Compare commits
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 Codex
|
378cc4d56a | ||
|
Codex
|
9195470ceb | ||
|
Codex
|
cbe33ecab8 | ||
|
Codex
|
e3fc48e5b9 | ||
|
Codex
|
ed3bcf76c7 |
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
|
||||
"created_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
|
||||
"schema_version": 1,
|
||||
"state_writer": "openclaw",
|
||||
"work_units": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"fallback": "codex",
|
||||
"gate": "R0_RUNNER_LIVE_RECOVERY",
|
||||
"id": "R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER",
|
||||
"primary": "openclaw",
|
||||
"status": "READY",
|
||||
"track": "R_RUNNER"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"fallback": "codex",
|
||||
"gate": "P2_REAL_B3_EVIDENCE",
|
||||
"id": "P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE",
|
||||
"primary": "openclaw",
|
||||
"status": "READY",
|
||||
"track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"fallback": "openclaw",
|
||||
"gate": "P1_REPAIR3_CODE",
|
||||
"id": "P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK",
|
||||
"primary": "codex",
|
||||
"status": "READY",
|
||||
"track": "P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"adaptive_dispatch": {
|
||||
"codex_first": [
|
||||
"complex_code",
|
||||
"security_boundary",
|
||||
"architecture",
|
||||
"high_risk_review",
|
||||
"strong_model_materially_better"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"default_orchestrator": "openclaw",
|
||||
"dual_required": [
|
||||
"release_gate",
|
||||
"crypto_or_identity_change",
|
||||
"production_migration_or_rollback"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"max_attempts_per_work_unit": 2,
|
||||
"on_timeout": [
|
||||
"mark_TIMEOUT",
|
||||
"preserve_logs",
|
||||
"switch_agent"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"openclaw_first": [
|
||||
"quality_close",
|
||||
"large_or_repetitive",
|
||||
"long_running",
|
||||
"infra_or_git_inventory",
|
||||
"cost_sensitive"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"single_state_writer_lease_required": true,
|
||||
"strict_role_partition": false,
|
||||
"timeout_can_pass": false
|
||||
},
|
||||
"authoritative_state": {
|
||||
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
|
||||
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
|
||||
"baseline": "V1R4C6",
|
||||
"production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
|
||||
"release": "paused",
|
||||
"repair3": {
|
||||
"base": "8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575",
|
||||
"candidate": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
|
||||
"commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4",
|
||||
"exact4": "PASS",
|
||||
"result": "49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"runner": {
|
||||
"artifact_sha256": "85c472c05a1e55a5899b215d3cd41df53912787de529ac9cb3d5308da4158130",
|
||||
"commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
|
||||
"live": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
|
||||
"offline": "PASS",
|
||||
"result": "e789632e359e9232d8ae081e7c4f23ed7b615a9d"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"contract_id": "V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT",
|
||||
"facts_policy": {
|
||||
"accept": [
|
||||
"committed_git_tree",
|
||||
"full_oid",
|
||||
"worktree_bare_gitea_oid_match",
|
||||
"test_log_with_rc",
|
||||
"immutable_digest",
|
||||
"result_only_commit",
|
||||
"live_evidence"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"reject": [
|
||||
"verbal_claim",
|
||||
"readme_only",
|
||||
"local_only_commit",
|
||||
"environment_variable_as_secret_ref",
|
||||
"compile_only",
|
||||
"timeout_as_pass",
|
||||
"unrelated_repo",
|
||||
"fabricated_evidence"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"forbidden_git": [
|
||||
"reset",
|
||||
"amend",
|
||||
"rebase",
|
||||
"force_push",
|
||||
"direct_main_push",
|
||||
"direct_bare_ref_mutation",
|
||||
"unapproved_gitea_db_mutation",
|
||||
"reuse_accident_worktree",
|
||||
"delete_live_worktree_to_clear_collision"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"generated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00",
|
||||
"handoff": {
|
||||
"ack": "CONTRACT_ACK=<full_contract_commit_oid>",
|
||||
"advance": "independent_verification_required",
|
||||
"all_agents_match": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"join_gate": {
|
||||
"requires": [
|
||||
"RUNNER_RECOVERED",
|
||||
"B3_PASS",
|
||||
"B4_PASS",
|
||||
"INTEGRATION_PASS"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"model_policy": {
|
||||
"codex": "strongest_model_actually_available_in_runtime",
|
||||
"gpt_5_6": "use_only_if_exposed",
|
||||
"no_unverified_model_claims": true,
|
||||
"openclaw_default": "DeepSeek V4 Flash"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"owner_authorization": {
|
||||
"adaptive_agent_assignment_authorized": true,
|
||||
"agent_substitution_authorized": true,
|
||||
"autonomous_execution": true,
|
||||
"may_bypass_release_controls": false,
|
||||
"may_bypass_secret_controls": false,
|
||||
"may_fabricate_evidence": false,
|
||||
"user_step_by_step_confirmation_required": false
|
||||
},
|
||||
"release_gates": [
|
||||
"MAIN_MERGE",
|
||||
"STAGING_AND_CANARY",
|
||||
"PRODUCTION"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"schema_version": 3,
|
||||
"state_rules": [
|
||||
"tracks_run_parallel",
|
||||
"runner_block_does_not_block_offline_work_or_evidence_inventory",
|
||||
"join_requires_both_tracks",
|
||||
"failure_stops_dependents",
|
||||
"production_remains_V1R4C6_paused_until_production_pass"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"status": "ACTIVE",
|
||||
"tracks": {
|
||||
"P_PERSONAL_WEIXIN": {
|
||||
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
|
||||
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
|
||||
"parallel": true,
|
||||
"repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
|
||||
"repair3_commit": "e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"R_RUNNER": {
|
||||
"commit": "bbd27cf06acf1f589eef291eab54d4b127aa3aea",
|
||||
"current": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
|
||||
"fallback": "codex",
|
||||
"parallel": true,
|
||||
"primary": "openclaw",
|
||||
"required": [
|
||||
"artifact_verified",
|
||||
"approved_secret_provider_contract",
|
||||
"owner_probe_verified",
|
||||
"service_healthy",
|
||||
"heartbeat_healthy",
|
||||
"gateway_auth",
|
||||
"durable_task_create_read_cancel",
|
||||
"execution_channel",
|
||||
"live_rollback"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
authorization_id: TASK-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714
|
||||
task_id: TASK-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714
|
||||
executor: GPT_CODEX
|
||||
status: PASS
|
||||
started_at: 2026-07-14T02:24:00+08:00
|
||||
finished_at: 2026-07-14T02:27:46+08:00
|
||||
repository: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
|
||||
review_branch: review/codex/v2r1-runtime-integration-discovery-20260714
|
||||
review_worktree: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-runtime-integration-discovery-20260714
|
||||
result_commit: SELF
|
||||
result_commit_resolution: The containing commit is resolved by Git from the review branch because embedding its object ID would change the commit identity.
|
||||
parent_commit: 3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f
|
||||
source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
|
||||
gate1_commit: 7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e
|
||||
merge_base: 1a9cb9095e6e76c548c967e03cb7a3e47b85134b
|
||||
main_graph_commits: 21
|
||||
source_graph_commits: 44
|
||||
main_changed_paths: 16
|
||||
source_changed_paths: 42
|
||||
approved_replay_paths: 38
|
||||
excluded_source_paths: 4
|
||||
changed_path_overlap: 0
|
||||
workspace_clean_after_commit: true
|
||||
rollback_target: 3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f
|
||||
runtime_modified: false
|
||||
tests_modified: false
|
||||
main_modified: false
|
||||
tag_created: false
|
||||
baseline_modified: false
|
||||
service_modified: false
|
||||
deployment_performed: false
|
||||
force_push_used: false
|
||||
risk: HIGH
|
||||
recommendation: Proceed to a separately authorized P2 allowlist replay from exact main; keep tag, baseline, staging and deployment blocked until P4/P5 close every listed blocker.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# V2R1 Runtime Integration P1 Discovery Result
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
**PASS for discovery only.** The repository graph, path classifications, preservation boundary, exclusion boundary, and safe integration strategy are now explicit. This result does not authorize runtime integration or release activity.
|
||||
|
||||
## Authoritative identities
|
||||
|
||||
| Item | Verified value |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Current main | `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f` |
|
||||
| V2R1 source | `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` |
|
||||
| Gate1 PASS commit | `7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e` |
|
||||
| Merge base | `1a9cb9095e6e76c548c967e03cb7a3e47b85134b` |
|
||||
| Main graph | `21` commits / `16` changed paths |
|
||||
| Source graph | `44` commits / `42` changed paths |
|
||||
| Changed-path overlap | `0` |
|
||||
|
||||
Gate1 commit is a direct child of source and adds one OpenClaw report. Main already contains the identical accepted report blob `ff31f7ab603d7a7cd07319e6f8422ae464916179`. The Gate1 commit must not be merged again.
|
||||
|
||||
## Exact classification
|
||||
|
||||
### Preserve from main — 16 paths
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md
|
||||
deployments/V1R4C6/backup-result.md
|
||||
deployments/V1R4C6/deployment-result.md
|
||||
deployments/V1R4C6/preflight-result.md
|
||||
deployments/V1R4C6/rollback-result.md
|
||||
deployments/V1R4C6/verification-result.md
|
||||
docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md
|
||||
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-weixin-quoted-text-failclosed.md
|
||||
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-12-weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-design.md
|
||||
fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py
|
||||
fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py
|
||||
fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes.py
|
||||
patches/deploy_v1r4c6-production-20260711.branch.json
|
||||
tests/test_weixin_bigint_parser.py
|
||||
tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py
|
||||
tests/test_weixin_outbound_quote_timestamp.py
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Replay from source — 38 paths
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
.gitignore
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/audit.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/cell_manager.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/channel_adapter.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/cli.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/fleet.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_profile.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/identity.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/memory_scope.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/message_ledger.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/runtime.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/secret_scope.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/session_pool.py
|
||||
active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py
|
||||
agents/registry.yaml
|
||||
data/webops.sqlite3 [delete]
|
||||
deploy/v2r1/healthcheck.sh
|
||||
deploy/v2r1/install.sh
|
||||
deploy/v2r1/validate.sh
|
||||
docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md
|
||||
docs/architecture/AIOS_V1R5_to_V2R1_Migration_Plan.md
|
||||
docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md
|
||||
openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/index.js
|
||||
openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/policy.js
|
||||
openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json
|
||||
openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json
|
||||
release/v2r1c0-rc1/RELEASE.md
|
||||
tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_acceptance_manifest.md
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_hermes_contract.md
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py
|
||||
tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Exclude from source — 4 paths
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md
|
||||
.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713.md
|
||||
patches/release_v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712.branch.json
|
||||
release/v2r1c0-rc1/STATUS.md
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The task record contains the category-level counts, exact commit exclusions, and reason for every excluded class.
|
||||
|
||||
## Strategy and invariants
|
||||
|
||||
The approved future strategy is allowlist final-blob replay from source onto exact main. It intentionally avoids merging or cherry-picking historical evidence ancestry. Thirty-seven present paths are restored from source and the tracked `data/webops.sqlite3` path is explicitly deleted.
|
||||
|
||||
The future integration must preserve:
|
||||
|
||||
- exact first parent and rollback target `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`;
|
||||
- all 16 main-only paths above;
|
||||
- Gate1 evidence blob `ff31f7ab603d7a7cd07319e6f8422ae464916179`;
|
||||
- `VERSION` blob `dd4988511ee5957d599098408c89de0c8b758df9` (`V1R4C6`);
|
||||
- baseline registry blob `81b5bbe59397e01d7fff048a5a91c9636ee85696`;
|
||||
- no tag, baseline, service, deployment, or force-push mutation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Baseline and tag evidence
|
||||
|
||||
`V1R4C6` is annotated tag object `356a8a8c1860b94b7d61a456c29228c88e57d963`, peeled release commit `d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2`. The baseline registry pointer is `e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd`, while the current registry-containing commit is `031215916826f1f0700147242a77878b8514b719`. They are distinct identities. No `V2*` tag exists and P1 creates none.
|
||||
|
||||
## Conflict and workspace evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Current main contains six tracked conflict-marker lines in two files. Source contains zero, and the two corrected source blobs are in the replay allowlist. Final verification must still prove zero markers.
|
||||
|
||||
The canonical workspace had two unrelated untracked controller audit records during discovery. They were not cleaned or included. The P1 review branch uses a separate worktree created from exact main.
|
||||
|
||||
## Blockers
|
||||
|
||||
- Attachment-composition regression is not closed by candidate-bound evidence.
|
||||
- Node plugin tests are missing even though `npm test` references `test/*.test.js`.
|
||||
- Plugin versions differ: `2.1.0-rc.1` and `2.1.0-rc1`.
|
||||
- V2R1 install tooling hardcodes an old release branch.
|
||||
- RC1 `STATUS.md` is stale and excluded.
|
||||
- Static scripts do not prove a real OpenClaw runtime probe or rollback recovery.
|
||||
- Existing release automation masks failures and does not safely update the current baseline schema.
|
||||
|
||||
These blockers prevent release, tagging, baseline promotion, staging, and deployment. They do not invalidate the P1 discovery result.
|
||||
|
||||
## Disposition
|
||||
|
||||
P1 produces evidence only. A separately authorized P2 may implement the exact allowlist replay. P4/P5 must bind tests, security scans, attachment regression, Node plugin verification, real runtime inspection, and rollback evidence to the resulting immutable integration commit before any release action.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"b3": "BLOCKED_EVIDENCE_REQUIRED",
|
||||
"b4": "NOT_STARTED",
|
||||
"baseline": "V1R4C6",
|
||||
"contract_branch": "task/governance/v2r1-personal-weixin-production-contract-20260717",
|
||||
"contract_commit": "cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc",
|
||||
"dispatch_commit": null,
|
||||
"production_release": "NOT_STARTED",
|
||||
"release": "paused",
|
||||
"repair3": "PASS_CANDIDATE_PREPARED",
|
||||
"runner": "BLOCKED_GATEWAY_SECRET_REF_UNAVAILABLE",
|
||||
"schema_version": 1,
|
||||
"single_state_writer": "openclaw",
|
||||
"updated_at": "2026-07-17T14:13:38+00:00"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
# Codex V2R1 adaptive execution
|
||||
CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
|
||||
Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
|
||||
Execute P1-POST-CONTRACT-REACK now:
|
||||
- read-only verify Repair3 e110cda9968cadc5c7b7179ec5003b05aad11ce4
|
||||
- read-only verify RESULT 49a9c2e0cc898ecf2bbd45f454e007644d7f3045
|
||||
- verify lineage from 8d9c6da90fc8caa69b691d243c6fefb40b6b0575, exact4, tests, Gitleaks and RESULT-only scope
|
||||
- do not modify Repair3 code in this unit
|
||||
Act as fallback for OpenClaw only on timeout/unavailability. Use GPT-5.6 only if actually exposed; otherwise strongest visible model. Prefer OpenClaw when quality is comparable or volume is high; prefer Codex for complex/security-critical work.
|
||||
Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
|
||||
Report:
|
||||
CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=codex STATUS=<status> IMPLEMENTATION=<oid-or-NONE> RESULT=<oid-or-NONE> OID_MATCH=<YES-or-NO> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
|
||||
Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
|
||||
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
authorization_id: TASK-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714
|
||||
task_id: TASK-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714
|
||||
executor: GPT_CODEX
|
||||
status: DISCOVERY_COMPLETE
|
||||
started_at: 2026-07-14T02:24:00+08:00
|
||||
finished_at: 2026-07-14T02:27:46+08:00
|
||||
repository: /data/aios-gitops/workspace
|
||||
review_branch: review/codex/v2r1-runtime-integration-discovery-20260714
|
||||
review_worktree: /data/aios-gitops/worktrees/v2r1-runtime-integration-discovery-20260714
|
||||
main_commit: 3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f
|
||||
source_commit: 502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e
|
||||
gate1_commit: 7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e
|
||||
merge_base: 1a9cb9095e6e76c548c967e03cb7a3e47b85134b
|
||||
result_path: .agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714.md
|
||||
write_scope:
|
||||
- .agent/tasks/codex/TASK-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714.md
|
||||
- .agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-RUNTIME-INTEGRATION-P1-20260714.md
|
||||
forbidden_actions:
|
||||
- modify_runtime_or_tests
|
||||
- merge_or_push_main
|
||||
- create_or_move_tag
|
||||
- update_baseline
|
||||
- change_service_or_deploy
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# V2R1 Runtime Integration P1 Discovery Task
|
||||
|
||||
## Objective
|
||||
|
||||
Produce a reproducible, evidence-only discovery record for integrating the approved V2R1 source tree onto current main without importing divergent historical evidence ancestry. P1 does not implement the integration.
|
||||
|
||||
## Locked graph
|
||||
|
||||
- Authoritative main: `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f`.
|
||||
- Approved V2R1 source: `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e`.
|
||||
- Accepted Gate1 evidence commit: `7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e`.
|
||||
- Merge base: `1a9cb9095e6e76c548c967e03cb7a3e47b85134b`.
|
||||
- Main-only graph: `21` commits and `16` changed paths.
|
||||
- Source-only graph: `44` commits and `42` changed paths.
|
||||
- Main/source changed-path overlap: `0` paths.
|
||||
|
||||
## Main paths that must be preserved exactly — 16
|
||||
|
||||
1. `.agent/results/openclaw/RESULT-V2R1-G1-OPENCLAW-FINAL-EVIDENCE-20260714.md`
|
||||
2. `deployments/V1R4C6/backup-result.md`
|
||||
3. `deployments/V1R4C6/deployment-result.md`
|
||||
4. `deployments/V1R4C6/preflight-result.md`
|
||||
5. `deployments/V1R4C6/rollback-result.md`
|
||||
6. `deployments/V1R4C6/verification-result.md`
|
||||
7. `docs/incidents/WEIXIN_TEXT_IMAGE_CACHE_ISOLATION_20260711.md`
|
||||
8. `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-weixin-quoted-text-failclosed.md`
|
||||
9. `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-12-weixin-quoted-text-failclosed-design.md`
|
||||
10. `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_bigint.py`
|
||||
11. `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_hermes.py`
|
||||
12. `fixes/patch_openclaw_weixin_outbound_quotes.py`
|
||||
13. `patches/deploy_v1r4c6-production-20260711.branch.json`
|
||||
14. `tests/test_weixin_bigint_parser.py`
|
||||
15. `tests/test_weixin_image_followup_intent.py`
|
||||
16. `tests/test_weixin_outbound_quote_timestamp.py`
|
||||
|
||||
Additional immutable main invariants:
|
||||
|
||||
- `VERSION` remains `V1R4C6`, blob `dd4988511ee5957d599098408c89de0c8b758df9`.
|
||||
- `baseline/current.json` remains blob `81b5bbe59397e01d7fff048a5a91c9636ee85696`.
|
||||
- Accepted Gate1 evidence remains blob `ff31f7ab603d7a7cd07319e6f8422ae464916179`.
|
||||
- The future integration commit must have `3cf9958cb94614449e093639cbf902216d73447f` as its first-parent/rollback target.
|
||||
|
||||
## Approved source-tree allowlist — 38 paths
|
||||
|
||||
### Python V2R1 runtime — 15
|
||||
|
||||
1. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/audit.py`
|
||||
2. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/cell_manager.py`
|
||||
3. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/channel_adapter.py`
|
||||
4. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/cli.py`
|
||||
5. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/fleet.py`
|
||||
6. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_fabric.py`
|
||||
7. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/hermes_profile.py`
|
||||
8. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/identity.py`
|
||||
9. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/memory_scope.py`
|
||||
10. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/message_ledger.py`
|
||||
11. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/router.py`
|
||||
12. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/runtime.py`
|
||||
13. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/secret_scope.py`
|
||||
14. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/session_pool.py`
|
||||
15. `active-runtime/app/aios_v2r1/tenant_context.py`
|
||||
|
||||
### OpenClaw plugin — 4
|
||||
|
||||
1. `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/index.js`
|
||||
2. `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/dist/policy.js`
|
||||
3. `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/openclaw.plugin.json`
|
||||
4. `openclaw/plugins/aios-tenant-boundary/package.json`
|
||||
|
||||
### Tests and contracts — 9
|
||||
|
||||
1. `tests/integration/test_runtime_ingress_flow.py`
|
||||
2. `tests/v2r1/test_acceptance_manifest.md`
|
||||
3. `tests/v2r1/test_hermes_contract.md`
|
||||
4. `tests/v2r1/test_hermes_fabric.py`
|
||||
5. `tests/v2r1/test_message_ledger_append.py`
|
||||
6. `tests/v2r1/test_router_isolation.py`
|
||||
7. `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_identity_binding.py`
|
||||
8. `tests/v2r1/test_runtime_wiring.py`
|
||||
9. `tests/v2r1/test_tenant_context.py`
|
||||
|
||||
### Static deployment tooling — 3
|
||||
|
||||
1. `deploy/v2r1/healthcheck.sh`
|
||||
2. `deploy/v2r1/install.sh`
|
||||
3. `deploy/v2r1/validate.sh`
|
||||
|
||||
### Architecture and release documents — 4
|
||||
|
||||
1. `docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md`
|
||||
2. `docs/architecture/AIOS_V1R5_to_V2R1_Migration_Plan.md`
|
||||
3. `docs/architecture/AIOS_V2R1_OpenClaw_Tenant_Cell_Hermes_Shared_Agent_Fabric_Architecture.md`
|
||||
4. `release/v2r1c0-rc1/RELEASE.md`
|
||||
|
||||
### Cleanup and governance — 3
|
||||
|
||||
1. `.gitignore`
|
||||
2. `agents/registry.yaml`
|
||||
3. `data/webops.sqlite3` — explicit tracked-file deletion, not a restore operation.
|
||||
|
||||
The replay operation restores the `37` present paths from source and explicitly removes `data/webops.sqlite3`. No directory-wide restore is allowed outside this list.
|
||||
|
||||
## Excluded source paths — 4
|
||||
|
||||
1. `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-202607132000-CODEX.md` — historical branch evidence.
|
||||
2. `.agent/results/codex/RESULT-V2R1-G1-CODEX-CLEANUP-20260713.md` — historical branch evidence.
|
||||
3. `patches/release_v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712.branch.json` — stale branch-specific patch metadata.
|
||||
4. `release/v2r1c0-rc1/STATUS.md` — stale status: references tree `6569065` and contradicts later test/rollback evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Excluded commit ancestry
|
||||
|
||||
- Do not merge source commit ancestry and do not cherry-pick any of its `44` source-only commits. Replay only the approved final blobs.
|
||||
- Do not merge Gate1 commit `7f5d5d90b3111c35fb00044f385358f528e3344e`; main already contains its accepted evidence blob.
|
||||
- Do not replay result-only source commits `d6ba7e8fa859407ec55acf49b5468bba5eac96da`, `b9e1f9db66eb08282b7b690199e56461d28dd76d`, or `502ef30642597fb0b70b90ae2e8a0b6af217d80e` as commits.
|
||||
- Explicitly exclude rejected OpenClaw candidates `7a2f16ee72e944737a9f6995e511ef176413ae6b`, `b1d3439ee9e66b5eed1c94595a22bc630d893b6e`, `38320044b54c172c28877a81f291478267dd7b9e`, `7fd63b55f27b23658ea26e2a39d949c7b1e91dda`, and `71239b4d187e683e05fd22fc9d5df8ae324e3390`.
|
||||
- Prior Codex final-verification commit `0eebcf0b72f06c02205fdb6e300ceb5b3a5647a7` is not an integration input.
|
||||
|
||||
## Strategy decision
|
||||
|
||||
Use allowlist file replay from the immutable source tree, not a historical merge or commit-range cherry-pick. The two branches diverged for `21` and `44` commits after the merge base. Historical ancestry includes obsolete result reports and branch metadata, while main contains V1R4C6 incident fixes and the already accepted Gate1 evidence. Final-blob replay makes the intended runtime delta explicit and keeps those histories out of the future integration commit.
|
||||
|
||||
P2 must start from exact main, revalidate all refs, restore only the 37 present allowlist paths from source, remove the one tracked SQLite path, and stop if any additional path appears.
|
||||
|
||||
## Conflict preview
|
||||
|
||||
- Current main has `6` tracked conflict-marker lines across `agents/registry.yaml` and `docs/architecture/AIOS_AGENT_AUDIT_PLANE.md`.
|
||||
- Source has `0` tracked conflict-marker lines.
|
||||
- Both corrected source blobs are in the allowlist; the final tree must scan to zero markers.
|
||||
- The changed-path overlap between main and source deltas is zero, but this does not waive blob-preservation checks.
|
||||
|
||||
## Baseline and tag distinction
|
||||
|
||||
- Annotated tag object `356a8a8c1860b94b7d61a456c29228c88e57d963` is `V1R4C6` and peels to release commit `d8cf6058e99f5c7f2dfd2b45a406c0a7edf955b2`.
|
||||
- `baseline/current.json` records baseline registry pointer `e204a90398bf646d46245b3088226749fa056edd`; its latest modifying commit is `031215916826f1f0700147242a77878b8514b719`.
|
||||
- The tag object, peeled release commit, registry pointer, and registry-containing commit are separate audit identities.
|
||||
- No V2 tag exists. Future approved namespace is `refs/tags/V2R1C0`; P1 does not create it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Current workspace pollution
|
||||
|
||||
At discovery time, canonical workspace `/data/aios-gitops/workspace` contained two unrelated untracked controller records:
|
||||
|
||||
- `audit/controller-runs/c-1783966122.json`
|
||||
- `audit/controller-runs/c-1783966722.json`
|
||||
|
||||
They are excluded. All P1 writes occur in the isolated worktree, and no canonical workspace cleanup is authorized.
|
||||
|
||||
## Known blockers
|
||||
|
||||
1. Attachment-composition regression lacks a closed, candidate-bound regression result.
|
||||
2. Plugin `npm test` targets `test/*.test.js`, but source tracks no Node test files.
|
||||
3. Plugin package version `2.1.0-rc.1` differs from manifest version `2.1.0-rc1`.
|
||||
4. `deploy/v2r1/install.sh` hardcodes release branch `release/v2r1c0-tenant-cell-fabric-20260712`.
|
||||
5. `release/v2r1c0-rc1/STATUS.md` is stale and is excluded rather than silently rewritten.
|
||||
6. `validate.sh --install/--rollback` and `healthcheck.sh` do not prove a real OpenClaw runtime or rollback path.
|
||||
7. `scripts/release_version.sh` masks failures and does not match the active baseline registry schema; it must not be used.
|
||||
|
||||
## Exit criteria
|
||||
|
||||
P1 passes when the two evidence files are the only commit delta, the commit parent is exact main, the isolated worktree is clean after commit, and the review branch is pushed without force. Runtime integration, main update, tag, baseline promotion, and deployment remain separate blocked phases.
|
||||
+13
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
# OpenClaw V2R1 adaptive orchestration
|
||||
CONTRACT_ACK=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc
|
||||
Read `.agent/policies/V2R1-PERSONAL-WEIXIN-PRODUCTION-EXECUTION-CONTRACT.yaml`.
|
||||
You are default orchestrator and sole authoritative state writer.
|
||||
Execute immediately:
|
||||
1. R0-DISCOVER-SECRET-PROVIDER: discover approved provider metadata and owner-probe source without reading or outputting secrets. Environment variables alone are not approved secret refs.
|
||||
2. P2-INVENTORY-REAL-EVIDENCE: inventory approved restricted B3 evidence locations; validate existing facts; never synthesize evidence.
|
||||
3. Independently verify Codex results before advancing.
|
||||
Prefer OpenClaw for comparable-quality, large, repetitive, long-running, infrastructure and cost-sensitive work. Prefer Codex strongest actually available model for complex code, security boundaries, architecture and high-risk review. On timeout mark TIMEOUT and switch agent; never infer PASS.
|
||||
Forbidden: reset, amend, rebase, force push, direct main push, controller mutation, secret disclosure, fabricated evidence, skipped gates.
|
||||
Report:
|
||||
CONTRACT=cbe33ecab8e9794ba5f318bea43aeaf447a56fbc WORK_UNIT=<id> TRACK=<id> GATE=<id> AGENT=openclaw STATUS=<status> COMMIT=<oid-or-NONE> BLOCKER=<reason-or-NONE>
|
||||
Keep BASELINE=V1R4C6 RELEASE=paused PRODUCTION_RELEASE=NOT_STARTED until production gate passes.
|
||||
Executable
+652
@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Hardened WeChat outbound backend for AIOS.
|
||||
|
||||
Only the dedicated UCC adapter is a supported send backend. OpenClaw channel
|
||||
discovery is retained for diagnostics, but generic OpenClaw chat or agent
|
||||
delivery is never promoted to WeChat delivery.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import selectors
|
||||
import signal
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import urllib.error
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
import urllib.request
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
OPENCLAW_BIN = os.environ.get("AIOS_OPENCLAW_BIN", "openclaw")
|
||||
WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID", "")
|
||||
WECHAT_CHANNEL = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_CHANNEL", "")
|
||||
SEND_BACKEND = os.environ.get("AIOS_WECHAT_SEND_BACKEND", "")
|
||||
UCC_ADAPTER_URL = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18800")
|
||||
UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ADAPTER_TOKEN") or os.environ.get(
|
||||
"AIOS_WECHAT_QR_ADAPTER_TOKEN", ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
UCC_SEND_PATH = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send")
|
||||
_allowed_origins = os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS", "").strip()
|
||||
UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = tuple(
|
||||
origin.strip() for origin in _allowed_origins.split(",") if origin.strip()
|
||||
) or (
|
||||
"http://127.0.0.1:18800",
|
||||
"http://[::1]:18800",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
MAX_TARGET_BYTES = 512
|
||||
MAX_CONTENT_BYTES = 32 * 1024
|
||||
MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES = 512
|
||||
MAX_METADATA_BYTES = 8 * 1024
|
||||
MAX_METADATA_DEPTH = 32
|
||||
MAX_METADATA_NODES = 1024
|
||||
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
|
||||
MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES = 256
|
||||
_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
|
||||
_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
|
||||
_LEGACY_SEND_PATH = "/internal/channels/wechat/send"
|
||||
_SAFE_PATH = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9._~!$&'()*+,;=:@%/-]+$")
|
||||
_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS = 4
|
||||
_OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE = 124
|
||||
_OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE = 125
|
||||
_OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE = 126
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _bounded_timeout(value: str) -> int:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = int(value)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
|
||||
return min(max(parsed, 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = _bounded_timeout(os.environ.get("AIOS_UCC_WECHAT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "10"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BackendResult:
|
||||
def __init__(self, ok: bool, backend: str, status: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
self.ok = ok
|
||||
self.backend = backend
|
||||
self.status = status
|
||||
self.data = data
|
||||
|
||||
def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {"ok": self.ok, "backend": self.backend, "status": self.status, **self.data}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _BackendProtocolError(Exception):
|
||||
"""Internal marker whose details must never cross the module boundary."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _openclaw_base_args() -> List[str]:
|
||||
"""Return the OpenClaw 2026.6.11-compatible command prefix.
|
||||
|
||||
Gateway/auth global flags are not supported by the installed CLI and would
|
||||
also expose credentials through the process argument vector.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
return [OPENCLAW_BIN]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _terminate_process_tree(process: Any) -> None:
|
||||
if os.name == "posix":
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
process.wait(timeout=0.5)
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
time.sleep(0.05)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.killpg(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
process.wait(timeout=0.5)
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return
|
||||
if process.poll() is not None:
|
||||
return
|
||||
try:
|
||||
process.terminate()
|
||||
process.wait(timeout=1)
|
||||
return
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
process.kill()
|
||||
process.wait(timeout=1)
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _run_openclaw(
|
||||
args: List[str], timeout: int = 15
|
||||
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
|
||||
bounded_timeout = min(max(int(timeout), 1), _MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
|
||||
popen_options: Dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
"stderr": subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if os.name == "posix":
|
||||
popen_options["start_new_session"] = True
|
||||
elif hasattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP"):
|
||||
popen_options["creationflags"] = subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP
|
||||
try:
|
||||
process = subprocess.Popen(args, **popen_options)
|
||||
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
||||
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
|
||||
|
||||
selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
|
||||
streams = {"stdout": process.stdout, "stderr": process.stderr}
|
||||
buffers = {"stdout": bytearray(), "stderr": bytearray()}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for name, stream in streams.items():
|
||||
if stream is not None:
|
||||
selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
|
||||
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
||||
selector.close()
|
||||
_terminate_process_tree(process)
|
||||
for stream in streams.values():
|
||||
if stream is not None:
|
||||
stream.close()
|
||||
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
|
||||
|
||||
deadline = time.monotonic() + bounded_timeout
|
||||
total_bytes = 0
|
||||
return_code: Optional[int] = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
while selector.get_map():
|
||||
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
|
||||
if remaining <= 0:
|
||||
return_code = _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE
|
||||
break
|
||||
events = selector.select(min(remaining, 0.1))
|
||||
for key, _mask in events:
|
||||
allowance = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES - total_bytes
|
||||
try:
|
||||
chunk = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), min(8192, allowance + 1))
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return_code = _OPENCLAW_SPAWN_ERROR_RETURN_CODE
|
||||
break
|
||||
if not chunk:
|
||||
selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
|
||||
key.fileobj.close()
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if len(chunk) > allowance:
|
||||
return_code = _OPENCLAW_OUTPUT_LIMIT_RETURN_CODE
|
||||
break
|
||||
buffers[key.data].extend(chunk)
|
||||
total_bytes += len(chunk)
|
||||
if return_code is not None:
|
||||
break
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
selector.close()
|
||||
|
||||
if return_code is not None:
|
||||
_terminate_process_tree(process)
|
||||
for stream in streams.values():
|
||||
if stream is not None and not stream.closed:
|
||||
stream.close()
|
||||
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, return_code, "", "")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
completed_return_code = process.wait(timeout=1)
|
||||
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
||||
_terminate_process_tree(process)
|
||||
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, _OPENCLAW_TIMEOUT_RETURN_CODE, "", "")
|
||||
stdout = buffers["stdout"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
stderr = buffers["stderr"].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, completed_return_code, stdout, stderr)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _json_dict(text: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
value = json.loads(text or "{}")
|
||||
except (RecursionError, TypeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
return value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def discover_openclaw_wechat_channel() -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
"""Discover an explicitly typed WeChat/Weixin channel for diagnostics."""
|
||||
|
||||
if WECHAT_CHANNEL:
|
||||
return WECHAT_CHANNEL
|
||||
try:
|
||||
proc = _run_openclaw(_openclaw_base_args() + ["channels", "list", "--json"], timeout=15)
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if proc.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
data = _json_dict(proc.stdout[:MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES])
|
||||
candidates: List[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
def walk(value: Any) -> None:
|
||||
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
||||
name = value.get("name") or value.get("channel") or value.get("id")
|
||||
kind = value.get("type") or value.get("kind")
|
||||
if isinstance(name, str) and isinstance(kind, str):
|
||||
label = f"{name} {kind}".lower()
|
||||
if "wechat" in label or "weixin" in label:
|
||||
candidates.append(name)
|
||||
for child in value.values():
|
||||
walk(child)
|
||||
elif isinstance(value, list):
|
||||
for child in value:
|
||||
walk(child)
|
||||
|
||||
walk(data)
|
||||
return candidates[0] if candidates else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _auth_headers() -> Dict[str, str]:
|
||||
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}
|
||||
if UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN:
|
||||
headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN
|
||||
return headers
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_path(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
path = value if value.startswith("/") else "/" + value
|
||||
try:
|
||||
encoded_path = path.encode("utf-8")
|
||||
except UnicodeEncodeError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if len(encoded_path) > MAX_ENDPOINT_BYTES:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(path):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
decoded = path
|
||||
for _ in range(_MAX_PATH_DECODE_ROUNDS):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
next_decoded = urllib.parse.unquote_to_bytes(decoded).decode("utf-8")
|
||||
except UnicodeDecodeError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if next_decoded == decoded:
|
||||
break
|
||||
decoded = next_decoded
|
||||
if "%" in decoded or "\\" in decoded or "\x00" in decoded:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(decoded):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if any(segment in {".", ".."} for segment in decoded.split("/")):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _unique_paths(paths: List[str]) -> List[str]:
|
||||
out: List[str] = []
|
||||
for candidate in paths:
|
||||
path = _safe_path(candidate)
|
||||
if path and path not in out:
|
||||
out.append(path)
|
||||
if len(out) == 2:
|
||||
break
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _ucc_send_paths() -> List[str]:
|
||||
canonical = _safe_path(UCC_SEND_PATH) or "/api/internal/wechat/send"
|
||||
return _unique_paths([canonical, _LEGACY_SEND_PATH])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _canonical_origin(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value or len(value) > 2048:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if "\\" in value or any(ord(character) < 32 for character in value):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(value)
|
||||
port = parsed.port
|
||||
except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
|
||||
if scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in {"", "/"}:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
host = parsed.hostname.rstrip(".").encode("idna").decode("ascii").lower()
|
||||
except UnicodeError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not host:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if port is None:
|
||||
port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
|
||||
rendered_host = f"[{host}]" if ":" in host else host
|
||||
return f"{scheme}://{rendered_host}:{port}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _adapter_base_url() -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
origin = _canonical_origin(UCC_ADAPTER_URL)
|
||||
allowed = {
|
||||
canonical
|
||||
for canonical in (_canonical_origin(value) for value in UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS)
|
||||
if canonical
|
||||
}
|
||||
return origin if origin and origin in allowed else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _NoRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
|
||||
def redirect_request(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
req: Any,
|
||||
fp: Any,
|
||||
code: int,
|
||||
msg: str,
|
||||
headers: Any,
|
||||
newurl: str,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
del req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _open_no_redirect(request: urllib.request.Request, timeout: int) -> Any:
|
||||
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoRedirectHandler())
|
||||
return opener.open(request, timeout=timeout)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ucc_adapter_alive() -> bool:
|
||||
base_url = _adapter_base_url()
|
||||
if not base_url:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
||||
base_url + "/health", headers=_auth_headers(), method="GET"
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=min(5, REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)) as response:
|
||||
return 200 <= int(response.status) < 300
|
||||
except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def select_backend() -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
explicit = SEND_BACKEND.strip().lower()
|
||||
if explicit:
|
||||
if explicit == "ucc-adapter":
|
||||
return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "explicit"}
|
||||
return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "unsupported_backend"}
|
||||
if ucc_adapter_alive():
|
||||
return {"backend": "ucc-adapter", "reason": "ucc_adapter_alive"}
|
||||
return {"backend": "unavailable", "reason": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _post_ucc(path: str, payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> Tuple[int, Dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
base_url = _adapter_base_url()
|
||||
safe_path = _safe_path(path)
|
||||
if not base_url or not safe_path:
|
||||
raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid adapter endpoint")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
body = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
|
||||
raise _BackendProtocolError("invalid request payload") from exc
|
||||
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
||||
base_url + safe_path,
|
||||
data=body,
|
||||
headers=_auth_headers(),
|
||||
method="POST",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with _open_no_redirect(request, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response:
|
||||
raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
|
||||
if len(raw) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
|
||||
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response too large")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
text = raw.decode("utf-8")
|
||||
except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
|
||||
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response encoding invalid") from exc
|
||||
data = _json_dict(text)
|
||||
if not data:
|
||||
raise _BackendProtocolError("adapter response invalid")
|
||||
return int(response.status), data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _ucc_response_sent(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
|
||||
return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == "sent"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _ucc_result_is_ok(data: Dict[str, Any], dry_run: bool = False) -> bool:
|
||||
expected_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
|
||||
return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("ok") is True and data.get("status") == expected_status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _utf8_size(value: str) -> Optional[int]:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return len(value.encode("utf-8"))
|
||||
except UnicodeEncodeError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _valid_identifier(value: Any, required: bool = False) -> bool:
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if required and not value.strip():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not value:
|
||||
return not required
|
||||
if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
size = _utf8_size(value)
|
||||
return size is not None and size <= MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES and not any(
|
||||
ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_metadata(metadata: Any) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
nodes = 0
|
||||
stack: List[Tuple[Any, int]] = [(metadata, 0)]
|
||||
while stack:
|
||||
value, depth = stack.pop()
|
||||
nodes += 1
|
||||
if depth > MAX_METADATA_DEPTH or nodes > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
|
||||
return "input_too_large"
|
||||
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
||||
if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
|
||||
return "input_too_large"
|
||||
for key, child in value.items():
|
||||
if (
|
||||
not isinstance(key, str)
|
||||
or len(key) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES
|
||||
or _utf8_size(key) is None
|
||||
):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
stack.append((child, depth + 1))
|
||||
elif isinstance(value, list):
|
||||
if len(value) + nodes + len(stack) > MAX_METADATA_NODES:
|
||||
return "input_too_large"
|
||||
stack.extend((child, depth + 1) for child in value)
|
||||
elif isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
if len(value) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES:
|
||||
return "input_too_large"
|
||||
if _utf8_size(value) is None:
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
elif value is not None and not isinstance(value, (bool, int, float)):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
encoded = json.dumps(
|
||||
metadata,
|
||||
ensure_ascii=False,
|
||||
allow_nan=False,
|
||||
separators=(",", ":"),
|
||||
).encode("utf-8")
|
||||
except (RecursionError, TypeError, UnicodeEncodeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
return "input_too_large" if len(encoded) > MAX_METADATA_BYTES else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_payload(
|
||||
target: Any,
|
||||
content: Any,
|
||||
account_id: Any,
|
||||
message_id: Any,
|
||||
metadata: Any,
|
||||
dry_run: Any,
|
||||
) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
if not isinstance(target, str) or not isinstance(content, str):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
if not target.strip() or not content.strip() or not isinstance(dry_run, bool):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in target):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
if "\x00" in content or not _valid_identifier(account_id) or not _valid_identifier(message_id):
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
if len(target) > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or len(content) > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
|
||||
return "input_too_large"
|
||||
target_size = _utf8_size(target)
|
||||
content_size = _utf8_size(content)
|
||||
if target_size is None or content_size is None:
|
||||
return "invalid_input"
|
||||
if target_size > MAX_TARGET_BYTES or content_size > MAX_CONTENT_BYTES:
|
||||
return "input_too_large"
|
||||
return _validate_metadata(metadata)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_provider_message_id(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if len(value) > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
size = _utf8_size(value)
|
||||
if size is None or size > MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if any(ord(character) < 32 or ord(character) == 127 for character in value):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target: str,
|
||||
content: str,
|
||||
account_id: str = "",
|
||||
message_id: str = "",
|
||||
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
|
||||
dry_run: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> BackendResult:
|
||||
effective_account = account_id or WECHAT_ACCOUNT_ID
|
||||
effective_metadata: Any = {} if metadata is None else metadata
|
||||
error_code = _validate_payload(
|
||||
target,
|
||||
content,
|
||||
effective_account,
|
||||
message_id,
|
||||
effective_metadata,
|
||||
dry_run,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if error_code:
|
||||
return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", {"code": error_code})
|
||||
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"target": target,
|
||||
"content": content,
|
||||
"account_id": effective_account,
|
||||
"message_id": message_id,
|
||||
"metadata": effective_metadata,
|
||||
"dry_run": dry_run,
|
||||
}
|
||||
last_endpoint: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
for path in _ucc_send_paths():
|
||||
last_endpoint = path
|
||||
try:
|
||||
http_status, data = _post_ucc(path, payload)
|
||||
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
|
||||
if exc.code in {404, 405}:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
return BackendResult(
|
||||
False,
|
||||
"ucc-adapter",
|
||||
"failed",
|
||||
{"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": int(exc.code), "endpoint": path},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except (OSError, ValueError, urllib.error.URLError, _BackendProtocolError):
|
||||
return BackendResult(
|
||||
False,
|
||||
"ucc-adapter",
|
||||
"failed",
|
||||
{"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed without returning exception text, type, or chained cause.
|
||||
return BackendResult(
|
||||
False,
|
||||
"ucc-adapter",
|
||||
"failed",
|
||||
{"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable", "endpoint": path},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not (200 <= http_status < 300):
|
||||
return BackendResult(
|
||||
False,
|
||||
"ucc-adapter",
|
||||
"failed",
|
||||
{"code": "ucc_adapter_http_error", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not _ucc_result_is_ok(data, dry_run):
|
||||
return BackendResult(
|
||||
False,
|
||||
"ucc-adapter",
|
||||
"failed",
|
||||
{"code": "ucc_adapter_rejected", "http_status": http_status, "endpoint": path},
|
||||
)
|
||||
confirmed_status = "dry_run" if dry_run else "sent"
|
||||
result_data: Dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"code": confirmed_status,
|
||||
"http_status": http_status,
|
||||
"endpoint": path,
|
||||
}
|
||||
provider_message_id = _safe_provider_message_id(data.get("provider_message_id"))
|
||||
if provider_message_id:
|
||||
result_data["provider_message_id"] = provider_message_id
|
||||
return BackendResult(True, "ucc-adapter", confirmed_status, result_data)
|
||||
|
||||
data: Dict[str, Any] = {"code": "ucc_adapter_unavailable"}
|
||||
if last_endpoint:
|
||||
data["endpoint"] = last_endpoint
|
||||
return BackendResult(False, "ucc-adapter", "failed", data)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def send_openclaw_channel(
|
||||
target: str,
|
||||
content: str,
|
||||
account_id: str = "",
|
||||
message_id: str = "",
|
||||
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
|
||||
dry_run: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> BackendResult:
|
||||
del target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
|
||||
return BackendResult(
|
||||
False,
|
||||
"openclaw-channel",
|
||||
"failed",
|
||||
{"code": "unsupported_backend"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def send_message(
|
||||
target: str,
|
||||
content: str,
|
||||
account_id: str = "",
|
||||
message_id: str = "",
|
||||
metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
|
||||
dry_run: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
selected = select_backend()
|
||||
if selected.get("backend") == "ucc-adapter":
|
||||
return send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target, content, account_id, message_id, metadata, dry_run
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
code = "unsupported_backend" if selected.get("reason") == "unsupported_backend" else "wechat_outbound_backend_unavailable"
|
||||
return BackendResult(False, "unavailable", "failed", {"code": code}).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
print(json.dumps(select_backend(), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")))
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,20 @@
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import importlib.util
|
||||
import io
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import signal
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import urllib.error
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from types import SimpleNamespace
|
||||
from unittest import TestCase
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
from unittest.mock import Mock, call, patch
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
BACKEND_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "wechat_send_backend.py"
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +89,450 @@ class WechatSendBackendTests(TestCase):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(args[1]["content"], "hello")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(args[1]["dry_run"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ucc_auth_is_authorization_header_not_argv_or_output(self):
|
||||
secret = "ucc-super-secret-token"
|
||||
|
||||
class Response:
|
||||
status = 200
|
||||
|
||||
def __enter__(self):
|
||||
return self
|
||||
|
||||
def __exit__(self, *_args):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def read(self, _limit=-1):
|
||||
return b'{"ok":true,"status":"sent"}'
|
||||
|
||||
urlopen = Mock(return_value=Response())
|
||||
output = io.StringIO()
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", secret),
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", urlopen),
|
||||
redirect_stdout(output),
|
||||
redirect_stderr(output),
|
||||
):
|
||||
status, payload = self.backend._post_ucc(
|
||||
"/api/internal/wechat/send", {"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
request = urlopen.call_args.args[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), f"Bearer {secret}")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(status, 200)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(payload, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(secret, " ".join(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(secret, output.getvalue())
|
||||
self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(self.backend._openclaw_base_args()))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ucc_paths_are_canonical_first_unique_and_bounded(self):
|
||||
with patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"):
|
||||
paths = self.backend._ucc_send_paths()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(paths[0], "/api/internal/wechat/send")
|
||||
self.assertLessEqual(len(paths), 2)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(paths), len(set(paths)))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(all(path.startswith("/") for path in paths))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ucc_accepts_only_explicit_true_and_sent_when_not_dry_run(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(self.backend._ucc_response_sent({"ok": True, "status": "sent"}))
|
||||
for response in (
|
||||
{"ok": 1, "status": "sent"},
|
||||
{"ok": True, "status": "accepted"},
|
||||
{"ok": False, "status": "sent"},
|
||||
{"status": "sent"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.subTest(response=response):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self.backend._ucc_response_sent(response))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ambiguous_canonical_failures_never_fallback(self):
|
||||
secret = "raw-upstream-secret"
|
||||
failures = (
|
||||
TimeoutError(secret),
|
||||
ConnectionError(secret),
|
||||
self.backend._BackendProtocolError(secret),
|
||||
RuntimeError(secret),
|
||||
)
|
||||
for failure in failures:
|
||||
with self.subTest(failure=type(failure).__name__):
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=failure) as post,
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 1)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_only_explicit_http_404_or_405_uses_legacy_fallback(self):
|
||||
for http_status in (404, 405):
|
||||
with self.subTest(http_status=http_status):
|
||||
missing = urllib.error.HTTPError(
|
||||
"http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send",
|
||||
http_status,
|
||||
"not found",
|
||||
{},
|
||||
None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_SEND_PATH", "/api/internal/wechat/send"),
|
||||
patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"_post_ucc",
|
||||
side_effect=[missing, (200, {"ok": True, "status": "sent"})],
|
||||
) as post,
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["endpoint"], "/internal/channels/wechat/send")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(post.call_count, 2)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_not_found_http_error_never_falls_back(self):
|
||||
denied = urllib.error.HTTPError(
|
||||
"http://127.0.0.1/api/internal/wechat/send", 401, "denied", {}, None
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc", side_effect=denied) as post:
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="chat-001", content="hello").to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
|
||||
post.assert_called_once()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ucc_rejection_does_not_expose_raw_error_or_secret(self):
|
||||
secret = "provider-password=secret-value"
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"_post_ucc",
|
||||
return_value=(200, {"ok": False, "status": "failed", "error": secret}),
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello", message_id="msg-001"
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_rejected")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(secret, repr(result))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dry_run_requires_dry_run_status_and_never_reports_sent(self):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"_post_ucc",
|
||||
return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": "dry_run"}),
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=True
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["status"], "dry_run")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(result["status"], "sent")
|
||||
|
||||
for dry_run, upstream_status in ((True, "sent"), (False, "dry_run")):
|
||||
with self.subTest(dry_run=dry_run, upstream_status=upstream_status):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"_post_ucc",
|
||||
return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "status": upstream_status}),
|
||||
):
|
||||
rejected = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello", dry_run=dry_run
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(rejected["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rejected["status"], "failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_invalid_provider_message_id_never_reverses_confirmed_send(self):
|
||||
invalid_values = (
|
||||
"\ud800",
|
||||
"contains\x00control",
|
||||
"x" * (self.backend.MAX_IDENTIFIER_BYTES + 1),
|
||||
{"not": "a string"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
for provider_message_id in invalid_values:
|
||||
with self.subTest(value=repr(provider_message_id)[:40]):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"_post_ucc",
|
||||
return_value=(
|
||||
200,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"ok": True,
|
||||
"status": "sent",
|
||||
"provider_message_id": provider_message_id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello"
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["status"], "sent")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("provider_message_id", result)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_openclaw_2026_6_11_commands_have_no_unsupported_global_gateway(self):
|
||||
completed = SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout='{"channels": []}')
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "OPENCLAW_BIN", "/usr/local/bin/openclaw"),
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "_run_openclaw", return_value=completed) as run,
|
||||
):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(self.backend.discover_openclaw_wechat_channel())
|
||||
|
||||
command = run.call_args.args[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(command, ["/usr/local/bin/openclaw", "channels", "list", "--json"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse({"--gateway", "--token", "--password"} & set(command))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_openclaw_output_overflow_terminates_while_process_is_running(self):
|
||||
writer = (
|
||||
"import os,time;"
|
||||
f"os.write(1,b'x'*{self.backend.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 4096});"
|
||||
"time.sleep(10)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
started = time.monotonic()
|
||||
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw([sys.executable, "-c", writer], timeout=4)
|
||||
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertLess(elapsed, 2.0)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_openclaw_timeout_returns_failure_and_terminates_promptly(self):
|
||||
started = time.monotonic()
|
||||
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
|
||||
[sys.executable, "-c", "import time;time.sleep(10)"], timeout=1
|
||||
)
|
||||
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(completed.stdout, "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(completed.stderr, "")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_timeout_kills_inherited_pipe_descendant_after_parent_exits(self):
|
||||
if os.name != "posix" or not Path("/proc").is_dir():
|
||||
self.skipTest("POSIX process-group and procfs contract")
|
||||
|
||||
def process_is_running(pid):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
state = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text(encoding="utf-8").split()[2]
|
||||
except (FileNotFoundError, IndexError, OSError):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return state not in {"X", "Z"}
|
||||
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
|
||||
pid_path = Path(directory) / "descendant.pid"
|
||||
descendant = "import time;time.sleep(30)"
|
||||
launcher = (
|
||||
"import pathlib,subprocess,sys;"
|
||||
f"child=subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,'-c',{descendant!r}]);"
|
||||
f"pathlib.Path({str(pid_path)!r}).write_text(str(child.pid),encoding='utf-8')"
|
||||
)
|
||||
started = time.monotonic()
|
||||
completed = self.backend._run_openclaw(
|
||||
[sys.executable, "-c", launcher], timeout=1
|
||||
)
|
||||
elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
|
||||
self.assertTrue(pid_path.is_file())
|
||||
descendant_pid = int(pid_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
deadline = time.monotonic() + 2
|
||||
while process_is_running(descendant_pid) and time.monotonic() < deadline:
|
||||
time.sleep(0.02)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(process_is_running(descendant_pid))
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
if process_is_running(descendant_pid):
|
||||
os.kill(descendant_pid, signal.SIGKILL)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertLess(elapsed, 3.0)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(completed.returncode, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_process_tree_termination_uses_posix_process_group(self):
|
||||
if os.name != "posix":
|
||||
self.skipTest("POSIX process-group contract")
|
||||
|
||||
class Process:
|
||||
pid = 43210
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self.wait_count = 0
|
||||
|
||||
def poll(self):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
def wait(self, timeout):
|
||||
self.wait_count += 1
|
||||
if self.wait_count == 1:
|
||||
raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired(["openclaw"], timeout)
|
||||
return -signal.SIGKILL
|
||||
|
||||
process = Process()
|
||||
with patch.object(self.backend.os, "killpg") as killpg:
|
||||
self.backend._terminate_process_tree(process)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
killpg.call_args_list,
|
||||
[
|
||||
call(process.pid, signal.SIGTERM),
|
||||
call(process.pid, signal.SIGKILL),
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unsupported_and_generic_chat_backends_fail_closed(self):
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "SEND_BACKEND", "openclaw-chat"),
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "ucc_adapter_alive", return_value=False),
|
||||
):
|
||||
selected = self.backend.select_backend()
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_message(target="chat-001", content="hello")
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(selected["backend"], "unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(selected["reason"], "unsupported_backend")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "unsupported_backend")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_invalid_or_oversized_input_is_rejected_before_network(self):
|
||||
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
|
||||
empty = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(target="", content="hello").to_dict()
|
||||
oversized = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="x" * (self.backend.MAX_CONTENT_BYTES + 1)
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(empty["code"], "invalid_input")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(oversized["code"], "input_too_large")
|
||||
post.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unpaired_surrogate_inputs_fail_closed_before_network(self):
|
||||
cases = (
|
||||
{"target": "\ud800", "content": "hello"},
|
||||
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "\ud800"},
|
||||
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "account_id": "\ud800"},
|
||||
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "message_id": "\ud800"},
|
||||
{"target": "chat-001", "content": "hello", "metadata": {"bad": "\ud800"}},
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
|
||||
for kwargs in cases:
|
||||
with self.subTest(field=next(reversed(kwargs))):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(**kwargs).to_dict()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "invalid_input")
|
||||
post.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deeply_nested_metadata_is_bounded_before_network(self):
|
||||
metadata = {}
|
||||
for _ in range(1200):
|
||||
metadata = {"nested": metadata}
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(self.backend, "_post_ucc") as post:
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello", metadata=metadata
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "input_too_large")
|
||||
post.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_adapter_origin_must_be_allowlisted(self):
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://evil.example:8443"),
|
||||
patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
|
||||
("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
|
||||
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", "https://adapter.example:8443"),
|
||||
patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
|
||||
("https://adapter.example:8443",),
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
self.backend._adapter_base_url(), "https://adapter.example:8443"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_adapter_origin_rejects_scheme_userinfo_fragment_and_path(self):
|
||||
invalid_origins = (
|
||||
"ftp://127.0.0.1:18800",
|
||||
"http://user:password@127.0.0.1:18800",
|
||||
"http://127.0.0.1:18800#fragment",
|
||||
"http://127.0.0.1:18800/base-path",
|
||||
)
|
||||
for origin in invalid_origins:
|
||||
with self.subTest(origin=origin):
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_URL", origin),
|
||||
patch.object(
|
||||
self.backend,
|
||||
"UCC_ADAPTER_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
|
||||
("http://127.0.0.1:18800",),
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._adapter_base_url())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_adapter_path_rejects_decoded_traversal(self):
|
||||
for path in (
|
||||
"/api/%2e%2e/send",
|
||||
"/api/%2E%2E/send",
|
||||
"/api/%2525252e%2525252e/send",
|
||||
"/api/%252525252e%252525252e/send",
|
||||
"/api/../send",
|
||||
"/api/%zz/send",
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.subTest(path=path):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(self.backend._safe_path(path))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_adapter_path_keeps_intended_safe_canonical_paths(self):
|
||||
for path in (
|
||||
"/api/internal/wechat/send",
|
||||
"/internal/channels/wechat/send",
|
||||
"/api/%7Ehealth/status",
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.subTest(path=path):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(self.backend._safe_path(path), path)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redirects_are_refused_and_authorization_cannot_cross_origin(self):
|
||||
handler = self.backend._NoRedirectHandler()
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
handler.redirect_request(
|
||||
None,
|
||||
None,
|
||||
302,
|
||||
"redirect",
|
||||
{"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
|
||||
"https://evil.example/steal",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
redirected = urllib.error.HTTPError(
|
||||
"http://127.0.0.1:18800/api/internal/wechat/send",
|
||||
302,
|
||||
"redirect",
|
||||
{"Location": "https://evil.example/steal"},
|
||||
None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
with (
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "UCC_ADAPTER_TOKEN", "header-secret"),
|
||||
patch.object(self.backend, "_open_no_redirect", side_effect=redirected) as opened,
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = self.backend.send_ucc_adapter(
|
||||
target="chat-001", content="hello"
|
||||
).to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
request = opened.call_args.args[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlsplit(request.full_url).netloc, "127.0.0.1:18800")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(request.get_header("Authorization"), "Bearer header-secret")
|
||||
opened.assert_called_once()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["ok"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["code"], "ucc_adapter_http_error")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user