
+## Purpose
+
+The persistent Online Agent already supports the canonical read-only `source_capture` action, but
+its `SourceCaptureExecutor` always returns an `aios.engineering.source-snapshot.v2` tar.gz+base64
+payload. That is correct for implementation source transfer, but too large for control-plane
+consumers that only need a bounded implementation map.
+
+P2 adds a new **adapter**, not a new execution action:
+
+```text
+action=source_capture
+adapter=compact_interface_map
+```
+
+This preserves the existing execution-v2 schema and Bridge policy:
+
+- read-only repository;
+- no change set;
+- no verification commands;
+- `writer_lease=false`;
+- no branch or commit;
+- existing capability and execution-digest validation.
+
+## Compact map contract
+
+`aios_online_agent_compact_map.py` scans only approved repository roots and source suffixes. It
+returns:
+
+- at most 40 relevant modules;
+- at most 80 selected Python symbols in total;
+- at most 40 test symbols;
+- at most 25 excerpts;
+- at most 1200 characters per excerpt;
+- SQL table names;
+- systemd unit names;
+- current invariants, failure windows and reuse points;
+- P2 fleet contract-to-surface mappings.
+
+The result is hard-bounded to 120 KiB and contains no source archive or `payload_b64`.
+
+Source excerpts apply a conservative sensitive-pattern redaction before result construction.
+
+## P2 contracts
+
+The map supplies evidence surfaces for:
+
+- `FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION`
+- `FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING`
+- `FLEET_FAIRNESS`
+- `FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT`
+- `FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION`
+- `FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH`
+- `FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY`
+
+Missing first-class scheduling/fleet primitives are reported as gaps rather than invented.
+
+## Result
+
+When the adapter is selected, the worker returns:
+
+```text
+status=SUCCEEDED
+classification=P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED
+execution_mode=compact_interface_map
+writer_lease=NONE
+```
+
+The existing `source_capture_done` / P1 checkpoint/retry path is reused, so the compact analysis
+inherits attempt-aware result idempotency and restart-safe result submission.
+
+## Governance
+
+This capability is runtime infrastructure only. The implementation candidate may use a governed
+branch/WriterLease for its own code change, but any task executed through `compact_interface_map`
+is read-only and must not create a WriterLease, branch, commit, protected-ref write, or Production
+side effect.

docs/task-plane/r42-p0a-scope-isolation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# R4.2 P0-A TaskPlane Scope Isolation
+
+Status: candidate implementation. This is not proof of protected-main promotion or production deployment.
+
+Task scope is now represented by `scope_type`, `tenant_id`, `user_id`, `project_id`, `conversation_id`, and `run_id` in the model and SQLite persistence. Historical rows become `legacy`; their tenant is never guessed. Tenant tasks require `tenant_id`. System resources use `scope_type=system` without a fabricated tenant.
+
+The HTTP adapter uses the authenticated identity. `PolicyEngine` resolves that identity through server-owned `identity_actor_contexts`; request payload fields do not grant scope. Public create binds the trusted scope, and public list/get apply parameterized scope predicates in `TaskPlaneStore`.
+
+SQLite is the current runtime database. PostgreSQL remains a separate migration and runtime-acceptance gate.

docs/task-plane/r42-p0b-message-handoff-fabric.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# R4.2 P0-B — Durable Message / Handoff Fabric
+
+Status: candidate implementation; not evidence of protected-main merge or Production deployment.
+
+`MessageEnvelope` is the single durable handoff identity and carries source/target/type, tenant/user/
+project/conversation/task/run scope, causation, sequence, capability scope, confidentiality scope,
+idempotency key, expiry and delivery state.
+
+Identity includes **target + scope + sequence + idempotency key + payload hash**, fixing the existing
+AgentEventBus target collision. Server ActorContext is authoritative; caller scope may narrow but may
+not widen/forge trusted tenant/user/project/conversation/run fields.
+
+`DurableHandoffStore` provides SQLite durability in the current runtime. Each logical stream has
+unique `(stream_key, idempotency_key)` and `(stream_key, sequence)`. Exact retry returns `REPLAY`;
+changed payload under the same key is rejected; sequence gaps are rejected; expired messages are not
+delivered.
+
+Confidentiality scopes:
+
+- public: no tenant requirement
+- tenant: same tenant
+- project: same tenant + project
+- private: same tenant + project + user
+- run: same tenant + project + user + run
+
+Required `capability_scope` must be present on the authenticated delivery actor unless the actor is
+explicitly administrative.
+
+Compatibility adapters convert AgentEventBus events, TaskPlane CloudEvents and legacy Agent OS
+MessageBus messages into the durable envelope. Existing message_outbox remains intact as a migration
+source; P0-B does not delete or silently rewrite it.
+
+Required gates:
+`MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY`, `MESSAGE_TARGET_COLLISION_DENY`, `MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_REPLAY`,
+`MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT`, `MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE`,
+`HANDOFF_CROSS_TENANT_DENY`, plus existing P0-A TaskPlane scope/security regressions.
+
+SQLite remains current runtime persistence. PostgreSQL remains a separate migration gate.

runtime/agent-os/message_bus.py

@@ -48,3 +48,8 @@ class MessageBus:
         messages = list(self.queue)
         self.queue.clear()
         return messages
+
+# R4.2 P0-B compatibility adapter.
+def to_handoff_envelope(message, *, target=None, sequence=1, idempotency_key=None, **scope):
+    from message_handoff_adapters import legacy_message_to_envelope
+    return legacy_message_to_envelope(message, target=target, sequence=sequence, idempotency_key=idempotency_key, **scope)

services/aios-agent-runtime-broker/RUNTIME_CONTRACT.md

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-# Autonomous Engineering Runtime Contract v1
-
-The Online Agent Worker and the Hermes/Codex engineering runtime are separate
-security domains.
-
-The worker owns:
-- Agent Task polling, atomic claim, task lease and heartbeat;
-- intent resolution and restart state;
-- authoritative repository/base selection;
-- independent diff inspection and secret checks;
-- verification command allowlisting and re-execution;
-- Governed GitOps task/lease/commit;
-- final result submission.
-
-The runtime broker and Hermes/Codex backend do **not** receive:
-- Agent Task API token;
-- task lease token;
-- governed writer lease or Bridge credential;
-- authority repository write access.
-
-## stdin request
-
-The backend configured behind the broker receives one JSON object:
-
-`schema = aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1`
-
-It contains task goal/instructions/success criteria and a pinned disposable
-worktree path. The backend may inspect and modify that worktree. It must not
-commit or push.
-
-## stdout response
-
-The backend returns one JSON object:
-
-```json
-{
-  "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1",
-  "status": "COMPLETED",
-  "summary": "root cause and implementation summary",
-  "verification": [
-    {
-      "label": "focused test",
-      "argv": ["/usr/bin/python3", "-m", "pytest", "-q", "tests/test_x.py"],
-      "cwd": ".",
-      "timeout_seconds": 600
-    }
-  ],
-  "evidence": {
-    "root_cause": "..."
-  }
-}
-```
-
-`status` may also be `BLOCKED` or `FAILED`.
-
-The worker ignores any backend claim about changed files and independently reads
-Git state. It also reruns verification requests through its local command
-allowlist.
-
-## Real runtime requirement
-
-A chat/router/WeChat Hermes service is not an engineering backend. A compliant
-backend must be able to read and mutate the disposable worktree and emit the
-runtime result schema above.
-
-The exact Hermes/Codex CLI/API must be discovered from the installed runtime.
-Do not invent flags. `/etc/aios/agent-runtime-hermes.conf` contains only
-non-secret backend command configuration. Any model/runtime credential must be
-delivered to the broker/backend through its own systemd credential projection,
-never through the Online Agent worker token.
-
-
-## OpenClaw headless engineering backend
-
-For hosts that have a current OpenClaw CLI, use the bundled
-`openclaw_engineering_backend.py`.
-
-The wrapper invokes the documented headless coding entry point:
-
-`openclaw agent exec --message-file - --cwd <pinned-worktree> --model <model> --auth-env-only --timeout <seconds> --json`
-
-It deliberately does **not** use the Gateway/WeChat/chat route. `agent exec`
-runs an embedded, one-shot agent turn and scopes its workspace/tool working
-directory to `--cwd`.
-
-Provider credentials, if required, are projected into the broker service under
-separate systemd credentials and mapped to provider environment variables only
-for the OpenClaw child. The Online Agent Task token and writer lease remain
-absent.
-
-Before enabling the autonomous worker, run a disposable broker self-test that
-proves OpenClaw changes the requested worktree while Git HEAD remains at the
-base OID.

services/aios-agent-runtime-broker/broker.py

@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import array
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import pwd
-import re
-import socket
-import stat
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-
-MAX_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
-ADAPTER = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER", "").strip()
-SOCKET_PATH = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_SOCKET", ""))
-WORKSPACE_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_WORKSPACE_ROOT", ""))
-BACKEND_ARGV_JSON = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_BACKEND_ARGV_JSON", "")
-ALLOWED_PEER_UID = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_ALLOWED_PEER_UID", "-1"))
-ALLOWED_PEER_USER = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_ALLOWED_PEER_USER", "").strip()
-CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "15"))
-BACKEND_TIMEOUT = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "3600"))
-BACKEND_ENV_ALLOWLIST = (
-    "AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN",
-    "AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL",
-    "AIOS_OPENCLAW_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_JSON",
-    "AIOS_OPENCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
-)
-SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)")
-
-
-class BrokerError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, *, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def peer_uid(connection: socket.socket) -> int:
-    if not hasattr(socket, "SO_PEERCRED"):
-        raise BrokerError("SO_PEERCRED_UNAVAILABLE")
-    raw = connection.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, 12)
-    pid, uid, gid = array.array("i", raw[:12])
-    return int(uid)
-
-
-def configured_peer_uid() -> int:
-    if ALLOWED_PEER_UID >= 0:
-        return ALLOWED_PEER_UID
-    if not ALLOWED_PEER_USER:
-        raise BrokerError("ALLOWED_PEER_UID_NOT_CONFIGURED")
-    try:
-        return int(pwd.getpwnam(ALLOWED_PEER_USER).pw_uid)
-    except KeyError as exc:
-        raise BrokerError("ALLOWED_PEER_USER_NOT_FOUND") from exc
-
-
-def authorize_peer(connection: socket.socket) -> None:
-    uid = peer_uid(connection)
-    expected = configured_peer_uid()
-    if uid != expected:
-        raise BrokerError("PEER_UID_REJECTED", details={"peer_uid": uid})
-
-
-def read_request(connection: socket.socket) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    connection.settimeout(CONNECTION_TIMEOUT)
-    total = 0
-    chunks: list[bytes] = []
-    while True:
-        try:
-            chunk = connection.recv(65536)
-        except socket.timeout as exc:
-            raise BrokerError("REQUEST_TIMEOUT") from exc
-        if not chunk:
-            break
-        total += len(chunk)
-        if total > MAX_BYTES:
-            raise BrokerError("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
-        chunks.append(chunk)
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_INVALID_JSON") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-    return dict(value)
-
-
-def backend_argv() -> list[str]:
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(BACKEND_ARGV_JSON)
-    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
-        raise BrokerError("BACKEND_ARGV_JSON_INVALID") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, list) or not value or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item for item in value):
-        raise BrokerError("BACKEND_ARGV_INVALID")
-    executable = Path(value[0])
-    if not executable.is_absolute():
-        raise BrokerError("BACKEND_EXECUTABLE_INVALID")
-    try:
-        resolved = executable.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise BrokerError("BACKEND_EXECUTABLE_INVALID") from exc
-    if not resolved.is_file():
-        raise BrokerError("BACKEND_EXECUTABLE_INVALID")
-    return list(value)
-
-
-def validate_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], int]:
-    if value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1":
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    if value.get("adapter") != ADAPTER or ADAPTER not in {"hermes", "codex", "openclaw"}:
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_ADAPTER_INVALID")
-    context = value.get("execution_context")
-    policy = value.get("policy")
-    if not isinstance(context, Mapping) or not isinstance(policy, Mapping):
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_CONTEXT_INVALID")
-    worktree_raw = context.get("worktree")
-    if not isinstance(worktree_raw, str):
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_INVALID")
-    for field in (
-        "authoritative_repository_write",
-        "direct_git_ref_mutation",
-        "direct_git_push",
-        "direct_git_commit",
-        "main_write",
-        "force_push",
-        "production_write",
-        "tag_write",
-        "baseline_write",
-        "task_api_credential_visible",
-        "writer_lease_visible",
-    ):
-        if policy.get(field) is not False:
-            raise BrokerError("REQUEST_POLICY_REJECTED", details={"field": field})
-
-    root = WORKSPACE_ROOT.resolve()
-    candidate = Path(worktree_raw)
-    if not candidate.is_absolute():
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_INVALID")
-    parent = candidate.parent.resolve()
-    if root == parent or root not in parent.parents:
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_OUT_OF_SCOPE")
-
-    flags = getattr(os, "O_PATH", os.O_RDONLY) | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0) | os.O_DIRECTORY
-    try:
-        fd = os.open(str(candidate), flags)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_OPEN_FAILED") from exc
-    st = os.fstat(fd)
-    if not stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
-        os.close(fd)
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_NOT_DIRECTORY")
-    pinned = Path(f"/proc/self/fd/{fd}")
-    try:
-        resolved = pinned.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError:
-        os.close(fd)
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_PIN_FAILED")
-    if root not in resolved.parents:
-        os.close(fd)
-        raise BrokerError("REQUEST_WORKTREE_OUT_OF_SCOPE")
-    return dict(value), fd
-
-
-def sanitize(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        cleaned: dict[str, Any] = {}
-        for key, inner in value.items():
-            lowered = str(key).lower()
-            if any(marker in lowered for marker in ("token", "secret", "credential", "authorization", "password", "api_key", "apikey", "access_key")):
-                cleaned[str(key)] = "[REDACTED]"
-            else:
-                cleaned[str(key)] = sanitize(inner)
-        return cleaned
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return SENSITIVE_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", value)
-    return value
-
-
-def sanitized_failure(code: str, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    safe: dict[str, Any] = {}
-    for key, value in dict(details or {}).items():
-        lowered = str(key).lower()
-        if any(marker in lowered for marker in ("token", "secret", "credential", "authorization", "password", "api_key", "apikey", "access_key")):
-            safe[str(key)] = "[REDACTED]"
-        else:
-            safe[str(key)] = value
-    return {
-        "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1",
-        "status": "FAILED",
-        "summary": code,
-        "verification": [],
-        "evidence": safe,
-    }
-
-
-def execute_backend(request: Mapping[str, Any], worktree_fd: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    argv = backend_argv()
-    request = dict(request)
-    context = dict(request["execution_context"])
-    # Pass a pinned inode-backed path, not the original user-visible pathname.
-    context["worktree"] = f"/proc/self/fd/{worktree_fd}"
-    request["execution_context"] = context
-    payload = json.dumps(request, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    environment = {
-        "PATH": "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin",
-        "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8",
-        "AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_ADAPTER": ADAPTER,
-    }
-    for name in BACKEND_ENV_ALLOWLIST:
-        value = os.environ.get(name)
-        if value is not None:
-            environment[name] = value
-    credentials_dir = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
-    if credentials_dir:
-        environment["CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"] = credentials_dir
-
-    try:
-        completed = subprocess.run(
-            argv,
-            input=payload,
-            cwd=f"/proc/self/fd/{worktree_fd}",
-            pass_fds=(worktree_fd,),
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-            timeout=BACKEND_TIMEOUT,
-            env=environment,
-        )
-    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-        return sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT")
-    except OSError as exc:
-        return sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_EXEC_FAILED", {"error": type(exc).__name__})
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        return sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_FAILED", {"exit_code": completed.returncode})
-    if len(completed.stdout) > MAX_BYTES:
-        return sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_RESULT_TOO_LARGE")
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(completed.stdout.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        return sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_RESULT_INVALID")
-    if not isinstance(value, Mapping) or value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1":
-        return sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_RESULT_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    sanitized = sanitize(dict(value))
-    return sanitized if isinstance(sanitized, dict) else sanitized_failure("AGENT_BACKEND_RESULT_INVALID")
-
-
-def serve_once(listener: socket.socket) -> None:
-    connection, _ = listener.accept()
-    worktree_fd: int | None = None
-    try:
-        authorize_peer(connection)
-        request = read_request(connection)
-        request, worktree_fd = validate_request(request)
-        response = execute_backend(request, worktree_fd)
-    except BrokerError as exc:
-        response = sanitized_failure(exc.code, exc.details)
-    except Exception as exc:
-        response = sanitized_failure("BROKER_INTERNAL_ERROR", {"error": type(exc).__name__})
-    finally:
-        if worktree_fd is not None:
-            os.close(worktree_fd)
-    raw = json.dumps(response, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
-    try:
-        connection.settimeout(CONNECTION_TIMEOUT)
-        connection.sendall(raw[:MAX_BYTES])
-    finally:
-        connection.close()
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    if ADAPTER not in {"hermes", "codex", "openclaw"}:
-        raise BrokerError("BROKER_ADAPTER_INVALID")
-    if not SOCKET_PATH.is_absolute() or not WORKSPACE_ROOT.is_absolute():
-        raise BrokerError("BROKER_PATH_INVALID")
-    SOCKET_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    if SOCKET_PATH.exists() or SOCKET_PATH.is_symlink():
-        SOCKET_PATH.unlink()
-    listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-    listener.bind(str(SOCKET_PATH))
-    os.chmod(SOCKET_PATH, 0o660)
-    listener.listen(8)
-    try:
-        while True:
-            serve_once(listener)
-    finally:
-        listener.close()
-        if SOCKET_PATH.exists():
-            SOCKET_PATH.unlink()
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-agent-runtime-broker/openclaw_engineering_backend.py

@@ -1,369 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""OpenClaw engineering backend for the AIOS autonomous runtime broker.
-
-This process is intentionally *not* an Online Agent Task worker. It receives
-one secret-free `aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1` object on stdin, invokes
-OpenClaw's headless `agent exec` against the pinned disposable worktree, and
-returns one `aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1` object on stdout.
-
-Online Task claim/heartbeat/result and Governed GitOps remain owned by the
-AIOS autonomous worker.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import subprocess
-import sys
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-
-REQUEST_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1"
-RESULT_SCHEMA = "aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1"
-MAX_INPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
-MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
-DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 1800
-ALLOWED_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "codex", "openclaw"})
-SECRET_PATTERNS = (
-    re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b"),
-    re.compile(r"\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b"),
-    re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
-    re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-)
-
-
-class BackendError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, *, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def redact_text(value: str, limit: int = 8192) -> str:
-    value = value[:limit]
-    for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS:
-        value = pattern.sub("[REDACTED]", value)
-    return value
-
-
-def result(
-    status: str,
-    summary: str,
-    *,
-    verification: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
-    evidence: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "schema": RESULT_SCHEMA,
-        "status": status,
-        "summary": redact_text(summary) or status,
-        "verification": verification or [],
-        "evidence": dict(evidence or {}),
-    }
-
-
-def emit(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> int:
-    raw = json.dumps(dict(value), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
-    sys.stdout.write(raw)
-    sys.stdout.write("\n")
-    sys.stdout.flush()
-    return 0
-
-
-def read_request() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    raw = sys.stdin.buffer.read(MAX_INPUT_BYTES + 1)
-    if len(raw) > MAX_INPUT_BYTES:
-        raise BackendError("REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise BackendError("REQUEST_INVALID_JSON") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        raise BackendError("REQUEST_OBJECT_REQUIRED")
-    if value.get("schema") != REQUEST_SCHEMA:
-        raise BackendError("REQUEST_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-    return dict(value)
-
-
-def nonempty(value: Any, field: str, limit: int) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise BackendError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID")
-    value = value.strip()
-    if not value or len(value) > limit:
-        raise BackendError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-def string_list(value: Any, field: str) -> list[str]:
-    if not isinstance(value, list) or not value or len(value) > 64:
-        raise BackendError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID")
-    result_value: list[str] = []
-    for item in value:
-        result_value.append(nonempty(item, field, 4096))
-    return result_value
-
-
-def validate_request(value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], Path]:
-    adapter = str(value.get("adapter") or "")
-    if adapter not in ALLOWED_ADAPTERS:
-        raise BackendError("ADAPTER_INVALID")
-
-    task = value.get("task")
-    context = value.get("execution_context")
-    policy = value.get("policy")
-    if not isinstance(task, Mapping) or not isinstance(context, Mapping) or not isinstance(policy, Mapping):
-        raise BackendError("REQUEST_CONTEXT_INVALID")
-
-    task_id = nonempty(task.get("task_id"), "task_id", 180)
-    goal = nonempty(task.get("goal"), "goal", 16384)
-    instructions = nonempty(task.get("instructions"), "instructions", 65536)
-    success = string_list(task.get("success_criteria"), "success_criteria")
-
-    worktree_raw = context.get("worktree")
-    if not isinstance(worktree_raw, str) or not worktree_raw.startswith("/proc/self/fd/"):
-        raise BackendError("PINNED_WORKTREE_REQUIRED")
-    worktree = Path(worktree_raw)
-    try:
-        resolved = worktree.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise BackendError("PINNED_WORKTREE_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-    if not resolved.is_dir():
-        raise BackendError("PINNED_WORKTREE_INVALID")
-
-    for field in (
-        "authoritative_repository_write",
-        "direct_git_ref_mutation",
-        "direct_git_push",
-        "direct_git_commit",
-        "main_write",
-        "force_push",
-        "production_write",
-        "tag_write",
-        "baseline_write",
-        "task_api_credential_visible",
-        "writer_lease_visible",
-    ):
-        if policy.get(field) is not False:
-            raise BackendError("REQUEST_POLICY_REJECTED", details={"field": field})
-
-    return {
-        "adapter": adapter,
-        "task_id": task_id,
-        "goal": goal,
-        "instructions": instructions,
-        "success_criteria": success,
-        "repository": str(context.get("repository") or ""),
-        "base_oid": str(context.get("base_oid") or ""),
-        "target_branch": str(context.get("target_branch") or ""),
-    }, worktree
-
-
-def openclaw_binary() -> Path:
-    configured = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", "").strip()
-    if not configured:
-        raise BackendError("OPENCLAW_BINARY_NOT_CONFIGURED")
-    path = Path(configured)
-    if not path.is_absolute():
-        raise BackendError("OPENCLAW_BINARY_INVALID")
-    try:
-        resolved = path.resolve(strict=True)
-    except OSError as exc:
-        raise BackendError("OPENCLAW_BINARY_UNAVAILABLE") from exc
-    if not resolved.is_file() or not os.access(resolved, os.X_OK):
-        raise BackendError("OPENCLAW_BINARY_UNAVAILABLE")
-    return resolved
-
-
-def provider_environment() -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Build an environment containing only explicitly projected provider auth.
-
-    `--auth-env-only` tells OpenClaw not to load ambient config/auth stores.
-    The mapping is non-secret; values are read from systemd credential files.
-    """
-    raw = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_JSON", "{}")
-    try:
-        mapping = json.loads(raw)
-    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
-        raise BackendError("PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_INVALID") from exc
-    if not isinstance(mapping, Mapping):
-        raise BackendError("PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_INVALID")
-
-    credentials_directory = os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", "").strip()
-    environment = {
-        "PATH": "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin",
-        "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8",
-        "NO_COLOR": "1",
-        # Prevent optional login-shell env snapshot import into exec runs.
-        "OPENCLAW_EXEC_SHELL_SNAPSHOT": "0",
-    }
-    if mapping:
-        if not credentials_directory:
-            raise BackendError("PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_DIRECTORY_UNAVAILABLE")
-        credential_root = Path(credentials_directory)
-        for env_name, credential_name in mapping.items():
-            if (
-                not isinstance(env_name, str)
-                or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}", env_name)
-                or not isinstance(credential_name, str)
-                or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}", credential_name)
-            ):
-                raise BackendError("PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_INVALID")
-            path = credential_root / credential_name
-            if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
-                raise BackendError("PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE", details={"name": credential_name})
-            secret = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-            if not secret:
-                raise BackendError("PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_EMPTY", details={"name": credential_name})
-            environment[env_name] = secret
-    return environment
-
-
-def build_prompt(task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    criteria = "\n".join(f"- {item}" for item in task["success_criteria"])
-    return f"""You are the autonomous engineering runtime for AIOS task {task['task_id']}.
-
-Repository: {task['repository']}
-Base OID: {task['base_oid']}
-Target branch (owned by AIOS Governed GitOps, not by you): {task['target_branch']}
-
-Goal:
-{task['goal']}
-
-Instructions:
-{task['instructions']}
-
-Success criteria:
-{criteria}
-
-Execution boundary:
-- Work only inside the current disposable worktree.
-- Inspect the repository yourself and determine the root cause and files to change.
-- Implement the smallest correct fix.
-- Run focused tests and repair failures when feasible.
-- Do NOT run `git commit`, `git push`, `git update-ref`, create branches/tags, or modify authoritative refs.
-- Do NOT attempt to access AIOS Agent Task credentials, writer leases, or Governed GitOps credentials.
-- Leave Git HEAD unchanged; AIOS independently inspects the diff, reruns verification, and performs the governed commit.
-- In your final answer, concisely state root cause, files changed, and tests you ran.
-"""
-
-
-def openclaw_timeout() -> int:
-    raw = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", str(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT))
-    try:
-        value = int(raw)
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise BackendError("OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_INVALID") from exc
-    if not 60 <= value <= 7200:
-        raise BackendError("OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-def invoke_openclaw(task: Mapping[str, Any], worktree: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    binary = openclaw_binary()
-    model = nonempty(os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL"), "openclaw_model", 256)
-    timeout_seconds = openclaw_timeout()
-    prompt = build_prompt(task)
-
-    argv = [
-        str(binary),
-        "agent",
-        "exec",
-        "--message-file",
-        "-",
-        "--cwd",
-        str(worktree),
-        "--model",
-        model,
-        "--auth-env-only",
-        "--timeout",
-        str(timeout_seconds),
-        "--json",
-    ]
-
-    try:
-        pinned_fd = int(worktree.name)
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise BackendError("PINNED_WORKTREE_FD_INVALID") from exc
-
-    try:
-        completed = subprocess.run(
-            argv,
-            input=prompt.encode("utf-8"),
-            cwd=str(worktree),
-            pass_fds=(pinned_fd,),
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-            timeout=timeout_seconds + 90,
-            env=provider_environment(),
-        )
-    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-        return result(
-            "FAILED",
-            "OPENCLAW_HARD_TIMEOUT",
-            evidence={"backend": "openclaw-agent-exec", "timeout_seconds": timeout_seconds},
-        )
-    except OSError as exc:
-        return result(
-            "FAILED",
-            "OPENCLAW_EXEC_FAILED",
-            evidence={"backend": "openclaw-agent-exec", "error": type(exc).__name__},
-        )
-
-    stdout = completed.stdout[:MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES]
-    try:
-        envelope = json.loads(stdout.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        return result(
-            "FAILED",
-            "OPENCLAW_RESULT_INVALID",
-            evidence={
-                "backend": "openclaw-agent-exec",
-                "exit_code": completed.returncode,
-                "stderr_sha256": __import__("hashlib").sha256(completed.stderr).hexdigest(),
-            },
-        )
-
-    if not isinstance(envelope, Mapping):
-        return result("FAILED", "OPENCLAW_RESULT_INVALID", evidence={"backend": "openclaw-agent-exec"})
-
-    ok = envelope.get("ok") is True and envelope.get("status") == "ok" and completed.returncode == 0
-    final_text = str(envelope.get("final") or "").strip()
-    evidence = {
-        "backend": "openclaw-agent-exec",
-        "openclaw_status": envelope.get("status"),
-        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
-        "model": envelope.get("model"),
-        "provider": envelope.get("provider"),
-        "session_id_present": bool(envelope.get("sessionId")),
-        "code_mode_engaged": envelope.get("codeModeEngaged"),
-        "assistant_turns": envelope.get("assistantTurns"),
-        "tool_summary": envelope.get("toolSummary") if isinstance(envelope.get("toolSummary"), Mapping) else {},
-    }
-
-    if not ok:
-        error = envelope.get("error")
-        if isinstance(error, Mapping):
-            evidence["error_kind"] = error.get("kind")
-        summary = "OPENCLAW_" + str(envelope.get("status") or "ERROR").upper()
-        return result("FAILED", summary, evidence=evidence)
-
-    summary = final_text or "OpenClaw completed the engineering turn."
-    return result("COMPLETED", summary, evidence=evidence)
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    try:
-        request = read_request()
-        task, worktree = validate_request(request)
-        return emit(invoke_openclaw(task, worktree))
-    except BackendError as exc:
-        return emit(result("BLOCKED", exc.code, evidence=exc.details))
-    except Exception as exc:
-        return emit(result("FAILED", "OPENCLAW_BACKEND_INTERNAL_ERROR", evidence={"error": type(exc).__name__}))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/autonomous_worker.py

@@ -1,822 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-import grp
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import threading
-import time
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.request
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-from intent_runtime import IntentError, Resolution, is_claimable_intent, resolve
-from runtime_client import RuntimeErrorV2, collect_changes, invoke, request_payload, scan_secrets
-
-
-API_BASE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18940").rstrip("/")
-BRIDGE_BASE = os.environ.get("AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:19998").rstrip("/")
-AGENT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_ID", "online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-autonomous-20260815")
-AGENT_VERSION = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_VERSION", "2026-08-15.4-autonomous-intent")
-REPOSITORY = os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_REPOSITORY", "aios/aios")
-BASE_REF = os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_BASE_REF", "refs/heads/main")
-AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))
-STATE_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_STATE_ROOT", "/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker"))
-WORKSPACE_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_WORKSPACE_ROOT", str(STATE_ROOT / "workspaces")))
-SHARED_GROUP = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_RUNTIME_SHARED_GROUP", "aios-agent-runtime")
-DEFAULT_ADAPTER = os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_DEFAULT_ADAPTER", "hermes")
-HERMES_SOCKET = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_HERMES_BROKER_SOCKET", "/run/aios-agent-runtime/hermes.sock"))
-CODEX_SOCKET = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_CODEX_BROKER_SOCKET", "/run/aios-agent-runtime/codex.sock"))
-OPENCLAW_SOCKET = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BROKER_SOCKET", "/run/aios-agent-runtime/openclaw.sock"))
-POLL_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_POLL_SECONDS", "5"))
-HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS", "10"))
-LEASE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_LEASE_SECONDS", "300"))
-RUNTIME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_RUNTIME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "3600"))
-MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
-)
-
-
-class WorkerError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, *, phase: str, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.phase = phase
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def sha256_bytes(value: bytes) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()
-
-
-def sha256_json(value: Any) -> str:
-    return sha256_bytes(json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
-
-
-def sanitize(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        result: dict[str, Any] = {}
-        for key, inner in value.items():
-            lowered = str(key).lower()
-            if any(word in lowered for word in ("token", "secret", "credential", "authorization", "password", "api_key", "apikey", "access_key")):
-                result[str(key)] = "[REDACTED]"
-            else:
-                result[str(key)] = sanitize(inner)
-        return result
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, tuple):
-        return [sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return SENSITIVE_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", value)
-    return value
-
-
-def audit(event_type: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
-    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    path = STATE_ROOT / "events.jsonl"
-    record = {
-        "event_type": event_type,
-        "created_at": now(),
-        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
-        "agent_version": AGENT_VERSION,
-        "credential_material_exposed": False,
-        "writer_lease_material_exposed": False,
-        **sanitize(fields),
-    }
-    with path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-        handle.write(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
-    os.chmod(path, 0o640)
-    print(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True), flush=True)
-
-
-def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("STATE_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="state")
-    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=str(path.parent))
-    try:
-        os.fchmod(fd, 0o640)
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            json.dump(sanitize(dict(value)), handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
-            handle.write("\n")
-            handle.flush()
-            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
-        os.replace(temporary, path)
-    finally:
-        if os.path.exists(temporary):
-            os.unlink(temporary)
-
-
-def state_path(task_id: str) -> Path:
-    safe = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._:-]+", "-", task_id)[:180]
-    return STATE_ROOT / "tasks" / f"{safe}.json"
-
-
-def load_state(task_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    path = state_path(task_id)
-    if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
-        return None
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-    return value if isinstance(value, dict) else None
-
-
-def save_state(task_id: str, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-    atomic_json(state_path(task_id), value)
-
-
-def api_call(method: str, route: str, token: str, body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-    payload = None if body is None else json.dumps(dict(body), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Accept": "application/json"}
-    if payload is not None:
-        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-    request = urllib.request.Request(API_BASE + route, data=payload, headers=headers, method=method)
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=20) as response:
-            value = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-            return response.status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(exc.read(4096).decode("utf-8", "replace"))
-        except Exception:
-            value = {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-        return exc.code, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
-        return 599, {"error": "AGENT_TASK_API_UNAVAILABLE"}
-
-
-def bridge_call(route: str, body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-    if BRIDGE_BASE != "http://127.0.0.1:19998":
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "NON_STAGING_BRIDGE_REJECTED",
-            phase="startup",
-            details={"bridge_base": BRIDGE_BASE},
-        )
-    payload = json.dumps(dict(body), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    request = urllib.request.Request(
-        BRIDGE_BASE + route,
-        data=payload,
-        headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
-        method="POST",
-    )
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=60) as response:
-            value = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-            return response.status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(exc.read(4096).decode("utf-8", "replace"))
-        except Exception:
-            value = {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-        return exc.code, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
-        return 599, {"error": "GOVERNED_WRITE_API_UNAVAILABLE"}
-
-
-def load_agent_token() -> str:
-    directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ""))
-    path = directory / "agent_token"
-    if not path.is_file():
-        raise WorkerError("AGENT_RUNTIME_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE", phase="startup")
-    token = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    if len(token) < 24:
-        raise WorkerError("AGENT_RUNTIME_CREDENTIAL_INVALID", phase="startup")
-    return token
-
-
-def available_adapters() -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    values: list[str] = []
-    for name, path in (("hermes", HERMES_SOCKET), ("codex", CODEX_SOCKET), ("openclaw", OPENCLAW_SOCKET)):
-        try:
-            if path.is_socket():
-                values.append(name)
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-    return tuple(values)
-
-
-def capabilities() -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    values = {
-        "online_agent_task_api", "task.poll", "task.claim", "task.heartbeat", "task.result",
-        "intent.task", "engineering.consumer", "engineering.execute", "engineering.autonomous",
-        "workspace.worktree", "git.read", "git.diff", "git.test",
-        "governed.write.branch", "governed.write.file",
-    }
-    values.update(f"agent.runtime.{name}" for name in available_adapters())
-    return tuple(sorted(values))
-
-
-class LeaseHeartbeat:
-    def __init__(self, task_id: str, agent_token: str, lease_token: str) -> None:
-        self.task_id = task_id
-        self.agent_token = agent_token
-        self.lease_token = lease_token
-        self.stage = "claimed"
-        self.failed: str | None = None
-        self.stop = threading.Event()
-        self.thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run, daemon=True, name=f"heartbeat-{task_id}")
-
-    def set_stage(self, stage: str) -> None:
-        self.stage = stage
-        audit("TASK_PROGRESS_STAGE", task_id=self.task_id, stage=stage)
-
-    def send(self) -> None:
-        status, response = api_call(
-            "POST",
-            f"/v1/tasks/{self.task_id}/heartbeat",
-            self.agent_token,
-            {
-                "lease_token": self.lease_token,
-                "lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS,
-                "progress": {
-                    "stage": self.stage,
-                    "event_type": "TASK_STARTED" if self.stage == "started" else "TASK_PROGRESS",
-                    "execution_mode": "autonomous-intent-v2",
-                    "production_side_effects": False,
-                    "main_write": False,
-                },
-            },
-        )
-        if 200 <= status < 300:
-            audit(
-                "TASK_HEARTBEAT",
-                task_id=self.task_id,
-                stage=self.stage,
-                api_status=status,
-                task_status=response.get("status"),
-                lease_expires_at=response.get("lease_expires_at"),
-            )
-        else:
-            self.failed = str(response.get("error") or status)
-            audit("TASK_HEARTBEAT_FAILED", task_id=self.task_id, stage=self.stage, error=self.failed)
-
-    def _run(self) -> None:
-        while not self.stop.wait(HEARTBEAT_SECONDS):
-            try:
-                self.send()
-            except Exception as exc:
-                self.failed = type(exc).__name__
-                audit("TASK_HEARTBEAT_FAILED", task_id=self.task_id, error=self.failed)
-
-    def start(self) -> None:
-        self.thread.start()
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self.stop.set()
-        self.thread.join(timeout=3)
-
-
-def ensure_roots() -> None:
-    if WORKSPACE_ROOT.is_symlink() or STATE_ROOT.is_symlink() or AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("ROOT_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="startup")
-    if not AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR.is_dir():
-        raise WorkerError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_UNAVAILABLE", phase="startup")
-    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    WORKSPACE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-
-
-def run_git(args: Sequence[str], *, cwd: Path, timeout: int = 180) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[bytes]:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["/usr/bin/git", *args],
-        cwd=str(cwd),
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=timeout,
-        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "GIT_COMMAND_FAILED",
-            phase="workspace",
-            details={"operation": args[0] if args else "", "exit_code": completed.returncode},
-        )
-    return completed
-
-
-def prepare_worktree(task_id: str, base_oid: str) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
-    ensure_roots()
-    run_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"{task_id[:48]}-", dir=str(WORKSPACE_ROOT)))
-    os.chmod(run_root, 0o750)
-    clone = run_root / "repository"
-    worktree = run_root / "worktree"
-    run_git(["clone", "--no-local", "--no-hardlinks", str(AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR), str(clone)], cwd=run_root, timeout=300)
-    run_git(["-C", str(clone), "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{base_oid}^{{commit}}"], cwd=run_root)
-    run_git(["-C", str(clone), "worktree", "add", "--detach", str(worktree), base_oid], cwd=run_root, timeout=300)
-    return run_root, worktree
-
-
-def share_run_root(run_root: Path) -> None:
-    try:
-        gid = grp.getgrnam(SHARED_GROUP).gr_gid
-    except KeyError as exc:
-        raise WorkerError("RUNTIME_SHARED_GROUP_UNAVAILABLE", phase="workspace") from exc
-    root = run_root.resolve()
-    if not root.is_dir() or run_root.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("RUNTIME_RUN_ROOT_INVALID", phase="workspace")
-    for current, dirs, files in os.walk(root, topdown=True, followlinks=False):
-        current_path = Path(current)
-        for name in dirs + files:
-            candidate = current_path / name
-            if candidate.is_symlink():
-                raise WorkerError(
-                    "RUNTIME_WORKSPACE_SYMLINK_REJECTED",
-                    phase="workspace",
-                    details={"path": str(candidate.relative_to(root))},
-                )
-        for candidate in [current_path, *(current_path / name for name in dirs), *(current_path / name for name in files)]:
-            st = candidate.stat()
-            os.chown(candidate, -1, gid)
-            mode = st.st_mode & 0o777
-            os.chmod(candidate, mode | (0o070 if candidate.is_dir() else 0o060))
-
-
-def cleanup_run_root(run_root: Path) -> None:
-    root = WORKSPACE_ROOT.resolve()
-    candidate = run_root.resolve(strict=False)
-    if candidate == root or root not in candidate.parents:
-        raise WorkerError("CLEANUP_SCOPE_INVALID", phase="cleanup")
-    if candidate.exists():
-        shutil.rmtree(candidate)
-
-
-def allowed_programs() -> set[str]:
-    raw = os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_ALLOWED_PROGRAMS_JSON", '["/usr/bin/git","/usr/bin/python3"]')
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(raw)
-    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
-        raise WorkerError("ALLOWED_PROGRAMS_CONFIG_INVALID", phase="startup") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, list) or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item.startswith("/") for item in value):
-        raise WorkerError("ALLOWED_PROGRAMS_CONFIG_INVALID", phase="startup")
-    return set(value)
-
-
-def validate_verification_argv(value: Any) -> list[str]:
-    if not isinstance(value, list) or not value or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item for item in value):
-        raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_ARGV_INVALID", phase="verification")
-    argv = list(value)
-    if argv[0] not in allowed_programs():
-        raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_PROGRAM_NOT_ALLOWED", phase="verification", details={"program": Path(argv[0]).name})
-    if argv[0].endswith("/git") and any(item in {"push", "update-ref", "receive-pack", "send-pack", "commit", "reset", "clean"} for item in argv[1:]):
-        raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_GIT_MUTATION_REJECTED", phase="verification")
-    if argv[0].endswith("/python3") and "-c" in argv:
-        raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_INLINE_PYTHON_REJECTED", phase="verification")
-    return argv
-
-
-def run_verification(label: str, argv: Sequence[str], *, cwd: Path, timeout: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        list(argv),
-        cwd=str(cwd),
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=timeout,
-        env={"PATH": "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
-    )
-    result = {
-        "label": label[:120],
-        "argv": [Path(item).name if idx == 0 else item for idx, item in enumerate(argv)],
-        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
-        "stdout_sha256": sha256_bytes(completed.stdout),
-        "stderr_sha256": sha256_bytes(completed.stderr),
-        "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
-    }
-    audit("VERIFICATION_RESULT", **result)
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "VERIFICATION_FAILED",
-            phase="verification",
-            details={"label": label[:120], "exit_code": completed.returncode},
-        )
-    return result
-
-
-def independent_verification(
-    worktree: Path,
-    changed_files: Sequence[str],
-    runtime_verification: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
-) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    results = [
-        run_verification(
-            "git_diff_check",
-            ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(worktree), "diff", "--check"],
-            cwd=worktree,
-            timeout=120,
-        )
-    ]
-    py_files = [item for item in changed_files if item.endswith(".py")]
-    if py_files:
-        results.append(
-            run_verification(
-                "changed_python_compile",
-                ["/usr/bin/python3", "-m", "py_compile", *py_files],
-                cwd=worktree,
-                timeout=300,
-            )
-        )
-    test_files = [
-        item for item in py_files
-        if item.startswith("tests/") or Path(item).name.startswith("test_")
-    ]
-    if test_files:
-        results.append(
-            run_verification(
-                "changed_pytest",
-                ["/usr/bin/python3", "-m", "pytest", "-q", *test_files],
-                cwd=worktree,
-                timeout=900,
-            )
-        )
-    seen: set[str] = set()
-    for item in runtime_verification:
-        argv = validate_verification_argv(item.get("argv"))
-        cwd_value = item.get("cwd", ".")
-        if cwd_value in {"", "."}:
-            cwd = worktree
-        else:
-            if not isinstance(cwd_value, str) or cwd_value.startswith(("/", "~")) or ".." in Path(cwd_value).parts:
-                raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_CWD_INVALID", phase="verification")
-            cwd = (worktree / cwd_value).resolve()
-            if worktree.resolve() not in cwd.parents and cwd != worktree.resolve():
-                raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_CWD_ESCAPE", phase="verification")
-        timeout = item.get("timeout_seconds", 300)
-        if not isinstance(timeout, int) or isinstance(timeout, bool) or not 1 <= timeout <= 1800:
-            raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_TIMEOUT_INVALID", phase="verification")
-        key = sha256_json({"argv": argv, "cwd": str(cwd), "timeout": timeout})
-        if key in seen:
-            continue
-        seen.add(key)
-        results.append(
-            run_verification(str(item.get("label") or "agent_requested_verification"), argv, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
-        )
-    return results
-
-
-def governed_commit(
-    task_id: str,
-    resolution: Resolution,
-    worktree: Path,
-    changed_files: Sequence[str],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    files: dict[str, str] = {}
-    for relative in changed_files:
-        path = (worktree / relative).resolve()
-        if worktree.resolve() not in path.parents or not path.is_file():
-            raise WorkerError("COMMIT_FILE_INVALID", phase="committing", details={"path": relative})
-        files[relative] = base64.b64encode(path.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
-
-    governed_task_id = f"{task_id}-writer"
-    create_key = f"{task_id}-governed-v2"
-    commit_key = f"{task_id}-commit-v2"
-    status, created = bridge_call(
-        "/v2/governed-task",
-        {
-            "task_id": governed_task_id,
-            "repository": resolution.repository,
-            "base_oid": resolution.base_oid,
-            "target_branch": resolution.target_branch,
-            "risk": "engineering",
-            "description": f"Autonomous intent task {task_id}",
-            "idempotency_key": create_key,
-        },
-    )
-    if not 200 <= status < 300:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE_FAILED",
-            phase="committing",
-            details={"api_status": status, "error": created.get("error")},
-        )
-
-    generation = int(created.get("generation") or 1)
-    expected = str(created.get("expected_branch_oid") or resolution.base_oid)
-    branch_mode = str(created.get("branch_mode") or "CREATE_NEW")
-    status, lease = bridge_call(
-        "/v2/writer-lease",
-        {
-            "schema": "aios.task-writer-lease.v2",
-            "task_id": governed_task_id,
-            "repository": resolution.repository,
-            "branch_mode": branch_mode,
-            "base_oid": resolution.base_oid,
-            "expected_branch_oid": expected,
-            "target_branch": resolution.target_branch,
-            "generation": generation,
-            "lease_seconds": 900,
-        },
-    )
-    if not 200 <= status < 300:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "WRITER_LEASE_ACQUIRE_FAILED",
-            phase="committing",
-            details={"api_status": status, "error": lease.get("error")},
-        )
-
-    status, committed = bridge_call(
-        "/v2/commit-files",
-        {
-            "task_id": governed_task_id,
-            "repository": resolution.repository,
-            "expected_branch_oid": expected,
-            "target_branch": resolution.target_branch,
-            "generation": generation,
-            "idempotency_key": commit_key,
-            "files": files,
-            "message": f"chore(agent): execute online intent task {task_id}"[:240],
-        },
-    )
-    if not 200 <= status < 300:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "GOVERNED_COMMIT_FAILED",
-            phase="committing",
-            details={"api_status": status, "error": committed.get("error")},
-        )
-    commit_oid = committed.get("commit_oid")
-    if not isinstance(commit_oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(commit_oid):
-        raise WorkerError("GOVERNED_COMMIT_OID_INVALID", phase="committing")
-    return {
-        "governed_task_id": governed_task_id,
-        "generation": generation,
-        "branch_mode": branch_mode,
-        "commit_oid": commit_oid,
-        "commit_visible": committed.get("commit_visible"),
-        "target_branch": resolution.target_branch,
-        "create_idempotency_key": create_key,
-        "commit_idempotency_key": commit_key,
-    }
-
-
-def socket_for(adapter: str) -> Path:
-    if adapter == "hermes":
-        return HERMES_SOCKET
-    if adapter == "codex":
-        return CODEX_SOCKET
-    if adapter == "openclaw":
-        return OPENCLAW_SOCKET
-    raise WorkerError("ADAPTER_INVALID", phase="runtime")
-
-
-def resolve_task(task: Mapping[str, Any], prior: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> Resolution:
-    try:
-        return resolve(
-            task,
-            authority_git_dir=AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR,
-            repository=REPOSITORY,
-            base_ref=BASE_REF,
-            available_adapters=available_adapters(),
-            default_adapter=DEFAULT_ADAPTER,
-            prior=prior,
-        )
-    except IntentError as exc:
-        raise WorkerError(exc.code, phase="intent_resolution", details=exc.details) from exc
-
-
-def execute_claim(task: Mapping[str, Any], claim: Mapping[str, Any], token: str) -> int:
-    task_id = str(claim.get("task_id") or task.get("task_id") or "")
-    lease_token = claim.get("lease_token")
-    if not isinstance(lease_token, str) or len(lease_token) < 24:
-        raise WorkerError("LEASE_TOKEN_NOT_RETURNED", phase="claim")
-    attempt = int(claim.get("attempt") or 0)
-    state = load_state(task_id) or {"task_id": task_id, "phase": "claimed"}
-    prior = state.get("resolution") if isinstance(state.get("resolution"), Mapping) else None
-    resolution = resolve_task(task, prior=prior)
-    state["resolution"] = resolution.to_json()
-    state["attempt"] = attempt
-    save_state(task_id, state)
-
-    heartbeat = LeaseHeartbeat(task_id, token, lease_token)
-    heartbeat.start()
-    run_root: Path | None = None
-    try:
-        heartbeat.set_stage("started")
-        heartbeat.send()
-        audit("TASK_STARTED", task_id=task_id, attempt=attempt, adapter=resolution.adapter)
-
-        existing_commit = state.get("governed")
-        if isinstance(existing_commit, Mapping) and isinstance(existing_commit.get("commit_oid"), str):
-            result = {
-                "status": "SUCCEEDED",
-                "verification_state": "VERIFIED_BY_WORKER_READBACK_PENDING_SERVER",
-                "task_id": task_id,
-                "execution_mode": "autonomous-intent-v2",
-                "adapter": resolution.adapter,
-                "resolution_digest": resolution.resolution_digest,
-                "governed": dict(existing_commit),
-                "recovered_after_commit": True,
-                "secret_material_exposed": False,
-                "direct_main_write": False,
-                "force_push": False,
-                "production_write": False,
-            }
-        else:
-            heartbeat.set_stage("workspace_preparing")
-            run_root, worktree = prepare_worktree(task_id, resolution.base_oid)
-            share_run_root(run_root)
-            state["phase"] = "workspace_prepared"
-            save_state(task_id, state)
-
-            heartbeat.set_stage("agent_executing")
-            payload = request_payload(
-                adapter=resolution.adapter,
-                task_id=task_id,
-                goal=resolution.goal,
-                instructions=resolution.instructions,
-                success_criteria=resolution.success_criteria,
-                repository=resolution.repository,
-                base_oid=resolution.base_oid,
-                target_branch=resolution.target_branch,
-                worktree=worktree,
-            )
-            runtime = invoke(
-                socket_for(resolution.adapter),
-                payload,
-                timeout_seconds=RUNTIME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
-            )
-            heartbeat.set_stage("validating")
-            changed_files = collect_changes(worktree, resolution.base_oid)
-            scan_secrets(worktree, changed_files)
-            verification = independent_verification(worktree, changed_files, runtime.verification)
-
-            heartbeat.set_stage("committing")
-            governed = governed_commit(task_id, resolution, worktree, changed_files)
-            state.update({"phase": "commit_done", "governed": governed, "changed_files": list(changed_files)})
-            save_state(task_id, state)
-
-            result = {
-                "status": "SUCCEEDED",
-                "verification_state": "VERIFIED_BY_WORKER_READBACK_PENDING_SERVER",
-                "task_id": task_id,
-                "execution_mode": "autonomous-intent-v2",
-                "adapter": resolution.adapter,
-                "resolution_digest": resolution.resolution_digest,
-                "base_oid": resolution.base_oid,
-                "target_branch": resolution.target_branch,
-                "changed_files": list(changed_files),
-                "tests": verification,
-                "agent_summary": runtime.summary,
-                "agent_evidence": sanitize(runtime.evidence),
-                "governed": governed,
-                "secret_material_exposed": False,
-                "direct_main_write": False,
-                "force_push": False,
-                "production_write": False,
-            }
-
-        if heartbeat.failed:
-            raise WorkerError("HEARTBEAT_UNHEALTHY", phase="result_submitting", details={"error": heartbeat.failed})
-        heartbeat.set_stage("result_submitting")
-        result_key = f"{task_id}-result-v2"
-        status, response = api_call(
-            "POST",
-            f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/result",
-            token,
-            {
-                "lease_token": lease_token,
-                "idempotency_key": result_key,
-                "result": result,
-            },
-        )
-        if not 200 <= status < 300:
-            raise WorkerError(
-                "TASK_RESULT_SUBMIT_FAILED",
-                phase="result_submitting",
-                details={"api_status": status, "error": response.get("error")},
-            )
-        audit("RESULT_SUBMITTED", task_id=task_id, task_status=response.get("status"), result_idempotency_key=result_key)
-        state["phase"] = "result_submitted"
-        save_state(task_id, state)
-        return 0
-    except (WorkerError, RuntimeErrorV2) as exc:
-        code = exc.code if hasattr(exc, "code") else type(exc).__name__
-        phase = exc.phase if isinstance(exc, WorkerError) else "runtime"
-        details = exc.details if hasattr(exc, "details") else {}
-        audit("AUTONOMOUS_EXECUTION_FAILED", task_id=task_id, error=code, phase=phase, details=details)
-        failure_status = "BLOCKED" if code in {
-            "AGENT_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", "RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", "RUNTIME_BLOCKED",
-            "GOVERNED_WRITE_API_UNAVAILABLE", "NON_STAGING_BRIDGE_REJECTED",
-        } else "FAILED_RETRYABLE"
-        failure = {
-            "status": failure_status,
-            "verification_state": "UNVERIFIED",
-            "task_id": task_id,
-            "execution_mode": "autonomous-intent-v2",
-            "error": code,
-            "phase": phase,
-            "details": sanitize(details),
-            "secret_material_exposed": False,
-            "direct_main_write": False,
-            "force_push": False,
-            "production_write": False,
-        }
-        if not heartbeat.failed:
-            status, response = api_call(
-                "POST",
-                f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/result",
-                token,
-                {
-                    "lease_token": lease_token,
-                    "idempotency_key": f"{task_id}-attempt-{attempt}-failure-v2",
-                    "result": failure,
-                },
-            )
-            audit("FAILURE_RESULT_SUBMITTED", task_id=task_id, api_status=status, task_status=response.get("status"))
-        return 20
-    finally:
-        heartbeat.close()
-        if run_root is not None:
-            try:
-                cleanup_run_root(run_root)
-                audit("WORKSPACE_CLEANED", task_id=task_id, cleanup="PASS")
-            except Exception as exc:
-                audit("WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_FAILED", task_id=task_id, error=type(exc).__name__)
-
-
-def worker_once(token: str) -> int:
-    status, poll = api_call("POST", "/v1/tasks/poll", token, {"limit": 100})
-    if status != 200:
-        audit("TASK_POLL_FAILED", api_status=status, error=poll.get("error"))
-        return 10
-
-    worker_caps = capabilities()
-    candidates: list[Mapping[str, Any]] = []
-    for item in poll.get("tasks", []):
-        if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
-            continue
-        if not is_claimable_intent(item, worker_caps):
-            continue
-        try:
-            # Read-only preflight. Do not consume an attempt if runtime/base is unavailable.
-            resolve_task(item, prior=(load_state(str(item.get("task_id") or "")) or {}).get("resolution"))
-        except WorkerError as exc:
-            audit("TASK_SKIPPED_PREFLIGHT", task_id=item.get("task_id"), error=exc.code)
-            continue
-        candidates.append(item)
-
-    if not candidates:
-        return 0
-
-    # Server priority/order remains authoritative; take the first visible compatible task.
-    task = candidates[0]
-    task_id = str(task.get("task_id") or "")
-    status, claim = api_call("POST", f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/claim", token, {"lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS})
-    if status != 200:
-        audit("TASK_CLAIM_FAILED", task_id=task_id, api_status=status, error=claim.get("error"))
-        return 11
-    audit(
-        "TASK_CLAIMED",
-        task_id=task_id,
-        attempt=claim.get("attempt"),
-        revision=claim.get("revision"),
-        claim_mode="server_atomic",
-        execution_mode="autonomous-intent-v2",
-    )
-    merged = dict(task)
-    merged.update({key: value for key, value in claim.items() if key not in {"lease_token"}})
-    merged["task_id"] = task_id
-    return execute_claim(merged, claim, token)
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    ensure_roots()
-    if BRIDGE_BASE != "http://127.0.0.1:19998":
-        raise WorkerError("NON_STAGING_BRIDGE_REJECTED", phase="startup", details={"bridge_base": BRIDGE_BASE})
-    token = load_agent_token()
-    audit(
-        "AUTONOMOUS_WORKER_READY",
-        poll_mode="continuous",
-        claim_mode="server_atomic",
-        task_scope="intent-only",
-        bridge_base=BRIDGE_BASE,
-        available_adapters=list(available_adapters()),
-        capabilities=list(capabilities()),
-        main_write=False,
-        production_write=False,
-        force_push=False,
-    )
-    while True:
-        try:
-            result = worker_once(token)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            audit("WORKER_LOOP_ERROR", error=type(exc).__name__)
-            result = 20
-        time.sleep(POLL_SECONDS if result == 0 else max(POLL_SECONDS, 5))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/intent_runtime.py

@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-import hashlib
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-TASK_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
-REPOSITORY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]{2,199}$")
-ALLOWED_ADAPTERS = frozenset({"hermes", "codex", "openclaw"})
-
-
-class IntentError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, *, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def stable_digest(value: Any) -> str:
-    raw = json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _text(value: Any, field: str, limit: int) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise IntentError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID")
-    value = value.strip()
-    if not value or len(value) > limit:
-        raise IntentError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID")
-    return value
-
-
-def _string_list(value: Any, field: str, *, required: bool) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    if value is None and not required:
-        return ()
-    if not isinstance(value, list) or len(value) > 64 or (required and not value):
-        raise IntentError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID")
-    return tuple(_text(item, field, 4096) for item in value)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class IntentTask:
-    task_id: str
-    goal: str
-    instructions: str
-    success_criteria: tuple[str, ...]
-    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
-    digest: str
-
-    @classmethod
-    def parse(cls, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "IntentTask":
-        task_id = str(task.get("task_id") or "")
-        if not TASK_ID_RE.fullmatch(task_id):
-            raise IntentError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
-
-        metadata = task.get("metadata")
-        if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) and isinstance(metadata.get("execution"), Mapping):
-            raise IntentError("STRUCTURED_TASK_NOT_INTENT")
-
-        goal = _text(task.get("goal"), "goal", 16384)
-        instructions = _text(
-            task.get("instructions") or "Inspect the repository, implement the goal, and satisfy the success criteria.",
-            "instructions",
-            65536,
-        )
-        success = _string_list(task.get("success_criteria"), "success_criteria", required=True)
-        capabilities = _string_list(task.get("required_capabilities") or [], "required_capabilities", required=False)
-
-        required_markers = {"intent.task", "engineering.execute"}
-        missing = sorted(required_markers - set(capabilities))
-        if missing:
-            raise IntentError("INTENT_CAPABILITY_MARKER_REQUIRED", details={"missing": missing})
-
-        canonical = {
-            "task_id": task_id,
-            "goal": goal,
-            "instructions": instructions,
-            "success_criteria": success,
-            "required_capabilities": sorted(capabilities),
-        }
-        return cls(
-            task_id=task_id,
-            goal=goal,
-            instructions=instructions,
-            success_criteria=success,
-            required_capabilities=capabilities,
-            digest=stable_digest(canonical),
-        )
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Resolution:
-    schema: str
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    base_ref: str
-    base_oid: str
-    target_branch: str
-    adapter: str
-    intent_digest: str
-    goal: str
-    instructions: str
-    success_criteria: tuple[str, ...]
-    required_capabilities: tuple[str, ...]
-    resolution_digest: str
-
-    def to_json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        value = asdict(self)
-        value["success_criteria"] = list(self.success_criteria)
-        value["required_capabilities"] = list(self.required_capabilities)
-        return value
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_json(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any], *, intent: IntentTask) -> "Resolution":
-        if value.get("schema") != "aios.autonomous-intent-resolution.v2":
-            raise IntentError("RESOLUTION_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-        if value.get("task_id") != intent.task_id or value.get("intent_digest") != intent.digest:
-            raise IntentError("RESOLUTION_TASK_DRIFT")
-        result = cls(
-            schema=str(value["schema"]),
-            task_id=str(value["task_id"]),
-            repository=str(value["repository"]),
-            base_ref=str(value["base_ref"]),
-            base_oid=str(value["base_oid"]),
-            target_branch=str(value["target_branch"]),
-            adapter=str(value["adapter"]),
-            intent_digest=str(value["intent_digest"]),
-            goal=str(value["goal"]),
-            instructions=str(value["instructions"]),
-            success_criteria=tuple(str(item) for item in value.get("success_criteria") or []),
-            required_capabilities=tuple(str(item) for item in value.get("required_capabilities") or []),
-            resolution_digest=str(value["resolution_digest"]),
-        )
-        validate_resolution(result)
-        if result.resolution_digest != resolution_digest(result):
-            raise IntentError("RESOLUTION_DIGEST_INVALID")
-        return result
-
-
-def read_base_oid(authority_git_dir: Path, base_ref: str) -> str:
-    if not base_ref.startswith("refs/heads/"):
-        raise IntentError("BASE_REF_INVALID")
-    if authority_git_dir.is_symlink() or not authority_git_dir.is_dir():
-        raise IntentError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_INVALID")
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["/usr/bin/git", "--git-dir", str(authority_git_dir), "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{base_ref}^{{commit}}"],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=30,
-        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
-    )
-    oid = completed.stdout.strip()
-    if completed.returncode != 0 or not OID_RE.fullmatch(oid):
-        raise IntentError("BASE_OID_UNAVAILABLE")
-    return oid
-
-
-def derive_branch(task_id: str, digest: str) -> str:
-    slug = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+", "-", task_id).strip(".-").lower() or "task"
-    slug = slug[:100]
-    branch = f"agent/intent/{slug}-{digest[:12]}"
-    if len(branch) > 180:
-        branch = branch[:167] + "-" + digest[:12]
-    if ".." in branch or branch.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock")):
-        raise IntentError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID")
-    return branch
-
-
-def select_adapter(capabilities: Sequence[str], available: Sequence[str], default_adapter: str) -> str:
-    advertised = set(available)
-    if not advertised.issubset(ALLOWED_ADAPTERS):
-        raise IntentError("ADAPTER_CONFIGURATION_INVALID")
-    requested = {
-        item.split(".", 2)[-1]
-        for item in capabilities
-        if item.startswith("agent.runtime.")
-    }
-    requested.discard("")
-    if len(requested) > 1:
-        raise IntentError("MULTIPLE_AGENT_RUNTIMES_REQUIRED")
-    adapter = next(iter(requested)) if requested else default_adapter
-    if adapter not in ALLOWED_ADAPTERS:
-        raise IntentError("AGENT_RUNTIME_INVALID")
-    if adapter not in advertised:
-        raise IntentError("AGENT_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", details={"adapter": adapter})
-    return adapter
-
-
-def resolution_digest(value: Resolution) -> str:
-    return stable_digest({
-        "schema": value.schema,
-        "task_id": value.task_id,
-        "repository": value.repository,
-        "base_ref": value.base_ref,
-        "base_oid": value.base_oid,
-        "target_branch": value.target_branch,
-        "adapter": value.adapter,
-        "intent_digest": value.intent_digest,
-        "goal": value.goal,
-        "instructions": value.instructions,
-        "success_criteria": value.success_criteria,
-        "required_capabilities": sorted(value.required_capabilities),
-    })
-
-
-def validate_resolution(value: Resolution) -> None:
-    if not TASK_ID_RE.fullmatch(value.task_id):
-        raise IntentError("TASK_ID_INVALID")
-    if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(value.repository) or value.repository.startswith(("/", ".")):
-        raise IntentError("REPOSITORY_INVALID")
-    if not value.base_ref.startswith("refs/heads/"):
-        raise IntentError("BASE_REF_INVALID")
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(value.base_oid):
-        raise IntentError("BASE_OID_INVALID")
-    if not value.target_branch.startswith("agent/intent/"):
-        raise IntentError("TARGET_BRANCH_POLICY_INVALID")
-    if value.adapter not in ALLOWED_ADAPTERS:
-        raise IntentError("AGENT_RUNTIME_INVALID")
-
-
-def resolve(
-    task: Mapping[str, Any],
-    *,
-    authority_git_dir: Path,
-    repository: str,
-    base_ref: str,
-    available_adapters: Sequence[str],
-    default_adapter: str,
-    prior: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> Resolution:
-    intent = IntentTask.parse(task)
-    if prior is not None:
-        return Resolution.from_json(prior, intent=intent)
-    if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(repository) or repository.startswith(("/", ".")):
-        raise IntentError("REPOSITORY_INVALID")
-    base_oid = read_base_oid(authority_git_dir, base_ref)
-    adapter = select_adapter(intent.required_capabilities, available_adapters, default_adapter)
-    provisional = Resolution(
-        schema="aios.autonomous-intent-resolution.v2",
-        task_id=intent.task_id,
-        repository=repository,
-        base_ref=base_ref,
-        base_oid=base_oid,
-        target_branch=derive_branch(intent.task_id, intent.digest),
-        adapter=adapter,
-        intent_digest=intent.digest,
-        goal=intent.goal,
-        instructions=intent.instructions,
-        success_criteria=intent.success_criteria,
-        required_capabilities=intent.required_capabilities,
-        resolution_digest="",
-    )
-    result = Resolution(
-        **{**asdict(provisional), "resolution_digest": resolution_digest(provisional)}
-    )
-    validate_resolution(result)
-    return result
-
-
-def is_claimable_intent(task: Mapping[str, Any], worker_capabilities: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
-    try:
-        intent = IntentTask.parse(task)
-    except IntentError:
-        return False
-    required = set(intent.required_capabilities)
-    return required.issubset(set(worker_capabilities))

services/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/register.py

@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.request
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
-
-
-BASE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18940").rstrip("/")
-AGENT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_ID", "online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-autonomous-20260815")
-AGENT_TYPE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TYPE", "trusted-online-engineering-worker")
-AGENT_VERSION = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_VERSION", "2026-08-15.4-autonomous-intent")
-STATE_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_REGISTRATION_STATE", "/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/registration"))
-CREDENTIAL_PATH = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL", "/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/agent_token"))
-IDENTITY_PATH = STATE_DIR / "identity.json"
-PROJECTION_PROVIDER = "BridgeV2RuntimeCredentialProjection"
-
-
-def now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def runtime_capabilities() -> list[str]:
-    values = [
-        "online_agent_task_api", "task.poll", "task.claim", "task.heartbeat", "task.result",
-        "intent.task", "engineering.consumer", "engineering.execute", "engineering.autonomous",
-        "workspace.worktree", "git.read", "git.diff", "git.test",
-        "governed.write.branch", "governed.write.file",
-    ]
-    hermes = os.environ.get("AIOS_HERMES_BROKER_SOCKET", "")
-    codex = os.environ.get("AIOS_CODEX_BROKER_SOCKET", "")
-    openclaw = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BROKER_SOCKET", "")
-    if hermes and Path(hermes).is_socket():
-        values.append("agent.runtime.hermes")
-    if codex and Path(codex).is_socket():
-        values.append("agent.runtime.codex")
-    if openclaw and Path(openclaw).is_socket():
-        values.append("agent.runtime.openclaw")
-    return values
-
-
-def api_call(method: str, route: str, token: str, body: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-    payload = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Accept": "application/json"}
-    if payload is not None:
-        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-    request = urllib.request.Request(BASE + route, data=payload, headers=headers, method=method)
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
-            value = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-            return response.status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(exc.read(2048).decode("utf-8"))
-        except Exception:
-            value = {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-        return exc.code, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
-        return 599, {"error": "AGENT_TASK_API_UNAVAILABLE"}
-
-
-def encrypted_credential_is_valid() -> bool:
-    if not CREDENTIAL_PATH.is_file() or CREDENTIAL_PATH.is_symlink():
-        return False
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ["systemd-creds", "decrypt", "--with-key=host", str(CREDENTIAL_PATH), "/dev/null"],
-        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False, timeout=15,
-    )
-    return result.returncode == 0
-
-
-def load_identity() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    if not IDENTITY_PATH.is_file() or IDENTITY_PATH.is_symlink():
-        return None
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(IDENTITY_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-    return value if isinstance(value, dict) else None
-
-
-def identity_matches(value: dict[str, Any] | None) -> bool:
-    return bool(
-        value
-        and value.get("agent_id") == AGENT_ID
-        and value.get("agent_type") == AGENT_TYPE
-        and value.get("agent_version") == AGENT_VERSION
-        and value.get("task_scope") == "intent-only"
-        and value.get("credential_projection_provider") == PROJECTION_PROVIDER
-    )
-
-
-def encrypt_agent_token(token: str) -> None:
-    CREDENTIAL_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
-    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".agent-token.", dir=str(CREDENTIAL_PATH.parent))
-    os.close(fd)
-    os.unlink(temporary)
-    try:
-        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["systemd-creds", "encrypt", "--with-key=host", "--name=agent_token", "/dev/stdin", temporary],
-            input=(token + "\n").encode("utf-8"),
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False, timeout=20,
-        )
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise RuntimeError("AGENT_CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPT_FAILED")
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
-        os.replace(temporary, CREDENTIAL_PATH)
-    finally:
-        if os.path.exists(temporary):
-            os.unlink(temporary)
-
-
-def write_identity() -> None:
-    value = {
-        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
-        "agent_type": AGENT_TYPE,
-        "agent_version": AGENT_VERSION,
-        "task_scope": "intent-only",
-        "credential_projection_provider": PROJECTION_PROVIDER,
-        "credential_delivery": "systemd-LoadCredentialEncrypted",
-        "task_api_url": BASE,
-        "task_api_schema": "aios.agent-task.v1",
-        "execution_backend": "autonomous-intent-worker-v2",
-        "runtime_only_secret_delivery": True,
-        "main_write": False,
-        "production_write": False,
-        "force_push": False,
-        "tag_write": False,
-        "baseline_write": False,
-        "capabilities": runtime_capabilities(),
-        "created_at": now(),
-    }
-    STATE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="identity.", dir=str(STATE_DIR))
-    try:
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            json.dump(value, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
-            handle.write("\n")
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-        os.replace(temporary, IDENTITY_PATH)
-    finally:
-        if os.path.exists(temporary):
-            os.unlink(temporary)
-
-
-def register_or_recover() -> str:
-    STATE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    existing = load_identity()
-    if CREDENTIAL_PATH.exists():
-        if not identity_matches(existing):
-            raise RuntimeError("AGENT_IDENTITY_BINDING_CONFLICT")
-        if not encrypted_credential_is_valid():
-            raise RuntimeError("AGENT_ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
-        return "RECOVERED"
-    if existing is not None:
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_CREDENTIAL_MISSING_AFTER_PRIOR_REGISTRATION")
-    credential_directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ""))
-    control_path = credential_directory / "bridge_control_token"
-    if not control_path.is_file():
-        raise RuntimeError("BRIDGE_RUNTIME_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
-    control_token = control_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    status, response = api_call(
-        "POST", "/v1/agents/register", control_token,
-        {
-            "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
-            "agent_type": AGENT_TYPE,
-            "agent_version": AGENT_VERSION,
-            "capabilities": runtime_capabilities(),
-            "metadata": {
-                "task_scope": "intent-only",
-                "credential_projection_provider": PROJECTION_PROVIDER,
-                "runtime_only_secret_delivery": True,
-                "execution_backend": "autonomous-intent-worker-v2",
-                "main_write": False,
-                "production_write": False,
-                "force_push": False,
-            },
-        },
-    )
-    if status != 201:
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_REGISTER_FAILED_" + str(response.get("error") or status))
-    token = response.get("agent_token")
-    if not isinstance(token, str) or len(token) < 24:
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_TOKEN_NOT_RETURNED")
-    encrypt_agent_token(token)
-    write_identity()
-    return "REGISTERED"
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(0 if register_or_recover() in {"REGISTERED", "RECOVERED"} else 20)

services/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/runtime_client.py

@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import socket
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-MAX_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
-MAX_CHANGED_FILES = 256
-MAX_FILE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
-SENSITIVE_NAMES = frozenset({
-    ".env", ".env.local", ".env.production", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519",
-    "credentials", "credentials.json",
-})
-SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES = (".key", ".p12", ".pfx")
-SECRET_PATTERNS = (
-    re.compile(rb"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"),
-    re.compile(rb"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
-    re.compile(rb"\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b"),
-    re.compile(rb"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}\b"),
-)
-
-
-class RuntimeErrorV2(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, *, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def safe_relative_path(value: str) -> str:
-    if (
-        not value
-        or value.startswith(("/", "~"))
-        or "\\" in value
-        or "\x00" in value
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
-    ):
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("CHANGED_PATH_INVALID", details={"path": value[:160]})
-    lowered = value.split("/")[-1].lower()
-    if value.startswith(".git/") or value in {".git", ".gitmodules"}:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("GIT_METADATA_CHANGE_REJECTED", details={"path": value})
-    if lowered in SENSITIVE_NAMES or lowered.endswith(SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES):
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("SENSITIVE_PATH_REJECTED", details={"path": value})
-    return value
-
-
-def git(worktree: Path, args: Sequence[str], timeout: int = 60) -> bytes:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(worktree), *args],
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=timeout,
-        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("WORKTREE_GIT_FAILED", details={"operation": args[0] if args else ""})
-    return completed.stdout
-
-
-def _zpaths(raw: bytes) -> list[str]:
-    result: list[str] = []
-    for item in raw.split(b"\0"):
-        if not item:
-            continue
-        try:
-            result.append(item.decode("utf-8"))
-        except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("WORKTREE_PATH_ENCODING_INVALID") from exc
-    return result
-
-
-def collect_changes(worktree: Path, base_oid: str) -> list[str]:
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base_oid):
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("BASE_OID_INVALID")
-    head = git(worktree, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"]).decode("ascii", "strict").strip()
-    if head != base_oid:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("WORKTREE_HEAD_MUTATED", details={"expected": base_oid, "actual": head})
-    tracked = _zpaths(git(worktree, ["diff", "--name-only", "--no-renames", "-z", base_oid, "--"]))
-    untracked = _zpaths(git(worktree, ["ls-files", "--others", "--exclude-standard", "-z"]))
-    changed = sorted({safe_relative_path(item) for item in tracked + untracked})
-    if not changed:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("AGENT_PRODUCED_NO_CHANGES")
-    if len(changed) > MAX_CHANGED_FILES:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("CHANGED_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
-    root = worktree.resolve()
-    for relative in changed:
-        path = (root / relative).resolve(strict=False)
-        if root not in path.parents or not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("CHANGED_FILE_UNSUPPORTED", details={"path": relative})
-        if path.stat().st_size > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("CHANGED_FILE_TOO_LARGE", details={"path": relative})
-    return changed
-
-
-def scan_secrets(worktree: Path, changed: Sequence[str]) -> None:
-    root = worktree.resolve()
-    for relative in changed:
-        path = (root / safe_relative_path(relative)).resolve()
-        raw = path.read_bytes()
-        for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS:
-            if pattern.search(raw):
-                raise RuntimeErrorV2("SECRET_MATERIAL_REJECTED", details={"path": relative})
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RuntimeResult:
-    status: str
-    summary: str
-    verification: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
-    evidence: dict[str, Any]
-
-    @classmethod
-    def parse(cls, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "RuntimeResult":
-        if value.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1":
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_RESULT_SCHEMA_INVALID")
-        status = str(value.get("status") or "")
-        if status not in {"COMPLETED", "BLOCKED", "FAILED"}:
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_RESULT_STATUS_INVALID")
-        summary = str(value.get("summary") or "").strip()
-        if not summary or len(summary) > 8192:
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_RESULT_SUMMARY_INVALID")
-        verification = value.get("verification") or []
-        evidence = value.get("evidence") or {}
-        if not isinstance(verification, list) or len(verification) > 64:
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_VERIFICATION_INVALID")
-        if not isinstance(evidence, Mapping):
-            raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_EVIDENCE_INVALID")
-        return cls(status, summary, tuple(dict(item) for item in verification if isinstance(item, Mapping)), dict(evidence))
-
-
-def request_payload(
-    *,
-    adapter: str,
-    task_id: str,
-    goal: str,
-    instructions: str,
-    success_criteria: Sequence[str],
-    repository: str,
-    base_oid: str,
-    target_branch: str,
-    worktree: Path,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    if adapter not in {"hermes", "codex", "openclaw"}:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("ADAPTER_INVALID")
-    if not OID_RE.fullmatch(base_oid):
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("BASE_OID_INVALID")
-    return {
-        "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1",
-        "adapter": adapter,
-        "task": {
-            "task_id": task_id,
-            "goal": goal,
-            "instructions": instructions,
-            "success_criteria": list(success_criteria),
-        },
-        "execution_context": {
-            "repository": repository,
-            "base_oid": base_oid,
-            "target_branch": target_branch,
-            "worktree": str(worktree),
-        },
-        "policy": {
-            "authoritative_repository_write": False,
-            "direct_git_ref_mutation": False,
-            "direct_git_push": False,
-            "direct_git_commit": False,
-            "main_write": False,
-            "force_push": False,
-            "production_write": False,
-            "tag_write": False,
-            "baseline_write": False,
-            "task_api_credential_visible": False,
-            "writer_lease_visible": False,
-        },
-    }
-
-
-def invoke(socket_path: Path, payload: Mapping[str, Any], timeout_seconds: int) -> RuntimeResult:
-    if not socket_path.is_absolute():
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_SOCKET_NOT_ABSOLUTE")
-    if not 1 <= timeout_seconds <= 7200:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_TIMEOUT_INVALID")
-    raw = json.dumps(dict(payload), ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8") + b"\n"
-    if len(raw) > MAX_BYTES:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE")
-
-    client = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-    client.settimeout(timeout_seconds)
-    try:
-        client.connect(str(socket_path))
-        client.sendall(raw)
-        client.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
-        chunks: list[bytes] = []
-        total = 0
-        while True:
-            chunk = client.recv(65536)
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            total += len(chunk)
-            if total > MAX_BYTES:
-                raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE")
-            chunks.append(chunk)
-    except (OSError, socket.timeout) as exc:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", details={"socket": str(socket_path)}) from exc
-    finally:
-        client.close()
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(b"".join(chunks).decode("utf-8"))
-    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_RESPONSE_INVALID") from exc
-    if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_RESPONSE_INVALID")
-    result = RuntimeResult.parse(value)
-    if result.status == "BLOCKED":
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_BLOCKED", details={"summary": result.summary})
-    if result.status == "FAILED":
-        raise RuntimeErrorV2("RUNTIME_FAILED", details={"summary": result.summary})
-    return result

services/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/runtime_selftest.py

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-
-from runtime_client import collect_changes, invoke, request_payload, scan_secrets
-
-
-WORKSPACE_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get(
-    "AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_WORKSPACE_ROOT",
-    "/var/lib/aios-autonomous-agent-worker/workspaces",
-))
-ADAPTER = os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_SELFTEST_ADAPTER", "openclaw")
-SOCKET = Path(os.environ.get(
-    "AIOS_AUTONOMOUS_SELFTEST_BROKER_SOCKET",
-    f"/run/aios-agent-runtime/{ADAPTER}.sock",
-))
-
-
-def run(argv: list[str], cwd: Path) -> str:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        argv,
-        cwd=str(cwd),
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-        check=False,
-        timeout=60,
-        env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8"},
-    )
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise RuntimeError(f"SELFTEST_COMMAND_FAILED:{argv[0]}:{completed.returncode}")
-    return completed.stdout.strip()
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    if not SOCKET.is_socket():
-        raise RuntimeError("AUTONOMOUS_ENGINEERING_BACKEND_UNAVAILABLE")
-    WORKSPACE_ROOT.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o750, exist_ok=True)
-    run_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="runtime-selftest-", dir=str(WORKSPACE_ROOT)))
-    repo = run_root / "worktree"
-    repo.mkdir()
-    try:
-        run(["/usr/bin/git", "init", str(repo)], run_root)
-        run(["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(repo), "config", "user.email", "selftest@example.invalid"], run_root)
-        run(["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(repo), "config", "user.name", "AIOS Runtime Selftest"], run_root)
-        marker = repo / "agent_runtime_selftest.txt"
-        marker.write_text("VALUE=1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-        run(["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(repo), "add", "agent_runtime_selftest.txt"], run_root)
-        run(["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(repo), "commit", "-m", "selftest base"], run_root)
-        base_oid = run(["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], run_root)
-
-        payload = request_payload(
-            adapter=ADAPTER,
-            task_id="autonomous-runtime-selftest",
-            goal="Change agent_runtime_selftest.txt so it contains exactly VALUE=2 followed by a newline.",
-            instructions=(
-                "Modify only agent_runtime_selftest.txt in the provided disposable worktree. "
-                "Do not commit, push, change Git refs, or access task/governed-write credentials."
-            ),
-            success_criteria=[
-                "agent_runtime_selftest.txt contains VALUE=2",
-                "Git HEAD remains unchanged",
-            ],
-            repository="selftest/disposable",
-            base_oid=base_oid,
-            target_branch="agent/intent/runtime-selftest",
-            worktree=repo,
-        )
-        result = invoke(SOCKET, payload, timeout_seconds=300)
-        changed = collect_changes(repo, base_oid)
-        scan_secrets(repo, changed)
-        content = marker.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        head = run(["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], run_root)
-        if content != "VALUE=2\n":
-            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SELFTEST_CONTENT_MISMATCH")
-        if head != base_oid:
-            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SELFTEST_HEAD_MUTATED")
-        if changed != ["agent_runtime_selftest.txt"]:
-            raise RuntimeError("RUNTIME_SELFTEST_UNEXPECTED_DIFF")
-        print(json.dumps({
-            "status": "PASS",
-            "adapter": ADAPTER,
-            "base_oid": base_oid,
-            "changed_files": changed,
-            "head_unchanged": True,
-            "runtime_summary": result.summary,
-            "task_api_token_visible_to_runtime": False,
-            "writer_lease_visible_to_runtime": False,
-        }, sort_keys=True))
-        return 0
-    finally:
-        shutil.rmtree(run_root, ignore_errors=True)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-online-agent-worker/README.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# Generic Governed Online Agent Worker
-
-This worker is a pull-based, restartable consumer for `aios.agent-task.v1`.
-The service configuration contains only stable runtime identity, capability
-names, API endpoints, heartbeat timing, and the credential projection. It does
-not contain a task id, repository base OID, target branch, or plan-file path.
-
-## Dynamic task contract
-
-Engineering tasks carry `metadata.execution` with schema
-`aios.online-agent.execution.v2`. The payload supplies the repository, exact
-base OID, target branch, detached-worktree policy, adapter name, explicit file
-change set, verification commands, and governed commit idempotency keys.
-Task prose is descriptive only and is never passed to a shell.
-
-The worker accepts only structured operations:
-
-- `deterministic`: allow-listed file changes and test commands;
-- `codex`: fail-closed until a task supplies an explicit Codex file/command
-  policy;
-- `hermes`: fail-closed because the current Hermes runtime is a user-chat
-  service, not an engineering executor.
-
-All command execution uses `shell=False`, fixed program allowlists, relative
-paths beneath an ephemeral detached worktree, and output redaction. Direct
-`git branch`, `update-ref`, `push`, `commit`, `reset`, `clean`, main,
-production, tag, and baseline mutations are rejected by the worker.
-
-## Governed write path
-
-The worker calls the Bridge in this order:
-
-1. `POST /v2/governed-task`;
-2. `POST /v2/writer-lease`;
-3. `POST /v2/commit-files`;
-4. read-only authority-ref visibility verification.
-
-CREATE_NEW is represented by the task payload and is normalized by the Bridge
-lease authority. The worker never creates an authoritative ref itself.
-
-## Lifecycle and recovery
-
-The runtime registers with `register_or_recover`, receives its agent token
-once, and stores only the encrypted systemd credential. The consumer loops over
-poll, atomically claims one task, sends the first heartbeat, emits
-`TASK_STARTED`, and continues heartbeats while executing.
-
-State is atomically stored per task without agent or lease token material. If
-the process stops after a governed commit but before result submission, the
-next lease attempt reuses the stable governed idempotency key and submits the
-stored commit evidence without issuing a second commit.
-
-The control plane must independently verify submitted results; worker-local
-success is not production or mainline authorization.

services/aios-online-agent-worker/aios_online_agent_worker/__init__.py

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-"""Generic governed Online Agent Worker runtime."""
-
-__all__ = ["worker"]

services/aios-online-agent-worker/aios_online_agent_worker/worker.py

@@ -1,937 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Generic, restartable Online Agent Worker.
-
-The worker is deliberately task-agnostic.  A task's signed/durable payload is
-the only source of repository, branch, change, verification, and governance
-parameters.  There is no task id, base OID, branch name, or plan file in the
-runtime configuration.
-
-The worker performs local work only in an ephemeral detached worktree.  All
-authoritative ref updates go through the governed Bridge API; direct branch,
-update-ref, push, main, production, tag, and baseline mutations are rejected.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import base64
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import threading
-import time
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.request
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-from urllib.parse import unquote
-
-
-API_BASE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18940").rstrip("/")
-BRIDGE_BASE = os.environ.get("AIOS_GOVERNED_WRITE_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18892").rstrip("/")
-AGENT_ID = os.environ.get(
-    "AIOS_AGENT_ID", "online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-generic-20260815"
-)
-AGENT_TYPE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TYPE", "trusted-online-engineering-worker")
-AGENT_VERSION = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_VERSION", "2026-08-15.3-generic")
-AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR = Path(
-    os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git")
-)
-STATE_ROOT = Path(
-    os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_STATE_ROOT", "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815")
-)
-WORKSPACE_ROOT = Path(
-    os.environ.get(
-        "AIOS_WORKER_WORKSPACE_ROOT", "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/workspaces"
-    )
-)
-GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL = STATE_ROOT / "gitconfig"
-POLL_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_POLL_SECONDS", "5"))
-HEARTBEAT_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS", "20"))
-LEASE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_LEASE_SECONDS", "300"))
-MAX_TASK_BYTES = 512 * 1024
-MAX_FILE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
-OID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
-SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{2,179}$")
-BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$")
-PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^[^\\\x00-\x1f\x7f]+$")
-SENSITIVE_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+|(?:password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+)"
-)
-
-
-class WorkerError(RuntimeError):
-    def __init__(self, code: str, *, phase: str, details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
-        super().__init__(code)
-        self.code = code
-        self.phase = phase
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def digest_bytes(value: bytes) -> str:
-    return hashlib.sha256(value).hexdigest()
-
-
-def digest_json(value: Any) -> str:
-    return digest_bytes(
-        json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    )
-
-
-def sanitize(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        cleaned: dict[str, Any] = {}
-        for key, inner in value.items():
-            lowered = str(key).lower()
-            if any(marker in lowered for marker in ("token", "secret", "credential", "password", "authorization")):
-                cleaned[str(key)] = "[REDACTED]"
-            else:
-                cleaned[str(key)] = sanitize(inner)
-        return cleaned
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, tuple):
-        return [sanitize(item) for item in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return SENSITIVE_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", value)
-    return value
-
-
-def excerpt(value: str, limit: int = 800) -> str:
-    value = str(sanitize(value))
-    return value if len(value) <= limit else value[: limit // 2] + "...[TRUNCATED]..." + value[-limit // 2 :]
-
-
-def audit(event_type: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
-    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    path = STATE_ROOT / "events.jsonl"
-    record = {
-        "event_type": event_type,
-        "created_at": now(),
-        "agent_id": AGENT_ID,
-        "credential_material_exposed": False,
-        "lease_material_exposed": False,
-        **sanitize(fields),
-    }
-    with path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-        handle.write(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
-    os.chmod(path, 0o640)
-    print(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True), flush=True)
-
-
-def atomic_json(path: Path, value: Mapping[str, Any], mode: int = 0o640) -> None:
-    path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    if path.parent.is_symlink() or path.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("STATE_PATH_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="state")
-    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=str(path.parent))
-    try:
-        os.fchmod(fd, mode)
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            json.dump(sanitize(dict(value)), handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
-            handle.write("\n")
-            handle.flush()
-            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
-        os.replace(temporary, path)
-        os.chmod(path, mode)
-    finally:
-        if os.path.exists(temporary):
-            os.unlink(temporary)
-
-
-def safe_relative_path(value: Any, *, field: str = "path") -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 240:
-        raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID", phase="validation")
-    if unquote(value) != value or not PATH_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID", phase="validation")
-    if value.startswith(("/", "~")) or re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", value):
-        raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_ABSOLUTE", phase="validation")
-    parts = value.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
-    if any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in parts):
-        raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_TRAVERSAL", phase="validation")
-    return "/".join(parts)
-
-
-def resolve_under(root: Path, relative: str, *, write: bool = False) -> Path:
-    relative = safe_relative_path(relative)
-    root = root.resolve()
-    candidate = (root / relative).resolve(strict=False)
-    if candidate != root and root not in candidate.parents:
-        raise WorkerError("WORKSPACE_ESCAPE", phase="validation")
-    current = root
-    for part in Path(relative).parts:
-        current /= part
-        if current.exists() and current.is_symlink():
-            raise WorkerError("WORKSPACE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="validation")
-    if write and candidate.exists() and candidate.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("WRITE_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="validation")
-    return candidate
-
-
-def validate_oid(value: Any, field: str = "oid") -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID", phase="validation")
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_sha(value: Any, field: str = "sha256") -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not SHA256_RE.fullmatch(value):
-        raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID", phase="validation")
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_branch(value: Any) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not 3 <= len(value) <= 180:
-        raise WorkerError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID", phase="validation")
-    if value in {"main", "master", "HEAD"} or value.startswith(
-        ("main/", "master/", "refs/", "tags/", "tag/", "release/", "releases/", "baseline/", "production/")
-    ):
-        raise WorkerError("PROTECTED_BRANCH_REJECTED", phase="validation")
-    if (
-        value.startswith("/")
-        or value.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
-        or ".." in value
-        or "//" in value
-        or "@{" in value
-        or any(ch in value for ch in " ~^:?*[\\")
-        or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in value.split("/"))
-        or not BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(value)
-    ):
-        raise WorkerError("TARGET_BRANCH_INVALID", phase="validation")
-    return value
-
-
-def validate_program(argv: Any, *, internal_git: bool = False) -> list[str]:
-    if not isinstance(argv, list) or not argv or not all(isinstance(item, str) and item for item in argv):
-        raise WorkerError("STRUCTURED_ARGV_REQUIRED", phase="validation")
-    command = argv[0]
-    if command not in {"/usr/bin/git", "/usr/bin/python3"}:
-        raise WorkerError("PROGRAM_NOT_ALLOWLISTED", phase="validation", details={"program": Path(command).name})
-    if command.endswith("python3"):
-        if any(item in {"-c", "-", "--command"} for item in argv):
-            raise WorkerError("PYTHON_INLINE_CODE_REJECTED", phase="validation")
-        if "-m" in argv:
-            index = argv.index("-m")
-            if index + 1 >= len(argv) or argv[index + 1] not in {"pytest", "py_compile"}:
-                raise WorkerError("PYTHON_MODULE_NOT_ALLOWLISTED", phase="validation")
-    if command.endswith("git") and not internal_git:
-        rejected = {"push", "update-ref", "receive-pack", "send-pack", "reset", "clean", "branch", "commit", "merge", "rebase"}
-        if any(item in rejected for item in argv[1:]):
-            raise WorkerError("GIT_MUTATION_NOT_ALLOWLISTED", phase="validation")
-    return list(argv)
-
-
-def run_command(
-    label: str,
-    argv: list[str],
-    *,
-    cwd: Path,
-    timeout: int,
-    internal_git: bool = False,
-    allowed_returncodes: tuple[int, ...] = (0,),
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    validate_program(argv, internal_git=internal_git)
-    if not 1 <= timeout <= 3600:
-        raise WorkerError("COMMAND_TIMEOUT_INVALID", phase=label)
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    try:
-        completed = subprocess.run(
-            argv,
-            cwd=str(cwd),
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-            shell=False,
-            timeout=timeout,
-            env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8", "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": str(GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL)},
-        )
-    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
-        raise WorkerError("COMMAND_TIMEOUT", phase=label, details={"timeout_seconds": timeout}) from exc
-    result = {
-        "label": label,
-        "argv": [Path(item).name if index == 0 else item for index, item in enumerate(argv)],
-        "exit_code": completed.returncode,
-        "stdout_sha256": digest_bytes(completed.stdout.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
-        "stderr_sha256": digest_bytes(completed.stderr.encode("utf-8", "replace")),
-        "stdout_excerpt": excerpt(completed.stdout),
-        "stderr_excerpt": excerpt(completed.stderr),
-        "duration_ms": int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
-    }
-    audit("COMMAND_RESULT", **result)
-    if completed.returncode not in allowed_returncodes:
-        raise WorkerError("COMMAND_FAILED", phase=label, details={"exit_code": completed.returncode, "stderr": excerpt(completed.stderr, 400)})
-    return result
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ExecutionEnvelope:
-    task_id: str
-    repository: str
-    base_oid: str
-    target_branch: str
-    adapter: str
-    change_set: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
-    verification: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
-    governance: dict[str, Any]
-    workspace: dict[str, Any]
-    digest: str
-
-    @classmethod
-    def from_task(cls, task: Mapping[str, Any]) -> "ExecutionEnvelope":
-        task_id = str(task.get("task_id") or "")
-        if not ID_RE.fullmatch(task_id):
-            raise WorkerError("TASK_ID_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        metadata = task.get("metadata")
-        if not isinstance(metadata, Mapping):
-            raise WorkerError("TASK_METADATA_REQUIRED", phase="validation")
-        execution = metadata.get("execution")
-        if not isinstance(execution, Mapping):
-            raise WorkerError("DYNAMIC_EXECUTION_PAYLOAD_REQUIRED", phase="validation")
-        if execution.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.execution.v2":
-            raise WorkerError("EXECUTION_SCHEMA_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        repository = execution.get("repository")
-        if not isinstance(repository, str) or not repository:
-            raise WorkerError("REPOSITORY_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        base_oid = validate_oid(execution.get("base_oid"), "base_oid")
-        target_branch = validate_branch(execution.get("target_branch"))
-        workspace = execution.get("workspace")
-        if not isinstance(workspace, Mapping):
-            raise WorkerError("WORKSPACE_POLICY_REQUIRED", phase="validation")
-        workspace_value = dict(workspace)
-        if workspace_value.get("authority_git_dir") != str(AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR):
-            raise WorkerError("AUTHORITY_ROOT_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        if workspace_value.get("read_only_repository") is not True:
-            raise WorkerError("REPOSITORY_WRITE_POLICY_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        if workspace_value.get("cleanup_policy") not in {"always", "cleanup_on_success"}:
-            raise WorkerError("WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_POLICY_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        adapter_value = execution.get("adapter")
-        if isinstance(adapter_value, Mapping):
-            adapter = str(adapter_value.get("name") or "")
-        else:
-            adapter = str(adapter_value or "")
-        if adapter not in {"deterministic", "codex", "hermes"}:
-            raise WorkerError("RUNTIME_ADAPTER_UNSUPPORTED", phase="validation")
-        change_set = execution.get("change_set")
-        if not isinstance(change_set, list) or not change_set or len(change_set) > 128:
-            raise WorkerError("CHANGE_SET_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        normalized_changes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        for item in change_set:
-            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
-                raise WorkerError("CHANGE_OPERATION_INVALID", phase="validation")
-            operation = str(item.get("operation") or "")
-            relative = safe_relative_path(item.get("path"))
-            normalized = dict(item)
-            normalized["operation"] = operation
-            normalized["path"] = relative
-            if operation == "write_file":
-                content = item.get("content")
-                if not isinstance(content, str) or len(content.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
-                    raise WorkerError("WRITE_CONTENT_INVALID", phase="validation")
-            elif operation == "replace_text":
-                if not isinstance(item.get("old"), str) or not item.get("old") or not isinstance(item.get("new"), str):
-                    raise WorkerError("REPLACE_TEXT_INVALID", phase="validation")
-                if len(str(item["old"]).encode("utf-8")) > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
-                    raise WorkerError("REPLACE_TEXT_INVALID", phase="validation")
-            elif operation == "delete_file":
-                pass
-            else:
-                raise WorkerError("CHANGE_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED", phase="validation", details={"operation": operation})
-            expected = item.get("expected_sha256")
-            if expected is not None:
-                validate_sha(expected, "expected_sha256")
-            normalized_changes.append(normalized)
-        verification = execution.get("verification") or []
-        if not isinstance(verification, list) or len(verification) > 128:
-            raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        normalized_verification: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        for item in verification:
-            if not isinstance(item, Mapping):
-                raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_COMMAND_INVALID", phase="validation")
-            label = str(item.get("label") or "verification")
-            argv = validate_program(item.get("argv"))
-            cwd_value = item.get("cwd")
-            cwd = "." if cwd_value in {None, "", "."} else safe_relative_path(cwd_value, field="cwd")
-            timeout = item.get("timeout_seconds", 120)
-            if not isinstance(timeout, int) or isinstance(timeout, bool) or not 1 <= timeout <= 3600:
-                raise WorkerError("VERIFICATION_TIMEOUT_INVALID", phase="validation")
-            normalized_verification.append({"label": label, "argv": argv, "cwd": cwd, "timeout_seconds": timeout})
-        governance = execution.get("governance")
-        if not isinstance(governance, Mapping):
-            raise WorkerError("GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REQUIRED", phase="validation")
-        governance_value = dict(governance)
-        governed_task_id = str(governance_value.get("task_id") or f"{task_id}-writer")
-        if not ID_RE.fullmatch(governed_task_id):
-            raise WorkerError("GOVERNED_TASK_ID_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        idempotency_key = str(governance_value.get("idempotency_key") or f"{task_id}-governed-v1")
-        commit_key = str(governance_value.get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{task_id}-commit-v1")
-        for field, value in (("idempotency_key", idempotency_key), ("commit_idempotency_key", commit_key)):
-            if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{7,159}", value):
-                raise WorkerError(f"{field.upper()}_INVALID", phase="validation")
-        governance_value.update(
-            {
-                "task_id": governed_task_id,
-                "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,
-                "commit_idempotency_key": commit_key,
-                "message": str(governance_value.get("message") or f"chore(gitops): execute task {task_id}"),
-            }
-        )
-        for field in ("main_write", "force_push", "production_write", "tag_write", "baseline_write", "protected_ref_bypass"):
-            if governance_value.get(field, False) is not False:
-                raise WorkerError("GOVERNANCE_POLICY_REJECTED", phase="validation", details={"field": field})
-        allowed_files = governance_value.get("allowed_files")
-        if allowed_files is not None:
-            if not isinstance(allowed_files, list):
-                raise WorkerError("ALLOWED_FILES_INVALID", phase="validation")
-            allowed = {safe_relative_path(item, field="allowed_file") for item in allowed_files}
-            if not {item["path"] for item in normalized_changes}.issubset(allowed):
-                raise WorkerError("CHANGE_OUTSIDE_ALLOWED_FILES", phase="validation")
-            governance_value["allowed_files"] = sorted(allowed)
-        return cls(
-            task_id=task_id,
-            repository=repository,
-            base_oid=base_oid,
-            target_branch=target_branch,
-            adapter=adapter,
-            change_set=tuple(normalized_changes),
-            verification=tuple(normalized_verification),
-            governance=governance_value,
-            workspace=workspace_value,
-            digest=digest_json(execution),
-        )
-
-
-class RuntimeAdapter(ABC):
-    name: str
-
-    @abstractmethod
-    def execute(self, envelope: ExecutionEnvelope, worktree: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        raise NotImplementedError
-
-
-class DeterministicExecutor(RuntimeAdapter):
-    name = "deterministic"
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _write_atomic(path: Path, content: str) -> None:
-        path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}.", dir=str(path.parent))
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                handle.write(content)
-                handle.flush()
-                os.fsync(handle.fileno())
-            os.replace(temporary, path)
-        finally:
-            if os.path.exists(temporary):
-                os.unlink(temporary)
-
-    def execute(self, envelope: ExecutionEnvelope, worktree: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        changed: set[str] = set()
-        for change in envelope.change_set:
-            relative = str(change["path"])
-            path = resolve_under(worktree, relative, write=True)
-            expected = change.get("expected_sha256")
-            current = path.read_bytes() if path.is_file() else None
-            if expected is not None and (current is None or digest_bytes(current) != expected):
-                raise WorkerError("WORKTREE_SOURCE_DRIFT", phase="implementing", details={"path": relative})
-            operation = change["operation"]
-            if operation == "write_file":
-                self._write_atomic(path, str(change["content"]))
-            elif operation == "replace_text":
-                if current is None:
-                    raise WorkerError("REPLACE_SOURCE_MISSING", phase="implementing", details={"path": relative})
-                original = current.decode("utf-8")
-                old = str(change["old"])
-                count = original.count(old)
-                expected_count = int(change.get("count", 1))
-                if count != expected_count:
-                    raise WorkerError("REPLACE_TEXT_MATCH_COUNT_INVALID", phase="implementing", details={"path": relative, "count": count})
-                self._write_atomic(path, original.replace(old, str(change["new"])))
-            elif operation == "delete_file":
-                if path.exists():
-                    path.unlink()
-            changed.add(relative)
-            audit("REPOSITORY_CHANGE_APPLIED", operation=operation, path=relative, sha256=digest_bytes(path.read_bytes()) if path.exists() else None)
-        commands: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        if changed:
-            commands.append(run_command("git_intent_to_add", ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(worktree), "add", "-N", "--", *sorted(changed)], cwd=worktree, timeout=120, internal_git=True))
-        commands.append(run_command("git_diff_check", ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(worktree), "diff", "--check"], cwd=worktree, timeout=120))
-        commands.append(run_command("git_diff_stat", ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(worktree), "diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--stat"], cwd=worktree, timeout=120))
-        tests: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        for item in envelope.verification:
-            cwd = worktree if item["cwd"] == "." else resolve_under(worktree, item["cwd"])
-            tests.append(run_command(item["label"], item["argv"], cwd=cwd, timeout=item["timeout_seconds"]))
-        return {
-            "changed_files": sorted(changed),
-            "commands": commands,
-            "tests": tests,
-            "adapter": self.name,
-        }
-
-
-class CodexExecutor(RuntimeAdapter):
-    name = "codex"
-
-    def execute(self, envelope: ExecutionEnvelope, worktree: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "CODEX_ADAPTER_REQUIRES_EXPLICIT_POLICY",
-            phase="adapter",
-            details={"reason": "Codex is not allowed to mutate a governed worktree without an explicit file/command policy"},
-        )
-
-
-class HermesExecutor(RuntimeAdapter):
-    name = "hermes"
-
-    def execute(self, envelope: ExecutionEnvelope, worktree: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        raise WorkerError(
-            "HERMES_ENGINEERING_ADAPTER_UNAVAILABLE",
-            phase="adapter",
-            details={"reason": "The live Hermes service is a user-chat runtime, not an engineering executor"},
-        )
-
-
-def adapter_for(name: str) -> RuntimeAdapter:
-    return {"deterministic": DeterministicExecutor, "codex": CodexExecutor, "hermes": HermesExecutor}[name]()
-
-
-class HttpClient:
-    @staticmethod
-    def call(base: str, method: str, route: str, token: str | None, body: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-        payload = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-        headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
-        if token:
-            headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
-        if payload is not None:
-            headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-        request = urllib.request.Request(base + route, data=payload, headers=headers, method=method)
-        try:
-            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
-                value = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-                return response.status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
-        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-            raw = exc.read(8192).decode("utf-8", "replace")
-            try:
-                value = json.loads(raw)
-            except json.JSONDecodeError:
-                value = {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-            return exc.code, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
-            return 599, {"error": "SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE"}
-
-
-class AgentTaskClient:
-    def __init__(self, token: str) -> None:
-        self.token = token
-
-    def poll(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        status, response = HttpClient.call(API_BASE, "POST", "/v1/tasks/poll", self.token, {"limit": 100})
-        if status != 200:
-            raise WorkerError("TASK_POLL_FAILED", phase="poll", details={"api_status": status, "error": response.get("error")})
-        tasks = response.get("tasks")
-        return [dict(item) for item in tasks if isinstance(item, Mapping)] if isinstance(tasks, list) else []
-
-    def claim(self, task_id: str) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-        return HttpClient.call(API_BASE, "POST", f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/claim", self.token, {"lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS})
-
-    def heartbeat(self, task_id: str, lease_token: str, stage: str) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-        return HttpClient.call(
-            API_BASE,
-            "POST",
-            f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/heartbeat",
-            self.token,
-            {"lease_token": lease_token, "lease_seconds": LEASE_SECONDS, "progress": {"stage": stage, "worker_version": AGENT_VERSION}},
-        )
-
-    def result(self, task_id: str, lease_token: str, idempotency_key: str, result: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-        return HttpClient.call(
-            API_BASE,
-            "POST",
-            f"/v1/tasks/{task_id}/result",
-            self.token,
-            {"lease_token": lease_token, "idempotency_key": idempotency_key, "result": dict(result)},
-        )
-
-
-class BridgeClient:
-    def call(self, route: str, body: Mapping[str, Any]) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-        return HttpClient.call(BRIDGE_BASE, "POST", route, None, body, timeout=60)
-
-
-class LeaseHeartbeat:
-    def __init__(self, client: AgentTaskClient, task_id: str, lease_token: str) -> None:
-        self.client = client
-        self.task_id = task_id
-        self.lease_token = lease_token
-        self.stage = "claimed"
-        self.failed: str | None = None
-        self.stop_event = threading.Event()
-        self.lock = threading.Lock()
-        self.thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run, name="online-agent-heartbeat", daemon=True)
-
-    def first(self) -> None:
-        status, response = self.client.heartbeat(self.task_id, self.lease_token, self.stage)
-        if not 200 <= status < 300:
-            self.failed = str(response.get("error") or status)
-            raise WorkerError("TASK_HEARTBEAT_FAILED", phase="heartbeat", details={"api_status": status, "error": self.failed})
-        audit("TASK_HEARTBEAT", task_id=self.task_id, stage=self.stage, api_status=status)
-
-    def start(self) -> None:
-        self.thread.start()
-
-    def set_stage(self, stage: str) -> None:
-        with self.lock:
-            self.stage = stage
-
-    def _run(self) -> None:
-        while not self.stop_event.wait(HEARTBEAT_SECONDS):
-            with self.lock:
-                stage = self.stage
-            try:
-                status, response = self.client.heartbeat(self.task_id, self.lease_token, stage)
-                if not 200 <= status < 300:
-                    self.failed = str(response.get("error") or status)
-                    audit("TASK_HEARTBEAT_FAILED", task_id=self.task_id, stage=stage, api_status=status, error=self.failed)
-                else:
-                    audit("TASK_HEARTBEAT", task_id=self.task_id, stage=stage, api_status=status)
-            except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive runtime guard
-                self.failed = type(exc).__name__
-                audit("TASK_HEARTBEAT_FAILED", task_id=self.task_id, stage=stage, error=self.failed)
-
-    def ensure(self) -> None:
-        if self.failed:
-            raise WorkerError("TASK_LEASE_LOST", phase="heartbeat", details={"error": self.failed})
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self.stop_event.set()
-        if self.thread.ident is not None:
-            self.thread.join(timeout=2)
-
-
-def load_agent_token() -> str:
-    directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ""))
-    path = directory / "agent_token"
-    if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("AGENT_RUNTIME_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE", phase="startup")
-    value = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    if len(value) < 24:
-        raise WorkerError("AGENT_RUNTIME_CREDENTIAL_INVALID", phase="startup")
-    return value
-
-
-def ensure_roots() -> None:
-    if AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR.is_symlink() or STATE_ROOT.is_symlink() or WORKSPACE_ROOT.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("ROOT_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="startup")
-    if not AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR.is_dir():
-        raise WorkerError("AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR_UNAVAILABLE", phase="startup")
-    STATE_ROOT.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    WORKSPACE_ROOT.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    if GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL.is_symlink():
-        raise WorkerError("GIT_CONFIG_SYMLINK_REJECTED", phase="startup")
-    expected = f"[safe]\n\tdirectory = {AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR}\n"
-    if GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL.exists() and GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL.read_text(encoding="utf-8") != expected:
-        raise WorkerError("GIT_CONFIG_BINDING_CONFLICT", phase="startup")
-    if not GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL.exists():
-        GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL.write_text(expected, encoding="utf-8")
-        os.chmod(GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, 0o640)
-
-
-def task_state_path(task_id: str) -> Path:
-    if not ID_RE.fullmatch(task_id):
-        raise WorkerError("TASK_ID_INVALID", phase="state")
-    return STATE_ROOT / "tasks" / f"{task_id}.json"
-
-
-def load_task_state(task_id: str, execution_digest: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    path = task_state_path(task_id)
-    if not path.is_file() or path.is_symlink():
-        return None
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except Exception:
-        raise WorkerError("TASK_STATE_INVALID", phase="state")
-    if not isinstance(value, dict):
-        raise WorkerError("TASK_STATE_INVALID", phase="state")
-    if value.get("execution_digest") not in {None, execution_digest}:
-        raise WorkerError("TASK_PAYLOAD_DRIFT", phase="recovery")
-    return value
-
-
-def save_task_state(task_id: str, value: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-    atomic_json(task_state_path(task_id), value)
-
-
-def new_run_root() -> Path:
-    ensure_roots()
-    root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="task-", dir=str(WORKSPACE_ROOT)))
-    os.chmod(root, 0o750)
-    return root
-
-
-def cleanup_run_root(path: Path) -> None:
-    root = WORKSPACE_ROOT.resolve()
-    candidate = path.resolve(strict=False)
-    if candidate == root or root not in candidate.parents:
-        raise WorkerError("CLEANUP_SCOPE_INVALID", phase="cleanup")
-    if candidate.exists() or candidate.is_symlink():
-        shutil.rmtree(candidate)
-
-
-def prepare_worktree(run_root: Path, base_oid: str) -> Path:
-    clone = run_root / "repository"
-    worktree = run_root / "worktree"
-    run_command("workspace_clone", ["/usr/bin/git", "clone", "--no-local", "--no-hardlinks", str(AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR), str(clone)], cwd=run_root, timeout=300, internal_git=True)
-    run_command("workspace_base_probe", ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(clone), "rev-parse", "--verify", base_oid + "^{commit}"], cwd=run_root, timeout=60)
-    run_command("workspace_worktree_create", ["/usr/bin/git", "-C", str(clone), "worktree", "add", "--detach", str(worktree), base_oid], cwd=run_root, timeout=300, internal_git=True)
-    return worktree
-
-
-def governed_commit(envelope: ExecutionEnvelope, worktree: Path, bridge: BridgeClient, heartbeat: LeaseHeartbeat) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    governance = envelope.governance
-    create_body = {
-        "task_id": governance["task_id"],
-        "repository": envelope.repository,
-        "base_oid": envelope.base_oid,
-        "target_branch": envelope.target_branch,
-        "risk": str(governance.get("risk") or "engineering"),
-        "description": str(governance.get("description") or f"Governed execution for {envelope.task_id}"),
-        "idempotency_key": governance["idempotency_key"],
-    }
-    status, response = bridge.call("/v2/governed-task", create_body)
-    if not 200 <= status < 300:
-        raise WorkerError("GOVERNED_TASK_CREATE_FAILED", phase="committing", details={"api_status": status, "error": response.get("error")})
-    generation = int(response.get("generation") or 0)
-    expected_branch_oid = str(response.get("expected_branch_oid") or envelope.base_oid)
-    branch_mode = str(response.get("branch_mode") or "CREATE_NEW")
-    lease_body = {
-        "schema": "aios.task-writer-lease.v2",
-        "task_id": governance["task_id"],
-        "repository": envelope.repository,
-        "branch_mode": branch_mode,
-        "base_oid": envelope.base_oid,
-        "expected_branch_oid": expected_branch_oid,
-        "target_branch": envelope.target_branch,
-        "generation": generation,
-        "lease_seconds": int(governance.get("lease_seconds") or 900),
-    }
-    status, lease_response = bridge.call("/v2/writer-lease", lease_body)
-    if not 200 <= status < 300:
-        raise WorkerError("WRITER_LEASE_ACQUIRE_FAILED", phase="committing", details={"api_status": status, "error": lease_response.get("error")})
-    heartbeat.ensure()
-    files: dict[str, str] = {}
-    paths = governance.get("allowed_files") or [item["path"] for item in envelope.change_set]
-    for relative in sorted({safe_relative_path(item, field="allowed_file") for item in paths}):
-        path = resolve_under(worktree, relative)
-        if not path.is_file():
-            raise WorkerError("COMMIT_FILE_MISSING", phase="committing", details={"path": relative})
-        files[relative] = base64.b64encode(path.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
-    commit_body = {
-        "task_id": governance["task_id"],
-        "repository": envelope.repository,
-        "expected_branch_oid": expected_branch_oid,
-        "target_branch": envelope.target_branch,
-        "generation": generation,
-        "idempotency_key": governance["commit_idempotency_key"],
-        "files": files,
-        "message": governance["message"],
-    }
-    status, commit_response = bridge.call("/v2/commit-files", commit_body)
-    if not 200 <= status < 300:
-        raise WorkerError("GOVERNED_COMMIT_FAILED", phase="committing", details={"api_status": status, "error": commit_response.get("error")})
-    commit_oid = commit_response.get("commit_oid")
-    if not isinstance(commit_oid, str) or not OID_RE.fullmatch(commit_oid):
-        raise WorkerError("GOVERNED_COMMIT_OID_INVALID", phase="committing")
-    visible_oid: str | None = None
-    for _ in range(5):
-        probe = subprocess.run(
-            ["/usr/bin/git", "--git-dir", str(AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR), "rev-parse", "--verify", f"refs/heads/{envelope.target_branch}"],
-            text=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-            env={"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C.UTF-8", "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": str(GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL)},
-            timeout=30,
-        )
-        if probe.returncode == 0:
-            visible_oid = probe.stdout.strip()
-            if visible_oid == commit_oid:
-                break
-        time.sleep(1)
-    if visible_oid != commit_oid:
-        raise WorkerError("GIT_VISIBILITY_MISMATCH", phase="verification", details={"commit_oid": commit_oid, "visible_oid": visible_oid})
-    return {
-        "governed_task_id": governance["task_id"],
-        "branch_mode": branch_mode,
-        "generation": generation,
-        "target_branch": envelope.target_branch,
-        "commit_oid": commit_oid,
-        "visible_oid": visible_oid,
-        "commit_idempotency_key": governance["commit_idempotency_key"],
-        "api_commit_visible": commit_response.get("commit_visible"),
-        "direct_main_write": False,
-        "force_push": False,
-        "production_write": False,
-        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
-    }
-
-
-def build_result(task_id: str, envelope: ExecutionEnvelope, execution: Mapping[str, Any], governed: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "status": "SUCCEEDED",
-        "verification_state": "VERIFIED_BY_WORKER_PENDING_SERVER_REVIEW",
-        "task_id": task_id,
-        "execution_backend": "generic-online-agent-worker-v2",
-        "adapter": envelope.adapter,
-        "execution_digest": envelope.digest,
-        "repository": envelope.repository,
-        "base_oid": envelope.base_oid,
-        "target_branch": envelope.target_branch,
-        "changed_files": execution.get("changed_files", []),
-        "commands": [{k: item.get(k) for k in ("label", "exit_code", "stdout_sha256", "stderr_sha256", "duration_ms")} for item in execution.get("commands", [])],
-        "tests": [{k: item.get(k) for k in ("label", "exit_code", "stdout_sha256", "stderr_sha256", "duration_ms")} for item in execution.get("tests", [])],
-        "governed": dict(governed),
-        "workspace_cleanup": "PASS",
-        "secret_material_exposed": False,
-        "direct_main_write": False,
-        "force_push": False,
-        "production_write": False,
-        "protected_ref_bypass": False,
-    }
-
-
-class WorkerSupervisor:
-    def __init__(self, token: str) -> None:
-        self.agent = AgentTaskClient(token)
-        self.bridge = BridgeClient()
-
-    def process_claim(self, task: Mapping[str, Any], claim: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None:
-        task_id = str(claim.get("task_id") or task.get("task_id") or "")
-        lease_token = claim.get("lease_token")
-        if not isinstance(lease_token, str) or len(lease_token) < 24:
-            raise WorkerError("LEASE_TOKEN_NOT_RETURNED", phase="claim")
-        audit("TASK_CLAIMED", task_id=task_id, attempt=claim.get("attempt"), revision=claim.get("revision"))
-        heartbeat = LeaseHeartbeat(self.agent, task_id, lease_token)
-        try:
-            heartbeat.first()
-            heartbeat.set_stage("started")
-            heartbeat.start()
-            audit("TASK_STARTED", task_id=task_id, attempt=claim.get("attempt"))
-            envelope = ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(task)
-            state = load_task_state(task_id, envelope.digest) or {"task_id": task_id, "execution_digest": envelope.digest, "phase": "claimed"}
-            governed = state.get("governed") if isinstance(state.get("governed"), Mapping) else None
-            if isinstance(governed, Mapping) and isinstance(governed.get("commit_oid"), str) and OID_RE.fullmatch(governed["commit_oid"]):
-                result = state.get("result")
-                if not isinstance(result, Mapping):
-                    result = {"status": "SUCCEEDED", "verification_state": "VERIFIED_BY_WORKER_PENDING_SERVER_REVIEW", "task_id": task_id, "execution_digest": envelope.digest, "governed": dict(governed), "recovered_without_duplicate_commit": True, "direct_main_write": False, "production_write": False, "force_push": False, "protected_ref_bypass": False}
-                audit("TASK_RECOVERED_COMMIT", task_id=task_id, commit_oid=governed["commit_oid"], duplicate_commit=False)
-            else:
-                run_root = new_run_root()
-                try:
-                    worktree = prepare_worktree(run_root, envelope.base_oid)
-                    state.update({"phase": "workspace_prepared", "execution_digest": envelope.digest, "attempt": claim.get("attempt")})
-                    save_task_state(task_id, state)
-                    adapter = adapter_for(envelope.adapter)
-                    execution = adapter.execute(envelope, worktree)
-                    state.update({"phase": "verification_passed", "execution": execution})
-                    save_task_state(task_id, state)
-                    heartbeat.ensure()
-                    heartbeat.set_stage("committing")
-                    governed = governed_commit(envelope, worktree, self.bridge, heartbeat)
-                    result = build_result(task_id, envelope, execution, governed)
-                    state.update({"phase": "commit_done", "governed": governed, "result": result})
-                    save_task_state(task_id, state)
-                finally:
-                    cleanup_run_root(run_root)
-                    audit("WORKSPACE_CLEANED", task_id=task_id, cleanup="PASS")
-            heartbeat.ensure()
-            heartbeat.set_stage("result")
-            result_key = str(result.get("governed", {}).get("commit_idempotency_key") or f"{task_id}-result-{envelope.digest[:16]}")
-            status, response = self.agent.result(task_id, lease_token, result_key, result)
-            if not 200 <= status < 300:
-                raise WorkerError("TASK_RESULT_SUBMIT_FAILED", phase="result", details={"api_status": status, "error": response.get("error")})
-            audit("TASK_RESULT_SUBMITTED", task_id=task_id, api_status=status, result_idempotency_key=result_key, commit_oid=result.get("governed", {}).get("commit_oid"))
-        except WorkerError as exc:
-            audit("TASK_FAILED", task_id=task_id, error=exc.code, phase=exc.phase, details=exc.details)
-            failure_key = f"{task_id}-attempt-{claim.get('attempt', 0)}-failure"
-            failure = {
-                "status": "FAILED",
-                "verification_state": "UNVERIFIED",
-                "task_id": task_id,
-                "execution_backend": "generic-online-agent-worker-v2",
-                "error": exc.code,
-                "phase": exc.phase,
-                "details": exc.details,
-                "direct_main_write": False,
-                "force_push": False,
-                "production_write": False,
-                "protected_ref_bypass": False,
-                "secret_material_exposed": False,
-            }
-            try:
-                status, response = self.agent.result(task_id, lease_token, failure_key, failure)
-                audit("TASK_FAILURE_RESULT_SUBMITTED", task_id=task_id, api_status=status, error=response.get("error"))
-            except Exception as submit_exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive runtime guard
-                audit("TASK_FAILURE_RESULT_SUBMIT_FAILED", task_id=task_id, error=type(submit_exc).__name__)
-        finally:
-            heartbeat.close()
-
-    def once(self) -> int:
-        try:
-            tasks = self.agent.poll()
-            audit("TASK_POLL", visible_count=len(tasks))
-        except WorkerError as exc:
-            audit("TASK_POLL_FAILED", error=exc.code, phase=exc.phase, details=exc.details)
-            return 10
-        dynamic_tasks: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-        for task in tasks:
-            metadata = task.get("metadata")
-            execution = metadata.get("execution") if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) else None
-            if not isinstance(execution, Mapping) or execution.get("schema") != "aios.online-agent.execution.v2":
-                audit("TASK_SKIPPED_NON_DYNAMIC", task_id=task.get("task_id"), reason="DYNAMIC_EXECUTION_PAYLOAD_REQUIRED")
-                continue
-            dynamic_tasks.append(task)
-        for task in dynamic_tasks:
-            task_id = str(task.get("task_id") or "")
-            status, claim = self.agent.claim(task_id)
-            if status == 409:
-                audit("TASK_CLAIM_SKIPPED", task_id=task_id, api_status=status, error=claim.get("error"))
-                continue
-            if status != 200:
-                audit("TASK_CLAIM_FAILED", task_id=task_id, api_status=status, error=claim.get("error"))
-                continue
-            self.process_claim(task, claim)
-            return 0
-        return 0
-
-    def run_forever(self) -> int:
-        ensure_roots()
-        audit("WORKER_STARTED", task_agnostic=True, api_base=API_BASE, bridge_base=BRIDGE_BASE, adapter_names=["deterministic", "codex", "hermes"], runtime_only_credentials=True)
-        while True:
-            self.once()
-            time.sleep(POLL_SECONDS)
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    try:
-        token = load_agent_token()
-        supervisor = WorkerSupervisor(token)
-        if os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_ONCE") == "1":
-            ensure_roots()
-            return supervisor.once()
-        return supervisor.run_forever()
-    except WorkerError as exc:
-        audit("WORKER_START_FAILED", error=exc.code, phase=exc.phase, details=exc.details)
-        return 20
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

services/aios-online-agent-worker/register.py

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Register or recover the generic Online Agent using runtime-only secrets."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import urllib.error
-import urllib.request
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any
-
-
-BASE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18940").rstrip("/")
-AGENT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_ID", "online-engineering-worker-cn-network-mkt-generic-20260815")
-AGENT_TYPE = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_TYPE", "trusted-online-engineering-worker")
-AGENT_VERSION = os.environ.get("AIOS_AGENT_VERSION", "2026-08-15.3-generic")
-PROJECTION_PROVIDER = "BridgeV2RuntimeCredentialProjection"
-STATE_DIR = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_REGISTRATION_STATE", "/var/lib/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/registration"))
-CREDENTIAL_PATH = Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_WORKER_ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL", "/etc/credstore.encrypted/aios-online-agent-worker-20260815/agent_token"))
-IDENTITY_PATH = STATE_DIR / "identity.json"
-AUDIT_PATH = STATE_DIR / "events.jsonl"
-CAPABILITIES = [
-    "online_agent_task_api", "task.poll", "task.claim", "task.heartbeat", "task.result",
-    "engineering.consumer", "engineering.execute", "workspace.worktree", "git.read", "git.diff",
-    "git.test", "governed.write.branch", "governed.write.file",
-]
-
-
-def now() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def audit(event_type: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
-    STATE_DIR.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    record = {"event_type": event_type, "created_at": now(), "agent_id": AGENT_ID, "credential_material_exposed": False, **fields}
-    with AUDIT_PATH.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-        handle.write(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
-    os.chmod(AUDIT_PATH, 0o640)
-    print(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True), flush=True)
-
-
-def api_call(method: str, route: str, token: str, body: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
-    payload = None if body is None else json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
-    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Accept": "application/json"}
-    if payload is not None:
-        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
-    request = urllib.request.Request(BASE + route, data=payload, headers=headers, method=method)
-    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
-            value = json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
-            return response.status, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
-    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
-        try:
-            value = json.loads(exc.read(2048).decode("utf-8"))
-        except Exception:
-            value = {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-        return exc.code, value if isinstance(value, dict) else {"error": "HTTP_ERROR"}
-    except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
-        return 599, {"error": "AGENT_TASK_API_UNAVAILABLE"}
-
-
-def read_identity() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    if not IDENTITY_PATH.is_file() or IDENTITY_PATH.is_symlink():
-        return None
-    try:
-        value = json.loads(IDENTITY_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-    return value if isinstance(value, dict) else None
-
-
-def identity_matches(value: dict[str, Any] | None) -> bool:
-    return bool(value and value.get("agent_id") == AGENT_ID and value.get("agent_type") == AGENT_TYPE and value.get("agent_version") == AGENT_VERSION and value.get("credential_projection_provider") == PROJECTION_PROVIDER and value.get("task_scope") == "dynamic")
-
-
-def encrypted_credential_is_valid() -> bool:
-    if not CREDENTIAL_PATH.is_file() or CREDENTIAL_PATH.is_symlink():
-        return False
-    result = subprocess.run(["systemd-creds", "decrypt", "--with-key=host", str(CREDENTIAL_PATH), "/dev/null"], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False, timeout=15)
-    return result.returncode == 0
-
-
-def write_identity() -> None:
-    value = {"agent_id": AGENT_ID, "agent_type": AGENT_TYPE, "agent_version": AGENT_VERSION, "task_scope": "dynamic", "credential_projection_provider": PROJECTION_PROVIDER, "credential_delivery": "systemd-LoadCredentialEncrypted", "task_api_url": BASE, "task_api_schema": "aios.agent-task.v1", "execution_backend": "generic-online-agent-worker-v2", "runtime_only_secret_delivery": True, "production_write": False, "main_write": False, "force_push": False, "tag_write": False, "baseline_write": False, "writer_lease": True, "created_at": now()}
-    STATE_DIR.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="identity.", dir=str(STATE_DIR))
-    try:
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            json.dump(value, handle, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
-            handle.write("\n")
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o640)
-        os.replace(temporary, IDENTITY_PATH)
-    finally:
-        if os.path.exists(temporary):
-            os.unlink(temporary)
-
-
-def encrypt_agent_token(agent_token: str) -> None:
-    CREDENTIAL_PATH.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".online-agent-token.", dir=str(CREDENTIAL_PATH.parent))
-    os.close(fd)
-    os.unlink(temporary)
-    try:
-        result = subprocess.run(["systemd-creds", "encrypt", "--with-key=host", "--name=agent_token", "/dev/stdin", temporary], input=(agent_token + "\n").encode("utf-8"), stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False, timeout=20)
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            raise RuntimeError("AGENT_CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPT_FAILED")
-        os.chmod(temporary, 0o600)
-        os.replace(temporary, CREDENTIAL_PATH)
-        os.chmod(CREDENTIAL_PATH, 0o600)
-    finally:
-        if os.path.exists(temporary):
-            os.unlink(temporary)
-
-
-def register_or_recover() -> str:
-    STATE_DIR.mkdir(mode=0o750, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    existing = read_identity()
-    if CREDENTIAL_PATH.exists():
-        if not identity_matches(existing):
-            raise RuntimeError("AGENT_IDENTITY_BINDING_CONFLICT")
-        if not encrypted_credential_is_valid():
-            raise RuntimeError("AGENT_ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
-        audit("AGENT_RECOVERED", credential_delivery="systemd-LoadCredentialEncrypted", credential_projection_provider=PROJECTION_PROVIDER, register_or_recover=True)
-        return "RECOVERED"
-    if existing is not None:
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_CREDENTIAL_MISSING_AFTER_PRIOR_REGISTRATION")
-    credential_directory = Path(os.environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ""))
-    control_path = credential_directory / "bridge_control_token"
-    if not control_path.is_file():
-        raise RuntimeError("BRIDGE_RUNTIME_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
-    control_token = control_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    if len(control_token) < 32:
-        raise RuntimeError("BRIDGE_RUNTIME_CONTROL_CREDENTIAL_INVALID")
-    status, response = api_call("POST", "/v1/agents/register", control_token, {"agent_id": AGENT_ID, "agent_type": AGENT_TYPE, "agent_version": AGENT_VERSION, "capabilities": CAPABILITIES, "metadata": {"task_scope": "dynamic", "credential_projection_provider": PROJECTION_PROVIDER, "runtime_only_secret_delivery": True, "task_api_schema": "aios.agent-task.v1", "execution_backend": "generic-online-agent-worker-v2", "production_write": False, "main_write": False, "force_push": False, "tag_write": False, "baseline_write": False, "writer_lease": True}})
-    if status == 409 and response.get("error") == "AGENT_ALREADY_EXISTS":
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_ALREADY_EXISTS_RECOVERY_CREDENTIAL_UNAVAILABLE")
-    if status != 201:
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_REGISTER_FAILED_" + str(response.get("error") or status))
-    agent_token = response.get("agent_token")
-    if not isinstance(agent_token, str) or len(agent_token) < 24:
-        raise RuntimeError("AGENT_TOKEN_NOT_RETURNED")
-    encrypt_agent_token(agent_token)
-    write_identity()
-    audit("AGENT_REGISTERED", credential_delivery="systemd-LoadCredentialEncrypted", credential_projection_provider=PROJECTION_PROVIDER, register_or_recover=True)
-    return "REGISTERED"
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    try:
-        raise SystemExit(0 if register_or_recover() in {"REGISTERED", "RECOVERED"} else 20)
-    except Exception as exc:
-        audit("AGENT_REGISTRATION_FAILED", error=type(exc).__name__)
-        raise SystemExit(20)

services/aios-online-agent-worker/test_worker_contract.py

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from aios_online_agent_worker.worker import ExecutionEnvelope, WorkerError, sanitize  # noqa: E402
-
-
-BASE = "a" * 40
-
-
-def payload(task_id: str, branch: str, *, base_oid: str = BASE) -> dict[str, object]:
-    return {
-        "task_id": task_id,
-        "metadata": {
-            "execution": {
-                "schema": "aios.online-agent.execution.v2",
-                "repository": "aios/aios",
-                "base_oid": base_oid,
-                "target_branch": branch,
-                "adapter": "deterministic",
-                "workspace": {
-                    "authority_git_dir": str(Path(os.environ.get("AIOS_AUTHORITY_GIT_DIR", "/data/aios-gitops/repo.git"))),
-                    "read_only_repository": True,
-                    "cleanup_policy": "always",
-                },
-                "change_set": [
-                    {
-                        "operation": "write_file",
-                        "path": "tests/generated_marker.py",
-                        "content": "def test_marker():\n    assert True\n",
-                        "expected_sha256": None,
-                    }
-                ],
-                "verification": [
-                    {"label": "compile", "argv": ["/usr/bin/python3", "-m", "py_compile", "tests/generated_marker.py"], "cwd": ".", "timeout_seconds": 60}
-                ],
-                "governance": {
-                    "task_id": f"{task_id}-writer",
-                    "idempotency_key": f"{task_id}-governed-v1",
-                    "commit_idempotency_key": f"{task_id}-commit-v1",
-                    "allowed_files": ["tests/generated_marker.py"],
-                    "main_write": False,
-                    "force_push": False,
-                    "production_write": False,
-                    "tag_write": False,
-                    "baseline_write": False,
-                    "protected_ref_bypass": False,
-                },
-            }
-        },
-    }
-
-
-def test_dynamic_payload_is_not_bound_to_task_or_base() -> None:
-    first = ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(payload("task-alpha-20260815", "agent/alpha-20260815"))
-    second = ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(payload("task-beta-20260815", "agent/beta-20260815", base_oid="b" * 40))
-    assert first.task_id != second.task_id
-    assert first.base_oid != second.base_oid
-    assert first.target_branch != second.target_branch
-
-
-def test_protected_branch_is_rejected() -> None:
-    try:
-        ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(payload("task-main-20260815", "main"))
-    except WorkerError as exc:
-        assert exc.code == "PROTECTED_BRANCH_REJECTED"
-    else:
-        raise AssertionError("protected branch accepted")
-
-
-def test_task_payload_does_not_persist_secret_values() -> None:
-    value = sanitize({"agent_token": "agt-secret", "nested": {"authorization": "Bearer secret"}})
-    assert value == {"agent_token": "[REDACTED]", "nested": {"authorization": "[REDACTED]"}}
-
-
-def test_execution_digest_is_stable() -> None:
-    value = payload("task-digest-20260815", "agent/digest-20260815")
-    assert ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(value).digest == ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(value).digest

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_shadow_client_rbac.py

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ class ShadowClientRBACPublicInterfaceTests(unittest.TestCase):
             identity_verifier=self.IdentityVerifier({"shadow-client"}),
             execution_enabled=False,
             identity_capabilities={"shadow-client": set(capabilities)},
+            identity_actor_contexts={
+                "shadow-client": {"scope_type": "system"}
+            },
         )
         service = self.TaskPlaneService(store, policy=policy)
 

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_fleet.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
+ACTIVE_RUNTIME = ROOT / "active-runtime"
+if str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ACTIVE_RUNTIME))
+
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.task_plane.fleet import FleetConflict, FleetScheduler
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Plan:
+    task_id: str
+    required_capabilities: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda:["code.read"])
+    metadata: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
+    scope_type: str = "tenant"
+    tenant_id: str = "tenant-a"
+    project_id: str | None = "project-a"
+    user_id: str | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Task:
+    task_id: str
+    revision: int = 1
+    status: str = "QUEUED"
+    created_at: float = 1.0
+    task_plan: Plan | None = None
+
+    def __post_init__(self):
+        if self.task_plan is None:
+            self.task_plan=Plan(self.task_id)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Worker:
+    worker_id: str
+    capabilities: list[str]=field(default_factory=lambda:["code.read"])
+
+
+class Store:
+    def __init__(self, path=":memory:"):
+        self.conn=sqlite3.connect(path,check_same_thread=False)
+        self._lock=threading.RLock()
+        self.conn.executescript("""
+        CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS claims(
+          claim_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,task_id TEXT,worker_id TEXT,status TEXT,lease_expires_at REAL
+        );
+        """)
+        self.tasks=[]
+        self.workers={}
+
+    def list_tasks(self,_ctx=None):
+        return list(self.tasks)
+
+    def get_worker(self,worker_id):
+        return self.workers[worker_id]
+
+
+class Registry:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.online=set()
+    def is_online(self,worker_id,now=None):
+        return worker_id in self.online
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fleet():
+    store=Store(); registry=Registry()
+    for wid in ("w-a","w-b","w-c"):
+        store.workers[wid]=Worker(wid)
+        registry.online.add(wid)
+    scheduler=FleetScheduler(store,registry,now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-a",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-a",weight=1)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-b",max_slots=2,failure_domain="zone-b",weight=1)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-c",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-c",weight=2)
+    return store,registry,scheduler
+
+
+def test_FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION_capacity_policy_is_durable(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    policy=scheduler.state.worker_policy("w-b")
+    assert policy.max_slots==2 and policy.failure_domain=="zone-b"
+    reloaded=type(scheduler)(store, scheduler.workers, now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    assert reloaded.state.worker_policy("w-b").max_slots==2
+
+
+def test_FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING_does_not_oversubscribe_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1"),Task("task-2"),Task("task-3")]
+    decisions=scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=3,now=1000.0)
+    assert [d.worker_id for d in decisions]==["w-a"]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING_accounts_for_active_claims(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.conn.execute(
+      "INSERT INTO claims VALUES ('claim-1','other','w-a','ACTIVE',2000)"
+    )
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    assert scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=1,now=1000.0)==[]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAIRNESS_scope_virtual_finish_prevents_hot_scope_monopoly(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[
+      Task("a1",created_at=1,task_plan=Plan("a1",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p-a")),
+      Task("a2",created_at=2,task_plan=Plan("a2",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p-a")),
+      Task("b1",created_at=3,task_plan=Plan("b1",tenant_id="tenant-b",project_id="p-b")),
+    ]
+    first=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    assert first.task_id=="a1"
+    scheduler.state.release("a1",state="COMPLETED",now=1000.1)
+    store.tasks=[task for task in store.tasks if task.task_id!="a1"]
+    second=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.2)[0]
+    assert second.task_id=="b1"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION_opens_worker_circuit_after_threshold(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    for _ in range(3):
+        scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",now=1000.0)
+    assert scheduler.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.0)
+    assert scheduler.select(["w-a"],limit=1,now=1001.0)==[]
+
+
+def test_FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT_avoids_quarantined_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    scheduler.state.record_task_worker_failure(
+      "task-1","w-a","lease_expired",quarantine_seconds=60,now=1000.0
+    )
+    decision=scheduler.select(["w-a","w-b"],limit=1,now=1001.0)[0]
+    assert decision.worker_id=="w-b"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION_uses_tenant_project_fairness_keys(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[
+      Task("a",task_plan=Plan("a",tenant_id="tenant-a",project_id="p")),
+      Task("b",task_plan=Plan("b",tenant_id="tenant-b",project_id="p")),
+    ]
+    decisions=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=2,now=1000.0)
+    assert {d.scope_key for d in decisions}=={
+      "tenant:tenant-a|project:p","tenant:tenant-b|project:p"
+    }
+
+
+def test_FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH_replay_same_task_worker(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    store.tasks=[Task("task-1")]
+    one=scheduler.select(["w-b"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    # Reservation remains authoritative; a conflicting second worker cannot steal it.
+    with pytest.raises(FleetConflict):
+        scheduler.state.reserve(
+            task_id="task-1",worker_id="w-c",task_revision=1,
+            scope_key=one.scope_key,failure_domain="zone-c",score=one.score,
+            reservation_seconds=30,now=1001.0,scope_weight=1.0,
+        )
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY_worker_success_closes_circuit(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    for _ in range(3):
+        scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",now=1000.0)
+    scheduler.state.record_worker_success("w-a",now=1001.0)
+    assert not scheduler.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.1)
+
+
+def test_affinity_and_failure_domain_anti_affinity(fleet):
+    store,_,scheduler=fleet
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-b",max_slots=2,failure_domain="zone-b",labels={"gpu":"false"})
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-c",max_slots=1,failure_domain="zone-c",labels={"gpu":"true"})
+    task=Task("gpu-task")
+    task.task_plan.metadata={
+      "fleet_affinity_labels":{"gpu":"true"},
+      "fleet_avoid_failure_domains":["zone-b"],
+    }
+    store.tasks=[task]
+    decision=scheduler.select(["w-b","w-c"],limit=1,now=1000.0)[0]
+    assert decision.worker_id=="w-c"
+
+
+def test_FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY_state_survives_sqlite_restart(tmp_path):
+    path=tmp_path/"task-plane.sqlite3"
+    first=Store(str(path)); registry=Registry()
+    first.workers["w-a"]=Worker("w-a"); registry.online.add("w-a")
+    scheduler=FleetScheduler(first,registry,now_fn=lambda:1000.0)
+    scheduler.configure_worker("w-a",max_slots=3,failure_domain="zone-a")
+    scheduler.state.record_worker_failure("w-a","runtime_crash",threshold=1,now=1000.0)
+    first.conn.close()
+
+    second=Store(str(path)); second.workers["w-a"]=Worker("w-a")
+    resumed=FleetScheduler(second,registry,now_fn=lambda:1001.0)
+    assert resumed.state.worker_policy("w-a").max_slots==3
+    assert resumed.state.worker_circuit_open("w-a",1001.0)

tests/task_plane/public_interface/test_task_plane_scope_isolation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import threading
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = os.getcwd()
+if os.path.join(ROOT, "active-runtime") not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.append(os.path.join(ROOT, "active-runtime"))
+
+from app.task_plane.api import TaskPlaneRequestHandler, TaskPlaneService
+from app.task_plane.errors import ForbiddenError, NotFoundError, ValidationError
+from app.task_plane.models import TaskPlan
+from app.task_plane.policy import PolicyEngine
+from app.task_plane.store import TaskPlaneStore
+
+
+def _policy() -> PolicyEngine:
+    return PolicyEngine(
+        identity_capabilities={
+            "actor-a": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+            "actor-b": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+            "reader-a": {"task.read"},
+            "reader-b": {"task.read"},
+            "owner": {"task.creator", "task.read", "task.read.all"},
+            "unbound": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+        },
+        identity_actor_contexts={
+            "actor-a": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+                "user_id": "user-a",
+                "project_id": "project-a",
+                "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+                "run_id": "run-a",
+            },
+            "reader-a": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+                "user_id": "user-a",
+                "project_id": "project-a",
+                "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+                "run_id": "run-a",
+            },
+            "actor-b": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-b",
+                "user_id": "user-b",
+                "project_id": "project-b",
+            },
+            "reader-b": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-b",
+                "user_id": "user-b",
+                "project_id": "project-b",
+            },
+            "owner": {"scope_type": "system"},
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def _service() -> TaskPlaneService:
+    return TaskPlaneService(TaskPlaneStore(":memory:"), policy=_policy())
+
+
+def test_taskplan_scope_fields_round_trip_as_first_class_values() -> None:
+    plan = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-scope-roundtrip",
+            "scope_type": "tenant",
+            "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+            "user_id": "user-a",
+            "project_id": "project-a",
+            "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+            "run_id": "run-a",
+        }
+    )
+    payload = plan.to_dict()
+    assert TaskPlan.from_dict(payload).to_dict() == payload
+
+
+def test_tenant_scope_requires_tenant_id_and_system_scope_does_not() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
+        TaskPlan.from_dict({"task_id": "task-missing-tenant", "scope_type": "tenant"})
+    assert exc.value.error_code == "TASK_SCOPE_TENANT_ID_REQUIRED"
+    system = TaskPlan.from_dict(
+        {"task_id": "task-system", "scope_type": "system", "run_id": "system-run"}
+    )
+    assert system.tenant_id is None
+
+
+def test_ACTOR_BINDING_AUTHZ_MERGE_uses_server_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    created = service.create_task(
+        {"task_id": "task-a", "task_type": "code.change"},
+        actor_identity="actor-a",
+    )
+    assert created["plan"]["tenant_id"] == "tenant-a"
+    assert created["plan"]["user_id"] == "user-a"
+    assert created["plan"]["project_id"] == "project-a"
+    declared = service.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": "task-a-declared",
+            "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+            "user_id": "user-a",
+            "project_id": "project-a",
+            "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+            "run_id": "run-a",
+        },
+        actor_identity="actor-a",
+    )
+    assert declared["plan"]["scope_type"] == "tenant"
+
+
+def test_TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY_rejects_forged_client_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    with pytest.raises(ForbiddenError) as exc:
+        service.create_task(
+            {
+                "task_id": "task-forged",
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-b",
+                "user_id": "user-b",
+                "project_id": "project-b",
+            },
+            actor_identity="actor-a",
+        )
+    assert exc.value.error_code == "TASK_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"
+
+
+def test_public_create_fails_closed_without_server_actor_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    with pytest.raises(ForbiddenError) as exc:
+        service.create_task(
+            {"task_id": "task-unbound"}, actor_identity="unbound"
+        )
+    assert exc.value.error_code == "TASK_ACTOR_SCOPE_UNAVAILABLE"
+
+
+def test_TASKPLANE_LIST_AUTHZ_DENY_and_TASK_OWNERSHIP_FILTER() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-b"}, actor_identity="actor-b")
+    assert [item["task_id"] for item in service.list_tasks("reader-a")] == ["task-a"]
+    assert [item["task_id"] for item in service.list_tasks("reader-b")] == ["task-b"]
+
+
+def test_TASKPLANE_GET_AUTHZ_DENY_does_not_disclose_cross_tenant_task() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError):
+        service.get_task("task-a", "reader-b")
+
+
+def test_http_authentication_drives_server_scope_and_cross_tenant_404() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+
+    class Handler(TaskPlaneRequestHandler):
+        pass
+
+    Handler.service = service
+    Handler.authenticator = lambda token: {
+        "token-a": "actor-a",
+        "token-b": "reader-b",
+    }.get(token)
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
+    try:
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + "/tasks",
+            data=json.dumps({"task_id": "task-http-a"}).encode(),
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": "Bearer token-a",
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            },
+            method="POST",
+        )
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=3) as response:
+            created = json.loads(response.read())
+        assert created["plan"]["tenant_id"] == "tenant-a"
+
+        denied = urllib.request.Request(
+            base + "/tasks/task-http-a",
+            headers={"Authorization": "Bearer token-b"},
+        )
+        with pytest.raises(urllib.error.HTTPError) as exc:
+            urllib.request.urlopen(denied, timeout=3)
+        assert exc.value.code == 404
+    finally:
+        server.shutdown()
+        server.server_close()
+        thread.join(timeout=3)
+
+
+def test_mutating_endpoint_is_scoped_before_cancel() -> None:
+    policy = PolicyEngine(
+        execution_enabled=True,
+        identity_capabilities={
+            "actor-a": {"task.creator", "task.read"},
+            "actor-b": {"task.cancel"},
+        },
+        identity_actor_contexts={
+            "actor-a": {"scope_type": "tenant", "tenant_id": "tenant-a"},
+            "actor-b": {"scope_type": "tenant", "tenant_id": "tenant-b"},
+        },
+    )
+    service = TaskPlaneService(TaskPlaneStore(":memory:"), policy=policy)
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError):
+        service.cancel("task-a", {"actor_identity": "actor-b"})
+
+
+def test_privileged_server_actor_can_cross_scope() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-b"}, actor_identity="actor-b")
+    assert {item["task_id"] for item in service.list_tasks("owner")} == {
+        "task-a",
+        "task-b",
+    }
+
+
+def test_scope_sql_parameters_do_not_interpolate_tenant_values() -> None:
+    service = _service()
+    service.create_task({"task_id": "task-a"}, actor_identity="actor-a")
+    policy = PolicyEngine(
+        identity_capabilities={"attacker": {"task.read"}},
+        identity_actor_contexts={
+            "attacker": {
+                "scope_type": "tenant",
+                "tenant_id": "tenant-a' OR 1=1 --",
+            }
+        },
+    )
+    attacker_service = TaskPlaneService(service.store, policy=policy)
+    assert attacker_service.list_tasks("attacker") == []
+
+
+def test_existing_sqlite_rows_migrate_to_legacy_without_tenant_guess(tmp_path) -> None:
+    path = tmp_path / "legacy.sqlite3"
+    connection = sqlite3.connect(path)
+    connection.execute(
+        """
+        CREATE TABLE tasks (
+            task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, revision INTEGER NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL,
+            task_json TEXT NOT NULL, task_type TEXT NOT NULL, root_task_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+            parent_task_id TEXT, correlation_id TEXT, idempotency_key TEXT UNIQUE,
+            created_at REAL NOT NULL, updated_at REAL NOT NULL, failure_reason TEXT
+        )
+        """
+    )
+    connection.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+        (
+            "task-legacy",
+            1,
+            "CREATED",
+            json.dumps({"task_id": "task-legacy"}),
+            "code.change",
+            "task-legacy",
+            None,
+            None,
+            "legacy-key",
+            1.0,
+            1.0,
+            None,
+        ),
+    )
+    connection.commit()
+    connection.close()
+
+    store = TaskPlaneStore(str(path))
+    task = store.get_task("task-legacy")
+    assert task.task_plan.scope_type == "legacy"
+    assert task.task_plan.tenant_id is None
+    replay = store.create_task(
+        TaskPlan.from_dict({"task_id": "task-legacy"}),
+        idempotency_key="legacy-key",
+    )
+    assert replay.task_id == "task-legacy"
+    assert tuple(
+        store.conn.execute(
+            "SELECT scope_type,tenant_id FROM tasks WHERE task_id='task-legacy'"
+        ).fetchone()
+    ) == ("legacy", None)
+    tenant_context = _policy().actor_context("reader-a")
+    with pytest.raises(NotFoundError):
+        store.get_task("task-legacy", tenant_context)
+    store.close()

tests/test_agent_event_bus.py

@@ -20,3 +20,12 @@ def test_unified_event_flow():
 
     dashboard = AgentEventDashboard(bus).overview()
     assert dashboard["audit"]["enabled"] is True
+
+
+def test_target_changes_event_identity(tmp_path):
+    bus = AgentEventBus(tmp_path)
+    first = bus.publish('test', 'same', 'user-a', 'same summary', {'value': 1})
+    second = bus.publish('test', 'same', 'user-b', 'same summary', {'value': 1})
+    first_id = first.get('id') if isinstance(first, dict) else getattr(first, 'id', first)
+    second_id = second.get('id') if isinstance(second, dict) else getattr(second, 'id', second)
+    assert first_id != second_id

tests/test_agent_task_retry_extension.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib, json, sqlite3, sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+from aios_agent_task_retry_extension import RetryExtensionRequest, RetryExtensionStore, RetryExtensionError
+
+AUTHORIZATION_ID="owner-scheme-a-20260817"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _authorization_id(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID", AUTHORIZATION_ID)
+
+
+def canon(v):
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(v,sort_keys=True,separators=(",",":")).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def db(tmp_path):
+    p=tmp_path/"state.sqlite3"
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    c.executescript("""
+    CREATE TABLE tasks(
+      task_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,status TEXT,attempt INTEGER,max_attempts INTEGER,revision INTEGER,
+      claimed_by TEXT,lease_token_hash TEXT,lease_expires_at TEXT,verification_json TEXT,result_json TEXT
+    );
+    CREATE TABLE task_events(
+      event_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,task_id TEXT,event_type TEXT,agent_id TEXT,
+      payload_json TEXT,created_at TEXT
+    );
+    """)
+    verification={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"BASE_OID_BINDING_INVALID"}
+    c.execute("INSERT INTO tasks VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+              ("task-a","FAILED",10,10,41,None,None,None,json.dumps(verification),json.dumps({"status":"FAILED"})))
+    c.commit(); c.close()
+    return p,verification
+
+
+def request(v):
+    return RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping({
+      "expected_status":"FAILED","expected_revision":41,"expected_attempt":10,"expected_max_attempts":10,
+      "next_max_attempts":11,"previous_verification_sha256":canon(v),
+      "authorization_id":AUTHORIZATION_ID,"idempotency_key":"retry-task-a-attempt11",
+    })
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_cas_and_audit(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    out=RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+    assert out["status"]=="QUEUED" and out["max_attempts"]==11 and out["revision"]==42
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute("select status,attempt,max_attempts,revision from tasks").fetchone()==("QUEUED",10,11,42)
+    event=c.execute("select event_type,payload_json from task_events").fetchone()
+    assert event[0]=="TASK_RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZED"
+    assert json.loads(event[1])["authorization_id"]=="owner-scheme-a-20260817"
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_idempotent_replay(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path); store=RetryExtensionStore(p); req=request(v)
+    first=store.extend("task-a",req); second=store.extend("task-a",req)
+    assert first["idempotent"] is False and second["idempotent"] is True
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute("select count(*) from task_retry_extensions").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_normalizes_stale_terminal_claim_without_active_lease(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    c.execute("update tasks set claimed_by='previous-worker'")
+    c.commit(); c.close()
+    out=RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+    assert out["status"]=="QUEUED"
+    c=sqlite3.connect(p)
+    assert c.execute(
+        "select claimed_by,lease_token_hash,lease_expires_at from tasks"
+    ).fetchone()==(None,None,None)
+    payload=json.loads(c.execute("select payload_json from task_events").fetchone()[0])
+    assert payload["previous_claimed_by"]=="previous-worker"
+    assert payload["stale_terminal_claim_normalized"] is True
+    assert c.execute("select count(*) from task_events").fetchone()[0]==1
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_verification_drift_denied(tmp_path):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    bad=request({"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK","reason":"other"})
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_VERIFICATION_DRIFT"):
+        RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",bad)
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_authorization_id_mismatch_rejected(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    p,v=db(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_AUTHORIZATION_ID", "other-owner-id")
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_AUTHORIZATION_ID_MISMATCH"):
+        RetryExtensionStore(p).extend("task-a",request(v))
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_bounded_one_step():
+    v={"decision":"NEEDS_REWORK"}
+    data={
+      "expected_status":"FAILED","expected_revision":41,"expected_attempt":10,"expected_max_attempts":10,
+      "next_max_attempts":12,"previous_verification_sha256":canon(v),
+      "authorization_id":"owner-scheme-a-20260817","idempotency_key":"retry-task-a-attempt11",
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(RetryExtensionError,match="RETRY_EXTENSION_MUST_BE_BOUNDED_ONE_STEP"):
+        RetryExtensionRequest.from_mapping(data)
+
+
+def test_retry_extension_unit_is_unprivileged_and_requires_owner_binding():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-agent-task-retry-extension.service").read_text()
+    assert "User=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "Group=aios-agent-task" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential=agent_task_control_token:" in unit
+    assert "EnvironmentFile=/etc/aios-gitops/agent-task-retry-extension.env" in unit
+    assert "User=root" not in unit

tests/test_autonomous_broker_security_v2.py

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import importlib.util
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import socket
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import time
-
-import pytest
-
-
-BROKER_PATH = Path(__file__).parents[1] / "services" / "aios-agent-runtime-broker" / "broker.py"
-
-
-def load_broker():
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("broker_under_test", BROKER_PATH)
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    assert spec.loader is not None
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    return module
-
-
-def test_peer_credentials_accept_configured_uid(monkeypatch) -> None:
-    broker = load_broker()
-    left, right = socket.socketpair()
-    try:
-        monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ALLOWED_PEER_UID", os.getuid())
-        monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ALLOWED_PEER_USER", "")
-        broker.authorize_peer(left)
-    finally:
-        left.close()
-        right.close()
-
-
-def test_peer_credentials_reject_other_uid(monkeypatch) -> None:
-    broker = load_broker()
-    left, right = socket.socketpair()
-    try:
-        monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ALLOWED_PEER_UID", os.getuid() + 100000)
-        monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ALLOWED_PEER_USER", "")
-        with pytest.raises(broker.BrokerError) as caught:
-            broker.authorize_peer(left)
-        assert caught.value.code == "PEER_UID_REJECTED"
-    finally:
-        left.close()
-        right.close()
-
-
-def test_request_read_timeout(monkeypatch) -> None:
-    broker = load_broker()
-    left, right = socket.socketpair()
-    try:
-        monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "CONNECTION_TIMEOUT", 0.05)
-        with pytest.raises(broker.BrokerError) as caught:
-            broker.read_request(left)
-        assert caught.value.code == "REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
-    finally:
-        left.close()
-        right.close()
-
-
-def test_worktree_fd_remains_pinned_after_path_replacement(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
-    broker = load_broker()
-    root = tmp_path / "workspaces"
-    run_root = root / "run"
-    original = run_root / "worktree"
-    original.mkdir(parents=True)
-    (original / "marker.txt").write_text("original\n", encoding="utf-8")
-
-    request = {
-        "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1",
-        "adapter": "hermes",
-        "execution_context": {
-            "repository": "aios/aios",
-            "base_oid": "a" * 40,
-            "target_branch": "agent/intent/test",
-            "worktree": str(original),
-        },
-        "policy": {
-            "authoritative_repository_write": False,
-            "direct_git_ref_mutation": False,
-            "direct_git_push": False,
-            "direct_git_commit": False,
-            "main_write": False,
-            "force_push": False,
-            "production_write": False,
-            "tag_write": False,
-            "baseline_write": False,
-            "task_api_credential_visible": False,
-            "writer_lease_visible": False,
-        },
-    }
-    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ADAPTER", "hermes")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "WORKSPACE_ROOT", root)
-    _, fd = broker.validate_request(request)
-    try:
-        moved = run_root / "original-moved"
-        original.rename(moved)
-        original.mkdir()
-        (original / "marker.txt").write_text("replacement\n", encoding="utf-8")
-
-        pinned = Path(f"/proc/self/fd/{fd}")
-        (pinned / "through-fd.txt").write_text("pinned\n", encoding="utf-8")
-        assert (moved / "through-fd.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "pinned\n"
-        assert not (original / "through-fd.txt").exists()
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-
-
-def test_backend_receives_no_task_api_token(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
-    broker = load_broker()
-    worktree = tmp_path / "worktree"
-    worktree.mkdir()
-    backend = tmp_path / "backend.py"
-    backend.write_text(
-        """#!/usr/bin/env python3
-import json, os, pathlib, sys
-request = json.load(sys.stdin)
-assert 'AIOS_AGENT_TASK_TOKEN' not in os.environ
-worktree = pathlib.Path(request['execution_context']['worktree'])
-(worktree / 'changed.txt').write_text('ok\\n', encoding='utf-8')
-json.dump({
-  'schema':'aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1',
-  'status':'COMPLETED',
-  'summary':'done',
-  'verification':[],
-  'evidence':{'token_visible':False, 'api_key':'runtime-secret-value'}
-}, sys.stdout)
-""",
-        encoding="utf-8",
-    )
-    backend.chmod(0o755)
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ADAPTER", "hermes")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "BACKEND_ARGV_JSON", json.dumps(["/usr/bin/python3", str(backend)]))
-    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "BACKEND_TIMEOUT", 5)
-    monkeypatch.delenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", raising=False)
-
-    fd = os.open(str(worktree), getattr(os, "O_PATH", os.O_RDONLY) | os.O_DIRECTORY)
-    try:
-        request = {
-            "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1",
-            "adapter": "hermes",
-            "execution_context": {"worktree": str(worktree)},
-        }
-        result = broker.execute_backend(request, fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-    assert result["status"] == "COMPLETED"
-    assert result["evidence"]["api_key"] == "[REDACTED]"
-    assert (worktree / "changed.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "ok\n"
-
-
-def test_broker_backend_env_does_not_inherit_task_token(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
-    broker = load_broker()
-    worktree = tmp_path / "worktree-env"
-    worktree.mkdir()
-    backend = tmp_path / "backend-env.py"
-    backend.write_text(
-        """#!/usr/bin/env python3
-import json, os, sys
-assert 'AIOS_AGENT_TASK_TOKEN' not in os.environ
-assert os.environ.get('AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL') == 'test/model'
-assert os.environ.get('AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN') == '/test/openclaw'
-json.dump({
-  'schema':'aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1',
-  'status':'COMPLETED',
-  'summary':'environment isolated',
-  'verification':[],
-  'evidence':{'task_token_visible':False}
-}, sys.stdout)
-""",
-        encoding="utf-8",
-    )
-    backend.chmod(0o755)
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(broker, "ADAPTER", "openclaw")
-    monkeypatch.setattr(
-        broker,
-        "BACKEND_ARGV_JSON",
-        json.dumps(["/usr/bin/python3", str(backend)]),
-    )
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_AGENT_TASK_TOKEN", "must-not-cross")
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL", "test/model")
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", "/test/openclaw")
-    monkeypatch.delenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", raising=False)
-
-    fd = os.open(str(worktree), getattr(os, "O_PATH", os.O_RDONLY) | os.O_DIRECTORY)
-    try:
-        request = {
-            "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1",
-            "adapter": "openclaw",
-            "execution_context": {"worktree": str(worktree)},
-        }
-        result = broker.execute_backend(request, fd)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-    assert result["status"] == "COMPLETED"

tests/test_autonomous_intent_runtime_v2.py

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-
-import pytest
-
-from intent_runtime import IntentError, IntentTask, is_claimable_intent, resolve
-
-
-def make_bare(tmp_path: Path) -> tuple[Path, str]:
-    work = tmp_path / "work"
-    bare = tmp_path / "repo.git"
-    subprocess.run(["git", "init", str(work)], check=True, capture_output=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"], check=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "config", "user.name", "AIOS Test"], check=True)
-    (work / "README.md").write_text("base\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "add", "README.md"], check=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "commit", "-m", "base"], check=True, capture_output=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "branch", "-M", "main"], check=True)
-    oid = subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(work), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
-    subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "--bare", str(work), str(bare)], check=True, capture_output=True)
-    return bare, oid
-
-
-def intent_task(task_id: str = "custom-gpt-intent-20260815") -> dict[str, object]:
-    return {
-        "task_id": task_id,
-        "goal": "Fix the repository behavior described by the task.",
-        "instructions": "Inspect the code, find the root cause, implement and test the smallest correct fix.",
-        "success_criteria": ["Relevant tests pass", "git diff --check passes"],
-        "required_capabilities": [
-            "intent.task",
-            "engineering.execute",
-            "engineering.autonomous",
-            "git.read",
-            "git.diff",
-            "git.test",
-            "governed.write.file",
-            "governed.write.branch",
-            "workspace.worktree",
-            "agent.runtime.hermes",
-        ],
-        "metadata": {},
-    }
-
-
-def fixed_implementation_task() -> dict[str, object]:
-    return {
-        "task_id": "implement-autonomous-intent-worker-v2-20260815",
-        "goal": "Implement autonomous intent worker v2.",
-        "instructions": "Implement the worker.",
-        "success_criteria": ["Implementation succeeds"],
-        "required_capabilities": [
-            "engineering.execute",
-            "git.diff",
-            "git.read",
-            "git.test",
-            "governed.write.branch",
-            "governed.write.file",
-            "workspace.worktree",
-        ],
-        "metadata": {},
-    }
-
-
-def test_fixed_bootstrap_task_is_not_claimable_by_intent_worker() -> None:
-    worker_caps = intent_task()["required_capabilities"]
-    assert is_claimable_intent(fixed_implementation_task(), worker_caps) is False
-    with pytest.raises(IntentError) as caught:
-        IntentTask.parse(fixed_implementation_task())
-    assert caught.value.code == "INTENT_CAPABILITY_MARKER_REQUIRED"
-
-
-def test_native_custom_gpt_intent_task_is_claimable() -> None:
-    task = intent_task()
-    assert is_claimable_intent(task, task["required_capabilities"]) is True
-
-
-def test_missing_runtime_capability_fails_closed() -> None:
-    task = intent_task()
-    caps = [item for item in task["required_capabilities"] if item != "agent.runtime.hermes"]
-    assert is_claimable_intent(task, caps) is False
-
-
-def test_resolution_is_stable_across_restart(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    bare, oid = make_bare(tmp_path)
-    task = intent_task()
-    first = resolve(
-        task,
-        authority_git_dir=bare,
-        repository="aios/aios",
-        base_ref="refs/heads/main",
-        available_adapters=["hermes"],
-        default_adapter="hermes",
-    )
-    recovered = resolve(
-        task,
-        authority_git_dir=bare,
-        repository="aios/aios",
-        base_ref="refs/heads/main",
-        available_adapters=["hermes"],
-        default_adapter="hermes",
-        prior=first.to_json(),
-    )
-    assert first == recovered
-    assert recovered.base_oid == oid
-    assert recovered.target_branch.startswith("agent/intent/")
-
-
-def test_requested_codex_is_rejected_when_unavailable(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    bare, _ = make_bare(tmp_path)
-    task = intent_task("codex-only-20260815")
-    task["required_capabilities"] = [
-        item for item in task["required_capabilities"] if item != "agent.runtime.hermes"
-    ] + ["agent.runtime.codex"]
-    with pytest.raises(IntentError) as caught:
-        resolve(
-            task,
-            authority_git_dir=bare,
-            repository="aios/aios",
-            base_ref="refs/heads/main",
-            available_adapters=["hermes"],
-            default_adapter="hermes",
-        )
-    assert caught.value.code == "AGENT_RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE"
-
-
-def test_openclaw_is_a_first_class_runtime_adapter(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    bare, _ = make_bare(tmp_path)
-    task = intent_task("openclaw-intent-20260815")
-    task["required_capabilities"] = [
-        item for item in task["required_capabilities"] if item != "agent.runtime.hermes"
-    ] + ["agent.runtime.openclaw"]
-    resolved = resolve(
-        task,
-        authority_git_dir=bare,
-        repository="aios/aios",
-        base_ref="refs/heads/main",
-        available_adapters=["openclaw"],
-        default_adapter="openclaw",
-    )
-    assert resolved.adapter == "openclaw"

tests/test_autonomous_runtime_client_v2.py

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-import socket
-import subprocess
-import threading
-import time
-
-import pytest
-
-from runtime_client import RuntimeErrorV2, collect_changes, invoke, request_payload, scan_secrets
-
-
-def repo(tmp_path: Path) -> tuple[Path, str]:
-    work = tmp_path / "repo"
-    subprocess.run(["git", "init", str(work)], check=True, capture_output=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"], check=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "config", "user.name", "AIOS Test"], check=True)
-    (work / "a.py").write_text("VALUE = 1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "add", "a.py"], check=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "commit", "-m", "base"], check=True, capture_output=True)
-    oid = subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(work), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
-    return work, oid
-
-
-def test_collect_changes_reads_actual_git_state(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    work, oid = repo(tmp_path)
-    (work / "a.py").write_text("VALUE = 2\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    (work / "new.py").write_text("NEW = True\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    assert collect_changes(work, oid) == ["a.py", "new.py"]
-
-
-def test_agent_commit_is_rejected(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    work, oid = repo(tmp_path)
-    (work / "a.py").write_text("VALUE = 2\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "add", "a.py"], check=True)
-    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(work), "commit", "-m", "agent commit"], check=True, capture_output=True)
-    with pytest.raises(RuntimeErrorV2) as caught:
-        collect_changes(work, oid)
-    assert caught.value.code == "WORKTREE_HEAD_MUTATED"
-
-
-def test_secret_material_is_rejected(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    work, oid = repo(tmp_path)
-    private_key_marker = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE " + "KEY-----"
-    (work / "new.txt").write_text(
-        private_key_marker + "\nabc\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    changed = collect_changes(work, oid)
-    with pytest.raises(RuntimeErrorV2) as caught:
-        scan_secrets(work, changed)
-    assert caught.value.code == "SECRET_MATERIAL_REJECTED"
-
-
-def test_runtime_protocol_round_trip(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    sock = tmp_path / "runtime.sock"
-    response = {
-        "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-result.v1",
-        "status": "COMPLETED",
-        "summary": "Implemented the requested change.",
-        "verification": [],
-        "evidence": {"runtime": "fake-hermes"},
-    }
-
-    def server() -> None:
-        listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-        listener.bind(str(sock))
-        listener.listen(1)
-        conn, _ = listener.accept()
-        raw = b""
-        while True:
-            chunk = conn.recv(65536)
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            raw += chunk
-        value = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
-        assert value["schema"] == "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1"
-        conn.sendall(json.dumps(response).encode("utf-8"))
-        conn.close()
-        listener.close()
-
-    thread = threading.Thread(target=server)
-    thread.start()
-    for _ in range(100):
-        if sock.exists():
-            break
-        time.sleep(0.01)
-    payload = request_payload(
-        adapter="hermes",
-        task_id="intent-e2e-20260815",
-        goal="Change VALUE",
-        instructions="Inspect and implement",
-        success_criteria=["Tests pass"],
-        repository="aios/aios",
-        base_oid="a" * 40,
-        target_branch="agent/intent/example",
-        worktree=tmp_path,
-    )
-    result = invoke(sock, payload, 5)
-    thread.join(timeout=2)
-    assert result.status == "COMPLETED"
-    assert result.evidence["runtime"] == "fake-hermes"

tests/test_bridge_v2_governed_http_bootstrap.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import base64
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
+from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2 import BridgeV2Adapter, OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS
 from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server import BridgeHandler, RuntimeConfig
 from aios_continuation_executor import GiteaContinuationRemote, ServerSideCredentialProjection
 from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ class Probe:
 
 def test_create_new_lease_is_exact_base_and_absent():
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
+        job_id="job-bridge-runtime-lineage-test",
         task_id="TASK-P0-BRIDGE-V21-DURABLE-RECONCILIATION-20260809",
         repository="aios/aios",
         branch_mode="CREATE_NEW",
@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ def test_create_new_lease_is_exact_base_and_absent():
 
 def test_create_new_lease_rejects_existing_target():
     request = WriterLeaseRequestV2(
+        job_id="job-bridge-runtime-lineage-test",
         task_id="task",
         repository="aios/aios",
         branch_mode="CREATE_NEW",
@@ -75,7 +78,7 @@ def test_slash_branch_uses_paginated_collection():
 def test_http_route_contract_is_complete():
     expected = {
         "/v2/runtime", "/v2/capabilities", "/v2/governed-task",
-        "/v2/writer-lease", "/v2/commit-file", "/v2/commit-files",
+        "/v2/writer-lease", "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap", "/v2/writer-lease/renew", "/v2/commit-file", "/v2/commit-files",
         "/v2/job", "/v2/job/resume", "/v2/job/reconcile",
         "/v2/tag/approval-request",
         "/v2/tag/publish",
@@ -88,3 +91,121 @@ def test_http_route_contract_is_complete():
     from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server import ROUTES
 
     assert set(ROUTES) == expected
+
+
+def test_renew_writer_lease_is_exposed_in_action_and_capability_contracts():
+    adapter = BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status={})
+    capabilities = adapter.getGovernedWriteCapabilities()
+    contract = capabilities["operation_contracts"]["renewWriterLease"]
+
+    assert contract["method"] == "POST"
+    assert contract["path"] == "/v2/writer-lease/renew"
+    assert tuple(contract["required_fields"]) == OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["renewWriterLease"]
+    assert "runtime_rehydrated" in contract["response_fields"]
+
+    action_schema = Path("docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "/v2/writer-lease/renew:" in action_schema
+    assert "operationId: renewWriterLease" in action_schema
+    assert "BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryRequest" in action_schema
+    assert "BridgeWriterLeaseRecoveryResponse" in action_schema
+    assert {
+        capabilities["operation_contracts"][operation]["path"]
+        for operation in (
+            "acquireWriterLease",
+            "renewWriterLease",
+            "commitFileGoverned",
+            "commitFilesGoverned",
+        )
+    } == {
+        "/v2/writer-lease",
+        "/v2/writer-lease/renew",
+        "/v2/commit-file",
+        "/v2/commit-files",
+    }
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_writer_lease_is_exposed_in_action_and_capability_contracts():
+    adapter = BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status={})
+    capabilities = adapter.getGovernedWriteCapabilities()
+    contract = capabilities["operation_contracts"]["bootstrapWriterLease"]
+
+    assert contract["method"] == "POST"
+    assert contract["path"] == "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap"
+    assert tuple(contract["required_fields"]) == OPERATION_REQUIRED_FIELDS["bootstrapWriterLease"]
+    assert "bootstrapped" in contract["response_fields"]
+    assert "durable_branch_lease_present" in contract["response_fields"]
+
+    action_schema = Path("docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "/v2/writer-lease/bootstrap:" in action_schema
+    assert "operationId: bootstrapWriterLease" in action_schema
+    assert "bootstrapped: {type: boolean}" in action_schema
+    assert "durable_branch_lease_present: {type: boolean}" in action_schema
+
+
+
+def test_http_allows_explicit_job_id_on_lease_and_commit_requests():
+    handler = BridgeHandler.__new__(BridgeHandler)
+    lease_body = {
+        "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+        "task_id": "task",
+        "job_id": "job-explicit-runtime-lineage",
+        "repository": "aios/aios",
+        "branch_mode": "CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+        "base_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "target_branch": "agent/explicit-runtime-lineage",
+        "generation": 2,
+        "lease_seconds": 120,
+    }
+    handler._allowed("acquireWriterLease", lease_body)
+    handler._allowed(
+        "commitFilesGoverned",
+        {
+            "task_id": "task",
+            "job_id": "job-explicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+            "target_branch": "agent/explicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "generation": 2,
+            "idempotency_key": "commit-explicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "files": {"docs/x.txt": "eA=="},
+            "message": "test",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_http_allows_omitted_job_id_for_durable_server_resolution():
+    handler = BridgeHandler.__new__(BridgeHandler)
+    lease_body = {
+        "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+        "task_id": "task",
+        "repository": "aios/aios",
+        "branch_mode": "CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+        "base_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+        "target_branch": "agent/implicit-runtime-lineage",
+        "generation": 2,
+        "lease_seconds": 120,
+    }
+    handler._allowed("acquireWriterLease", lease_body)
+    handler._allowed(
+        "commitFilesGoverned",
+        {
+            "task_id": "task",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "expected_branch_oid": "a" * 40,
+            "target_branch": "agent/implicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "generation": 2,
+            "idempotency_key": "commit-implicit-runtime-lineage",
+            "files": {"docs/x.txt": "eA=="},
+            "message": "test",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_capability_contracts_return_exact_job_id_lineage():
+    contracts = BridgeV2Adapter(runtime_status={}).getGovernedWriteCapabilities()["operation_contracts"]
+    for operation in ("acquireWriterLease", "bootstrapWriterLease", "renewWriterLease"):
+        assert "job_id" in contracts[operation]["response_fields"]
+    for operation in ("commitFileGoverned", "commitFilesGoverned"):
+        assert "job_id" in contracts[operation]["response_fields"]

tests/test_continuation_runtime_normalization.py

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import json
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server import GovernedRuntime
+from aios_continuation_executor import ContinuationExecutor
+from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import JobState
+
+
+TASK = "continuation-normalization-test"
+JOB = "job-continuation-normalization-test"
+REPO = "aios/aios"
+BASE = "a" * 40
+BRANCH = "agent/continuation-normalization-test"
+
+
+class Authority:
+    def __init__(self, head: str | None) -> None:
+        self.head = head
+
+    def read_ref(self, ref: str) -> str | None:
+        assert ref == "refs/heads/" + BRANCH
+        return self.head
+
+    def commit_exists(self, oid: str) -> bool:
+        return oid == BASE
+
+    def branch_exists(self, branch: str) -> bool:
+        assert branch == BRANCH
+        return self.head is not None
+
+    def branch_head(self, branch: str) -> str:
+        assert branch == BRANCH and self.head is not None
+        return self.head
+
+    def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
+        return older == BASE and newer == BASE
+
+
+def lease(**overrides: object) -> WriterLeaseRequestV2:
+    values = {
+        "task_id": TASK,
+        "job_id": JOB,
+        "repository": REPO,
+        "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+        "base_oid": BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+        "target_branch": BRANCH,
+        "generation": 1,
+        "lease_seconds": 120,
+    }
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return WriterLeaseRequestV2(**values)
+
+
+def runtime(*, head: str | None = BASE, **binding_overrides: object) -> GovernedRuntime:
+    value = GovernedRuntime.__new__(GovernedRuntime)
+    value.authority = Authority(head)
+    binding = {
+        "task_id": TASK,
+        "job_id": JOB,
+        "repository": REPO,
+        "base_oid": BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+        "target_branch": BRANCH,
+        "generation": 1,
+        "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+    }
+    binding.update(binding_overrides)
+    value.bindings = {TASK: binding}
+    return value
+
+
+def test_same_lineage_create_new_normalizes_to_continue_existing() -> None:
+    normalized = runtime()._normalize_runtime_lease(lease())
+    assert normalized.branch_mode == "CONTINUE_EXISTING"
+    assert normalized.task_id == TASK
+    assert normalized.job_id == JOB
+    assert normalized.repository == REPO
+    assert normalized.target_branch == BRANCH
+    assert normalized.expected_branch_oid == BASE
+    assert normalized.generation == 1
+
+
+def test_unprovisioned_create_new_stays_create_new() -> None:
+    assert runtime(head=None)._normalize_runtime_lease(lease()).branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "value"),
+    (
+        ("repository", "other/repo"),
+        ("base_oid", "b" * 40),
+        ("expected_branch_oid", "b" * 40),
+        ("target_branch", "agent/foreign"),
+        ("generation", 2),
+    ),
+)
+def test_binding_mismatch_fails_closed(field: str, value: object) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"):
+        runtime(**{field: value})._normalize_runtime_lease(lease())
+
+
+def test_drifted_existing_head_fails_closed() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="EXPECTED_BRANCH_OID_CONFLICT"):
+        runtime(head="b" * 40)._normalize_runtime_lease(lease())
+
+
+def test_openapi_contract_parses_and_requires_exact_commit_lineage() -> None:
+    document = yaml.safe_load(
+        Path("docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    )
+    schema = document["components"]["schemas"]["BridgeCommitResponse"]
+    assert {
+        "job_id",
+        "commit_oid",
+        "commit_visible",
+        "branch_mode",
+        "target_branch",
+        "generation",
+    } <= set(schema["required"])
+
+
+def test_changed_production_files_pass_secret_scan() -> None:
+    paths = [
+        Path("active-runtime/app/aios_authority_git_executor.py"),
+        Path("active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server.py"),
+        Path("active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_executor.py"),
+        Path("active-runtime/app/aios_continuation_lease.py"),
+        Path("active-runtime/app/authorized_task_writer_provisioning.py"),
+        Path("active-runtime/app/aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2.py"),
+        Path("docs/gitops/openapi-chatgpt-actions.yaml"),
+    ]
+    expression = re.compile(
+        r"(?i)(BEGIN (RSA|OPENSSH|EC) PRIVATE KEY|"
+        r"authorization:\\s*bearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]{12,}|"
+        r"api[_-]?key\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"][^'\\\"]{12,})"
+    )
+    hits = []
+    for path in paths:
+        for number, line in enumerate(
+            path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines(), 1
+        ):
+            if expression.search(line):
+                hits.append(f"{path}:{number}")
+    assert hits == []
+
+
+def test_remote_verified_job_is_not_completed_when_head_cas_callback_fails() -> None:
+    class Store:
+        def read(self, _job_id):
+            return {
+                "branch": BRANCH,
+                "request_json": json.dumps(
+                    {"binding": {"expected_branch_oid": BASE}}
+                ),
+            }
+
+    class Controller:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.store = Store()
+            self.states = []
+
+        def advance(self, _job_id, state, **_kwargs):
+            self.states.append(state)
+            return SimpleNamespace(as_dict=lambda: {"state": state.value})
+
+    executor = ContinuationExecutor.__new__(ContinuationExecutor)
+    executor.controller = Controller()
+    executor._observe_remote = lambda _branch, oid: (oid, oid, True)
+
+    def fail_cas(_oid):
+        raise RuntimeError("LEASE_CAS_CONFLICT")
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_CAS_CONFLICT"):
+        executor._finish_remote_verification(
+            JOB,
+            "b" * 40,
+            "b" * 40,
+            before_complete=fail_cas,
+        )
+
+    assert executor.controller.states == [JobState.REMOTE_VERIFIED]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("branch_mode", ("CREATE_NEW", "CONTINUE_EXISTING"))
+def test_executor_preflight_accepts_the_exact_mode_dependent_normalized_shape(
+    branch_mode: str,
+) -> None:
+    from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+    from aios_continuation_executor import (
+        ContinuationPermissions,
+        ContinuationRuntimeBinding,
+    )
+
+    request = lease(branch_mode=branch_mode)
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    executor = ContinuationExecutor.__new__(ContinuationExecutor)
+    executor.authority = Authority(None if branch_mode == "CREATE_NEW" else BASE)
+    executor.now = lambda: now
+    executor._max_generation = lambda _branch, *, exclude_job_id=None: 0
+    executor.workspace = SimpleNamespace(
+        is_detached=lambda: True,
+        head_oid=lambda: BASE,
+    )
+    executor.remote = SimpleNamespace(repository_identity=lambda: REPO)
+    binding = ContinuationRuntimeBinding(
+        request=request,
+        job_id=JOB,
+        workspace_path=Path("/tmp/continuation-normalization-test"),
+        lease_not_before=now - timedelta(seconds=1),
+        lease_expires_at=now + timedelta(seconds=60),
+        original_receipt_valid=True,
+        original_grant_consumed=True,
+        permissions=ContinuationPermissions(),
+    )
+
+    executor._validate_preflight(binding, job_id=JOB)
+
+
+def test_create_new_executor_resumes_executing_and_uses_absence_bound_writers() -> None:
+    from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+    from aios_continuation_executor import (
+        ContinuationCommit,
+        ContinuationPermissions,
+        ContinuationRuntimeBinding,
+    )
+
+    new_oid = "b" * 40
+
+    class Store:
+        def read(self, _job_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+            return {"state": "EXECUTING", "revision": 4}
+
+    class Controller:
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.store = Store()
+            self.advanced: list[str] = []
+
+        def advance(self, _job_id: str, state: JobState, **_kwargs: object) -> object:
+            self.advanced.append(state.value)
+            return SimpleNamespace(as_dict=lambda: {"state": state.value})
+
+    class Workspace:
+        def commit_files(self, _files: object, _message: str) -> str:
+            return new_oid
+
+    class CreateAuthority:
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.created: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = []
+
+        def is_ancestor(self, older: str, newer: str) -> bool:
+            return older == BASE and newer == new_oid
+
+        def create_task_branch_cas(self, branch: str, base: str, new: str) -> str:
+            self.created.append((branch, base, new))
+            return new
+
+        def compare_and_swap_branch(self, *_args: object) -> str:
+            raise AssertionError("existing-branch CAS must not serve CREATE_NEW")
+
+    class CreateRemote:
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.created: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+
+        def push_new_exact(self, branch: str, new: str) -> None:
+            self.created.append((branch, new))
+
+        def push_exact(self, *_args: object) -> None:
+            raise AssertionError("existing-branch push must not serve CREATE_NEW")
+
+    class Credential:
+        def project(self) -> None: pass
+        def revoke(self) -> None: pass
+
+    controller=Controller(); authority=CreateAuthority(); remote=CreateRemote()
+    executor=ContinuationExecutor(controller,authority,Workspace(),remote,Credential())
+    executor._validate_preflight=lambda *_args,**_kwargs: None
+    executor._finish_remote_verification=lambda *_args,**_kwargs: {
+        "job_id":JOB,"state":"COMPLETED","receipt":{"authority_oid":new_oid,"commit_visible":True}
+    }
+    now=datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    binding=ContinuationRuntimeBinding(
+        request=lease(branch_mode="CREATE_NEW"),job_id=JOB,
+        workspace_path=Path("/tmp/create-new-executor-resume"),
+        lease_not_before=now-timedelta(seconds=1),lease_expires_at=now+timedelta(seconds=60),
+        original_receipt_valid=True,original_grant_consumed=True,
+        permissions=ContinuationPermissions(),
+    )
+    result=executor.execute(
+        binding,ContinuationCommit("create-new-test",{"docs/test.txt":b"ok"},"test")
+    )
+
+    assert result["state"]=="COMPLETED"
+    assert authority.created==[(BRANCH,BASE,new_oid)]
+    assert remote.created==[(BRANCH,new_oid)]
+    assert controller.advanced==["LOCAL_VERIFIED","REMOTE_SYNCING"]

tests/test_isolated_executor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import hashlib,json,os,tarfile,sys,tempfile
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+import aios_isolated_executor as mod
+
+def make_archive(tmp_path):
+    root=tmp_path/"src"; root.mkdir()
+    (root/"hello.py").write_text("VALUE = 1\n")
+    archive=tmp_path/"source.tgz"
+    with tarfile.open(archive,"w:gz") as tf: tf.add(root/"hello.py",arcname="hello.py")
+    return archive
+
+def test_isolated_executor_applies_hash_bound_change(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    archive=make_archive(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY",raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mod,"assert_uncredentialed",lambda:None)
+    request={
+      "schema":"aios.isolated-execution.request.v1",
+      "request_id":"task-req-0000000000000000",
+      "source_archive":str(archive),
+      "source_archive_sha256":mod.sha256(archive.read_bytes()),
+      "change_set":[{
+        "path":"hello.py","operation":"replace_text","old":"VALUE = 1","new":"VALUE = 2","count":1,
+        "expected_sha256":mod.sha256(b"VALUE = 1\n")
+      }],
+      "verification":[{"label":"compile","argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","py_compile","hello.py"],"cwd":".","timeout_seconds":30}]
+    }
+    req=tmp_path/"req.json"; res=tmp_path/"res.json"
+    req.write_text(json.dumps(request))
+    mod.execute_request(req,res)
+    out=json.loads(res.read_text())
+    assert out["request_id"]=="task-req-0000000000000000"
+    assert out["credential_isolation"]["credential_env_absent"] is True
+    changed=out["changed_files"][0]
+    assert changed["path"]=="hello.py" and changed["deleted"] is False
+
+def test_isolated_executor_source_drift_denied(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    archive=make_archive(tmp_path); monkeypatch.setattr(mod,"assert_uncredentialed",lambda:None)
+    request={
+      "schema":"aios.isolated-execution.request.v1","request_id":"task-req-0000000000000001",
+      "source_archive":str(archive),
+      "source_archive_sha256":mod.sha256(archive.read_bytes()),
+      "change_set":[{"path":"hello.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x\n","expected_sha256":"0"*64}],
+      "verification":[]
+    }
+    req=tmp_path/"req.json"; res=tmp_path/"res.json"; req.write_text(json.dumps(request))
+    with pytest.raises(mod.IsolatedExecutorError,match="SOURCE_DRIFT"):
+        mod.execute_request(req,res)
+
+def test_credential_boundary_eacces_is_accepted(monkeypatch):
+    class DeniedDirectory:
+        def exists(self): return True
+        def is_symlink(self): return False
+        def is_dir(self): return True
+        def iterdir(self): raise PermissionError(13,"permission denied")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(mod.os,"access",lambda *_args,**_kwargs:False)
+    assert mod._credential_exposure(DeniedDirectory()) is None
+
+def test_systemd_unit_has_no_credentials_and_private_network():
+    unit=(ROOT/"deploy/systemd/aios-online-agent-isolated-executor.service").read_text()
+    assert "PrivateNetwork=true" in unit
+    assert "InaccessiblePaths=/run/credentials" in unit
+    assert "LoadCredential" not in unit
+    assert "SupplementaryGroups=gitops" not in unit

tests/test_message_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime as dt
+import pathlib
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+APP = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "active-runtime" / "app"
+if str(APP) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(APP))
+
+from message_handoff import (
+    ConfidentialityScopeDenied,
+    DeliveryContext,
+    DurableHandoffStore,
+    HandoffFabric,
+    IdempotencyConflict,
+    MessageEnvelope,
+    MessageExpired,
+    MessageScopeMismatch,
+    SequenceGap,
+    authorize_delivery,
+    bind_envelope_scope,
+    stable_event_id,
+)
+
+
+def actor(**overrides):
+    values = dict(
+        tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a", project_id="project-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a", run_id="run-a",
+        capabilities=("task.read", "message.read"),
+    )
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return DeliveryContext(**values)
+
+
+def envelope(**overrides):
+    values = dict(
+        source="agent-a", target="agent-b", message_type="handoff.request", payload={"value": 1},
+        tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a", project_id="project-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a", task_id="task-a", run_id="run-a",
+        sequence=1, idempotency_key="idem-1", capability_scope=("message.read",),
+        confidentiality_scope="private",
+    )
+    values.update(overrides)
+    return MessageEnvelope(**values)
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_TARGET_COLLISION_DENY():
+    a = stable_event_id(source="a", target="user-a", message_type="event", payload={"x": 1},
+                        tenant_id="tenant-a", sequence=1, idempotency_key="same")
+    b = stable_event_id(source="a", target="user-b", message_type="event", payload={"x": 1},
+                        tenant_id="tenant-a", sequence=1, idempotency_key="same")
+    assert a != b
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY():
+    with pytest.raises(MessageScopeMismatch, match="MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        bind_envelope_scope(envelope(tenant_id="tenant-b"), actor())
+
+
+def test_HANDOFF_CROSS_TENANT_DENY(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    env = envelope()
+    store.put(env)
+    with pytest.raises(MessageScopeMismatch, match="MESSAGE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        store.get(env.envelope_id, actor=actor(tenant_id="tenant-b"))
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE():
+    with pytest.raises(ConfidentialityScopeDenied, match="MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"):
+        authorize_delivery(actor(project_id="project-b"), envelope(confidentiality_scope="project"))
+    with pytest.raises(ConfidentialityScopeDenied, match="MESSAGE_CONFIDENTIALITY_SCOPE_ENFORCE"):
+        authorize_delivery(actor(), envelope(capability_scope=("message.read", "secret.read")))
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_REPLAY(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    env = envelope()
+    assert store.put(env)[0] == "CREATED"
+    status, replay = store.put(env)
+    assert status == "REPLAY"
+    assert replay.envelope_id == env.envelope_id
+    with pytest.raises(IdempotencyConflict, match="MESSAGE_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"):
+        store.put(envelope(payload={"value": 2}))
+
+
+def test_MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    store.put(envelope(sequence=1, idempotency_key="one"))
+    with pytest.raises(SequenceGap, match="MESSAGE_SEQUENCE_GAP_DETECT"):
+        store.put(envelope(sequence=3, idempotency_key="three"))
+
+
+def test_sequence_advances_and_scope_filters_pending(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    store.put(envelope(sequence=1, idempotency_key="one"))
+    store.put(envelope(sequence=2, idempotency_key="two", payload={"value": 2}))
+    assert [item.sequence for item in store.pending(target="agent-b", actor=actor())] == [1, 2]
+    assert store.pending(target="agent-b", actor=actor(tenant_id="tenant-b")) == []
+
+
+def test_expired_message_rejected(tmp_path):
+    expired = (dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) - dt.timedelta(seconds=1)).isoformat()
+    with pytest.raises(MessageExpired, match="MESSAGE_EXPIRED"):
+        DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3").put(envelope(expires_at=expired))
+
+
+def test_server_actor_binding_fills_scope_and_recomputes_identity():
+    public = MessageEnvelope(
+        source="agent-a", target="agent-b", message_type="handoff.request", payload={"value": 1},
+        sequence=1, idempotency_key="bind-1", confidentiality_scope="public",
+    )
+    bound = bind_envelope_scope(public, actor())
+    assert (bound.tenant_id, bound.user_id, bound.project_id, bound.run_id) == (
+        "tenant-a", "user-a", "project-a", "run-a"
+    )
+    assert bound.envelope_id != public.envelope_id
+
+
+def test_handoff_fabric_publish_is_durable(tmp_path):
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    status, env = HandoffFabric(store).publish(envelope(), actor=actor())
+    assert status == "CREATED"
+    assert store.get(env.envelope_id, actor=actor()).payload == {"value": 1}

tests/test_online_agent_compact_interface_map.py

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import json
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+APP = ROOT / "active-runtime/app"
+sys.path.insert(0, str(APP))
+
+from aios_online_agent_compact_map import (
+    MAX_RESULT_BYTES,
+    build_compact_interface_map,
+)
+from aios_online_agent_execution import (
+    ExecutionProjectionError,
+    GovernedExecutionBinding,
+    project_execution_envelope,
+    validate_execution_envelope,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+from aios_online_agent_worker import (
+    CompactInterfaceMapExecutor,
+    ExecutionEnvelope,
+    build_compact_interface_map_result,
+)
+
+
+BASE = "68b95fea0d9af3b52269e79b7cf878254f191b61"
+
+
+def make_repo(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
+    root = tmp_path / "repo"
+    (root / "active-runtime/app").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "tests").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "db/migrations").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "deploy/systemd").mkdir(parents=True)
+    (root / "active-runtime/app/fleet.py").write_text(
+        """
+class WorkerRegistry:
+    def register_worker(self, worker_id, capabilities):
+        return {"worker_id": worker_id, "capabilities": capabilities}
+
+class TaskScheduler:
+    def claim_next(self, tenant_id, capacity):
+        return None
+
+def recover_assignment(task_id, worker_id):
+    return task_id, worker_id
+
+TOKEN = "fixturetok"
+""".strip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "active-runtime/app/checkpoint.py").write_text(
+        """
+class CheckpointStore:
+    def resume(self, task_id, attempt):
+        return None
+""".strip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "tests/test_fleet.py").write_text(
+        """
+def test_scheduler_fairness():
+    assert True
+
+def test_worker_reassignment():
+    assert True
+""".strip() + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "db/migrations/20260817_fleet.sql").write_text(
+        "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS worker_slots (worker_id TEXT, capacity INTEGER);\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (root / "deploy/systemd/aios-fleet-worker.service").write_text(
+        "[Service]\nExecStart=/usr/bin/true\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    return root
+
+
+def binding() -> GovernedExecutionBinding:
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping(
+        {
+            "task_id": "r42-p2-agent-fleet-interface-map-20260817",
+            "job_id": "job-2c451360f78ef595e41663e3b444a8fb",
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "base_oid": BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+            "target_branch": "agent/r42-p2-agent-fleet-interface-map-20260817",
+            "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation": 1,
+            "idempotency_key": "r42-p2-agent-fleet-interface-map-68b95fe-v1",
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def envelope_mapping():
+    return project_execution_envelope(
+        binding(),
+        {
+            "action": "source_capture",
+            "adapter": "compact_interface_map",
+            "capability_scope": ["git.read", "git.test"],
+            "source_signals": [
+                "worker registry scheduler capacity fairness fault isolation",
+                "checkpoint resume retry scope trace message",
+            ],
+        },
+        required_capabilities=["git.read", "git.test"],
+    )
+
+
+def task_for(envelope):
+    return {
+        "task_id": envelope["task_id"],
+        "metadata": {"execution": envelope},
+        "required_capabilities": ["git.read", "git.test"],
+    }
+
+
+def test_compact_map_bounds_and_surfaces(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(
+        root,
+        ["worker scheduler capacity fairness checkpoint recovery"],
+        source_commit=BASE,
+    )
+    encoded = json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+    assert result["schema"] == "aios.engineering.interface-map.v1"
+    assert len(encoded) <= MAX_RESULT_BYTES
+    assert len(result["implementation_map"]["modules"]) <= 40
+    assert len(result["bounded_excerpts"]) <= 25
+    assert len(result["implementation_map"]["tests"]) <= 40
+    assert any(item["symbol"] == "WorkerRegistry" for item in result["implementation_map"]["classes"])
+    assert any(item["table"] == "worker_slots" for item in result["implementation_map"]["tables"])
+    assert any(item["unit"] == "aios-fleet-worker.service" for item in result["implementation_map"]["systemd_units"])
+
+
+def test_compact_map_redacts_sensitive_source_patterns(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(root, ["token fleet"], source_commit=BASE)
+    excerpts = json.dumps(result["bounded_excerpts"], ensure_ascii=False)
+    assert "fixturetok" not in excerpts
+
+
+def test_compact_execution_projection_is_read_only():
+    envelope = envelope_mapping()
+    assert envelope["action"] == "source_capture"
+    assert envelope["adapter"] == "compact_interface_map"
+    assert envelope["governance"]["writer_lease"] is False
+    assert envelope["change_set"] == []
+    assert envelope["verification"] == []
+    validate_execution_envelope(envelope, binding=binding(), worker_capabilities=["git.read", "git.test"])
+
+
+def test_compact_execution_rejects_mutation():
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionProjectionError, match="SOURCE_CAPTURE_MUTATION_DENY"):
+        project_execution_envelope(
+            binding(),
+            {
+                "action": "source_capture",
+                "adapter": "compact_interface_map",
+                "change_set": [{"path": "x.py", "operation": "write_file", "content": "x=1\n"}],
+            },
+        )
+
+
+def test_worker_accepts_compact_adapter_and_builds_result(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker, "audit", lambda *args, **kwargs: None)
+    mapped = envelope_mapping()
+    envelope = ExecutionEnvelope.from_task(
+        task_for(mapped),
+        worker_capabilities=("git.read", "git.test"),
+    )
+    execution = CompactInterfaceMapExecutor().execute(envelope, root)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map_result(envelope.task_id, envelope, execution)
+    assert result["status"] == "SUCCEEDED"
+    assert result["classification"] == "P2_INTERFACE_MAP_CAPTURED"
+    assert result["execution_mode"] == "compact_interface_map"
+    assert result["writer_lease"] == "NONE"
+    assert "source_snapshot" not in result
+    assert result["result_bytes"] <= 120 * 1024
+    assert result["source_commit"] == BASE
+
+
+def test_compact_contract_keys_are_complete(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(root, ["fleet worker scheduler retry"], source_commit=BASE)
+    assert set(result["contracts"]) == {
+        "FLEET_AGENT_REGISTRATION",
+        "FLEET_CAPACITY_SCHEDULING",
+        "FLEET_FAIRNESS",
+        "FLEET_FAULT_ISOLATION",
+        "FLEET_WORKER_REASSIGNMENT",
+        "FLEET_SCOPE_ISOLATION",
+        "FLEET_IDEMPOTENT_DISPATCH",
+        "FLEET_FAILURE_RECOVERY",
+    }
+
+
+def test_compact_result_has_no_source_archive(tmp_path):
+    root = make_repo(tmp_path)
+    result = build_compact_interface_map(root, ["fleet"], source_commit=BASE)
+    serialized = json.dumps(result)
+    assert "payload_b64" not in serialized
+    assert "tar.gz+base64" not in serialized
+
+
+def test_create_new_retries_discard_known_policy_reconciliation_marker(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    task_id = "r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime-20260817"
+    job_id = "job-74d0982f616a7f2653ef346144139044"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker, "STATE_ROOT", tmp_path / "worker-state")
+    state_path = worker.task_state_path(task_id)
+    state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    state_path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "task_id": task_id,
+                "execution_digest": "old-digest",
+                "phase": "reconciliation_required",
+                "attempt": 16,
+                "job_id": job_id,
+                "details": {
+                    "api_status": 503,
+                    "error": "SECRET_LIKE_PAYLOAD_REJECTED",
+                },
+            }
+        ),
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    assert worker.load_task_state(
+        task_id,
+        "new-digest",
+        attempt=18,
+        continuation_head_oid=None,
+        continuation_job_id=job_id,
+        commit_idempotency_key="r42-p2-compact-interface-map-runtime-commit-v1",
+    ) is None

tests/test_online_agent_durable_checkpoint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import json
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+APP=ROOT/"active-runtime/app"
+sys.path.insert(0,str(APP))
+
+from aios_online_agent_checkpoint import (
+    CheckpointBinding,
+    CheckpointError,
+    CheckpointStore,
+)
+import aios_online_agent_worker as worker
+
+
+def binding(attempt: int = 1, *, tenant_head: str = "b"*40):
+    return CheckpointBinding(
+        task_id="task-p1-a",
+        attempt=attempt,
+        execution_digest="d"*64,
+        job_id="job-p1-a",
+        repository="aios/aios",
+        base_oid="a"*40,
+        expected_branch_oid=tenant_head,
+        target_branch="agent/task-p1-a",
+        generation=1,
+    )
+
+
+def test_CHECKPOINT_DURABLE_WRITE(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    first=store.append(binding(), "claimed", {"phase":"claimed","attempt":1})
+    second=store.append(binding(), "workspace_prepared", {"phase":"workspace_prepared","attempt":1})
+    assert first["sequence"] == 1
+    assert second["sequence"] == 2
+    latest=store.latest("task-p1-a")
+    assert latest["phase"]=="workspace_prepared"
+    assert latest["payload"]["attempt"]==1
+
+
+def test_CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_ISOLATION(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    store.append(binding(), "claimed", {"phase":"claimed"})
+    changed=CheckpointBinding(
+        task_id="task-p1-a",attempt=1,execution_digest="d"*64,job_id="job-p1-a",
+        repository="aios/other",base_oid="a"*40,expected_branch_oid="b"*40,
+        target_branch="agent/task-p1-a",generation=1,
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(CheckpointError,match="CHECKPOINT_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        store.append(changed,"workspace_prepared",{"phase":"workspace_prepared"})
+
+
+def test_RESUME_FROM_CHECKPOINT_across_attempt_same_binding(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    store.append(binding(1), "source_capture_done", {
+        "phase":"source_capture_done",
+        "attempt":1,
+        "result":{"status":"SUCCEEDED","classification":"NEEDS_REWORK_SOURCE_CAPTURE"},
+    })
+    resumed=store.verify_latest_binding(binding(2))
+    assert resumed is not None
+    assert resumed["attempt"]==1
+    assert resumed["phase"]=="source_capture_done"
+
+
+def test_checkpoint_new_attempt_can_start_from_claimed(tmp_path):
+    store=CheckpointStore(tmp_path/"checkpoints.sqlite3")
+    store.append(binding(1),"result_submitted",{"phase":"result_submitted"})
+    cp=store.append(binding(2),"claimed",{"phase":"claimed"})
+    assert cp["attempt"]==2
+    assert cp["sequence"]==1
+
+
+def envelope():
+    return worker.ExecutionEnvelope(
+        task_id="task-p1-a",
+        job_id="job-p1-a",
+        repository="aios/aios",
+        base_oid="a"*40,
+        expected_branch_oid="b"*40,
+        target_branch="agent/task-p1-a",
+        branch_mode="CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+        generation=1,
+        idempotency_key="governed-p1-a",
+        action="source_capture",
+        adapter="source_capture",
+        capability_scope=("git.read","git.test"),
+        source_signals=(),
+        change_set=(),
+        verification=(),
+        governance={"task_id":"task-p1-a","job_id":"job-p1-a"},
+        workspace={},
+        digest="d"*64,
+    )
+
+
+def test_RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE_attempt_aware_key():
+    env=envelope()
+    result={"status":"SUCCEEDED","execution_digest":env.digest}
+    one=worker.result_idempotency_key(env.task_id,1,env,result)
+    two=worker.result_idempotency_key(env.task_id,2,env,result)
+    assert one != two
+    assert "-a1-result-" in one
+    assert "-a2-result-" in two
+    assert one == worker.result_idempotency_key(env.task_id,1,env,result)
+
+
+class RetryClient:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls=[]
+    def result(self,task_id,lease_token,key,result):
+        self.calls.append((task_id,key,dict(result)))
+        return (599,{"error":"SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE"}) if len(self.calls)==1 else (201,{"status":"VERIFYING"})
+    def get(self,task_id):
+        return 500,{}
+
+
+def test_RETRY_IDEMPOTENT_NO_DUPLICATE_SIDE_EFFECT_reuses_same_key(monkeypatch):
+    client=RetryClient()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker.time,"sleep",lambda _:None)
+    status,response=worker.submit_result_replay_safe(
+        client,"task-p1-a","lease-token-"+"x"*32,"stable-key",{"status":"SUCCEEDED"}
+    )
+    assert status==201
+    assert [item[1] for item in client.calls]==["stable-key","stable-key"]
+
+
+class ConflictClient:
+    def __init__(self,result):
+        self.result_value=result
+    def result(self,*args):
+        return 409,{"error":"IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"}
+    def get(self,task_id):
+        return 200,{"status":"VERIFYING","result":dict(self.result_value)}
+
+
+def test_RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE_reconciles_exact_result():
+    result={"status":"SUCCEEDED","value":1}
+    status,response=worker.submit_result_replay_safe(
+        ConflictClient(result),"task-p1-a","lease-token-"+"x"*32,"stable-key",result
+    )
+    assert status==200
+    assert response["idempotent"] is True
+    assert response["reconciled"] is True
+
+
+def test_RESULT_SUBMISSION_REPLAY_SAFE_rejects_conflicting_result():
+    status,response=worker.submit_result_replay_safe(
+        ConflictClient({"status":"SUCCEEDED","value":2}),
+        "task-p1-a","lease-token-"+"x"*32,"stable-key",
+        {"status":"SUCCEEDED","value":1},
+    )
+    assert status==409
+    assert response["error"]=="IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT"
+
+
+def test_WORKSPACE_CLEANUP_RECOVERY(tmp_path,monkeypatch):
+    root=tmp_path/"workspaces"; root.mkdir()
+    stale=root/"task-old"; stale.mkdir(); (stale/"x").write_text("x")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"WORKSPACE_ROOT",root)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"STATE_ROOT",tmp_path/"state")
+    removed=worker.recover_stale_workspaces()
+    assert removed==1
+    assert not stale.exists()
+
+
+class LeaseBridge:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls=0
+    def call(self,route,body):
+        assert route=="/v2/writer-lease"
+        self.calls+=1
+        if self.calls==1:
+            return 599,{"error":"SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE"}
+        return 200,{
+            "lease_id":"lease-p1-a",
+            "job_id":"job-p1-a",
+            "task_id":"task-p1-a",
+            "repository":"aios/aios",
+            "base_oid":"a"*40,
+            "expected_branch_oid":"b"*40,
+            "branch_mode":"CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+            "generation":1,
+            "target_branch":"agent/task-p1-a",
+            "state":"ACTIVE",
+        }
+
+
+class LeaseHeartbeatStub:
+    def ensure(self):
+        return None
+
+
+def test_LEASE_RENEWAL_RECOVERY_retries_same_binding(monkeypatch):
+    env=envelope()
+    env=worker.ExecutionEnvelope(
+        task_id=env.task_id,job_id=env.job_id,repository=env.repository,
+        base_oid=env.base_oid,expected_branch_oid=env.expected_branch_oid,
+        target_branch=env.target_branch,branch_mode=env.branch_mode,generation=env.generation,
+        idempotency_key=env.idempotency_key,action=env.action,adapter=env.adapter,
+        capability_scope=env.capability_scope,source_signals=env.source_signals,
+        change_set=env.change_set,verification=env.verification,
+        governance={"task_id":env.task_id,"job_id":env.job_id,"lease_seconds":900},
+        workspace=env.workspace,digest=env.digest,
+    )
+    bridge=LeaseBridge()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker.time,"sleep",lambda _:None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(worker,"STATE_ROOT",Path("/tmp")/"aios-p1-test-state")
+    response=worker.acquire_writer_lease_replay_safe(env,bridge,LeaseHeartbeatStub())
+    assert response["lease_id"]=="lease-p1-a"
+    assert bridge.calls==2

tests/test_online_agent_plan_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+import pytest
+
+ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/"active-runtime/app"))
+
+from aios_online_agent_execution import GovernedExecutionBinding
+from aios_online_agent_plan_store import ExecutionPlanStore, ExecutionPlanError
+
+BASE="a642b045775b9154a00ae78543037fbef4fb447b"
+HEAD="71523aef6e48b1e2fa516c456ca189b7a039104b"
+
+def binding(head=HEAD):
+    return GovernedExecutionBinding.from_mapping({
+      "task_id":"task-plan-a","job_id":"job-plan-a","repository":"aios/aios","base_oid":BASE,
+      "expected_branch_oid":head,"target_branch":"agent/task-plan-a","branch_mode":"CONTINUE_EXISTING",
+      "generation":1,"idempotency_key":"governed-plan-a",
+    })
+
+def request():
+    return {
+      "schema":"aios.online-agent.plan.v1","task_id":"task-plan-a","job_id":"job-plan-a",
+      "source_head_oid":HEAD,"generation":1,"idempotency_key":"plan-task-a-v1",
+      "execution":{
+        "action":"deterministic",
+        "change_set":[{"path":"x.py","operation":"write_file","content":"x=1\n"}],
+        "verification":[{"label":"compile","argv":["/usr/bin/python3","-m","py_compile","x.py"],"cwd":".","timeout_seconds":30}],
+        "capability_scope":["git.read","git.test"],
+      }
+    }
+
+def test_plan_register_and_resolve(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path)
+    created=store.register(binding(),request())
+    assert created["idempotent"] is False
+    resolved=store.resolve(binding())
+    assert resolved["plan_digest"]==created["plan_digest"]
+    assert resolved["execution"]["action"]=="deterministic"
+
+def test_plan_is_idempotent(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path); req=request()
+    first=store.register(binding(),req); second=store.register(binding(),req)
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    assert first["plan_digest"]==second["plan_digest"]
+
+def test_plan_source_head_drift_denied(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path); store.register(binding(),request())
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionPlanError,match="SOURCE_HEAD_DRIFT"):
+        store.resolve(binding("b"*40))
+
+def test_plan_replacement_requires_cas(tmp_path):
+    store=ExecutionPlanStore(tmp_path); first=store.register(binding(),request())
+    changed=request(); changed["idempotency_key"]="plan-task-a-v2"
+    changed["execution"]["change_set"][0]["content"]="x=2\n"
+    with pytest.raises(ExecutionPlanError,match="REPLACEMENT_CAS_MISMATCH"):
+        store.register(binding(),changed)
+    changed["expected_previous_plan_digest"]=first["plan_digest"]
+    second=store.register(binding(),changed)
+    assert second["plan_digest"]!=first["plan_digest"]

tests/test_openclaw_engineering_backend_v2.py

@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import importlib.util
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-import sys
-
-import pytest
-
-
-BACKEND_PATH = Path(__file__).parents[1] / "services" / "aios-agent-runtime-broker" / "openclaw_engineering_backend.py"
-
-
-def load_backend():
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("openclaw_backend_under_test", BACKEND_PATH)
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    assert spec.loader is not None
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    return module
-
-
-def fake_openclaw(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
-    path = tmp_path / "openclaw"
-    path.write_text(
-        """#!/usr/bin/env python3
-import json, os, pathlib, sys
-args = sys.argv[1:]
-assert args[:2] == ['agent', 'exec']
-def value(flag):
-    return args[args.index(flag) + 1]
-assert value('--message-file') == '-'
-cwd = pathlib.Path(value('--cwd'))
-assert cwd.resolve() == pathlib.Path.cwd().resolve()
-assert '--auth-env-only' in args
-assert '--json' in args
-assert os.environ.get('OPENCLAW_EXEC_SHELL_SNAPSHOT') == '0'
-assert 'AIOS_AGENT_TASK_TOKEN' not in os.environ
-prompt = sys.stdin.read()
-assert 'Do NOT run `git commit`' in prompt
-(cwd / 'changed_by_openclaw.txt').write_text('changed\\n', encoding='utf-8')
-json.dump({
-  'ok': True,
-  'status': 'ok',
-  'final': 'Changed the requested file and verified the result.',
-  'payloads': [{'text':'done'}],
-  'model': value('--model'),
-  'provider': 'test-provider',
-  'sessionId': 'test-session',
-  'assistantTurns': 2,
-  'codeModeEngaged': True,
-  'toolSummary': {'calls': 3, 'tools': ['read','write','exec'], 'totalToolTimeMs': 10}
-}, sys.stdout)
-""",
-        encoding="utf-8",
-    )
-    path.chmod(0o755)
-    return path
-
-
-def request(worktree: Path) -> dict[str, object]:
-    return {
-        "schema": "aios.online-agent.runtime-request.v1",
-        "adapter": "hermes",
-        "task": {
-            "task_id": "openclaw-backend-selftest",
-            "goal": "Make the requested change.",
-            "instructions": "Inspect, implement, and test.",
-            "success_criteria": ["The change is correct"],
-        },
-        "execution_context": {
-            "repository": "aios/aios",
-            "base_oid": "a" * 40,
-            "target_branch": "agent/intent/openclaw-backend-selftest",
-            "worktree": str(worktree),
-        },
-        "policy": {
-            "authoritative_repository_write": False,
-            "direct_git_ref_mutation": False,
-            "direct_git_push": False,
-            "direct_git_commit": False,
-            "main_write": False,
-            "force_push": False,
-            "production_write": False,
-            "tag_write": False,
-            "baseline_write": False,
-            "task_api_credential_visible": False,
-            "writer_lease_visible": False,
-        },
-    }
-
-
-def test_openclaw_agent_exec_contract(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
-    backend = load_backend()
-    worktree = tmp_path / "worktree"
-    worktree.mkdir()
-    fake = fake_openclaw(tmp_path)
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", str(fake))
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL", "test/model")
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_JSON", "{}")
-    fd = os.open(str(worktree), getattr(os, "O_PATH", os.O_RDONLY) | os.O_DIRECTORY)
-    try:
-        value = request(worktree)
-        value["execution_context"]["worktree"] = f"/proc/self/fd/{fd}"
-        task, pinned = backend.validate_request(value)
-        result = backend.invoke_openclaw(task, pinned)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-    assert result["status"] == "COMPLETED"
-    assert result["evidence"]["backend"] == "openclaw-agent-exec"
-    assert result["evidence"]["model"] == "test/model"
-    assert (worktree / "changed_by_openclaw.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "changed\n"
-
-
-def test_provider_credential_is_projected_only_to_openclaw_child(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
-    backend = load_backend()
-    credentials = tmp_path / "credentials"
-    credentials.mkdir()
-    (credentials / "openai_api_key").write_text("provider-secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    monkeypatch.setenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", str(credentials))
-    monkeypatch.setenv(
-        "AIOS_OPENCLAW_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_MAP_JSON",
-        json.dumps({"OPENAI_API_KEY": "openai_api_key"}),
-    )
-    env = backend.provider_environment()
-    assert env["OPENAI_API_KEY"] == "provider-secret"
-    assert "AIOS_AGENT_TASK_TOKEN" not in env
-    assert env["OPENCLAW_EXEC_SHELL_SNAPSHOT"] == "0"
-
-
-def test_missing_model_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch) -> None:
-    backend = load_backend()
-    worktree = tmp_path / "worktree"
-    worktree.mkdir()
-    monkeypatch.setenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", str(fake_openclaw(tmp_path)))
-    monkeypatch.delenv("AIOS_OPENCLAW_MODEL", raising=False)
-    fd = os.open(str(worktree), getattr(os, "O_PATH", os.O_RDONLY) | os.O_DIRECTORY)
-    try:
-        value = request(worktree)
-        value["execution_context"]["worktree"] = f"/proc/self/fd/{fd}"
-        task, pinned = backend.validate_request(value)
-        with pytest.raises(backend.BackendError) as caught:
-            backend.invoke_openclaw(task, pinned)
-    finally:
-        os.close(fd)
-    assert caught.value.code == "OPENCLAW_MODEL_INVALID"
-
-
-def test_pinned_worktree_is_required(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
-    backend = load_backend()
-    value = request(tmp_path)
-    value["execution_context"]["worktree"] = str(tmp_path)
-    with pytest.raises(backend.BackendError) as caught:
-        backend.validate_request(value)
-    assert caught.value.code == "PINNED_WORKTREE_REQUIRED"

tests/test_trace_tool_credential_governance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from active_runtime.app.aios_credential_broker import CredentialBroker
+from active_runtime.app.agent_observability_hooks import AgentObservabilityHooks
+from active_runtime.app.message_handoff import DurableHandoffStore, MessageEnvelope
+from active_runtime.app.search_gateway import (
+    SearchEvidence,
+    SearchGateway,
+    SearchProviderAttempt,
+    SearchRequest,
+)
+from active_runtime.app.search_gateway_orchestrator import SearchGatewayOrchestrator
+from active_runtime.app.trace_tool_credential_governance import (
+    CredentialGrant,
+    GovernanceActor,
+    GovernanceError,
+    GovernanceScope,
+    GovernanceStore,
+    ToolDescriptor,
+    TraceContext,
+    bind_trace_lineage,
+)
+
+
+TENANT_SCOPE = GovernanceScope(
+    "tenant",
+    tenant_id="tenant-a",
+    user_id="user-a",
+    project_id="project-a",
+    conversation_id="conversation-a",
+    run_id="run-a",
+)
+
+
+def actor(*capabilities: str, tenant_id: str = "tenant-a") -> GovernanceActor:
+    return GovernanceActor(
+        "actor-a",
+        GovernanceScope(
+            "tenant",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            user_id="user-a",
+            project_id="project-a",
+            conversation_id="conversation-a",
+            run_id="run-a",
+        ),
+        tuple(capabilities),
+    )
+
+
+def owner() -> GovernanceActor:
+    return GovernanceActor("owner-control", GovernanceScope("system"), ("system.admin",))
+
+
+def message(**changes):
+    values = dict(
+        source="task-plane",
+        target="worker-a",
+        message_type="tool.invoke",
+        payload={"query": "safe"},
+        sequence=1,
+        idempotency_key="message-a-1",
+        tenant_id="tenant-a",
+        user_id="user-a",
+        project_id="project-a",
+        conversation_id="conversation-a",
+        task_id="task-a",
+        run_id="run-a",
+        confidentiality_scope="run",
+    )
+    values.update(changes)
+    return MessageEnvelope(**values)
+
+
+def task(**changes):
+    value = {
+        "task_id": "task-a",
+        "claim_id": "claim-a",
+        "correlation_id": "correlation-a",
+        "scope_type": "tenant",
+        "tenant_id": "tenant-a",
+        "user_id": "user-a",
+        "project_id": "project-a",
+        "conversation_id": "conversation-a",
+        "run_id": "run-a",
+    }
+    value.update(changes)
+    return value
+
+
+def root_trace():
+    return bind_trace_lineage(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"),
+        task=task(),
+        message=message(),
+        trace_id="trace-a",
+        span_id="span-root",
+    )
+
+
+def test_trace_lineage_continuity_and_durable_restart(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    root = root_trace()
+    child = root.child(span_id="span-tool", actor=actor("tool.search"))
+    store.record_trace(root, actor("tool.search"))
+    store.record_trace(child, actor("tool.search"))
+
+    reopened = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    assert reopened.verify_audit_chain(("TRACE_RECORDED",))
+    assert child.trace_id == root.trace_id
+    assert child.parent_span_id == root.span_id
+    assert child.task_id == "task-a"
+    assert child.claim_id == "claim-a"
+
+
+def test_trace_lineage_continuity_rejects_task_change() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TRACE_LINEAGE_CONTINUITY"):
+        bind_trace_lineage(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"),
+            task=task(task_id="task-b"),
+            message=message(),
+            trace_id="trace-a",
+            span_id="span-root",
+        )
+
+
+def test_trace_scope_mismatch_deny() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TRACE_SCOPE_MISMATCH_DENY"):
+        bind_trace_lineage(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"),
+            task=task(),
+            message=message(tenant_id="tenant-b"),
+            trace_id="trace-a",
+            span_id="span-root",
+        )
+
+
+def test_message_correlation_is_identity_bound() -> None:
+    first = message(correlation_id="correlation-a")
+    second = message(correlation_id="correlation-b")
+    assert first.envelope_id != second.envelope_id
+    assert first.as_record()["correlation_id"] == "correlation-a"
+
+
+def test_message_handoff_legacy_schema_migrates_without_changing_id(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    import sqlite3
+
+    path = tmp_path / "legacy.sqlite3"
+    legacy = message()
+    record = legacy.as_record()
+    record.pop("correlation_id")
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.executescript(
+            """
+            CREATE TABLE message_handoff (
+              envelope_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, stream_key TEXT NOT NULL, source TEXT NOT NULL,
+              target TEXT NOT NULL, message_type TEXT NOT NULL, payload_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              payload_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL, tenant_id TEXT, user_id TEXT, project_id TEXT,
+              conversation_id TEXT, task_id TEXT, run_id TEXT, causation_id TEXT,
+              sequence INTEGER NOT NULL, capability_scope_json TEXT NOT NULL,
+              confidentiality_scope TEXT NOT NULL, idempotency_key TEXT NOT NULL,
+              expires_at TEXT, created_at TEXT NOT NULL, status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING',
+              delivered_at TEXT, acked_at TEXT,
+              UNIQUE(stream_key,idempotency_key), UNIQUE(stream_key,sequence)
+            );
+            """
+        )
+        columns = tuple(record)
+        connection.execute(
+            f"INSERT INTO message_handoff ({','.join(columns)}) VALUES ({','.join('?' for _ in columns)})",
+            tuple(record[name] for name in columns),
+        )
+    store = DurableHandoffStore(path)
+    loaded = store.get(
+        legacy.envelope_id,
+        actor={
+            "tenant_id": "tenant-a", "user_id": "user-a", "project_id": "project-a",
+            "conversation_id": "conversation-a", "run_id": "run-a",
+            "capabilities": [],
+        },
+    )
+    assert loaded.envelope_id == legacy.envelope_id
+    assert loaded.correlation_id is None
+
+
+def test_message_handoff_rejects_raw_credential_material(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY"):
+        message(payload={"value": "Bearer " + "x" * 24})
+    DurableHandoffStore(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3")
+    import sqlite3
+    with sqlite3.connect(tmp_path / "handoff.sqlite3") as connection:
+        assert connection.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM message_handoff").fetchone()[0] == 0
+
+
+def test_tool_mcp_authz_deny_and_scope_propagation(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor("mcp.search", "mcp", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",)),
+        owner(),
+    )
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY"):
+        store.authorize_tool(
+            actor=actor(), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+            requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+            invocation_key="invoke-deny-capability",
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_SCOPE_PROPAGATION"):
+        store.authorize_tool(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+            requested_scope=GovernanceScope("tenant", tenant_id="tenant-b"),
+            input_digest="a" * 64, invocation_key="invoke-deny-scope",
+        )
+
+    invocation = store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-search-a",
+    )
+    assert invocation["trace_id"] == "trace-a"
+    assert invocation["evidence"]["action"] == "TOOL_AUTHORIZED"
+
+
+def test_tool_requires_recorded_trace_and_receipt_is_idempotent(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor(
+            "mcp.search", "mcp", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",),
+            credential_ref="systemd-credential:search-provider-a",
+        ),
+        owner(),
+    )
+    trace = root_trace()
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY:trace"):
+        store.authorize_tool(
+            actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+            requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+            invocation_key="invoke-unrecorded",
+        )
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+    authorized = store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-replay-a",
+    )
+    assert authorized["credential_required"] is True
+    assert "credential_ref" not in authorized
+    receipt = store.record_tool_receipt(
+        invocation_key="invoke-replay-a", result_digest="b" * 64,
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), trace=trace,
+    )
+    assert receipt["status"] == "VERIFIED"
+    replay = store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-replay-a",
+    )
+    assert replay["idempotent"] is True
+    assert replay["receipt_sha256"] == "b" * 64
+    assert store.verify_audit_chain(
+        ("TRACE_RECORDED", "TOOL_AUTHORIZED", "TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED")
+    )
+
+
+def test_system_and_global_resources_do_not_use_fake_tenants(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="GOVERNANCE_NON_TENANT_SCOPE_INVALID"):
+        GovernanceScope("system", tenant_id="fake-tenant")
+
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    descriptor = ToolDescriptor("system.health", "tool", GovernanceScope("global"), ("system.admin",))
+    registered = store.register_tool(descriptor, owner())
+    assert registered["descriptor"]["scope_type"] == "global"
+    assert registered["descriptor"]["tenant_id"] is None
+
+
+def test_credential_scope_and_secret_exposure_deny(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    grant = CredentialGrant(
+        "grant-search-a",
+        "systemd-credential:search-provider-a",
+        TENANT_SCOPE,
+        ("search.invoke",),
+        task_id="task-a",
+        tool_name="mcp.search",
+        expires_at=(datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=5)).isoformat(),
+    )
+    stored = store.store_grant(grant, owner())
+    assert "secret" not in stored["grant"]
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY"):
+        store.authorize_credential(
+            grant_id=grant.grant_id,
+            actor=actor("tool.search", tenant_id="tenant-b"),
+            trace=trace,
+            operation="search.invoke",
+            task_id="task-a",
+            tool_name="mcp.search",
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY"):
+        CredentialGrant("grant-raw", "Bearer raw-secret", TENANT_SCOPE, ("search.invoke",))
+
+    authorized = store.authorize_credential(
+        grant_id=grant.grant_id,
+        actor=actor("tool.search"),
+        trace=trace,
+        operation="search.invoke",
+        task_id="task-a",
+        tool_name="mcp.search",
+    )
+    assert authorized["credential_ref"] == "systemd-credential:search-provider-a"
+    assert "credential_ref" not in authorized["evidence"]["details"]
+
+
+def test_audit_evidence_completeness_and_tamper_detection(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    path = tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3"
+    store = GovernanceStore(path)
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor("mcp.search", "mcp", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",)), owner()
+    )
+    store.authorize_tool(
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), tool_name="mcp.search", trace=trace,
+        requested_scope=TENANT_SCOPE, input_digest="a" * 64,
+        invocation_key="invoke-audit-a",
+    )
+    assert store.verify_audit_chain(("TRACE_RECORDED", "TOOL_REGISTERED", "TOOL_AUTHORIZED"))
+    assert not store.verify_audit_chain(("CREDENTIAL_AUTHORIZED",))
+
+    import sqlite3
+
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "UPDATE governance_audit_evidence SET outcome='DENY' WHERE sequence=1"
+        )
+    assert not GovernanceStore(path).verify_audit_chain()
+
+
+def test_observability_record_carries_governed_trace(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    from active_runtime.app.agent_observability_store import AgentObservabilityStore
+
+    hooks = AgentObservabilityHooks(AgentObservabilityStore(tmp_path / "observability"))
+    trace = root_trace()
+    started = hooks.start(
+        "user-a", "project-a", "openclaw",
+        actor=actor("tool.search"), trace=trace,
+    )
+    record = hooks.finish(started["execution_id"])["record"]
+    assert record["trace_id"] == "trace-a"
+    assert record["tenant_id"] == "tenant-a"
+    assert record["task_id"] == "task-a"
+    assert record["message_id"] == message().envelope_id
+
+
+def test_active_runtime_credential_broker_scope_and_raw_secret_deny() -> None:
+    class Provider:
+        def environment(self, lease):
+            return {"ACCESS_TOKEN": "raw-secret"}
+
+    broker = CredentialBroker(Provider())
+    lease = broker.issue(
+        task_id="task-a", repository="aios/aios", target_branch="agent/task-a",
+        generation=1, scopes=("tool.invoke",), scope_type="tenant",
+        tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a", project_id="project-a", run_id="run-a",
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="CREDENTIAL_SCOPE_DENY"):
+        broker.authorize(
+            lease["lease_id"], task_id="task-a", operation="tool.invoke",
+            scope_type="tenant", tenant_id="tenant-b", user_id="user-a",
+            project_id="project-a", run_id="run-a",
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="CREDENTIAL_SECRET_EXPOSURE_DENY"):
+        broker.authorize(
+            lease["lease_id"], task_id="task-a", operation="tool.invoke",
+            scope_type="tenant", tenant_id="tenant-a", user_id="user-a",
+            project_id="project-a", run_id="run-a",
+        )
+
+
+def test_search_gateway_uses_governed_tool_boundary(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    class Provider:
+        name = "official_site"
+        called = False
+
+        def search(self, request, queries):
+            self.called = True
+            return (
+                [SearchEvidence("Official", "https://example.test", self.name, "safe")],
+                SearchProviderAttempt(self.name, "ok", 1),
+            )
+
+    store = GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "governance.sqlite3")
+    store.register_tool(
+        ToolDescriptor("search.official_site", "tool", TENANT_SCOPE, ("tool.search",)),
+        owner(),
+    )
+    provider = Provider()
+    gateway = SearchGateway([provider], governance_store=store)
+    trace = root_trace()
+    store.record_trace(trace, actor("tool.search"))
+    response = gateway.search(
+        SearchRequest(
+            query="AIOS", requester="actor-a", correlation_id="trace-a",
+            authorized_sources=["official_site"],
+        ),
+        actor=actor("tool.search"),
+        trace=trace,
+    )
+    assert response.status == "found"
+    assert provider.called is True
+    assert store.verify_audit_chain(
+        ("TOOL_REGISTERED", "TRACE_RECORDED", "TOOL_AUTHORIZED", "TOOL_RESULT_VERIFIED")
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY"):
+        gateway.search(
+            SearchRequest(query="AIOS", requester="forged", correlation_id="trace-a"),
+            actor=actor("tool.search"),
+            trace=trace,
+        )
+
+
+def test_search_gateway_redacts_provider_exception() -> None:
+    class Provider:
+        name = "general_web"
+
+        def search(self, request, queries):
+            raise RuntimeError("Bearer should-not-leak")
+
+    response = SearchGateway([Provider()]).search(SearchRequest(query="AIOS", requester="legacy"))
+    assert response.attempts[0].reason == "PROVIDER_FAILURE"
+    assert "should-not-leak" not in str(response.to_dict())
+
+
+def test_search_runtime_default_path_requires_governance(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    orchestrator = SearchGatewayOrchestrator(
+        governance_store=GovernanceStore(tmp_path / "search-governance.sqlite3")
+    )
+    assert orchestrator.status()["governance"] == "required"
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="TOOL_MCP_AUTHZ_DENY"):
+        orchestrator.execute({"query": "AIOS", "requester": "actor-a"})
+
+
+def test_governance_newer_schema_fails_closed(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    import sqlite3
+    path = tmp_path / "newer.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(path) as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "CREATE TABLE governance_schema_metadata(singleton INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL)"
+        )
+        connection.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO governance_schema_metadata(singleton,schema_version) VALUES(1,999)"
+        )
+    with pytest.raises(GovernanceError, match="GOVERNANCE_SCHEMA_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED"):
+        GovernanceStore(path)
+
+
+def test_changed_production_files_have_no_embedded_secret_material() -> None:
+    import re
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    paths = (
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_event_bus.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_event_observability_bridge.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability_api.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability_hooks.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/agent_observability_store.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/aios_credential_broker.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/message_handoff.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_agent_adapter.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_gateway.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_gateway_api.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/search_gateway_orchestrator.py",
+        "active-runtime/app/trace_tool_credential_governance.py",
+    )
+    patterns = (
+        re.compile(r"BEGIN (?:RSA|OPENSSH|EC) PRIVATE KEY"),
+        re.compile(r"Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{24,}"),
+    )
+    hits = [path for path in paths for pattern in patterns if pattern.search((root / path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))]
+    assert hits == []

tests/test_writer_lease_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+import hashlib
+from dataclasses import asdict
+from pathlib import Path
+import sqlite3
+import json
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from aios_chatgpt_bridge_v2_server import GovernedRuntime
+from aios_continuation_executor import ContinuationPermissions, ContinuationRuntimeBinding
+from aios_continuation_lease import WriterLeaseRequestV2
+from aios_gitops_job_controller import GitOpsJobController, JobError, JobStore
+from aios_governed_task_bootstrap import GovernedTaskBootstrap
+
+
+TASK_ID = "gov-writer-lease-recovery-test"
+BRANCH = "agent/writer-lease-recovery-test"
+BASE = "a" * 40
+JOB_ID_PREFIX = "writer-lease-runtime-lineage"
+
+
+class LocalAuthority:
+    def __init__(self, head: str | None = None) -> None:
+        self.head = head
+
+    def read_ref(self, _ref: str) -> str | None:
+        return self.head
+
+    def commit_exists(self, _oid: str) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+    def ancestry_check(self, _older: str, _newer: str) -> bool:
+        return True
+
+
+def writer_request(task_id: str = TASK_ID, **overrides: object) -> dict[str, object]:
+    request: dict[str, object] = {
+        "schema": WriterLeaseRequestV2.schema,
+        "task_id": task_id,
+        "repository": "aios/aios",
+        "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+        "base_oid": BASE,
+        "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+        "target_branch": BRANCH,
+        "generation": 1,
+        "lease_seconds": 120,
+    }
+    request.update(overrides)
+    return request
+
+
+def make_runtime(tmp_path: Path, task_id: str = TASK_ID, *, authority_head: str | None = None) -> GovernedRuntime:
+    runtime = GovernedRuntime.__new__(GovernedRuntime)
+    runtime.config = SimpleNamespace(repository="aios/aios", state_root=tmp_path)
+    runtime.authority = LocalAuthority(authority_head)
+    runtime.bindings = {
+        task_id: {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "base_oid": BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+            "target_branch": BRANCH,
+            "branch_mode": "CREATE_NEW",
+            "generation": 1,
+        }
+    }
+    runtime.runtimes = {}
+    runtime.controllers = {}
+    runtime.bootstrap = GovernedTaskBootstrap(
+        runtime.authority,
+        tmp_path,
+        remote_name="test",
+        token_path=tmp_path / "token",
+        ssh_key_path=tmp_path / "key",
+    )
+    runtime.bindings = {}
+    runtime.create_task(
+        {
+            "task_id": task_id,
+            "repository": "aios/aios",
+            "base_oid": BASE,
+            "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+            "target_branch": BRANCH,
+            "risk": "engineering",
+            "description": "governed runtime lineage test",
+            "idempotency_key": JOB_ID_PREFIX + "-" + task_id,
+        }
+    )
+    job_root = runtime._job_root(task_id)
+    runtime.controllers[task_id] = GitOpsJobController(
+        JobStore(job_root, payload_root=job_root / "payloads")
+    )
+
+    def build(
+        lease: WriterLeaseRequestV2,
+        *,
+        job_id: str,
+        lease_not_before: datetime | None = None,
+        lease_expires_at: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> tuple[ContinuationRuntimeBinding, GitOpsJobController, object]:
+        controller = runtime.controllers.get(lease.task_id)
+        if controller is None:
+            root = runtime._job_root(lease.task_id)
+            controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads"))
+        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        return (
+            ContinuationRuntimeBinding(
+                request=lease,
+                job_id=job_id,
+                workspace_path=tmp_path / "worktrees" / lease.task_id,
+                lease_not_before=lease_not_before or now - timedelta(seconds=1),
+                lease_expires_at=lease_expires_at or now + timedelta(seconds=lease.lease_seconds),
+                original_receipt_valid=True,
+                original_grant_consumed=True,
+                permissions=ContinuationPermissions(),
+            ),
+            controller,
+            object(),
+        )
+
+    runtime._build_runtime = build
+    return runtime
+
+
+def create_durable_lease(
+    runtime: GovernedRuntime,
+    *,
+    expires_at: str = "2020-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
+) -> GitOpsJobController:
+    root = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID)
+    controller = GitOpsJobController(JobStore(root, payload_root=root / "payloads"))
+    receipt = SimpleNamespace(job_id=runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"])
+    controller.lease_job(
+        receipt.job_id,
+        lease_id="writer-lease-recovery",
+        lineage_anchor_oid=BASE,
+        current_head_oid=BASE,
+        generation=1,
+        lease_expires_at=expires_at,
+        expected_revision=0,
+    )
+    runtime.controllers[TASK_ID] = controller
+    return controller
+
+
+def durable_row(runtime: GovernedRuntime) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT lease_expires_at, revision FROM branch_leases WHERE lease_id=?",
+            ("writer-lease-recovery",),
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert row is not None
+    return row
+
+
+def test_first_bootstrap_refreshes_only_runtime_without_durable_lease(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    result = runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+
+    assert result["bootstrapped"] is True
+    assert result["runtime_rehydrated"] is False
+    assert result["durable_branch_lease_present"] is False
+    assert result["idempotent"] is False
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        assert connection.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM branch_leases").fetchone()[0] == 0
+
+
+def test_duplicate_bootstrap_is_idempotent_without_consuming_generation(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    first = runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+    second = runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+
+    assert first["bootstrapped"] is True
+    assert first["generation"] == 1
+    assert second["bootstrapped"] is False
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    assert second["generation"] == 1
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        assert connection.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM branch_leases").fetchone()[0] == 0
+
+
+def test_commit_after_bootstrap_reuses_the_exact_runtime_binding(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    class RecordingWorkspace:
+
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.files: dict[str, bytes] = {}
+
+        def materialize_files(self, files: dict[str, bytes]) -> None:
+            self.files = dict(files)
+
+    class RecordingExecutor:
+
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.workspace = RecordingWorkspace()
+            self.binding = None
+            self.commit = None
+
+        def execute(self, binding: object, commit: object) -> dict[str, object]:
+            self.binding = binding
+            self.commit = commit
+            return {'task_id': binding.request.task_id, 'generation': binding.request.generation, 'files': sorted(self.workspace.files)}
+    executor = RecordingExecutor()
+    original_build = runtime._build_runtime
+
+    def build(lease: WriterLeaseRequestV2, *, job_id: str, lease_not_before: datetime | None=None, lease_expires_at: datetime | None=None) -> tuple[ContinuationRuntimeBinding, GitOpsJobController, object]:
+        binding, controller, _ = original_build(lease, job_id=job_id, lease_not_before=lease_not_before, lease_expires_at=lease_expires_at)
+        return (binding, controller, executor)
+    runtime._build_runtime = build
+    runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+    lease_response = runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+    binding, controller, executor = runtime.runtimes[TASK_ID, 1]
+    assert lease_response['job_id'] == binding.job_id
+    assert lease_response['durable_branch_lease_present'] is True
+    _original_execute = executor.execute
+
+    def _execute_with_governed_commit_contract(*args, **kwargs):
+        _before_complete = kwargs.pop('before_complete', None)
+        _legacy = dict(_original_execute(*args, **kwargs))
+        _result = {**_legacy, 'job_id': binding.job_id, 'state': 'COMPLETED', 'side_effect_state': 'REMOTE_VERIFIED', 'receipt': {'authority_oid': 'b' * 40, 'git_remote_oid': 'b' * 40, 'api_branch_oid': 'b' * 40, 'commit_visible': True, 'remote_verified': True, 'force_push': False}}
+        if _before_complete is not None:
+            _before_complete('b' * 40)
+        return _result
+    executor.execute = _execute_with_governed_commit_contract
+    _bound_job_id = binding.job_id
+    result = runtime.commit_files({'task_id': TASK_ID, 'repository': 'aios/aios', 'generation': 1, 'target_branch': BRANCH, 'expected_branch_oid': BASE, 'idempotency_key': 'commit-after-bootstrap-v1', 'path': 'docs/recovery.txt', 'content_base64': 'YQ==', 'message': 'test commit after bootstrap'})
+    assert result['task_id'] == TASK_ID
+    assert result['generation'] == 1
+    assert result['files'] == ['docs/recovery.txt']
+    assert executor.binding.request.task_id == TASK_ID
+    assert executor.binding.request.generation == 1
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / 'state.sqlite3'
+    with sqlite3.connect(f'file:{database}?mode=ro', uri=True) as connection:
+        assert connection.execute('SELECT COUNT(*) FROM branch_leases').fetchone()[0] == 1
+        assert connection.execute('PRAGMA foreign_key_check(branch_leases)').fetchall() == []
+    assert result['commit_oid'] == 'b' * 40
+    assert result['commit_visible'] is True
+    assert result['branch_mode'] == 'CONTINUE_EXISTING'
+    assert result['target_branch'] == BRANCH
+    assert int(result['generation']) == 1
+    with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+        _persisted = connection.execute('SELECT current_head_oid,revision FROM branch_leases WHERE lease_id=?', ('lease-' + str(_bound_job_id),)).fetchone()
+    assert _persisted is not None
+    assert _persisted[0] == 'b' * 40
+    assert int(_persisted[1]) == 1
+    fresh_runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path, authority_head='b' * 40)
+    fresh_response = fresh_runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request(branch_mode='CONTINUE_EXISTING', expected_branch_oid='b' * 40))
+    fresh_binding, _, _ = fresh_runtime.runtimes[TASK_ID, 1]
+    assert fresh_response['job_id'] == str(_bound_job_id)
+    assert fresh_response['runtime_rehydrated'] is True
+    assert fresh_binding.job_id == str(_bound_job_id)
+    assert fresh_binding.request.expected_branch_oid == 'b' * 40
+    with fresh_runtime.controllers[TASK_ID].store._connect() as connection:
+        _fresh_lease = connection.execute('SELECT job_id,current_head_oid,revision FROM branch_leases WHERE lease_id=?', ('lease-' + str(_bound_job_id),)).fetchone()
+    assert tuple(_fresh_lease) == (str(_bound_job_id), 'b' * 40, 1)
+
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("field", "value", "error"),
+    (
+        ("repository", "other/repository", "LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        ("base_oid", "b" * 40, "LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        ("expected_branch_oid", "b" * 40, "LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        ("target_branch", "agent/wrong-target", "LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+        ("generation", 2, "GENERATION_BINDING_CONFLICT"),
+    ),
+)
+def test_bootstrap_rejects_any_nonmatching_binding_field(
+    tmp_path: Path, field: str, value: object, error: str
+) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=error):
+        runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request(**{field: value}))
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_rejects_unknown_task_ownership(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="TASK_OWNERSHIP_INVALID"):
+        runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request(task_id="unknown-task"))
+
+
+def test_renew_missing_durable_lease_is_not_bootstrap(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_NOT_FOUND"):
+        runtime.renew_writer_lease(writer_request())
+
+
+def test_renew_is_generation_scoped_before_durable_lookup(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    create_durable_lease(runtime)
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="GENERATION_BINDING_CONFLICT"):
+        runtime.renew_writer_lease(writer_request(generation=2))
+    assert durable_row(runtime) == ("2020-01-01T00:00:00+00:00", 0)
+
+
+def test_restart_rehydrates_only_from_matching_durable_lease(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    create_durable_lease(runtime)
+    runtime.runtimes.clear()
+
+    result = runtime.renew_writer_lease(writer_request())
+
+    expires_at, revision = durable_row(runtime)
+    assert result["recovered"] is True
+    assert result["runtime_rehydrated"] is True
+    assert result["durable_branch_lease_present"] is True
+    assert revision == 1
+    assert datetime.fromisoformat(expires_at) > datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def test_duplicate_renewal_is_idempotent_after_first_durable_recovery(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    create_durable_lease(runtime)
+
+    first = runtime.renew_writer_lease(writer_request())
+    second = runtime.renew_writer_lease(writer_request())
+
+    assert first["recovered"] is True
+    assert first["idempotent"] is False
+    assert second["recovered"] is False
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    assert durable_row(runtime)[1] == 1
+
+
+def test_update_lease_keeps_expiry_without_optional_argument_and_keeps_cas(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    controller = create_durable_lease(runtime)
+
+    controller.update_lease(
+        "writer-lease-recovery",
+        expected_revision=0,
+        current_head_oid=BASE,
+        generation=1,
+    )
+    assert durable_row(runtime) == ("2020-01-01T00:00:00+00:00", 1)
+    with pytest.raises(JobError, match="LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT"):
+        controller.update_lease(
+            "writer-lease-recovery",
+            expected_revision=0,
+            current_head_oid=BASE,
+            generation=1,
+        )
+
+
+def test_two_runtime_connections_resolve_renewal_cas_race_idempotently(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    first = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    first_controller = create_durable_lease(first)
+    second = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    second_controller = GitOpsJobController(
+        JobStore(second._job_root(TASK_ID), payload_root=second._job_root(TASK_ID) / "payloads")
+    )
+    second.controllers[TASK_ID] = second_controller
+    gate = threading.Barrier(2)
+
+    def gate_update(controller: GitOpsJobController) -> None:
+        original = controller.update_lease
+
+        def update(*args: object, **kwargs: object) -> None:
+            gate.wait(timeout=5)
+            original(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        controller.update_lease = update
+
+    gate_update(first_controller)
+    gate_update(second_controller)
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as pool:
+        results = list(pool.map(lambda runtime: runtime.renew_writer_lease(writer_request()), (first, second)))
+
+    assert sorted((item["recovered"], item["idempotent"]) for item in results) == [
+        (False, True),
+        (True, False),
+    ]
+    assert durable_row(first)[1] == 1
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_preserves_exact_governed_job_lineage(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+
+    response = runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+    binding, _, _ = runtime.runtimes[(TASK_ID, 1)]
+
+    assert response["job_id"] == expected_job_id
+    assert binding.job_id == expected_job_id
+    assert binding.request.job_id == expected_job_id
+
+
+def test_restart_rehydrate_preserves_exact_governed_job_lineage(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    first = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = first.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+    first.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    assert runtime is not first
+    assert runtime.runtimes == {}
+    response = runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+    binding, _, _ = runtime.runtimes[(TASK_ID, 1)]
+
+    assert response["job_id"] == expected_job_id
+    assert binding.job_id == expected_job_id
+    assert binding.request.job_id == expected_job_id
+
+
+def test_wrong_governed_job_id_is_denied_before_runtime_or_lease_side_effect(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"):
+        runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request(job_id="job-wrong-lineage"))
+
+    assert runtime.runtimes == {}
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        assert connection.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM branch_leases").fetchone()[0] == 0
+        assert connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_key_check(branch_leases)").fetchall() == []
+
+
+def test_acquire_creates_exact_governed_writer_lease_with_fk_and_cas(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+
+    response = runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+
+    assert response["job_id"] == expected_job_id
+    assert response["durable_branch_lease_present"] is True
+    assert response["idempotent"] is False
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        foreign_keys = connection.execute(
+            "PRAGMA foreign_key_list(branch_leases)"
+        ).fetchall()
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT job_id,branch,lineage_anchor_oid,current_head_oid,generation,state,revision "
+            "FROM branch_leases"
+        ).fetchone()
+        job = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT state,side_effect_state,revision FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?",
+            (expected_job_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert connection.execute("PRAGMA foreign_key_check(branch_leases)").fetchall() == []
+    assert any(
+        fk[2] == "jobs" and fk[3] == "job_id" and fk[4] == "job_id"
+        for fk in foreign_keys
+    )
+    assert row == (expected_job_id, BRANCH, BASE, BASE, 1, "ACTIVE", 0)
+    assert job == ("LEASED", "LEASED", 2)
+
+
+def test_duplicate_acquire_observes_same_durable_writer_lease(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+
+    first = runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+    second = runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+
+    assert first["job_id"] == expected_job_id
+    assert second["job_id"] == expected_job_id
+    assert second["idempotent"] is True
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        leases = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT lease_id,job_id,revision FROM branch_leases"
+        ).fetchall()
+        job = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT state,revision FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?",
+            (expected_job_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert leases == [("lease-" + expected_job_id, expected_job_id, 0)]
+    assert job == ("LEASED", 2)
+
+
+def test_wrong_job_acquire_is_denied_before_authorize_or_lease(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_BINDING_CONFLICT"):
+        runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request(job_id="job-wrong-lineage"))
+
+    database = runtime._job_root(TASK_ID) / "state.sqlite3"
+    with sqlite3.connect(f"file:{database}?mode=ro", uri=True) as connection:
+        job = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT state,side_effect_state,revision FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?",
+            (expected_job_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        lease_count = connection.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM branch_leases").fetchone()[0]
+    assert job == ("REQUESTED", "NONE", 0)
+    assert lease_count == 0
+
+
+def test_omitted_request_job_id_resolves_the_exact_durable_parent(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+    raw = dict(writer_request())
+
+    response = runtime.acquire_lease(raw)
+    binding, _, _ = runtime.runtimes[(TASK_ID, 1)]
+
+    assert response["job_id"] == expected_job_id
+    assert binding.job_id == expected_job_id
+    assert binding.request.job_id == expected_job_id
+
+
+def test_durable_job_expected_head_mismatch_is_denied(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    expected_job_id = runtime.bindings[TASK_ID]["job_id"]
+    controller = runtime.controllers[TASK_ID]
+    with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT request_json FROM jobs WHERE job_id=?", (expected_job_id,)
+        ).fetchone()
+        request = json.loads(row[0])
+        request["expected_branch_oid"] = "c" * 40
+        request["binding"]["expected_branch_oid"] = "c" * 40
+        connection.execute(
+            "UPDATE jobs SET request_json=? WHERE job_id=?",
+            (json.dumps(request, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")), expected_job_id),
+        )
+        connection.commit()
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="RUNTIME_GOVERNED_JOB_UNRESOLVED"):
+        runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+
+    assert runtime.runtimes == {}
+
+
+def _commit_ready_runtime(tmp_path: Path):
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    runtime.bootstrap_writer_lease(writer_request())
+    binding, controller, _ = runtime.runtimes[(TASK_ID, 1)]
+
+    class Workspace:
+        def materialize_files(self, _files):
+            return None
+
+    class Executor:
+        def __init__(self):
+            self.workspace = Workspace()
+            self.calls = 0
+
+        def execute(self, _binding, _commit, *, before_complete=None):
+            self.calls += 1
+            result = {
+                "job_id": binding.job_id,
+                "state": "COMPLETED",
+                "side_effect_state": "REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+                "receipt": {
+                    "authority_oid": "b" * 40,
+                    "git_remote_oid": "b" * 40,
+                    "api_branch_oid": "b" * 40,
+                    "commit_visible": True,
+                    "remote_verified": True,
+                    "force_push": False,
+                },
+            }
+            if before_complete is not None:
+                before_complete("b" * 40)
+            return result
+
+    executor = Executor()
+    runtime.runtimes[(TASK_ID, 1)] = (binding, controller, executor)
+    runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+    return runtime, binding, controller, executor
+
+
+def _commit_request():
+    return {
+        "task_id": TASK_ID,
+        "repository": "aios/aios",
+        "generation": 1,
+        "target_branch": BRANCH,
+        "expected_branch_oid": BASE,
+        "idempotency_key": "commit-cas-test-v1",
+        "path": "docs/cas.txt",
+        "content_base64": "YQ==",
+        "message": "test commit cas",
+    }
+
+
+def test_commit_lease_revision_cas_conflict_is_preserved(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime, _binding, controller, _executor = _commit_ready_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    def conflict(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        raise JobError("LEASE_REVISION_CAS_CONFLICT")
+
+    controller.update_lease = conflict
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_CAS_CONFLICT"):
+        runtime.commit_files(_commit_request())
+
+
+def test_commit_divergent_durable_head_fails_before_executor(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime, binding, controller, executor = _commit_ready_runtime(tmp_path)
+    controller.update_lease(
+        "lease-" + binding.job_id,
+        expected_revision=0,
+        current_head_oid="c" * 40,
+        generation=1,
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="LEASE_HEAD_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"):
+        runtime.commit_files(_commit_request())
+    assert executor.calls == 0
+
+
+def test_remote_pending_never_advances_durable_head(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime, binding, controller, executor = _commit_ready_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    def pending(_binding, _commit, **_kwargs):
+        executor.calls += 1
+        return {
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "state": "RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED",
+            "side_effect_state": "REMOTE_PUSH_PENDING",
+            "receipt": {
+                "authority_oid": "b" * 40,
+                "desired_remote_oid": "b" * 40,
+                "remote_verified": False,
+            },
+        }
+
+    executor.execute = pending
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"):
+        runtime.commit_files(_commit_request())
+    with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT current_head_oid,revision FROM branch_leases WHERE lease_id=?",
+            ("lease-" + binding.job_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert tuple(row) == (BASE, 0)
+
+
+def test_retry_accepts_exact_head_already_advanced_at_remote_verified_boundary(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime, binding, controller, executor = _commit_ready_runtime(tmp_path)
+    commit_oid = "b" * 40
+    controller.update_lease(
+        "lease-" + binding.job_id,
+        expected_revision=0,
+        current_head_oid=commit_oid,
+        generation=1,
+    )
+    receipt = {
+        "authority_oid": commit_oid,
+        "git_remote_oid": commit_oid,
+        "api_branch_oid": commit_oid,
+        "commit_visible": True,
+        "remote_verified": True,
+        "force_push": False,
+    }
+    with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+        connection.execute(
+            "UPDATE jobs SET state='REMOTE_VERIFIED',side_effect_state='REMOTE_VERIFIED',"
+            "receipt_json=? WHERE job_id=?",
+            (json.dumps(receipt, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")), binding.job_id),
+        )
+        connection.commit()
+
+    result = runtime.commit_files(_commit_request())
+
+    assert result["commit_oid"] == commit_oid
+    assert executor.calls == 1
+    with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT current_head_oid,revision FROM branch_leases WHERE lease_id=?",
+            ("lease-" + binding.job_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert tuple(row) == (commit_oid, 1)
+
+
+def test_completed_response_with_invalid_oid_uses_canonical_oid_error(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime, binding, controller, executor = _commit_ready_runtime(tmp_path)
+
+    def invalid_oid(_binding, _commit, **_kwargs):
+        executor.calls += 1
+        return {
+            "job_id": binding.job_id,
+            "state": "COMPLETED",
+            "side_effect_state": "REMOTE_VERIFIED",
+            "receipt": {
+                "authority_oid": "not-an-oid",
+                "commit_visible": True,
+                "remote_verified": True,
+            },
+        }
+
+    executor.execute = invalid_oid
+    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="GOVERNED_COMMIT_OID_INVALID"):
+        runtime.commit_files(_commit_request())
+    with controller.store._connect() as connection:
+        row = connection.execute(
+            "SELECT current_head_oid,revision FROM branch_leases WHERE lease_id=?",
+            ("lease-" + binding.job_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+    assert tuple(row) == (BASE, 0)
+
+
+def test_acquire_renews_an_expired_matching_durable_lease_with_revision_cas(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    runtime = make_runtime(tmp_path)
+    create_durable_lease(runtime)
+    runtime.runtimes.clear()
+
+    result = runtime.acquire_lease(writer_request())
+
+    expires_at, revision = durable_row(runtime)
+    assert result["recovered"] is True
+    assert result["runtime_rehydrated"] is False
+    assert result["durable_branch_lease_present"] is True
+    assert revision == 1
+    assert datetime.fromisoformat(expires_at) > datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def test_authority_recovers_only_clean_detached_single_attempt_worktree(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    import subprocess
+    from aios_authority_git_executor import AuthorityGitExecutor
+
+    bare = tmp_path / "authority.git"
+    seed = tmp_path / "seed"
+    subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", str(bare)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+    subprocess.run(["git", "init", str(seed)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+    (seed / "base.txt").write_text("base\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(seed), "add", "base.txt"], check=True)
+    subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", str(seed), "-c", "user.name=test", "-c", "user.email=test@example.invalid",
+         "commit", "-m", "base"], check=True, capture_output=True,
+    )
+    base = subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(seed), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
+    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(seed), "push", str(bare), "HEAD:refs/heads/main"], check=True, capture_output=True)
+    root = tmp_path / "worktrees"
+    authority = AuthorityGitExecutor(bare, root)
+    worktree = authority.create_detached_worktree(base, "task")
+    (worktree / "attempt.txt").write_text("attempt\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(worktree), "add", "attempt.txt"], check=True)
+    subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", str(worktree), "-c", "user.name=test", "-c", "user.email=test@example.invalid",
+         "commit", "-m", "failed attempt"], check=True, capture_output=True,
+    )
+    stale = subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(worktree), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
+
+    recovered = authority.recover_failed_detached_worktree_exact(
+        path=worktree,
+        expected_oid=base,
+        stale_oid=stale,
+        target_ref="refs/heads/agent/recovery-test",
+    )
+
+    assert recovered == stale
+    assert subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(worktree), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip() == base
+    assert subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(worktree), "symbolic-ref", "-q", "HEAD"]).returncode == 1
+    assert subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(worktree), "status", "--porcelain"], text=True) == ""